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Abstract 
There is a growing recognition that a better understanding of the heterogeneity of motives and 
determinants of labour market choices is needed to inform policies intended to redress current 
maldistribution of health workers, particularly in developing countries. 
This thesis explored the influence of altruism and other individual characteristics on nurses' job 
preferences in South Africa, to investigate the impact of potential policy interventions designed to 
attract nurses to under-served areas. Primary data collection was carried out with a sample of 
377 nurses. 
First, measures of altruism were constructed by playing the dictator game, a behavioural 
economic game. The nurses showed greater altruism than is usually seen in such experiments, 
suggesting that more altruistic individuals self-select into the nursing profession. Since actual 
choices could not be observed, a labelled choice experiment was then used to reproduce the job 
opportunities offered to nurses at the beginning of their career. In the analysis of nurses' job 
preferences, a positive correlation was found between pro-social values and preferences for 
public jobs, while individuals from rural backgrounds were more likely to prefer rural jobs. Another 
choice experiment was used to model the effects of potential policy levers to make rural public 
jobs more attractive. The analysis showed that packages including monetary incentives were 
often the most powerful, and it confirmed the preferences of nurses from rural backgrounds. 
Combining the two choice experiments, a Markov model was constructed to predict the long-term 
effects of different policies on nurses' distribution in the labour market. Building on these 
outcomes, a cost-effectiveness model compares the effectiveness of several intervention 
packages to attract nurses to rural areas. This analysis showed that monetary incentives are 
never cost-effective, unlike education opportunities and the selection of more individuals who 
were more likely to prefer rural areas, such as people of rural origins. 
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Chapter 1 · Introduction 
1.1. The human resources crisis in health systems 
Since the adoption in 2000 of the Millennium Development Goals, several initiatives and reports 
have focused on the critical role played by human resources in improving health system 
performance, and the challenges posed by the Human Resources (HR) crisis (WHO, 2000, Liese 
et al. , 2003, Joint Learning Initiative, 2004, WHO, 2006) . Health professionals are particularly 
scarce where they are mostly needed as evidenced at the global level in Figure 1.1, while at the 
country level, rural areas are predominantly affected (Dussault and Franceschini , 2006, Serneels 
et al., 2007). This issue is particularly acute for nurses, whose presence and role are underlined 
as critical for the good functioning of health systems in developing countries (Buchan and 
Caiman, 2004). 
Figure 1.1: The world redrawn according to nursing population density (top) and maternal 
mortality (bottom) 
Source: wvvw. worldmapper.org 
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The long-term supply of registered nurses in the labour market can be defined as the number of 
adequately trained nurses who are available to work as a nurse 1. In any labour market, this 
number is driven by several external factors. The capacity of the education system, specifically 
the number of training institutions and the size of the teaching faculty, is a key driving factor of the 
production of trained nurses, together with the length of time required to obtain a nursing degree. 
The number of trained nurses is also determined by factors influencing students' decisions to 
start training as nurses: level of tuition fees, and the anticipated return to nursing training 
compared to other training. Finally, exogenous factors such as the statutory age for retirement, 
the age distribution of the current nursing workforce, the mortality rate in the population of interest 
and migration patterns of workers are also responsible for the attrition of the available workforce 
in the long-run. 
In South Africa, where this thesis was undertaken, the current lack of nurses stems from a 
growing demand for nurses and failure of the supply of nurses to keep pace. 
The demand for nurses has been fuelled by the transformation of the public health system after 
the end of Apartheid in 1994, the continued growth of private hospital groups, and the growing 
health needs of a country with the highest number of HIV-infected people in the world2. 
Meanwhile, the long-term supply of nurses is insufficient to meet the demand for nurses, mainly 
due to the inadequate capacity of nursing training institutions (Coovadia et al., 2009), which have 
been unable to produce enough nurses to compensate the natural flow of leavers caused by an 
aging nursing workforce, high HIV prevalence and significant emigration of skilled workers since 
the end of Apartheid. Consequently, at least in the short-run before more nurses can be trained 
and made available, market clearing is not possible in the South African nursing labour market. 
Beyond this problem of human resources, public health goals in South Africa are threatened by 
two additional problems. First, the public sector suffers more acutely from staff shortages, with 
studies suggesting that less than 50% of nurses work in the public sector (Breier et al., 2009), 
whilst nearly 85% of the population uses this sector for hospital care and 80% for primary care 
(Chopra et al., 2009b). This situation compounds some socio-economic inequalities inherited 
from Apartheid, as it contributes to deteriorating working conditions and quality of care in health 
facilities used by the more disadvantaged groups. Second, there is evidence suggesting that the 
nursing shortage affects particularly rural and remote areas, as these rely exclusively on the 
presence of public providers (Coovadia et al., 2009). Although lack of detailed data prevents 
1 As opposed to the short-term labour supply, which pertains to the decisions made by existing (trained) nurses to 
participate or not in the labour market. 
2 All these factors are presented in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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measuring the problem adequately, official statistics show that nurse to population ratios are 
systematically lower in the more rural provinces (SANC, 2008). Since significant domestic public 
resources are devoted to health workers' salaries, this geographic unequal distribution of the 
workforce translates into inequitable benefits of public subsidies. Overall, these problems of 
maldistribution of the available nursing workforce in South Africa contribute directly and indirectly 
to fuel existing inequalities of access to basic health care and of health outcomes (Chopra et al., 
2009a). 
1.2. Uncovering nurses' preferences 
Although these HR issues are particularly critical, current policy debate rests on little evidence, in 
particular concerning the effects of policy interventions (Grobler et al., 2009). Despite this lack of 
evidence, the South African government has recently introduced two initiatives to attract and 
retain nurses in the public sector and in rural areas: a 24% salary increase was granted to nurses 
in 2007 (Department of Public Service and Administration, 2008), and a one-year compulsory 
service was introduced the same year. Qualitative evidence suggests that these two initiatives 
might not necessarily bring the desired effects (Breier et al., 2009): 
"In the focus group discussions with students conducted after the announcement of the 
OSD, we were disappointed to encounter the view that the salaries alone were insufficient 
to prevent students who already planned to emigrate from doing so." 
At the same time, there is a growing body of work underlying the complexity of the determinants 
of human behaviour and the possible role played by "intrinsic motivation" (Deci, 1971, Deci et al., 
1999) in contexts where economic incentives might not have the desired effect. In 1970, when 
Richard Titmuss argued that monetary compensation for donating blood might reduce the supply 
of blood donors (Titmuss, 1970), his views were met with scepticism among economists (Solow, 
1971, Arrow, 1972) whose theories had long placed material and financial interests at the centre 
of human motivation. However, in his 1759 Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith already 
presented human behaviours not only driven by self-interest, but also by "sympathy" towards 
others: 
"However selfish so ever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his 
nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary 
to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it." (Smith, 1759) 
These words echo those of South African nurses interviewed in a recent study (Breier et al., 
2009): 
"The reason why I chose nursing is just basically to make a difference .. .just to help 
people ... It should be a passion ... to be there for people in need." (p.87) 
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"After a long day, the patient just goes to you and says thank you', then you go home and 
you are happy." (p.110J 
"When the patient at the end of the day says thank you, [it] gives me a boost to come back 
tomorrow." (p. 11 OJ 
"A dedicated nurse is motivated by an intrinsic desire to help the sick and vulnerable and by 
the particular kind of professional but emotional intimacy and trust that develops between 
nurse and patient in the course of care." (p. 11 OJ 
"All you need is just a patient to come to you and say thank you." (p.110J 
"A student who had already been in nursing for 19 years spoke of nursing as a calling and 
said it takes a 'special' person to be a nurse: "No one can say I'm going to become a nurse 
because of the job or for money ... because there's no money in it .. .it's got to be a calling." 
(p.87J 
There is a growing recognition that a better understanding of the motives and determinants of 
health professionals' labour market choices is needed to design interventions aiming to redress 
the current maldistribution of staff (Vujicic and Zurn, 2006, Glassman et al., 2008). As explained 
earlier, the long-term nursing labour supply is mainly driven by exogenous factors or regulatory 
decisions, which are irrelevant to understand the dynamics that determine the distribution of 
nurses in the short run. To inform the design of interventions aiming to redress the inadequate 
distribution of nurses in South Africa, it is critical to understand better what drives the decisions 
made by nurses who are already in the labour market. This work therefore considers the short-
run supply of nurses, specifically the decisions of individuals who are already qualified as nurses 
and have to decide whether they want to work and for which employer. 
1.3. Outline of the thesis 
The objective of this thesis is to explore the influence of altruism and other individual 
characteristics on the job choices made by graduate nurses in South Africa, with a view to inform 
the design of policy interventions to attract nurses to under-served areas. 
The thesis starts with a review of the literature on the determinants of job choices and how the 
main issues have been tackled in the health care literature (Chapter 2). This review characterises 
how the labour economics literature explains the determinants of the labour supply decision. It 
then shows how recent developments in behavioural economics can provide a richer perspective 
on individuals' motives, and the review provides some evidence from other bodies of literature 
showing why such approach might be particularly relevant to health workers. This chapter also 
includes discussions of the types of policy interventions that have been implemented in 
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developed and developing countries to incentivise health workers, and discusses the limitations 
of evidence of their effectiveness. 
Building on findings from the literature, the following chapter develops a conceptual framework 
and associated empirical strategy (Chapter 3). The conceptual framework describes the possible 
elements affecting the decisions made by nurses on the labour market. It then depicts the 
expected effects of different incentives on these job choices. The empirical methods used to test 
these theoretical insights are then introduced. This includes a description of the data used in the 
study. 
Background information on South Africa is given in Chapter 4, with details on the health system in 
general, and the broad policy elements that can influence the choices made by nurses. 
Five results chapters follow (Chapters 5 to 9). Chapter 5 describes in detail the empirical 
approach adopted to measure nurses' altruism. It also explores the determinants of nurses' 
altruism, while contrasting the findings obtained with nursing and economic students. Chapter 6 
analyses the determinants of labour market nurses' choices in South Africa, using a discrete 
choice experiment designed to mimic the main choices faced by nurses. Chapter 7 assesses the 
relative impact of potential strategies to increase the uptake of rural posts by nurses, by means of 
another discrete choice experiment. It particularly explores the potential influence of altruism and 
other individual characteristics on the sensitivity to various incentives. Chapter 8 develops a 
model to model the short-term and long-term effects of HR policy interventions. Chapter 9 
determines the cost-effectiveness of the various policy interventions, and explores the impact of 
nurses' heterogeneity of motives on the government's optimal strategy. 
Finally, Chapter 10 brings together the main findings from the results chapters, considering them 
in relation to the literature and the conceptual framework. The methodological strengths and 
limitations of the thesis are also discussed. The chapter concludes by discussing policy 
implications, both for South Africa and for low and middle income countries, and areas for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2 · Literature Review 
This chapter reviews several bodies of literature deemed pertinent to the research topic. It starts 
with an overview of normative approaches developed in labour economics to explain workers' 
labour supply decisions, and that can inform a study of nurses' job choices. It continues with an 
overview of the empirical literature on the determinants of nurses' labour supply decisions. This is 
followed by a presentation of theoretical and empirical literature underlying the potential role of 
pro-social motives on individual decisions, and their relevance to nurses' work decisions. Finally, 
it provides a review of the strategies that have been used in developed and developing countries 
to influence the recruitment and retention of health workers, particularly in rural areas. 
2.1. Normative models of labour supply decisions 
Labour economics has been one of the most prolific fields in economics, and as a result there are 
virtually countless models developed to study labour market decisions. However, much of the 
labour economics literature is concerned with specific problems (e.g. explaining unemployment, 
or the impact of taxation on labour supply) which are not directly relevant to understanding the 
motives driving nurses' job preferences in this specific context. Therefore, this section only 
presents specific normative models that are relevant to understanding the choices made by 
nurses regarding their jobs. 
As outlined in the introduction, this work considers the short-term supply of nurses. First, this 
thesis is concerned with individual decisions made by nurses. Second, this work looks at job 
choices made by nursing students who have just completed their training; hence it does not 
consider decisions made by students to invest in nursing training. Consequently, the scope of this 
study excludes some areas that are important topics in the analysis of labour supply, but not 
pertinent to the specific problem considered here. 
2.1.1. Neoclassical framework 
The standard neoclassical approach to labour supply decisions is set in the context of a perfect 
labour market where jobs are homogenous and access to information is perfect. This framework 
posits that individuals make a trade-off between allocating their time to income-generating 
activities (work) and leisure. This allocation decision is informed by an indifference curve which 
indicates all the possible combinations of leisure and work that will give the individual a specific 
level of utility: 
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U = (H, L) 
where H is the number of hours worked which allow the worker to consume a certain amount of 
goods, determined by a given wage rate, and L is the leisure time. The indifference curve in 
Figure 2.1A represents the various combinations of leisure and work that maximises the utility of 
the worker, at a given wage rate (i.e. the slope of the budget constraint). In this framework, the 
quantity of labour supplied by an individual Hi is therefore exclusively determined by pecuniary 
considerations, which are the wage rate (W) offered and other possible non-labour income 1 (e.g. 
non-wage income and spouse's income) that may enter in the budget constraint. A key corollary 
of this approach is that workers' utility from working can be written as: 
UL = (HL, WL) (1) 
where 8U/8H<O and 8U/8w>O. 
For a higher salary rate, the worker is able to consume more goods for a reduced number of 
hours worked (income effect). Yet as the wage rate rises, the worker will substitute work for 
leisure, to increase his income as the opportunity cost of leisure has increased (substitution 
effect). As long as the substitution effect is greater than the income effect (as long as H < H*), 
work is an increasing function of wage, and the labour supply curve is upward sloping to the right 
(see Figure 2.1 B). 
Figure 2.1: The neoclassical framework of labour supply 
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By the importance given to income and earnings-related incentives, this standard approach to 
labour supply decisions concludes that individuals choosing between different jobs compare the 
wages offered in each job (thanks to perfect information on the job opportunities on the labour 
market), and take the one that offers the higher wage rate. Consequently, the labour supply 
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facing a firm seeking to employ workers is perfectly elastic (any attempt by an employer to cut 
wages will cause all existing workers to leave the employer instantaneously). This ultimately 
implies that there is a single wage in the economy for similar jobs. 
Following the same framework, the occupational choice model considers that the decision to 
migrate is made as a result of the optimisation between job opportunities at home and better job 
opportunities overseas. That comparison accounts for the employment probabilities in their home 
country vs. the destination country. For example, nurses coming from countries where there is 
unemployment in the nursing labour market will tend to migrate to countries where there is a 
shortage of nurses, therefore improving their chances of finding a job (or their income for those 
who are employed, as countries with a shortage will, ceteris paribus, offer relatively higher 
wages). 
2.1.2. Heterogeneity of jobs 
The predictions of the neoclassical models are contradicted by much empirical evidence,. In 
particular, in many labour markets, including the nursing labour markets, a wide distribution of 
wages for comparable jobs can be observed. This is the reason why most of the developments in 
labour economics have tried to enrich this simplistic approach. The models presented below all 
seek to explain this wage dispersion, and in doing so they also provide new insights into the 
determinants of workers' supply decisions. 
A. Human capital and job choices 
Human capital refers to the knowledge and skills of an individual that allow him/her to perform 
his/her work adequately. Investment in human capital (through studies) leads to the accumulation 
of different skills, which in turn determine labour productivity, hence explaining the differences in 
salaries observed (Mincer, 1958). This model of investment in human capital developed by 
Becker to model the training decisions made by individuals (Becker, 1962), was extended by 
Ben-Porath to post-school accumulation of human capital (Ben-Porath, 1967). His model 
introduced the idea that workers could accumulate human capital throughout their working life, in 
particular through on-the-job learning. 
Applied to the particular question of job choices, this model provides a refined perspective 
compared to the neoclassical approach. In the latter, individuals who have two job opportunities 
would systematically take the one with the better salary. In the perspective of a human capital 
model, individuals might choose a job with a lower salary if they anticipate that the human capital 
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they will be able to accumulate with this job will increase their expected financial flows over their 
entire career. 
This perspective is potentially relevant for the study of nurses' job choices, as different nursing 
posts might give access to varying opportunities for on-the-job training or continuing education 
programmes. For example, some positions in the public sector might give access to privileged 
training opportunities, such as the possibility to upgrade one's skills or to follow a course of 
subsidised specialised training. 
B. Compensating wage differentials 
Initially formulated by Adam Smith, the theory of compensating wage differentials provides 
another explanation for the wage differences that can be observed for comparable jobs (Smith, 
1776). The starting point is that jobs are not really identical and usually differ in the working and 
living conditions they offer to workers: 
"The wages of labour vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, the 
honourableness or dishonourableness of the employment. Thus in most places, a 
journeyman tailor earns Jess than a journeyman weaver. His work is much easier. A 
journeyman weaver earns less than a journeyman smith, His work is not always easier by 
it is much cleaner( .. .). The most detestable of all employments, that of public executioner, 
is, in proportion to the quantity of work done, better paid than any common trade 
whatever''. Book I, Chapter X, Part one - Inequalities arising from the Nature of the 
Employments themselves (Smith, 1776) 
Formalising the intuitions of Smith, Rosen showed that perfect labour markets ensure that net 
advantages of jobs must be equalised (Rosen, 1974, Rosen, 1986). This means that the wages 
proposed for a particular job will depend on two sets of job characteristics, desirable (Y) and 
undesirable {Z) ones: 
W= f(Y, Z) 
The theory of compensating wage differential predicts that 8w /BZ>O, and conversely 
8w jaY <0. This means for example that higher salaries are expected for areas where the cost of 
living is higher or for jobs with poor working conditions (disagreeability of working conditions, 
physical risks, emotional stress, etc.). Conversely, employers who provide good working 
conditions in urban centres where workers can enjoy a lot of amenities can propose lower wages. 
This model also provides a theoretical justification for the wage gap sometimes observed 
between private and public jobs. Assuming that these two types of jobs only differ in their fringe 
benefits and stability (public employment providing job security and access to less costly pension 
plans), workers might accept lower wages in the public sector. 
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The compensating wage differential approach departs from the neoclassical framework in that it 
suggests that workers will not only consider salaries (in which case they would not mind the 
differences in other work aspects). This model therefore assumes that workers make their 
choices based on various job characteristics. Stated differently, workers not only compare the 
wages paid when making their decisions, but also take into account the utility of the alternative 
jobs, which is determined by different attributes. The utility derived from working can therefore be 
modelled as: 
2.1.3. Heterogeneity of workers 
In the neoclassical model, one of the assumptions is that workers are homogenous in their 
abilities and preferences. The human capital model already introduced the possibility of 
heterogeneous agents, with different skills. Other normative models have made a similar 
assumption and examined the consequences of this diversity for occupational choices. This 
section presents some of these models and explains their possible relevance for nurses' career 
choices. 
A. Heterogeneity in productivity and self-selection models 
Some economists have explained the choices made between two types of professions or careers 
as the result of self-selection processes, rationally made by the individuals themselves, aware of 
their skills and comparative advantages. The seminal selection model developed by Roy provides 
a framework for analysing the impact of heterogeneity of workers' skills or comparative 
advantages (Roy, 1951). In practical terms, this model provides some theoretical basis for 
understanding that individuals gain by choosing the job that better fits their range of talents and 
skills. 
The Roy model assumes that there are two types of workers, who differ in their skill endowment 
(they have a mix of two skills, 1 and 2). Workers are aware of the relative advantages their skill 
endowment provides them with regards to the returns they can expect in two sectors, A and B. 
(see Figure 2.2). In each sector, only one of their skills can be used at a time. 
The model shows that workers automatically self-select rationally and choose the occupation that 
maximises their pecuniary returns. Workers with a comparatively higher endowment in skill 1 will 
choose sector B and workers with a higher endowment in skill 2 will choose sector A. In a 
perfectly competitive framework, the allocation of workers to the two types of employers is 
efficient in the sense that it maximises the total value of labour's product and income. 
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Figure 2.2: Comparative advantages in the Roy model 
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The framework provided by Roy has been widely applied to a wide range of self-selection 
processes: occupational choice (Dolton et al., 1989), female labour market participation 
(Heckman, 1974), the choice of industry (Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985), decisions to become an 
entrepreneur (Bianchflower et al., 2001, Lazear, 2005), or working for the public or private sector 
(Blank, 1985, Borjas, 2002). 
Formally, these models underline that the utility derived from a particular job will also be 
determined by an individuals' characteristics, so that equation (2) can be further enriched: 
UiL = (WL, HL, YL, XL, Zi) (3) 
where Z are individuals' skills and characteristics. 
These applications are interesting in that they underline that workers will choose their occupation 
based on an assessment of their own skills and abilities, which can encompass a wide realm of 
abilities, not just cognitive ones. 
B. Heterogeneity in tastes 
This last section provides two examples of recent developments in economics that assume or 
justify why workers might differ in their tastes for job characteristics, while unlike the Roy model, 
they have not rooted this heterogeneity in productivity differences. Although both examples are 
not models of occupational choices, they provide some insight into the relevance of considering 
heterogeneity of tastes in a broad understanding. 
The first example comes from the new economic geography literature, an area which focuses on 
the dynamics of spatial organization of economic activities. A model developed by Tabuchi and 
Thisse seeks to investigate the impact of the heterogeneity of workers' tastes on the spatial 
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distribution of activities (Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002). In this framework, individual decisions to 
migrate from one region to another are not based on economic considerations, but on 
differentiated perceptions of regional differences: 
"It seems highly implausible that all potentially mobile individuals will react in the same 
way to a given "gap" between regions. Some people show a high degree of attachment 
to the region where they are born; they will stay put even though they may guarantee to 
themselves higher living standards in other places." 
Their model goes on to explain how this heterogeneity in tastes acts as a dispersion force on 
economic activities, thereby providing some theoretical basis for some of the assumptions on the 
effects of economic development on migration. The assumptions are particularly interesting in the 
context of employment in a national health care labour market, where equivalent jobs are 
available in different regions. Besides, individuals who have a high degree of attachment to a 
region (because they were born there or their family resides there) are more likely to work there, 
even if they lack social amenities and obvious incentives (Brooks et al., 2002). 
The second example is provided by the literature on imperfect competition on the labour market, 
and more precisely oligopsonistic or monopsonistic models3 (Bhaskar et al., 2002, Manning, 
2003). These models depart from the traditional framework in that they posit that firms face an 
upward-sloping labour supply curve, meaning that a reduction in wage does not necessarily lead 
to workers' resignations. Two main arguments have been advanced to explain the existence of 
monopsonistic labour markets: lack of employee information about labour market opportunities 
inducing job search costs4 and individual heterogeneity in job preferences. The latter argument is 
further detailed by Bhaskar et al. (2002) as follows: 
"Suppose that workers with identical skills and abilities have heterogeneous preferences 
over non wage job characteristics. ( .. .) Non-wage job characteristics include the job 
specification, hours of work, distance of the firm from the worker's home, and the social 
environment in the workplace." 
They continue their argument by using travel costs as an illustration of a literal or figurative 
reason why workers might have different preferences: 
"This notion of transportation cost can be interpreted literally as the actual cost of 
travelling to and from work. However, it can a/so be interpreted as a subjective measure 
of the extent to which a worker prefers one set of job characteristics over another set. 
Whether it involves physical distance or psychic distance, a worker may be willing to 
"travel" to the further, less preferred, employer for a sufficient wage premium. The key 
insight here is that a worker in a preferred job may not immediately choose to leave an 
employer that slightly reduces its wage rate." (Bhaskar et al., 2002) 
3 A monopsony/oligopsony describes a market where there is only one I a few buyer(s) for the product of a large 
number of sellers. 
4 This relates to the prolific theory of job search. 
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The authors of these models show that they can effectively account for a number of empirical 
observations, that perfectly competitive market models are unable to explain (wage dispersion, 
ethnic and gender wage gaps, etc.). 
The relevance of monopsonistic labour markets for the analysis of the nursing labour markets has 
been often underlined, some economic textbooks even making it the typical example of such 
markets (Sullivan, 1989, Hirsch and Schumacher, 1995, Bhaskar et al., 2002, Hirsch and 
Schumacher, 2005). This would therefore suggest that there are reasons to believe that nurses 
might have differentiated job preferences. Some might favour working for a private hospital, while 
others might prefer the working conditions of small clinics. 
This review highlights the importance given by economists to economic motives to justify labour 
supply choices. Some of the models have been enriched by heterogeneity of individuals, but they 
have only focused on the study of traditional individual characteristics. In a sense, this overview 
confirmed that "most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes 
that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest" (Fehr and Schmidt, 2000). 
Several prominent economists have emphasised that a concern for others is quite common 
(Smith, 1759, Becker, 1974, Samuelson, 1993), and a powerful source of motivation. There has 
been mounting evidence from economics and other social sciences supporting this heterodox 
view. The following section reviews this evidence and discusses its relevance to the study of 
health workers' job choices. 
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2.2. Altruism and workers' behaviours 
This section is divided into three parts. The first provides an overview of the economic literature 
on altruism. The second summarises conceptions of alternative forms of motivations, and the last 
explains why these approaches are particularly relevant for health care providers. 
2.2.1. Economic agents as altruistic individuals 
A growing body of experimental games has demonstrated that individuals sometimes behave in a 
manner inconsistent with the maximization of their own monetary rewards, when this would affect 
the welfare of others5. For instance, a review of behaviours in experimental public good gamess 
shows that participants contribute more than self-maximization would predict (Ledyard, 1995), 
while one study showed that half of all cooperation in public goods games is from people who 
understand free riding but choose to give anyway (Andreoni, 1995). In dictator games, where 
people are given an endowment to split between themselves and someone else, a large 
proportion of participants freely choose to allocate some of their money to anonymous recipients, 
while no mechanism or interaction incites them to act as such (Camerer, 2003). 
As a result, a large body of literature has developed to explain such unorthodox behaviours, 
sometimes called "social preferences". Social preferences describe individuals' concern for 
others' well-being in addition to concern for one's own, and this concept encompasses four types 
of "other-regarding" preferences (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). The first relates to reciprocal 
fairness, and relies on strategic interactions and assumes that the desire to raise or lower others' 
welfare depends on the perception of others' fairness (Falk and Fishbacher, 1999, Falk et al., 
2003): 
"A reciprocal individual responds to actions that are perceived to be kind in a kind 
manner, and to actions that are perceived to be hostile in a hostile manner" (Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2002). 
The second is inequity aversion and posits that individuals are concerned with minimizing 
disparities between their and others' benefits (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 
2000): 
"This means that they are altruistic towards other persons, i.e. they want to 
increase the other persons' material payoffs, if the other persons' material payoffs 
are below an equitable benchmark, but they feel envy, i.e. they want to decrease 
s More information can be found on experimental economic games, their design, interpretation and limitations in 
Chapter 5. 
s Individuals have an endowment m which they each must allocate between themselves and a public account. Each 
of the n members of the group earns a for each dollar allocated to the public account. By design, 0 < a< 1 so giving 
nothing is a dominant strategy, but an> 1 so giving m is Pareto efficient. 
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the other persons' payoffs, when the payoffs of the others exceed the equitable 
level". (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). 
The third is spitefulness, and is not conditional upon a form of interaction: 
"A spiteful or envious person always values the material payoff of relevant 
reference agents negatively". (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). 
Finally, unconditional altruism: people value the well-being of others positively, independently 
from any interaction with these others or any benefit to themselves. This does not necessarily 
imply a form of sacrifice (Andreoni et al., 2007), but in economic terms, it means that the well-
being of others is valued positively. Formally, the utility of an individual i defined as: 
ui = (ni, ni) 
where Tik are benefits enjoyed by individual k, and aui /ani >0. 
One of the questions debated by economists has been to understand the nature of such selfless 
behaviours, in particular whether these behaviours were purely disinterested, or whether "ulterior'' 
(self-interested) motives were driving them {Andreoni et al., 2007). One of the central motives that 
potentially confounds "pure" altruism is the "warm-glow of giving" (Andreoni, 1990); the utility one 
gets from the act of giving with or without a particular concern for the interests of others: "donors 
may value not only the benefits supplied by the organisation but also their own acts of charity" 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Alternatively, some view altruism as a signalling strategy of individuals 
who seek to receive social esteem and valuation. According to a model developed by Benabou 
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and Tirole (2006), individuals engage in altruistic activities to receive social esteem from others, 
or improve their prestige. 
2.2.2. Nature and impact of intrinsic motivation 
Psychologists and economists who have focused on individual motivations have drawn attention 
to the fact that individuals were not systematically motivated by economic rewards, and could find 
another endogenous source of motivation for performing an act (which may or may not benefit to 
others). 
A. Definition of intrinsic motivation 
Intrinsic motivation was first introduced by social psychologists in the 1970s (Deci, 1971 ), and has 
recently been adopted by economists seeking to explain behaviours that couldn't be accounted 
for in the neoclassical economic framework (Frey, 1997). Opposed to extrinsic motivation which 
comes from outside individuals and is triggered by outside rewards or incentives, intrinsic 
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motivation comes from inside an individual and is generated by the satisfaction coming from the 
act of accomplishing a particular action. Unlike extrinsically motivated individuals who need 
incentives and rewards to counter the negative effects (marginal disutility) of making an effort, 
intrinsically motivated agents derive pleasure or greater utility from making these efforts: 
"People do things by intrinsic motivation when they just enjoy doing them, such 
as ( .. .) jogging for miles, climbing high mountains, spending hours solving 
crossword puzzles, contributing anonymously to a charitable organisation or 
working without compensation in a developing country's hospital" (Frey, 1997), 
preface. 
This definition underlines that intrinsic motivation goes beyond actions undertaken in a work 
situation. Formally, intrinsic motivation means that the impact of effort on the utility derived from 
working is defined as follows: 
Ui = (wi, e, Kie) 
where Wi is the salary earned?, e the effort produced and Ki >0 measures the degree to which a 
worker is intrinsically motivated by job i. Utility is usually decreasing in effort aui ;ae <0 but the 
presence of intrinsic motivation mitigates this effect since aui /8Kie >0. 
Figure 2.3 shows how the relationship between effort and utility will vary according to the level of 
intrinsic motivation. 
Figure 2.3: Effect of intrinsic motivation on the utility of effort 
e 
B. Sources of intrinsic motivation 
Three main reasons have been identified to explain the existence of intrinsic motivation. 
The first resembles some of the economic models of altruism, if one considers that individuals 
derive utility from their effort and work in order to boost their self-esteem (Delfgaauw and Our, 
2007). This perspective directly relates to the social psychology literature, and in particular the 
human needs theory developed by Maslow (Maslow, 1954). In this conceptualisation, intrinsic 
motivation at work is achieved when work meets the self-esteem (or self-actualisation) needs of 
individuals- which are the highest in the hierarchy of needs. 
7 Formally, wi depends on the effort produced e. 
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Intrinsic motivation has also been explained by the existence of professionalism (Dixit, 2002) 
which explains compliance with certain norms. Wilson defines a professional as "someone who 
receives important occupational rewards from a reference group whose membership is limited to 
people who have undergone specialized formal education and have accepted the group-defined 
code of proper conduct" (Wilson, 1989 p. 60). Akerlof and Kranton have expanded these 
arguments and provided a broader framework explaining how individuals in a particular social 
context or work environment develop a form of intrinsic motivation (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 
Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). In their approach, individuals increase their utility when they perform 
actions that comply with the norms that form their identity. An individual's identity "prescribes 
behavioural norms that circumscribe the life domains that are relatively more important for the 
sense of self' (Russo and van Hooft, 2009). A professional identity can set norms dictating the 
appropriate proportion of time and effort to allocate to one's work, but also about the attitudes, 
decisions and behaviours. In the case of health care professionals, identity can prescribe that 
nurses or doctors should always act in the interest of the patient first, even if that means 
compromising one's interests. 
Finally, some authors have postulated that workers can be intrinsically motivated by their job or 
actions because they contribute to some "idealistic or ethical purpose" (Dixit, 2002). This 
justification was developed by economists to explain the reasons why some people would opt for 
jobs in non-profit organisations or in the public sector over more lucrative offers in the for-
profit/private sector (Bemabou and Tirole, 2006). Starting from the acknowledgment that "an 
important distinction between a Government agency and a private company is that the former is 
instructed to pursue social welfare objectives while the latter is asked to maximize solely 
shareholder value" (Dewatripont et al., 1999), economists have assumed that individuals involved 
in the supply of public goods or working for "mission-oriented" employers (Besley and Ghatak, 
2005) derive a satisfaction from their work because it is doing some 'good' and helping others 
(Dixit, 1997, Dewatripont et al., 1999, Dixit, 2002). 
In conclusion, it is interesting to see how the literatures on altruism and intrinsic motivation 
somehow merge into the literature on public sector motivation. The public administration literature 
specifically refers to 'Public Service Motivation' and defines it as a "general, altruistic motivation to 
serve the interests of a community of people, a state, a nation or humankind" (Rainey and 
Steinbauer, 1999) p. 20). In this perspective, the literature on altruism and intrinsic motivation 
overlap, as intrinsic (public) motivation is generated by the benefits derived by others from one's 
work. Altruistic individuals driven by a sense of public service provision are the "knights" 
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described by Le Grand (Le Grand, 1997, Le Grand, 2003), rewarded by the act of providing a 
service to others through their job. 
C. Consequences of intrinsic motivation 
Theories of intrinsic motivation have underlined three important consequences of the existence of 
intrinsic motivation. 
First, the existence of intrinsic motivation allows employers to pay lower salaries, as the utility 
generated by the intrinsic motivation compensate for a loss in salary. Economists have underlined 
how these developments are not true for all firms, but are particularly relevant for the public 
sector and can contribute to explain the persistence of public-private pay differentials. In this 
case, intrinsic motivation relates to the type of employer- i.e. belonging to a "mission-oriented" 
sector (Besley and Ghatak, 2005)- and can explain the heterogeneity of preferences highlighted 
in monopsonistic labour market models (Bhaskar et al., 2002, Manning, 2003). In the case of 
nursing, that can explain why they are ready to accept a smaller wage (Heyes, 2005). Economists 
have described two ways for public or mission-oriented organisations and intrinsically motivated 
individuals to match. According to some, firms may want to recruit the intrinsically motivated 
workers by setting low wages (Delfgaauw and Our, 2007), but this approach will also attract less 
productive employees. For others, matching agents and principals with similar preferences and 
purposes is easier, and more closely represents a self-selection process of workers over 
occupations (or employers) with different attributes (Besley and Ghatak, 2005, Prendergast, 
2007). For example, Deflgaauw and Our show how altruistic workers self-select into the public 
sector, as contributing to the provision of public goods represents an essential source of 
satisfaction (Delfgaauw and Our, 2008) 
Second, intrinsic motivation can provide powerful incentives in situations where the self-interest 
hypothesis predicts the absence of any incentives. Consequently, intrinsic motivation has led to 
various extensions in the theory of incentives, as economists have sought to determine what 
would be an optimal incentive schemes for a principal dealing with motivated agents (Benabou 
and Tirole, 2003). A common finding is that intrinsic motivation lowers the marginal cost of effort; 
therefore in a principal-agent framework, principals can obtain a certain level of productivity from 
their motivated workers with smaller incentives than they would have to use with standard 
workers (Dixit, 2002; Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Delfgaauw and Our, 2007 and 2008). 
Finally, for some financial incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation (Frey, 1997), when they are 
perceived as controlling. Others have argued that monetary incentives can diminish the 
reputational value of pro-social actions (Bemabou and Tirole, 2006) or signal a task that is no 
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longer seen as contributing to a greater good (Delfgaauw and Our, 2007). Since the study by 
Titmuss (1970) which emphasized that paying for blood donation could have the unintended 
consequence of reducing voluntary contribution, there has been a growing body of empirical 
evidence demonstrating this crowding-out effect. For example, studying volunteers in 
Switzerland, Frey and Gotte (1999) have shown that introducing monetary rewards can reduce 
the number of volunteers. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) found that giving performance incentives 
to children collecting donations for a charitable organization was counter-productive. A study in 
Sweden found evidence supporting Titmuss' original claim as female students were less willing to 
donate blood when offered monetary incentives (Mellstrom and Johannessen, 2008). 
2.2.3. The motivations of health care workers 
This section builds upon different bodies of empirical and theoretical studies to illustrate why 
altruism and intrinsic motivation are particularly relevant for health care workers. 
A. Empirical studies 
First, there is broad empirical literature demonstrating the existence of altruistic intrinsic 
motivation amongst health care providers, which relates to a complex mix of the explanations 
highlighted above. Many surveys have identified altruistic motives amongst would-be nurses or 
doctors as a reason for choosing their profession. A study in the United States showed that most 
nursing students had chosen this career path because they wanted to "help others", and they felt 
that "being caring" or "compassionate" would help them in their jobs (Prater and McEwen, 2006). 
A similar study in the UK found that altruism was the most frequently cited reason for wishing to 
join a health care profession (Miers et al., 2007). In a study amongst high schoolleavers in South 
Africa, nearly 90% of those who said they wanted to start a career in nursing justified this choice 
by the fact that it offered an "opportunity to care for others" (Mkhize and Nzimande, 2007). At the 
same time, qualitative evidence regularly portrays nurses as a category of workers less likely to 
be influenced by or interested in monetary incentives, but much more by other-regarding 
sentiments (Kingma, 2003). 
Second, studies of vocational motivation suggest that nurses' professional identity directly relates 
to altruism or others' well being (Kingma, 2003). This view relates to the concept of identity 
developed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). The nursing literature has described the existence and 
role of this set of professional and moral values shared by nurses (Shaw and Degazon, 2008). 
Arrow argued that physicians' concern for patient welfare has developed to reduce the adverse 
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effects arising from the information asymmetry between patients and physicians (Arrow, 1963). 
This perspective relates to the idea that health providers' training could aim to "keep them from 
abusing their superior knowledge, by installing a sense of moral obligation towards patients into 
their norms and beliefs" (Delfgaauw, 2007a). 
Finally, a recent study trying to understand the underlying motives of altruism and intrinsic 
motivation amongst nurses confirmed the approach favouring the willingness to boost one's self-
esteem or self-actualisation needs (Zysberg and Berry, 2005). In this case, altruism seems to 
emerge from the warm-glow effect described by Andreoni (1990). 
B. Theoretical models 
Considering altruistic health care workers is not uncommon in the health economics literature, 
and it has figured prominently in theoretical models of physician agency. Indeed, although 
mainstream models of physician agency follow the neoclassical model of the firm and consider 
the doctor as a supplier making decisions to maximise his profit, McGuire (2000) underlines that 
physicians have been considered early on to be good candidates for alternative theories, where 
the objective functions of the supplier incorporates non-selfish arguments. In his survey of the 
literature, McGuire highlights several ways that have been used by economists to model 
physicians' altruistic concerns for their patients: their utility function includes something valued by 
the patient, either the quality of the quantity of health care received, or the patient's utility itself. 
Models that have considered altruistic health care workers in the context of job choices are more 
uncommon. 
The empirical literature suggests that nurses somehow self-select into a nursing career because 
they anticipate that the actions performed during their job will increase their utility. This 
perspective is true for all types of nursing jobs however, and does not say anything about how 
health care providers would choose between different employers (in particular public or private 
ones). Yet, both empirical and theoretical literature suggest that altruism and/or public sector 
motivation is likely to play a role in the job decisions made by nurses and other health care 
providers. 
Two recent papers predict that altruistic doctors would choose public sector employers (this can 
be generalised to nurses). 
In a model studying the effects of incentives on health care providers, Ma deviates from 
traditional models that assume that all providers are profit-maximisers, and instead develops a 
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model where some doctors display altruism and do not seek to maximise their material payoffs. 
The model shows that altruistic physicians self-select into the public sector (Ma, 2007), because 
altruistic health providers value the services rendered to the patients more than the salary 
offered, and therefore don't mind the low-powered incentives of the public jobs. 
In a similar paper assuming a distribution of altruism amongst physicians, it is shown that 
those who are the most concerned with their patients' well-being prefer working in the public 
sector over a private practice (Delfgaauw, 2007a). For the author, this choice stems from the 
difference in the type of patients seen in each sector, with richer patients seeking care in the 
private sector. Consequently, he demonstrates that altruistic physicians will prefer the public 
sector because they can have greater impact on patients' welfare in this sector. 
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2.3. Empirical approaches to studying nurses' job preferences 
Three main approaches have been used to explore empirically the determinants of labour supply 
choices made by nurses. These include econometric estimations of labour supply functions, 
qualitative or quantitative investigation of the determinants of job satisfaction, and studies of the 
determinants of stated job preferences. 
The objective of this section was to find key references and studies providing an illustrative 
overview of the evidence rather than a comprehensive one. In addition to existing literature 
reviews, a snowballing approach was used to identify further literature, by systematically checking 
the reference lists of the reviews and other most relevant journal articles. Finally, a 
complementary literature search was carried out at the end of 2009 to complement existing 
reviews and identify the most recent references. Details of the literature search can be found in 
Appendix 2.1. 
2.3.1. Econometric models of labour supply 
Following the neoclassical model of labour supply, the objective of several economic studies on 
nursing labour supply was to understand the influence of salaries on the decisions by trained 
nurses to offer their labour supply on the market, or to increase their number of hours (Shields, 
2004). That nurses are mostly female also raised interesting questions in the neoclassical 
framework, and incited researchers to study the trade-offs between work and household 
activities, and the influence of household revenues. 
The approach undertaken by these studies was to estimate regression models in which the 
dependent variable was either working hours or participation rates. Such analysis requires rich 
datasets, sometimes longitudinal (Askildsen et al., 2003, Rice, 2005), which explains why all 
studies in this literature have taken place in developed countries, and almost exclusively in the 
United States. Independent variables included salary and basic socio-demographic 
characteristics (gender, age, household or spouse's income, etc.). 
Recent reviews of this literature (Antonazzo et al., 2003, Elliott et al., 2003, Shields, 2004) 
suggest a rather ambiguous picture of the determinants of nurses' labour force participation in 
developed countries. One suggests that the variety of results can be explained by the wide array 
of methods used to estimate supply functions, and the various econometric problems 
encountered and addressed in different manners (Antonazzo et al., 2003). 
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Despite this, three findings seem to emerge from this literature (Antonazzo et al., 2003, Elliott et 
al., 2003, Shields, 2004). First, the impact of salary on nursing labour supply is uncertain. 
Antonazzo et al. (2003) underline that even the more recent (and refined) econometric models 
cast some doubt over the role of salaries on labour supply decisions. When working hours are 
used as a dependent variable, the majority of studies find a positive association, though 
sometimes very weak or insignificant, and some studies show evidence of a backward bending 
labour supply function as suggested by the income effect depicted in Figure 2.1 B. Salary is 
generally not found to be significantly related to labour force participation either. Second, two 
series of factors seem to be negatively associated with labour supply: the wage of the spouse 
(and household non-labour income), and the presence of children aged under five (while the 
presence of older children is much less clear). Finally, the age and the education of nurses do not 
appear to have been significantly linked to labour supply decisions. 
In his review, Shields highlights two major shortcomings of this literature. The first concerns the 
inability of the studies to establish a robust causal effect between wage variations and labour 
supply, due to the lack of exogenous variations such as the ones provided by a natural 
experiment. The second relates to the "lack of control for individual unobservable heterogeneity 
(e.g. motivation, ability and other personality traits)" in nurses' decisions (Shields, 2004). 
2.3.2. Analysis of job satisfaction and other work outcomes 
Although the economic literature provides new insights into the determinants of labour supply 
decisions, its application to nurses remains very scant. This section presents findings from the 
empirical literature on job satisfaction from economics and other social sciences. Job satisfaction 
is a subjective construct imported from social psychology, measuring the "degree to which 
employees have a positive affective orientation towards employmenf' (Price, 1997). 
A. Economic literature 
Following the seminal studies of Hamermesh and Freeman, self-reported job satisfaction has 
been used by economists in empirical studies as a proxy measure of the utility derived from a job 
(Hamermesh, 1977, Freeman, 1978). 
To address the criticisms formulated against the use of such self-reported measures, economists 
have underlined that they are correlated with observed choices made by workers, such as quitting 
one's job (Clark and Oswald, 1996). For example, in his original paper, Freeman showed how the 
probability of leaving one's job was a decreasing function of job satisfaction (Freeman, 1978). A 
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similar relationship was found by subsequent studies (Kristensen and Westergard-Nielsen, 2004) 
while other economic studies found a correlation between turnover and job satisfaction (Akerlof et 
al., 1988, Clark et al., 1998). More recently a study showed how the different domains of job 
satisfaction were able to explain not only whether employees were actively looking for a job, but 
also to predict the type of employers and sectors where they were looking (Delfgaauw, 2007b). 
Evidence on the determinants and influence of nurses' job satisfaction on labour supply 
outcomes8 is very scant. Unlike some of the more general economic literature, studies on nurses' 
job satisfaction have been unable to study relationships between self-reported job satisfaction 
and quitting behaviours, due to the absence of adequate longitudinal datasets9. The most 
relevant study was carried out with nurses in the UK and showed a positive correlation between 
job satisfaction and intentions to quit (Shields and Ward, 2001). 
B. Psychology and sociology literature 
The nursing literature offers a large empirical body of evidence on the sources of nurses' job 
satisfaction and its correlates with a number of outcomes (absenteeism, intentions to quit, actual 
decisions to leave), based on models rooted in psychology and sociology. These empirical 
studies have relied on cross-sectional surveys to collect data on individual and job characteristics, 
and tools validated to measure job satisfaction (Mueller and McCloskey, 1990, Price, 1997). The 
methods used in this literature vary, only a small fraction using an index of job satisfaction in a 
regression model. The key findings from this literature are summarised below, based on several 
reviews (Lu et al., 2005, Hayes et al., 2006, Coomber and Louise Barriball, 2007). 
Mainly rooted in two seminal psychology theories -the Human Needs theory (Maslow, 1954) and 
the Motivation-Hygiene theory (Herzberg and Mausner, 1959)10 - the nursing literature on the 
determinants of job satisfaction (Lu et al., 2005, Hayes et al., 2006, Coomber and Louise 
Barriball, 2007) has explored the influence of a number of variables suggested as influential on 
job satisfaction. As a result, a wide range of factors have been tested, and those factors that were 
found to contribute to higher levels of job satisfaction for nurses can be divided into two groups. 
The first relates to traditional economic approaches as they can be seen as factors that increase 
the utility of workers through better present or future monetary returns (better salary, promotion 
a Labour supply outcomes include outcomes capturing workers' mobility: quitting behaviour, intentions to quit, job 
turnover. 
9 Such studies require longitudinal datasets where job satisfaction is observed at t, and job turnover at t+1. 
1o The theory of Maslow identifies five levels of needs (psychological, safety, belongingness!love, self-esteem and 
self-actualisation) and by extension job satisfaction is then viewed in the perspective of need fulfilment. In contrast, 
Hertzberg identified two series of factors - factors intrinsic to the nature of the job which were motivators 
(achievement, responsibility, work itseiD and external or "hygiene" factors which were potential sources of 
dissatisfaction (salary, interpersonal relationships, supervision, etc.). 
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opportunities, training, job security), less effort (lower workload/less demanding work), or better 
conditions. In the second group, psychological and organisational factors are more prominent 
(interaction with patients/workers, management style, praise and recognition, personal 
achievement). 
Studying the relationship between job satisfaction and labour supply decisions, other studies in 
the nursing literature have mainly relied on the "turnover model" from the organizational sociology 
literature (Price, 1977, Price and Mueller, 1981, Hayes et al., 2006, Coomber and Louise 
Barriball, 2007). This model views nurses' turnover (decisions to quit) as the result of job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment11, which are themselves influenced by various 
aspects of working conditions and individual factors. Empirical studies have found that job 
satisfaction is a good predictor of intentions to leave and sometimes of actual decisions to quit 
(Lu et al., 2005). In particular, a longitudinal study in an American hospital found that job 
satisfaction was negatively correlated with nurses' quitting decisions (Mueller and Price, 1990). In 
contrast, the few studies trying to link measures of absenteeism to job satisfaction were 
inconclusive (Lu et al., 2005). 
Very few studies from developing countries were identified in these reviews. One of the reasons 
might be that studies from low-income settings have often used work motivation, which is a 
slightly different construct than job satisfaction, although both are closely related (Dolea and 
Adams, 2005, Willis-Shattuck et al., 2008). A similar distinction is made between "psychological" 
(management, recognition) and "materialistic" factors (income, career development or training 
opportunities, working conditions). However, the working conditions identified in this literature 
seem to be more important and capture some of the difficulties of health systems in low-income 
settings (poor infrastructure, lack of equipment). 
C. Health systems literature 
Due to the critical issue of staff shortage in rural areas, the health systems literature has 
produced a wealth of studies trying to identify which characteristics are associated with rural 
employment. These studies have used qualitative and quantitative methods, and have applied 
different approaches (using outcomes such as job satisfaction, intent to leave, or simply 
comparing job and individual characteristics between rural and urban post-holders). This literature 
has been well summarised by several reviews (Brooks et al., 2002, Lehmann et al., 2008, Grobler 
11 This literature distinguishes several constructs: job satisfaction, pay satisfaction, organisational commitment, and 
work motivation. 
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et al., 2009) and three series of determinants have been found to be associated with a greater 
likelihood to like or be in a rural position: individual characteristics, work-related factors and 
broader environmental characteristics. 
Several individual factors were consistently found to be associated with working in rural 
areas. A systematic review showed that rural background was associated with rural practice in 10 
out of 12 case-control or retrospective cohort studies (Laven and Wilkinson, 2003). The spouse's 
background (of rural origin or not) was also influential. Finally, health professionals who report 
altruistic values or involvement in volunteering activities were more likely to practise in rural areas 
(Dieleman et al., 2003, Wilson et al., 2009). In contrast, there has been mixed evidence on the 
association between gender and working in a rural area (Laven and Wilkinson, 2003, Wilson et 
al., 2009). 
A wide range of unsatisfactory working conditions has been found to be associated with 
intention to leave rural areas or dissatisfaction at working in such places: low salaries, higher 
workload due to staff shortage, lack of clinical practice, poor infrastructure and working 
conditions, and professional isolation (Farooq et al., 2004, Wilson et al., 2009). However, 
although they remain marginal, some studies have emphasized the positive impact of factors 
such as prestige in small communities (Page et al., 1992, Siziya and Woelk, 1995, Dieleman et 
al., 2003) or better contact with patients (Dagnew et al., 1992, Dieleman et al., 2003) that might 
increase intentions to stay in a rural area. 
Finally, this literature underlines the broader living conditions, and environmental factors 
such as poor quality of life, poor access to social amenities and infrastructures (in particular 
schools for children), and lack of job opportunities for the spouse, as reasons for dissatisfaction 
with being in rural areas (Eisenberg and Cantwell, 1976, Page et al., 1992, Agyepong et al., 
2004, Tolhurst et al., 2006). All these reasons were underlined in the case of South Africa 
(Sankar et al., 1997, De Vries and Marincowitz, 2004). 
In conclusion, findings from this varied body of literature underline the limitations of the empirical 
approach described in section 2.3.1, as they suggest that a wide range of individual, 
environmental and work-related factors are likely to influence the decisions made by nurses. By 
highlighting the importance of working conditions, they confirm some of the insights from the 
compensating wage differential model, while the influence of individual characteristics they 
underline tends to validate the theoretical studies highlighting the importance of heterogeneity of 
tastes. 
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2.3.3. Discrete choice experiments of job preferences 
More recently, a third approach to studying the determinants of nurses' job preferences has been 
developed, using a stated preference technique called Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs). 
Originally, DCEs are a quantitative methodology for evaluating the relative importance of different 
product attributes that influence consumer choice behaviour (Louviere et al., 2000). This 
technique has its origins in the economic theory of demand, and especially in the work of 
Lancaster, who proposed that the demand for goods was effectively demand for a specific 
combination of product characteristics (Lancaster, 1966). 
Rather than evaluating the decisions that workers have actually made, this methodology analyses 
the stated preferences of health workers for different job characteristics. In choice experiments, 
respondents are asked to make choices between hypothetical job descriptions, where each job 
description is defined by several characteristics called "attributes" (such as salary, hours worked, 
available equipment, type of administrative tasks, etc.). DCEs then use regression techniques to 
model respondents' choices as a function of the scenario attributes. The significance and 
magnitude of the regression coefficients indicates the relative importance of those attributes 
which statistically influence respondents' choices and the ratio of any two coefficients represents 
the rate of substitution between them. Performing regressions for different sub-groups of health 
workers can be used to reveal differences in their preferences. The investigation of stated 
preferences by means of DCEs has been used by economists in other fields, such as transport or 
environmental economics (Louviere et al., 2000), to study the determinants of choices that cannot 
be easily observed in the market or for which a market does not exist (van Soest et al., 2007)12. 
There are still only a small number of studies that have used this methodology to analyse the 
choices of health workers. A recent review identified 11 studies using DCE techniques (Lagarde 
and Blaauw, 2009), most of which have been used in developing countries13, only three of which 
focused on nurses (Penn-Kekana et al., 2005, Mangham, 2007, Hanson and Jack, 2008). 
Overall, existing DCEs on health worker preferences show that non-financial aspects are often 
more powerful than financial ones. Several aspects relating to quality of life (fewer hours per 
week and less after-hours work in developed countries; the provision of better housing and 
12 A more detailed presentation of the theoretical framework underpinning DCE studies is presented in Chapter 6. 
This chapter also explains in greater detail when the use of DCEs is justified, and it describes issues in design and 
analysis of DCEs. 
13 Four of these studies were from the United Kingdom. Other countries included Indonesia (Chomitz et al. 1998) 
South Africa (Penn-Kekana et al. 2005), Malawi (Mangham and Hanson 2008), Ethiopia (Hanson and Jack 2008) 
and Tanzania (Kolstad, 2008). 
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improved work conditions in developing countries) are positively valued by health workers in most 
countries. In developing countries, the importance given by health workers to education 
opportunities appears to emphasise the potential relevance of the Human Capital theory for 
occupational choices. 
Unlike studies of job satisfaction, DCEs force respondents to make trade-offs, thereby revealing 
and quantifying their underlying hierarchy of preferences. Although increased salaries always 
feature as a key determinant of job satisfaction, studies based on traditional questionnaires have 
failed to provide evidence of the relative importance of salary compared to other job 
characteristics. In contrast, DCEs enable comparison of the relative value of job characteristics by 
computing the marginal rates of substitution (ratios of coefficients) between an attribute and 
salary. This provides an empirical test of the compensating wage differential theory. For example, 
a study on GPs in England found that they would require an annual compensation of £5,029 to 
work with highly deprived patients (Gosden et al., 2000). 
DCEs also emphasise the existence of heterogeneity in workers' tastes, and the importance of 
investigating the preferences of different sub-groups. For example, a DCE from Tanzania showed 
that women were less sensitive to pecuniary incentives and more concerned with facility 
upgrading than men (Kolstad, 2010), while in South Africa nurses working in rural areas were 
more concerned about facility management than urban nurses (Penn-Kekana et al., 2005). 
Finally, DCE studies proved particularly relevant for investigating the potential effects of 
interventions to influence job preferences. The more recent DCE studies provide a list of possible 
policies to influence health workers' job choices, particularly addressing staff maldistribution and 
encouraging them to take up positions in under-served areas. Using the respondents' responses 
to model fabricated scenarios, the authors computed the expected effects of such policies. For 
example, the study in Ethiopia (Hanson and Jack, 2008) showed that the provision of superior 
housing would increase the proportion of doctors willing to take up positions in rural areas by 
more than 250% (from 7.5% to 26.9%), while a reduction in time commitment to the public service 
would have a non-significant effect. 
In conclusion, DCEs have confirmed the limitations of the econometric approach presented in 
section 2.3.1, as they have demonstrated that health workers make trade-offs between various 
job characteristics to choose a position, not just the salary. They have also underlined the 
existence of heterogeneous preferences amongst health workers. 
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2.4. Policy interventions to attract and retain health workers in rural areas 
Because guaranteeing equitable access to health care to the population has been identified as a 
critical problem, governments in both developed and developing countries have tried to increase 
the number of health workers in rural areas. This final section reviews the literature on policy 
interventions that have been introduced both in developed and developing countries to attract 
health workers (not just nurses) to rural areas. This literature constitutes a logical policy 
application of the determinants of health workers' job choices. 
This section relies mainly on recently published reviews, which were updated at the end of 2009 
with a literature search whose complete details are provided in Appendix 2.1. This review does 
not seek to be comprehensive, but rather to provide an illustrative list of the array of policy levers 
that have been used. Some of the reviews identified a wide array of interventions (Sempowski, 
2004, Henderson and Tulloch, 2008, Lehmann et al., 2008, Grobler et al., 2009), while others 
critically assessed the evidence of the effects of some of these policies (Sempowski, 2004, 
Grobler et al., 2009, Wilson et al., 2009). The bulk of this literature reports interventions in the 
United States, Canada and Australia. 
2.4.1. Categorising policy interventions 
This brief introduction highlights the links between existing policy interventions and the preceding 
sections that detailed the theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of job choices. 
Since the supply of adequate human resources (HR) for health care services requires first 
training and then hiring health providers, HR policies can be divided into "upstream" and 
"downstream" interventions. 
Downstream interventions pertain to policies that change the working conditions in rural 
jobs. These measures aim to retain staff already in post or attract some new health workers, by 
improving jobs in rural areas, through financial incentives or others. 
Upstream interventions relate to the selection and training of future health professionals. 
They rely on the assumption that there are heterogeneous tastes for different jobs, and seek to 
select individuals who are more likely to like rural jobs. These measures can also try to influence 
individuals' tastes during their training (e.g. sensitising individuals to rural settings). 
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2.4.2. Downstream measures 
Four major types of "downstream" interventions have been implemented: direct or indirect 
financial incentives, provision of education opportunities, interventions supporting the work of 
health professionals and regulatory mechanisms (see Table 2.1 for an illustrative list). 
Direct financial incentives to attract health workers in under-served areas have been widely used, 
and have mainly taken two different forms. The most common strategy in developed countries 
has been to provide direct rural allowances to compensate health workers who chose to practice 
in under-served areas (Eisenberg and Cantwell, 1976, Kristiansen and Forde, 1992, Fournier, 
2001, Sempowski, 2004). In developing countries, direct financial strategies of one sort or 
another have also constituted the majority of interventions, in the form of rural allowances (Adams 
and Hicks, 2000, Mauritius Ministry of Health and Quality of Life, 2003, Wibulpolprasert and 
Pengpaiboon, 2003, Schwabe et al., 2004, Koot and Martineau, 2005, Dambisya, 2007, Dovlo, 
2007). Indirect financial incentives have been quite different in developed and developing 
countries. In high-income countries, governments have provided health professionals with 
housing (Hegney et al., 2002, MacRae et al., 2007) or financial help (tax-free grants, bursaries) 
with a commitment from health workers to work in rural areas (Eisenberg and Cantwell, 1976, 
Wilson et al., 1998, Sempowski, 2004). Similar measures have only been adopted in Thailand, 
with scholarships conditional on rural postings (Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaiboon, 2003). In other 
developing countries, the range of interventions has been wider. Some have provided free or 
subsidised housing (Lindelow et al., 2004, Schwabe et al., 2004, Dambisya, 2007). Others have 
provided loan facilities (Koot and Martineau, 2005) or allowed quicker career enhancements. For 
example, in Mozambique health workers get a 50% bonus when calculating their years of service 
(Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaiboon, 2003, Lindelow et al., 2004). 
Other interventions have included the possibility of benefiting from various training opportunities 
to enhance workers' skills through formal training (i.e. degrees) or on-the-job opportunities 
(Mauritius Ministry of Health and Quality of Life, 2003, Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaiboon, 2003, 
Drager et al., 2006). 
Improving working conditions in remote areas has also been an objective for diverse policies. 
Direct measures have included allowing flexible arrangements (Mackintosh, 2003, Dovlo, 2007), 
or improving means of communication (Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaiboon, 2003, Schwabe et al., 
2004, Drager et al., 2006, Dambisya, 2007). Furthermore, some attempts have been made to 
increase the status of those working in rural areas (Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaiboon, 2003). 
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Several developed countries have also introduced indirect support measures by professional 
support to the staff sent to remote areas (Jones et al., 2004, Orpin and Gabriel, 2005). 
Table 2.1: Categories and examples of downstream interventions, by type of countries 
Intervention Examples of Examples of developing 
developed countries countries that introduced the 
that introduced the measures 
measures 
Direct monetary incentives 
··-i=rn·anci.af'in.cenHve.s/aiiowance·-······················ ·······································}~ew .. ze·a·i·an·a·:····o·s·A·:········- ·····-N-amT51a:-·sauth-·Afrfca-:···iam-t>ia~-· 
Norway, Canada Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. Ib .. 9.!!9..~_g! ..... Y!~.!~.?._I!)L_P...~.!.I.ipp!.~~~-·-· 
Indirect monetary incentives 
····i=ei·i·aws.h1pslpo.shia·n .. s···9·ra·r;·iea··ta···s·iaH·················································· ·································-················· 
working in rural areas preferably 
Loan forgiveness or repayment by service in USA , Canada 
rural areas 
Career enhancement 
Housing provision 
Provision of free health care 
Loan facility 
Education measures 
Canada, Australia 
Namibia, Tanzania 
Thailand 
Mozambique, Thailand 
Thailand, Lesotho, 
Mozambique 
Malawi, Mozambique 
Zambia 
Continuing education programmes/ Canada Kenya, Mauritius, Thailand 
.... P.Ei.~.!l.~.9~.9. .... !.r..~.!.~.i.~.9 ... 9PP9.~.~.~.iJ!.~~ ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... __ .... _. 
Support measures 
Professional (visits from senior colleagues) Australia, Canada 
and/or psychological support 
Flexibility (part time arrangements, rotation 
between rural and urban areas) 
Improved communication means (IT support) 
"Social" recognition awards 
Coercive measures 
······················-···~········ .. ···········~·"········ .. ····· .. ···"•''''"'''''''"'""'''"''''''''''''""''"''"'"'''"""''''''''''''''''''''""'''"''"''"'''''"''''''''"'''"''''''''''''''''''''"''"'''''''''''''''''' 
Recruitment of foreign health professionals USA 
Compulsory service in rural/underserved 
areas (before registration/specialisation), 
with or without buying out option 
Thailand 
Zambia, Malawi 
Kenya, Lesotho, Thailand 
Thailand 
Zambia, Mauritius, South Africa 
Russia, Mexico, Ecuador, 
Bolivia, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Thailand, Namibia, Zambia 
Service-requiring scholarships or student 
loans 
Canada, Japan, USA, South Africa, Thailand 
New Zealand 
Finally, coercive mechanisms such as compulsory service in under-serviced areas, either before 
or after registration, or as a pre-requisite for specialization have been used to increase the 
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number of health professionals in rural areas (Grobler et al., 2009). These strategies have been 
particularly favoured by developing countries which have also chosen compulsory strategies of 
mandatory placements in rural areas (Danielson, 1979, Ugalde and Homedes, 1988, Rubel, 
1990, Asturizaga Rodriguez, 1996, Malaga, 1997, Sankar et al., 1997, Cavender and Alban, 
1998, Maseka et al., 2002, Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaiboon, 2003, Reid, 2004, Dovlo, 2007). In 
developed countries (e.g. USA, Canada, Japan) compulsory rural placements have been typically 
linked to the provision of scholarships or student loans (Sempowski, 2004, Barnighausen and 
Bloom, 2009). Another regulatory measure has been to recruit and send foreign health workers to 
those areas in exchange for the recognition of their degrees (Volmink et al., 2006). This has been 
adopted on a very small scale by South Africa through bilateral agreements, involving the 
recruitment of doctors from Iran and Cuba, and nurses from India (Gilson and Erasmus, 2005). 
2.4.3. Upstream measures 
There have been two types of upstream strategies to attract health workers who would be more 
likely to work in rural areas: those selecting students and those trying to sensitise future health 
workers to rural areas during their training. Table 2.2 summarises some of these experiences. 
Table 2.2: Categories of upstream interventions, by type of countries 
Intervention 
Selection 
Referenced examples of 
high-income countries that 
introduced 'upstream' 
measures 
Reserved entry or quotas for people from Australia, USA, Japan 
rural background 
Scholarships for students with rural 
background 
Australia, USA, Japan 
Sensitisation to working in rural areas 
Location of training sites in rural areas Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Norwa , 
Rotations in rural areas during training 
Curriculum content (emphasis on 
rural/community medicine) 
Role models encouraging practice of 
community (rural) medicine 
Australia, Canada, USA 
Australia, USA 
USA 
Referenced examples of 
low· and middle-income 
countries that introduced 
'upstream' measures 
Thailand, Mauritius 
Thailand 
Thailand 
In recognition of the limitations of reward systems, several countries have tried to encourage the 
recruitment of students more likely to be attracted by rural areas (Rabinowitz et al., 2000). Such 
strategies have aimed at selecting students with rural origins via quotas (Rabinowitz, 1983, 
Brazeau et al., 1990, Inoue et al., 1997, Laven and Wilkinson, 2003) or bursaries (Rabinowitz, 
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1983, Inoue et al., 1997, Laven and Wilkinson, 2003). Some authors have highlighted the 
limitations of these strategies, including the possibility of gaming through a late relocation to rural 
areas to qualify for the guaranteed quotas (Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaiboon, 2003). Other 
strategies have included the preferential selection of students with a stated intention to work in 
such areas (Rabinowitz, 1983, Volmink et al., 2006). 
Many developed countries have also tried to increase the sensitisation of enrolled students to 
remote and disadvantaged areas. To that end, countries have purposefully located training sites 
in hardship areas (Magnus and Tollan, 1993, Inoue et al., 1997, Crump, 2002, Sullivan and 
Oreilly, 2002, Laven and Wilkinson, 2003, Hsueh et al., 2004, Lea and Cruickshank, 2005, 
Chopra et al., 2008), made rotations in those areas compulsory (Rabinowitz, 1983, Wilson et al., 
1998), or increased sensitisation through curriculum content (Rabinowitz, 1983, Brazeau et al., 
1990, Margolis et al., 2005, Wilson et al., 2009) or role modelling (Rabinowitz, 1983, Brazeau et 
al., 1990, Margolis et al., 2005). In contrast, very few developing countries have promoted the 
recruitment of students with stronger commitment to rural areas and/or exposed them to working 
in rural areas during their training (Chomitz et al., 1998, Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaiboon, 2003). 
2.4.4. Evidence of effectiveness 
A recent Cochrane review of the effects of interventions in increasing the proportion of health 
professionals practising in rural and underserved areas concluded that "there are no studies in 
which bias and confounding are minimised to support any of the interventions that have been 
implemented to address the inequitable distribution of health care professionals" (Grobler et al., 
2009). Their conclusion was based on the absence of study that met their rigorous inclusion 
criteria, which would have ensured minimal bias in the results14. Yet, there is a growing 
recognition that other types of studies can provide rigorous evidence to inform debates on the 
usefulness and effects of health systems policies (Mills et al., 2008). This is the reason why a 
separate review was published that included all studies (typically longitudinal or multivariate 
analyses) that had not met the inclusion criteria of the Cochrane review, but still provided some 
evidence of the effects of interventions or of associations between individual characteristics and 
rural service (Wilson et al., 2009). The conclusions of that review are provided in Table 2.3. 
According to Wilson et al. (2009) the programmes that seem to have obtained the best results 
have undertaken a mix of 'upstream' interventions, such as selecting rural students and training 
them in rural areas (Rabinowitz, 1983, Brazeau et al., 1990, Rabinowitz, 1993, Hsueh et al., 
14 To be included in the systematic review, a study had to be a (cluster) randomised controlled trial, a controlled 
before-and-after study, or an interrupted time-series study. 
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2004). Students with rural origins or those who had trained in rural training institutions were often 
found to be more likely to work and remain in rural areas (Rabinowitz, 1988, Magnus and Tollan, 
1993, Rabinowitz et al., 1999, Hsueh et al., 2004, Inoue et al., 2007). 
Table 2.3: Summary of evidence strength 
Category Possible and actual interventions Strength of evidence 
Upstream measures 
00000000'"''''koOoooooooooooo,OOO>Ooo•Oooo''''''00<000000ooO<o '''''''''"'''''"''''''"'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''"""''"'"''""~ooooo>o<0•<"0'000'0 '''''''''''''"'''"''M•oO•o"""""''''''''''""'''"'"'"''''"'''''""""''''''' Selection Reserved entry or quotas for peopTe .. fro·m··············--·-·--·-···-·····---·····-Good~---·······---··---··-·· 
rural background I Scholarships for students 
with rural background 
.............................................................................................. 
··········· · · ···················-····rrai.n"fn9.ce.iltres··-rr;···;:urai"areas················· -······ ···············-···-·--------···--Goocr·--··-·---·--··· Sensitisation 
.................................................................... . ........................................................... ~ ..... B.~.~~-~- .. ~-~pg~.~.~~ .. ~.~t~n.9 ... !r~!.~J.~.9 .......... _...... .. ........................... ~ ................ ---~-~~-~!_C!~~~ ........................... .. 
Downstream measures 
oireciiiil.an.ciaf.iil.ceniives·······························-····~=·i·il·and.af·cc;m-i>.en.sation·············· Moderate 
-·-i-nCii.re"Ct .. fi.nancia"iTn.ce.ntives········· .... ···- ··schofarshii).witi1 .. rurai.service . w •••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••• • ·- • -·---Moderate····--· -····· .. 
Other interventions Absent 
·-···su.illlort·~n·eas.ures·····································-··············-·········-·····rfme··;f'r····· ................................................... ················································ · ·············-·········-·····---······weakc---······--·······-········ 
Professional support Weak 
••••••••••••• ••••• " F..~~!IY ... ~.~9..1i.f.~~t>.'.l.~ i~~-~~~ w•••••••••••••oo•••o••••••••• • • •••ooo ••••••-•••••••Y.Y.~-~~•o•o-• """ •••" " 
Coercive measures Compulsory rural service Weak 
Rural service pre-requisite for specialisation Weak 
International recruitment Moderate 
Source: (Wilson et al., 2009) 
aGood quality: "consistent findings from multiple studies (retrospective and/or prospective) performed in various 
settings, where the independent effect of the particular variable was confirmed through multivariate analysis". 
bModerate quality: "which was defined as 'consistent qualitative and/or quantitative findings from multiple studies and 
in various settings, but without multivariate analysis". 
cweak quality: "qualitative and/or quantitative findings that were inconsistent across studies or only reported in a 
single study". 
Systematic reviews of the evidence have underlined the low quality of evidence on the impact of 
financial incentives. Existing evidence suggests mixed results, in particular when buying-out 
options were available (Sempowski, 2004). Besides, potential success might have been linked to 
a combination of financial incentives and other interventions (Wilson et al., 2009), or to the 
existence of a high debt load amongst students (Sempowski, 2004). 
There is some evidence of moderate quality suggesting that coercive measures can address 
recruitment issues in rural areas, but it remains questionable whether they can make a difference 
in the long run (Wilson et al., 2009). Some evidence shows that coercive strategies may actually 
be detrimental if community service is enforced in an unsupportive environment (Reid, 2001). 
There is also anecdotal evidence that such policies have often been undermined by corruption or 
by-passing strategies (Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaiboon, 2003). Similarly, recruiting foreign 
doctors seems to offer an effective short term solution to importing countries, but often initiates a 
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domino effect in the exporting country, which is the reason why this strategy has not been 
promoted widely in developing countries (Wilson et al., 2009). 
The paucity of evidence on the effects of HR interventions is met by an absence of evidence on 
their costs (and a fortiori their cost-effectiveness). None of the articles referenced here contains 
information on the cost of interventions. A specific search of the economic evaluation literature1s 
was undertaken to verify the absence of relevant studies. Economic evaluations relating to HR in 
the health sector were exclusively concerned with staffing levels and staff mix, and all studies 
pertained to developed countries. No study was found that dealt with HR interventions addressing 
staff shortages. Only one study was found (Jung et al., 1991) that evaluated and casted a peer 
support programme to retain nurses in a hospital in the US, but it failed to carry out a proper 
economic evaluation. 
Overall, the potential impact of policy interventions to redress the geographic imbalance between 
rural and urban areas remains unsatisfactory. One of the reasons is likely to be that measuring 
the impact of complex HR interventions is difficult, as many strategies require national policy 
changes and prevent the existence of a counterfactual (Mills et al., 2008). 
Two other important questions for policy makers remain unanswered. First, policy-makers might 
be interested to know how different combinations of interventions could be effective - which is 
even more difficult to test. Second, for the interventions for which there are reasonable grounds to 
introduce them, such as financial incentives16, many essential questions remain regarding their 
relative impact (e.g. what is the elasticity of labour supply for rural positions?), and their cost-
effectiveness compared to other possible interventions. 
2.5. Conclusions 
2.5.1. Lessons from the normative literature 
Starting from a neoclassical framework where agents offering their labour are only interested in 
maximising the monetary benefits they can derive from their job, the evolution of the labour 
economics literature has departed from these simplistic assumptions. More satisfying models 
have been introduced that show how jobs differ from one another by their characteristics, and 
how individuals derive utility not only from salary but also from good and bad working conditions. 
1s Using the Health Economic Evaluations Database (HEED), a broad search of the health economics literature was 
realised, using limited key terms in the title ("nurse", "doctor", "shortage", "staff', "personnel", "~uman resources"). 
1s There is reasonable theoretical justification, as well as empirical evidence of moderate quality. 
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At the same time, recent developments in labour economics have sought to abandon the 
simplifying assumption of homogenous preferences amongst workers, and argued for a 
heterogeneity of tastes in labour market decisions that can be justified by non-economic 
preferences. Although most of these models fail to explain the nature and origin of these varying 
preferences, it is now accepted that different workers will be attracted by different types of jobs, 
leading to a wide dispersion of wages and working conditions. 
The development of behavioural economic models has provided new insights into the 
determinants of individual behaviours, beyond the traditional emphasis on economic incentives. 
In particular, the role of altruistic motives and professional identity have been postulated to be a 
potential source of intrinsic motivation of workers. To the extent that these factors influence the 
importance individuals attribute to job characteristics, they have economic value since they may 
be sources of different job preferences among individuals. 
2.5.2. Lessons from the empirical literature 
The recent extensions of the normative literature on the determinants of individual behaviours, 
and the role played by altruistic motives or intrinsic motivation have not been directly applied to 
empirical studies of occupational choices. The economic empirical work on the determinants of 
nurses' labour market decisions has been dominated by the role of financial incentives in 
influencing behaviour. Yet there is evidence from a vast and varied empirical literature from 
developed and developing countries suggesting that if financial motives are important for job 
choices, other work-related and environmental factors matter as well. There is also evidence of 
heterogeneity in health professionals' career preferences. 
A few conclusions emerge from the survey of the empirical literature on the methods used to 
study nurses' labour supply in relation to the study of South African nurses' choices. 
The econometric evaluation of labour supply functions is inadequate for the study of 
South African nurses' job choices for two reasons. First, such research is not possible in most 
developing countries in general and South Africa in particular, because longitudinal data on 
nurses are not available, and labour market surveys that could provide information on nurses are 
not detailed enough (Statistics South Africa, 2008b). Second, this approach mainly focuses on 
participation decisions (participating or not, working part-time or full-time, etc.). It is not adequate 
for the study of choices made by nurses between different employment opportunities. 
Unlike the traditional econometric approach which focused on the role of salaries and 
was grounded in the neoclassical model, the job satisfaction literature is more related to the 
theory of compensating wage differentials. The job satisfaction literature has studied and 
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provided evidence of the role of a wide range of factors, such as personal work ethic, 
remuneration, working conditions and career opportunities. However, this literature is intrinsically 
limited in two ways. First, self-reported job satisfaction measures provide no quantified evidence 
on the relative importance of the different job characteristics in different contexts. Second, despite 
some convincing studies, self-reported measures of satisfaction cannot be equated to job choices 
made by workers (Levy-Garboua and Montmarquette, 2007), and there are examples of 
discrepancies between self-reported measures or intentions and actual choices. For instance, a 
recent study in Taiwan found a positive correlation between self-reported job satisfaction of 
nurses and their intentions to quit (Chen et al., 2008). However, three years later, job satisfaction 
was a poor predictor of actual quitting decisions. 
The use of discrete choice experiments to study the job preferences of health workers 
presents a number of advantages. First, it provides a flexible framework to study the utility 
derived from a variety of job offers. In all studies, the range of levels was broader than those 
offered on the job market at the time of the study. In particular, the range of salaries was often 
widened, which allowed testing of the potential effects of an increase in remuneration. Second, 
DCEs help understand better the potential heterogeneity in tastes, as well as self-selection 
behaviours which are otherwise difficult to observe. Finally, this approach does not rely on 
existing datasets and therefore can be easily applied in a data-poor setting. 
2.5.3. Identified gaps 
Four gaps in the literature may be identified. 
First, despite their increased recognition as key determinants of individual behaviour, 
very little attention has been given to the role of altruism in labour supply choices. More 
particularly, very little work has been done to investigate whether altruistic characteristics could 
contribute to choosing to work in the public sector or in rural areas. 
Second, the few quantitative studies that have attempted to determine the preferences of 
nurses in developing countries have usually focused on a restricted number of job opportunities 
(e.g. usually public sector positions), potentially leading to biases. No quantitative analysis has 
been undertaken to understand the driving factors of nurses' career choices (private vs. public, 
domestic vs. overseas, urban vs. rural). 
Third, despite a growing interest in HR issues, the design of policy interventions to 
address rural shortages rests mostly on evidence from developed countries. Quantitative 
evidence is needed to help policy-makers shape the policies that could be effective to redress the 
imbalance of the health workforce in developing countries. 
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Fourth, there has been no investigation of the cost-effectiveness of alternative policy 
options to address rural shortages. In particular, the comparison between 'upstream' strategies 
(selecting more suitable candidates) and 'downstream' strategies (improving working conditions) 
has never been made. 
The present research seeks to address these gaps in the context of the nursing labour market in 
South Africa. 
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Chapter 3 · Study objectives and design 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework used in this thesis, it details the hypotheses to be 
tested in the empirical analysis and describes briefly the empirical approach used. It is 
constructed as follows. The first section presents the objectives of this work, and details each of 
the sub-questions. The second section draws on the literature reviewed in the preceding chapter 
and provides an overview of the conceptual framework underlying this work. The third section 
provides a general outline of the empirical approach used and briefly explains the context of this 
thesis. The fourth section presents information related to the study population and justifies the 
empirical approach used. Finally, the last section briefly explains some of the ethical issues 
raised by this research and how they were addressed. 
3.1. Study objectives 
The work aims to investigate the determinants of job choices in the context of the nursing labour 
market in South Africa, in order to identify efficient policies to remedy the lack of nurses in rural 
areas. There are four specific objectives in this work: 
1. To investigate the nature and determinants of South African nurses' altruism 
i. Are South African nursing students more altruistic than economic students? 
ii. What are the determinants of South African nurses' altruism? 
2. To study the determinants of nurses' labour market preferences 
i. What are the preferences of new nurse graduates for the various opportunities offered 
to South African nurses? 
ii. What is the relative impact of financial and non-financial job characteristics? 
iii. Does altruism or public sector motivation affect nurses' career preferences? 
3. To investigate the effectiveness of different interventions to attract nurses to rural areas 
i. What interventions are the most efficient to increase the uptake of rural jobs? 
ii. What is the impact of individual characteristics on the likely effectiveness of policy 
interventions? 
4. To carry out an economic analysis of different policy interventions 
i. Which interventions to attract nurses to rural areas would be the most cost-effective? 
ii. Are upstream measures more cost-effective than downstream measures? 
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3.2. Conceptual framework 
3.2.1. Rationale for a public intervention in the nursing labour market 
The importance of human resources for the provision of health services has been underlined by 
policy initiatives (Joint Learning Initiative, 2004, WHO, 2006) and by ecological evidence of a 
positive correlation between the population density of health care providers in a country and the 
coverage achieved for cost-effective health interventions (Anand and Barnighausen, 2004, 
Speybroeck et al., 2006). In South Africa, concern over human resources has been a prominent 
theme in the transformation of the country's health system, and it remains a critical area where 
issues must be addressed to be able to provide good quality care to all populations in the country. 
As detailed in Chapter 1, the long-term supply of nurses17 is mainly driven by exogenous factors 
(statutory age for retirement, age distribution of the current nursing workforce, mortality rate) or 
regulatory decisions that can hardly be affected by the South African Department of Health 1a 
(Coovadia et al., 2009). The inadequate production of nurses by training institutions has resulted 
in an insufficient number of nurses currently available on the labour market to work. In addition, 
the distribution of this workforce between private and public sectors on the one hand, and rural 
and urban areas on the other hand, is particularly unbalanced. This double imbalance is 
especially detrimental in the more rural parts of the country where the more disadvantaged and 
vulnerable populations can only receive health care in public facilities19 that suffer more acutely 
from the lack of nursing staff (Coovadia et al., 2009). 
Redressing the unbalanced distribution of staff between rural and urban areas is a public health 
priority for the South African authorities. As a result of the wage rigidities in the public sector and 
national budget constraints, wages cannot be used to reach an equilibrium level that would 
contribute to address the unequal distribution of staff between rural and urban posts. 
Consequently, alternative public sector interventions are necessary to address this issue and two 
questions should be answered to help design potential future policies: 
1. What individual characteristics are associated with a greater willingness to work in rural 
areas? 
11 Defined as the number of adequately trained nurses who are available to work as a nurse, as opposed to the 
short-tern labour supply, which pertains to the decisions made by existing (trained) nurses to participate or not in the 
labour market. 
1a In particular, the capacity of the education system and the level of tuition fees depend on decisions made by the 
Departments of Education and Finance. 
19 Private providers are not attracted to these areas because they are not profitable enough, mainly because 
populations are too scattered and poor to constitute a sufficient demand for expensive private health services. One 
exception is the presence of health care providers linked to and organised by mining companies, for their employees 
and their families. 
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2. What job characteristics are more likely to attract nurses to rural positions? 
Answering the first question provides information shaping the design of upstream interventions, 
while responses to the second inform the design of downstream interventions (see Chapter 2). 
To understand how individual and job characteristics affect individuals' labour market decisions, a 
model of occupational choice is developed, building upon the theoretical literature analysing 
labour supply decisions. The theoretical framework also incorporates behavioural economic 
theories of motivation. 
3.2.2. A model of labour choices 
The conceptual framework developed below focuses only on the individual decisions made by 
health workers when they choose a job. Therefore it excludes broader labour market issues, such 
as the determinants of the demand for health professionals, which would be relevant in a general 
study of health care labour markets and their functioning. A more focused approach has the 
advantage of making hypotheses more evident and easier to test empirically. 
Further, this framework considers individuals who have already chosen to participate in the labour 
market, and are about to choose between different job options. Formally this means that it is 
assumed that job opportunities on the labour market offer salaries greater than the reservation 
wage wo of the representative agent. Considering the amount of theoretical and empirical 
literature (in particular on nurses) that has been concerned with the analysis of decisions to work 
or not, the perspective chosen here is quite restrictive. However, it is justified by the purpose of 
the study, which looks at choices between job alternatives. Further, considering the economic 
context in South Africa (see Chapter 4) this does not appear an unreasonable assumption for two 
reasons. Firstly, it is reasonable to assume that the reservation wage of the average graduating 
nurse will be quite low, considering the time and money invested in nursing training. Secondly, 
nurses' salaries are much higher than the average salaries offered on the labour market. 
Following the compensating wage theory (Smith, 1776, Rosen, 1986), the utility derived from a 
particular job is determined by the job characteristics: 
UL=(e,WL,YL,XL) (3.1) 
where WL is the salary offered with job L, e is the effort provided to perform job L (this 
encompasses hours of work, as well as the cognitive and physical activities used to perform the 
job), YL are pleasant working conditions, and XL unpleasant working conditions. For the moment it 
is assumed that the marginal utility of salary and pleasant working conditions are positive 
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(8U/8w>O and 8U/8YL>0} while the marginal utility of effort and unpleasant working 
conditions are negative (8U/8e<O and 8U/8XL<0). It is also possible to hypothesise that 
pleasant working conditions include training opportunities - the better the training opportunities, 
the greater the expected future financial returns. 
When choosing between different job opportunities, individuals will compare the levels of utility 
provided by the various jobs, and choose the one that maximises their utility. If one follows the 
implications of the compensating wage theory, wages will perfectly reflect variations in working 
conditions, and maintain the same level of utility - i.e. salaries will increase with poor working 
conditions and decrease with good ones. Therefore, assuming that the effort required by nursing 
jobs is the same in all jobs, workers choosing between two jobs will end up comparing the wages, 
and choose the job offering the highest salary. This is the reason why the neoclassical theory 
predicts a perfectly elastic labour supply and a unique equilibrium wage. 
However, the existence of wage rigidities due to labour union agreements, public sector wage 
scales or imperfect information on working conditions, means that actual wages will probably not 
reflect the equilibrium wages (suggesting that wages will not represent health workers' willingness 
to be compensated for job characteristics). Furthermore, it has been assumed that the level of 
utility derived from job L did not depend on individual characteristics. 
The remainder of this section analyses the implications for job preferences when assumptions in 
this initial model setup are relaxed. First, sub-section 3.2.3 describes some of the key aspects of 
nursing jobs that create heterogeneity of job offers available in the labour market; then section 
3.2.4 addresses the consequences of heterogeneity in health workers' tastes and characteristics. 
3.2.3. Heterogeneity of nursing jobs 
This section presents some of the key characteristics that are likely to distinguish nursing jobs 
from each other. This is not meant to capture all the possible characteristics that can differentiate 
jobs. Instead this section focuses on those attributes that are highlighted as important in the 
theoretical literature presented in Chapter 2, and relevant for the study of nurses' choices in 
developing countries (as underlined by the empirical work presented in section 2.3). 
57 
A. Public vs. private jobs 
A first division can be established between jobs in public or private organisations. Economists 
and social scientists have emphasised how the public and private sectors usually differ in their 
purposes and incentives (Perry and Wise, 1990, Dixit, 1997, Dixit, 2002). Although one could 
argue that private and public health care providers are both contributing to an "idealistic or ethical 
purpose" (Dixit, 2002), and are both involved in the provision of a "public good" (Besley and 
Ghatak, 2005), major differences remain between both sectors. In fact, the definition provided by 
Dewatripont et al. in section 2.2.2 also applies to health care providers: a government agency "is 
instructed to pursue social welfare objectives while [a private company] is asked to maximize 
solely shareholder value"20 (Dewatripont et al., 1999). This typically translates into divergent 
health financing characteristics. In the public sector, poorer population groups are often exempted 
from payment and taken care of, while they generally cannot afford care in the private sector, 
where patients are asked to pay out-of-pocket (or covered by a private health insurance they 
have taken). This is particularly true in South Africa where the private sector caters for the 
wealthier, healthier segment of the population (see next chapter). 
B. Urban vs. rural jobs 
A second distinction between nursing jobs that is particularly relevant for developing countries is 
whether they are in rural or urban areas. Indeed, rural or isolated areas are associated with an 
objective reduction in welfare due to greater distance to markets, restricted variety of goods and 
services, and worse access to infrastructures such as schools. This situation is true for most 
countries, but more acute in developing countries where recent evidence also suggests that there 
is a lack of subjective well-being (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2007). Consequently, job opportunities in 
those areas are much less attractive to workers, as supported by empirical evidence from the 
health systems literature (see for example Lehmann et al. (2008) and overview in section 2.3.2). 
Furthermore, in most low and middle-income countries, positions in health facilities located in 
remote areas are also associated with poorer working conditions (for example there are more 
frequent shortages of medical supplies and drugs due to logistical difficulties on the supply chain, 
infrastructures are usually poorer because they can be less easily managed, and health workers 
suffer more from professional isolation). The utility of a job is therefore directly affected by the 
broader living conditions RL offered by the region it is located in: 
UL = (e, WL, YL, XL, RL) (3.2) 
20 This is particularly relevant for South Africa, where the main employers for nurses in the private sector, large 
hospital groups, are listed on the local stock exchange. 
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Typically in developing countries, au 1 aRL <0 in rural/isolated areas and au 1 aRL >0 in urban 
areas. 
3.2.4. Heterogeneity of workers' tastes 
When the model is extended to heterogeneous individuals, the utility derived from a job L is no 
longer expressed as in equation (3.1) but instead integrates a new parameter Zi that represents 
the role of individual characteristics of worker i: 
UiL = (e, WL, YL, XL, Zi) (3.3) 
In the Roy model of self-selection, individuals choose between two types of jobs based on an 
assessment of their own abilities and characteristics (Roy, 1951 ). In the original model, 
individuals with different abilities will have a different productivity in the two sectors and earn 
different income. This framework can be extended to reflect how individual characteristics interact 
with job characteristics to produce different levels of utility for a worker. It is possible to extend 
this framework to assume that some of the inherent job characteristics described in section 3.2. 3 
above are going to interact with individual characteristics, so that job characteristics will be 
perceived differently by different individuals, thereby leading to different levels of utility. Here the 
consequences of workers who differ in altruism, and who differ in their preferences for job 
locations, are considered. 
A. Altruistic health workers 
Here, a first hypothesis is made regarding nurses' concerns for others. It is assumed that the 
more altruistic individuals will self-select into nursing. This does not mean that all altruistic21 
individuals will choose nursing (some might choose other professions), nor than only altruistic 
individuals will choose nursing. Indeed, self-centred people might also be attracted into nursing 
for economic reasons. However, it implies that on balance nursing students are potentially more 
altruistic than other students. 
I H1. Individuals who are more altruistic self-select into nursing studies. 
; 
! 
I 
21 It is recognised that "altruism" is not a dichotomous characteristic. However, to simplify the language used, 
"altruistic individuals" is used interchangeably with "more altruistic individuals". 
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The assumption that health professionals intrinsically care about others is not unusual in 
economic models (Jack, 2005, Delfgaauw, 2007a, Ma, 2007). In practical terms, being altruistic 
means that one's utility is influenced by that of others: 
lh = ( m, 1Tj) where a lh 1 a 1Tj > o 
For altruistic nurses, it means that the patient's utility is an argument in their own utility function: 
(3.4) 
where Vi denotes the strength of a nurse's altruism; Up is the utility provided to the patient by the 
nurse's presence (or action), which is an increasing function of quality of care received q and 
income y. Further, U~ is the "baseline" utility for a patient, that is the utility they derive in the 
absence of (altruistic) health worker. Finally, quality of care is assumed to be determined only by 
health care providers' efforts: 
q = q(e) 
Following the modelling proposed by Delfgauuw (2007a), altruistic nurses care about making their 
patients better off, that means aUidOyi(Up -U~)>O. It follows that altruistic providers are 
intrinsically motivated to make greater efforts than non altruistic providers (see Figures 2.3 in 
section 2.2.2 for a graphic illustration). 
For a patient in the public sector, U~ is low (because patients are poor and cannot access good 
quality care). In contrast, a patient in the private sector always benefits from very good care, and 
his/her utility can only be improved by a decrease in the cost of care22. 
Following a framework similar to that of Roy (1951 ), and assuming that all other job 
characteristics are the same, altruistic individuals should self-select into the public sector, 
because they have a comparative advantage to work in that sector. Given their characteristics 
(yi>Y or at least yi>O), their utility will be higher in the public sector than in the private sector, 
because they generate greater improvement in public patients' utility23. It is also possible to 
assume that nurses will be driven by a sense of public good motivation and distinguish between 
poor and better-off patients, by placing greater weight on the utility of poor patients than on the 
22 Delfgaauw (2007a) underlines that this difference in U~ between private and public patients is what determines 
the sorting of altruistic health professionals into the public sector. 
23 Deflgauuw (2007a) shows formally that altruistic providers can marginally improve the utility of public patients more 
than that of private patients. This is due to the fact they can only improve the utility of private patients by lowering the 
costs of treatment, which is a marginal improvement of rich private patients' utility lower than that of public patients 
who receive better care than they would otherwise receive. 
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utility of rich patients. Intuitively, this can only reinforce the results of the self-selection process 
into the public sector. 
As a result of these individual preferences, the public sector has monopsony power over altruistic 
workers. This means that everything else being equal, altruistic nurses will accept a lower wage 
in the public sector as long as the utility gained from treating patients is greater than the utility lost 
in salary: 
H2. Everything being equal, more altruistic nurses are attracted by jobs in the public sector 
It follows that, everything being equal, altruistic providers will be attracted by jobs where their 
marginal impact on the patients will be greater. This means that within public sector jobs, altruistic 
providers should choose jobs where the marginal increase in the patients' utility Up _ U~ is 
greatest. This means that altruistic nurses will favour positions in under-served areas where there 
are vacant staff positions. Indeed, in those areas patients are both poor and otherwise have no 
access to health services, therefore U~{shortage) < U~(no shortage). Supposing that the quality 
of treatment provided only depends on the provider's effort, the marginal improvement in utility of 
patients in under-served areas will be greater than in other areas. It follows that altruistic nurses 
should be attracted to rural areas where the lack of staff is more critical. 
! H3. Everything being equal, more altruistic nurses are more attracted by rural jobs 
! 
However, relaxing some of the hypotheses of the models can mitigate those conclusions. 
First, it has been assumed so far that jobs are identical expect for salary. Yet, working 
conditions are rarely equivalent, in particular between the private and public sectors in developing 
countries. In South Africa, private sector facilities are typically better equipped, do not suffer from 
shortage of drugs or medical supplies (see next chapter). As underlined in the empirical literature, 
all these elements negatively affect worker satisfaction (see section 2.3.2). If pleasant working 
conditions are equivalent between a private and public job, or if they are better in private jobs, 
then the marginal utility of working conditions themselves will be higher in a private job: 
8Upri/8{YL, XL}pri > 8Upu/8{YL, XL}pu 
This means that the monopsony power of public providers is reduced, maybe to the extent that 
the lower utility generated by working conditions in the public sector is not compensated by the 
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gain in utility derived from the public service mission, so that Upri > Upu and nurses choose the 
private jobs. 
1 H4. More altruistic nurses will choose private jobs if working conditions in the public sector are 
J sufficiently poor 
This effect is particularly relevant for the decision made by altruistic nurses whether to choose a 
public job located in a rural area. Indeed, the loss in welfare generated by the location might be 
too high to be compensated by utility gains from altruism: 
8Uurb/8(YL, XL}urb- 8Uru/8{YL, XL}ru > BUru/B(Up-U~}ru- 8Uurb/8{Up-U~}urb 
1 H5. More altruistic nurses will choose urban jobs rather than rural ones, if working conditions in 
I rural areas are sufficiently poor I 
Second, it has been assumed that quality of care provided is only dependent on the effort 
made by nurses. Yet, quality of care is typically affected by many factors (Wouters, 1991) , 
amongst which working conditions are essential. Indeed, a poor work environment that negatively 
affects a worker's utility also affects the quality of care provided. For example, lack of staff means 
longer waiting times, and lack of equipment or drugs means a poorer health service provided. 
Consequently the quality of care provided is an increasing function of the effort provided and 
working conditions: 
q=q(e, XL) where 8qj8XL <0 
Now, assume that working conditions are increasingly bad when going from the private sector to 
the public urban sector, and to the public rural posts: 
8qj8XLpri < BqjBXLurb < 8qj8XLru 
This means that an increase in a patient's utility generated by a nurse is mitigated by the poor 
working conditions prevailing in the facility. As a result, this mitigates the "altruism" effect that is at 
play for altruistic individuals between private and public jobs, or between rural and urban jobs, 
since the marginal increase in the patient's utility Up is affected negatively by the poor working 
conditions. 
Intuitively, this indirect adverse effect reinforces the direct effect of bad working conditions 
described earlier by hypotheses H4 and H5. 
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B. Heterogeneity in locational preferences 
Models from the new economic geography have underlined that people might have different 
preferences for locations (Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002), as individuals may appreciate differently 
the characteristics offered by varying regions. Some individuals might have developed an interest 
for activities that can only be done in certain areas (e.g. rural areas for individuals craving for 
outdoor activities vs. urban areas for culture-hungry people). Finally, it is easy to imagine how the 
proximity to one's family or emotional attachment to one's childhood region can be important for 
some individuals. Such examples can explain why some individuals will derive a marginal 
increase in utility from being in an area that objectively lacks amenities. 
To explore this point, the following scenario is proposed: consider two jobs, located in two 
different regions 1 and 2. Objectively, region 2 has fewer social amenities and poorer access to 
infrastructure than region 1. However, region 2 provides access to other activities (e.g. hiking and 
other outdoor activities). Consider two nurses: nurse 1 from region 1 and nurse 2 is either from 
region 2 or is keen on outdoor activities. Providing all other job characteristics are the same, 
nurse 2 is more likely to choose a job located in region 2 than nurse 1, because she derives more 
utility from it: 
These differences in tastes may be captured by the compensating wage differences, as 
individuals will accept lower wages for areas they value more. 
The health systems literature suggests that such heterogeneity of preference is often created by 
the origin of individuals (see section 2.2.2). Rural health professionals are less likely to be 
deterred by the living conditions offered in rural areas, and everything else being equal, the utility 
they derive from a job in a rural area is greater than that of an urban job. 
H6. Nurses from rural areas are more likely to choose rural posts than other nurses. 
The empirical approach described below was developed to test some of the hypotheses 
developed above, as well as to inform the design of policies to attract nurses to rural areas. 
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3.3. Overview of empirical approach 
The work presented here is related to a project that was funded by the Department for 
International Development through the Consortium for Research on Equitable Systems (CREHS), 
and took place in several countries, including South Africa (Blaauw et al., 2007). As a result, the 
empirical approach used in this thesis was partly constrained by the decisions and study design 
defined by the CREHS project. The study design of this project is described below, and the 
resulting constraints are emphasised. The empirical approach adopted in this thesis is then 
detailed, in relation to the objectives presented in 3.1. 
3.3.1. Overall design of the CREHS project 
The CREHS project was designed to identify the factors attracting and retaining nurses in rural 
areas, and compare the findings from Thailand, Kenya and South Africa (Blaauw et al., 2007). 
One of the key features of the CREHS project was the decision to start a cohort study with nurses 
who were about to graduate and enter the labour market. Three reasons motivated this choice. 
First, a prospective cohort was thought to limit the potential biases and problems inherent 
in cross-sectional or retrospective study designs. Indeed, to study recruitment and retention in 
rural areas, cross-sectional surveys may be biased as health workers working in rural areas are 
the ones who have chosen to remain in these jobs. Retrospective cohort studies, on the other 
hand, are often limited by difficulties in tracing sufficient numbers of the initial cohort with the 
obvious concern that those health workers that can be traced are likely to differ from those that 
cannot. 
Second, a retrospective cohort was ruled out because there were questions about 
whether it would be ethical to obtain contact details from participants who would not have initially 
consented to be contacted. 
Third, prospective data collection enables a better investigation of the dynamics of 
individual choices and their determinants. For example, recall bias is less of a problem when 
events, choices and justifications are more recent. 
Although the project follows nurses over time and organises data collection at several points in 
time (see Figure 3.1 ), this thesis was built on baseline survey data only. Indeed, when the project 
started, it was not known whether the repeat surveys would actually happen, due to a lack of 
funding at the time. Consequently, the empirical approach was designed within the constraints 
determined by the baseline survey of the project. In particular, it meant that data would be 
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collected from nurses approaching graduation, who would not be employed at the time of the 
survey (hence their actual preferences would not be observed). 
Figure 3.1: CREHS study timeline 
Date Aug-Sep. 2009 Feb 2010 Feb 2011 
2008 
Study phases Baseline Cohort Follow-up Repeat Repeat 
Survey (quarterly updates) Survey #1 Survey #2 
3.3.2. Empirical approach of the thesis 
This section briefly presents the empirical approach chosen to address each of the four objectives 
of the thesis. The tools used are only briefly mentioned here, and more details are provided in 
Chapters 5 to 9. Indeed, considering the variety of approaches used, it was easier to present 
each method separately and justify their use and development in reference to the appropriate 
literature. Table 3.1 summarizes the various sets of data used in this PhD, and provides some 
details on the data collection process. 
A. Objective 1 - Investigating the nature and determinants of South African nurses' 
altruism 
The first objective of the thesis is to determine the nature and determinants of nurses' altruism. 
Altruism has typically been measured in two different ways: with survey measures or by 
measuring the choices made in experimental economic games (more details on the advantages 
and limitations of each method can be found in Chapter 5). The latter approach has been argued 
to provide more reliable measures, since researchers use real monetary incentives, which are 
supposed to avoid "self-serving" biases. Consequently, it was decided to measure altruism by 
playing the 'dictator game' with all survey participants. At the same time, questions capturing 
other dimensions of public motivation and societal altruism were asked in a self-administered 
questionnaire. To compare the levels of altruism of nurses to a benchmark, it was decided to 
carry out the same games with economic students who are the usual participants in economic 
games. 
B. Objective 2 - Studying the determinants of nurses' labour market preferences 
In South Africa, there is no database or survey detailed enough to investigate the actual career 
choices of nurses. Therefore it was necessary to collect primary data to investigate labour market 
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dynamics. As mentioned before, the survey respondents were not employed at the time of the 
CREHS baseline, therefore it was not possible to use actual decisions made in the labour market. 
Thus it was decided to use a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE), presented in section 2.3.3 of the 
literature review, to investigate health worker preferences for existing labour market opportunities. 
One of the main objectives in the design of the choice experiment was to capture as accurately 
as possible the scope of opportunities offered to South African nurses (see Chapter 6 for a 
detailed presentation of the design). 
C. Objective 3- Assessing the likely effects of policy interventions to attract nurses to 
rural areas 
In the absence of experimental or quasi-experimental evidence measuring the effect of a policy, 
economists have often used modelling techniques to estimate the likely effects of interventions. 
As explained in the literature review chapter, DCEs have been used by economists and 
researchers in marketing to predict the uptake of services or market shares. In the same spirit, a 
DCE was developed in the CREHS project to investigate to what extent some hypothetical 
policies, not currently offered to nurses, could attract new graduates to rural areas (see Chapter 7 
for further details on the design). 
D. Objective 4- Investigating the relative cost-effectiveness of different policy 
interventions 
Building on the measures of effectiveness of policy interventions derived from the choice 
experiment used in objective 3, a cost-effectiveness model was developed. This required the 
collection of two types of additional information. First, the cost-effectiveness analysis required the 
development of a model to estimate the likely effects of policy interventions in the long-term. To 
build that model, additional information was collected during interviews with relevant stake-
holders regarding the dynamics of career choices (see Chapter 8). Second, secondary data were 
collected to estimate the cost of inputs used in various policy interventions (see Chapter 9). 
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Table 3.1: Summary of data sources 
Chapter where 
Tools I Data Data collection process Objective Brief description Use made of tools/data are the data presented in 
details 
Experimental Economic During the baseline survey; To measure nurses' altruism The dictator game was played with all respondents. It required them to Objectives 1' Chapter 5 
game (dictator game) First tool administered. choose how to divide R 1 00 between themselves and a recipient; three 2, 3 and 4 
In 2009 with a group of different identities of recipients were given. 
economic students. An additional group of economic students was surveyed in 2009. 
Labour market Discrete During the baseline survey; To capture the job Labelled choice experiment presenting a series of 12 choices of 4 job Objective 2 Chapter 6 
Choice Experiment Third tool administered. preferences of nurses for the descriptions (public rural- public urban- private urban- overseas). 
main job opportunities Each job description was made up of 5 attributes, covering the main 
offered in South Africa characteristics of jobs (salary, place of work, education opportunities, 
population served, working conditions). 
'Policy' Discrete Choice During the baseline survey; To measure the effect of Labelled choice experiment presenting a series of 16 choice sets; each Objectives 2 Chapter 7 
Experiment Second tool administered. different policy levers to choice sets presented two different job descriptions one in a rural and 3 
attract nurses to rural areas another in an urban location; each job description was made up of 
different variations of 7 attributes, with rural job characteristics 
encompassing various possible policy interventions. 
Self-Administered During the baseline survey; To provide socio- Self-administered questionnaire entailing questions on the following Objectives Chapter 5 
questionnaire Fourth and last tool demographic and attitudinal areas: individual characteristics, education characteristics, questions 1,2, 3 and 4 
administered. information about study on values and preferences (including altruism), attitudes towards living 
respondents and working in rural areas. 
Cost data Use of secondary data To cost the HR possible Collection of data enabling to cost the various hypothetical policy Objective 4 Chapter 9 
(documents from the interventions to attract interventions that could be designed using attributes of the 'policy' 
Department of Health, real nurses to rural areas DCE*: such as the cost of a rented house; rural allowances, etc. 
estate reports, etc.), 
interviews with stake-
holders. 
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3.4. Institutional setting and intellectual ownership 
The initial development of this PhD emerged from several activities (literature reviews and 
development of tools) that were initiated or undertaken at the beginning of the CREHS project. 1 
led the coordination and design of the CREHS project, and remained heavily involved in the 
various phases of the development of the project (data collection and analysis) until its 
completion in April 2010. 
In terms of tool development, I proposed the use of experimental economics at a very early stage, 
and was solely responsible for the development of these tools within the project. Some other tools 
presented in this thesis (self-administered questionnaire (SAQ) and DCE 'policy') were developed 
specifically for the project and I played a key role in their design. Finally, some tools (DCE 'labour 
market' and some questions in the SAQ) were specifically designed to answer some questions 
raised in this thesis. Their genesis was independent from the project, but their administration 
'piggy-backed' on the project. 
In terms of data analysis, several situations should be distinguished. Some datasets 
(experimental economics) were analysed for this thesis and the project, where I was the only 
researcher responsible for their analysis. Other datasets were analysed under the project (by 
myself and others), and a different modelling was performed for this PhD (for the 'policy' DCE 
data). Finally, some data were solely analysed within this thesis (labour market DCE). 
Table 3.2 below gives a summary of the various activities undertaken for the project, the PhD, 
and it summarises which activities were common to both. 
Table 3.2: Summary of activities undertaken for the project and the PhD 
! PhD only (ML) 
I 
! Both PhD and project 
I 
! Project only 
Tools developed 
for: 
DCE 'labour market'; 
Markov Model; Cost-
Effectiveness Model 
I 
Experimental Game (ML) 
I 
SAQs (DB + ML) 
DCE 'policy' (DB + ML) 
Data analysed 1 DCE 'labour market' ; 1 Experimental Game (ML)* I DCE 'policy' (ML +DB)** 
for: I Markov Model ; Cost- j DCE 'policy' (ML)* I 
1 Effectiveness Model j SAQ2 (ML)* 
I I 
Notes: the initials between parentheses denote the individuals responsible for the task mentioned. DB- Duane 
Blaauw; ML=Mylene Lagarde. 
*the baseline self-administered questionnaire (SAQ1) will be used in the analysis of the DCEs and the 
experimental games to study the influence of individual characteristics. 
**the analysis of the policy DCE undertaken as part of the project differed from that done from that of the 
PhD: different methods will be used and costing of policy scenarios will not be realised. 
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3.5. Study population 
3.5.1. Population characteristics 
The population study consisted of South African graduate nurses who were about to enter the 
labour market as professional nurses. Several reasons guided the choice of professional nurses 
instead of enrolled or auxiliary nurses. First, because of their broad skills and the orientation of 
the South African health system towards primary health care, professional nurses now form the 
cornerstone of the health system. Second, as explained before, there is a shortage of 
professional nurses in South Africa. Third, with their four-year training, professional nurses have a 
nursing degree that is recognised overseas, thereby offering them the possibility to emigrate. 
Other categories of nurse do not benefit from a similar international recognition of their skills. 
Finally, professional nurses also have the possibility to specialise which can give them more 
lucrative opportunities in the private sector or more responsibilities in the public sector. 
For logistical and cost reasons it was not deemed possible to use a national random sample of 
graduate nurses. Instead, a multi-stage sampling strategy was used. Nursing colleges were first 
selected at random from rural and urban regions to present a diversified educational background. 
In South Africa, the North-West province is one of the rural provinces24, while Gauteng is the 
most urban province. These two regions were therefore selected as the sample frame to choose 
the nursing training institutions. 
The selection of nursing training institutions was not entirely random, as two additional criteria 
were used to select them. To capture graduates from the two main providers of training 
institutions in the public sector (see Chapter 4), it was decided to sample respondents from 
universities and nursing colleges in each province. Finally, the choice of nursing colleges was 
partly led by the number of students they trained. In order to obtain a sufficient sample size (see 
below), and without prior knowledge of the response rate that would be obtained in each 
institution, bigger institutions were favoured. Once selected training institutions agreed to 
participate in the study, and all final year students from these colleges were invited to participate 
in the study. 
24 The North-West province is also one of the provinces most severely affected by shortages of nurses in the public 
sector: see Chapter 4. 
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3.5.2. Sampling 
Sample size considerations were based on the requirements for the analysis of DCE and 
experimental economics data. 
For economic experiments, many studies have been carried out with less than 100 participants 
(Andreoni and Miller, 2002, Henrich et al., 2004b), although larger samples are always preferable. 
It was judged that the requirements in the DCE would be sufficient to obtain robust estimates in 
experimental economic games. 
The sampling strategy was based on the requirements of the DCE initially envisaged for the 
project25 . Following the recommendations of Hensher et al. (2005), the minimal sample size was 
estimated based on the predicted uptake p of the least popular alternative, in this case the rural 
job (see design of the DCE in chapter 7), as follows: 
where a is the level of allowable deviation as a percentage between p and p ; 1 - a is the 
confidence level of the estimations such as Pr (lp- pi < ap) > 1- a ; and¢> is the inverse 
cumulative distribution function of a standard normal. 
It was expected that rural jobs would be less popular than urban ones, but that the 'natural' 
imbalance would be redressed by some of the proposed new attributes in rural jobs. Therefore, 
we predicted that only 40% of respondents would choose the rural option. To estimate this 
proportion accurately with a 5% error margin, a minimal number of 224 respondents was needed 
(based on the assumption that each would answer 16 choice sets). A larger sample size was 
targeted, in order to carry out sub-group analysis. Anticipated groups of interest in the study 
mainly pertained to characteristics of their training and in particular whether they had been trained 
in a rural (North West) or urban (Gauteng) province. The origin of the students (rural or urban 
background) was also of interest, but in the absence of any preliminary information on students' 
characteristics, it was hoped that this would be partly captured by the sampling strategy based on 
the college. It was calculated that with a target sample size of 350 individuals, half from each 
group, it would be possible to estimate accurately the uptake of rural and urban posts for the 
2s At the time of the study design, the DCE developed solely for this PhD was not yet finalised. 
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whole population, and estimate the same proportions in the two groups with a reasonable 
confidence26. 
To sum up, a sample size of approximately 350 participants was targeted. A sample of 377 
respondents was obtained, mainly due to a higher response rate than expected in selected 
training institutions. Data collection with final year students was conducted between July and 
October 2008. 
Table 3.3: Summary of sample size per study site 
Name of Institution Date of Total Number Response 
fieldwork number of of rate 
students students 
surveyed 
Gauteng Province 
S.G. Lourens Nursing College (Pretoria) 28/07/08 79 71 90% 
Ann Latsky College of Nursing (Johannesburg) 12/08/08 159 125 79% 
University of Johannesburg 27/08/08 30 20 67% 
Total Gauteng 268 216 81% 
North West Province 
Mmabatho Nursing College 25/07/08 135 37 27% 
Excelsius Nursing College (Kierksdorp) 23/09/08 99 73 74% 
North West University (Potchefstroom campus) 13/10/08 19 9 47% 
North West University (Mafikeng campus) 27/10/08 57 42 74% 
Total North West 310 161 52% 
Total 578 377 65% 
26 It was calculated that with 175 individuals from each group, for the rural group, whose predicted uptake of rural 
posts was estimated at 40%, that deviation from that proportion would be at most 4.5%. For the urban group whose 
uptake of rural jobs was predicted to be 20%, the estimates would deviate from that proportion by 7.4% at most. 
These were judged acceptable risks, considering the budget and logistical constraints of the study. 
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3.5.3. Study population characteristics 
Table 3.4 shows the main characteristics of the sample. A brief comparison of the main 
characteristics of this population and the general nursing population is presented in the next 
chapter. 
Table 3.4: Demographic characteristics 
Variables Statistic description Result 
%Male 14.3 Sex 
(N=377) %Female 85.7 
··Aiie··························· · · ··· ............... m.ean.Ts<ff···················································Jr·o-··· 
(N=374) (7.n 
···Aiie................................. · · · ··· ............................................. 2 .. o-~·24 .. ye~irs ... CiiCi .......................................................... 25·:·7 ........... .. 
(N=374) 25-29 years old 
30-34 years old 
>35 years old 
22.8 
24.9 
26.5 
..... P .. ro.vili'C:e .. wlle.re ... traTiiea ......................................................... o;~ .. Galiieii-9 .................................................................................... 57':3 ....................... .. 
(N=377) % North West 42.7 
.... ira'inrn·9 · insht'u't'ioli ..................................................... o/~ ·o iiTversliY ............................... -................. · .. · · .... 18 ~ 8 
(N=377) %Nursing college 81.2 
..... Race ....................................................... · ....................................... o/~"J\trfc.an......................................................................... 89.3 
(N=375) % Coloured 2.9 
%White 
.. "M"a.riiai .. status ................ · .... · .... · · ...... · ............................. sin9ie·-·--·--·-··--.. ·-- ................ · ...................... .. 
(N=372) Married 
Divorced I Widowed 
7.7 
.... ' .......... . 
65.9 
30.4 
3.8 
..... An·y·cll·i-id're·r;·················· ......................................................................... oJ~Ves .............................................................................  ........................................................... 
(N=377) 
Area where born 
(N=375) 
............ · --o/~VeiY .. i"ij'ia'i" · --
% Relatively rural 
%Urban town 
%Urban city 
............... -..... ---··"''"''''"'' 
.... M.oth.e?s. edlicatioil "ievei' · · ................. · ............ p;:;n;-a·ry .................................. _ ................................ · · · 
(N=364) Secondary 
Matric 
Post-Matric 
61.0 
11.2 
35.7 
37.6 
15.5 
27.2 
41.2 
13.2 
18.4 
...... i=.athe.rs·; ... e.mpioyme.il't' .. st'at'u·s ........................................ o;~·-i=aiii"er .. work"fii9_ ............................................................. 44I .................. .. 
(N=233) 
· Moth_e.rsj"em.pioymenf's'iatu·s .............................. o/~--Moiii .. er-work-in9 ·--·- --· ......... -· 34.8 
(N=319) 
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As expected for a nursing population, the proportion of male students was relatively low (14.3%). 
The majority of the study participants were black/African (89%), although the proportion of white 
students in universities was 32.4%, reflecting differences in socio-economic background between 
nursing college and university students. The mean age of the study members was 31 years, with 
a younger population in universities (whereas in training colleges, some students were late-
comers into higher education). The majority of nurses (61 %) already had children, and just fewer 
than 50% of study participants said they were from rural areas. Lastly, the table reflects the dire 
employment conditions in the labour market with less than 50% of their parents working at the 
time of the survey27. 
3.6. Ethical issues 
Ethical approval was obtained in London from the ethics committee of the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (see Appendix 3.1 ), and in South Africa from the University of 
Witwatersrand in Johannesburg (see Appendix 3.2). Further research clearance was sought and 
obtained from the health authorities of the two provinces where the study took place. 
To ensure that participation was completely voluntary, enrolment in the study happened in two 
stages. One of the research team members would present the study to students gathered in their 
training institution. A study information sheet was then handed out to them (see Appendix 3.3), 
and they could ask further questions. They were then informed that the study would happen the 
following day, and were invited to participate. They were also informed that they would not be 
able to join the study if they arrived late. The following day, nursing students who had decided to 
participate in the study were then formerly asked to sign a study consent form (see Appendix 
3.4). 
As a standard element of experimental economics, all games were played with real monetary 
rewards. The rationale of this feature of experimental economics is to increase the realism of the 
choice, and avoid the biases that arise with other traditional methods that ask hypothetical 
questions. Research participants did not know in advance of the existence of such monetary 
stakes, so that these payments did not constitute an inducement to take part in the study. These 
small payments were in any case not seen as an undue incentive given the time required to 
participate in the study. 
21 The high number of non-response is explained by the fact that many respondents had already lost one or both 
parents. 
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The research team took particular care to provide feedback to study participants and policy-
makers. The main results of the overall study were fed back to all interviewees through a public 
website. Each time the website was updated with new information, study participants received a 
text message inviting them to consult it. In addition, some face-to-face meetings with study 
participants were organised during the follow-up in February 2010 and more information on the 
study findings was presented. 
Findings have also been presented to other relevant policymakers through policy briefs and 
presentations in a meeting organised in May 2009. Results were conveyed to a wider audience of 
public health specialists during a conference in November 2009. 
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Chapter 4 · Context of the thesis 
This chapter presents the overall context of the study in South Africa, with a focus on the different 
elements that are susceptible of playing a role in the job preferences of health workers in general, 
and nurses in particular. The first section presents the general political, economic and social 
situation in South Africa. It shows how the radical changes that occurred in this country in the 
1990s have contributed to shape the socio-economic situation of the country today, which 
constitutes the broad contextual elements that shape individual behaviours in South Africa. The 
second section describes the health system in the country, with a focus on the major 
transformations that have occurred since 1994, as well as the problems inherited from the 
situation before 1994. The third section describes the regulatory and policy environment for the 
nursing profession, and depicts the main characteristics of the nursing population. 
4.1. General background on South Africa 
4.1.1. Brief historical background 
The policy of apartheid (separateness) was officially introduced in South Africa in 1948, after the 
National Party won the national elections. That policy, enforcing strict race-based measures, 
allowed the development of different racial groups in their separate areas. Effectively, it divided 
the economy into a privileged white one, and an impoverished, predominantly unskilled and 
illiterate, black one (Thompson, 2001). 
At the end of the 1970s, as domestic protest was growing and was only met by violent repression, 
but no sign of political resolution, the policy started to be widely criticised on the international 
stage. This led to political and economic sanctions being placed against the country in the 1980s, 
which contributed to the political and economic pressure that saw the unravelling of apartheid. In 
1990, the white president Frederik de Klerk recognised the economic unsustainability of the 
apartheid system, released Nelson Mandela and unbanned the African National Congress (ANC) 
that Mandela led. 
After South Africa held its first multi-racial elections in 1994, the newly elected ANC government 
tried to restore order to an economy harmed by sanctions, while also integrating the previously 
disadvantaged segment of the population into it. To achieve that objective, they embarked on the 
Reconstruction and Development Plan to improve social services including housing, education 
and health to blacks, for whom these services had seriously lagged behind in the apartheid years. 
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4.1.2. Socio-economic background 
South Africa is a nation of about 48 million people of diverse origins. According to official 
population estimates (Statistics South Africa, 2008a), 79% of the population is black, 9.5% is 
white , 9% is coloured and about 2.5% is Indian or other Asian . Although eleven languages are 
recognised in the constitution, English is the most commonly spoken language in official and 
commercial public life, but it is only the fifth most spoken home language. Still reflecting the 
effects of the Apartheid regime where large numbers of people were concentrated in certain 
areas of the country, the population density varies widely across the country (Figure 4.1 ). 
According to World Bank estimates, 60% of the population lives in urban areas. The rest of the 
population is scattered over a large territory, so that rural population densities vary considerably 
across the country - they are highest in the former homelands and much lower in historically 
white-populated areas, especially in semi-arid western areas. 
Figure 4.1: Population density in South Africa (by municipalities) 
Northern Cape 
>100/km2 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/lmage:Popu lation density ZA.svg based on Census data (2001) 
With a Gross Domestic Product (GOP) per capita estimated in 2007 at US$5,91528, or US$9,73629 
in Purchasing Power Parity, South Africa is classified as an upper middle-income country and has 
28 http:/!imf.org/external/pubs/ft!weo/2008/02/weodata/index.aspx World Economic and Financial Surveys IMF World 
Economic Outlook Database October 2008 Edition. 
29 The ppp estimate was calculated using the PPP estimates of country GOP and population provided by the World 
Bank (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP PPP.pdf and 
http://siteresources. worldbank .org/DA TASTA TISTICS/Resources/POP. pdO 
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the biggest and most advanced economy in Africa. Although the average annual growth of the 
GOP has been positive since 2000, the wealth created has not been evenly distributed across the 
population, and it has not led to much job creation. 
After 1994, the implementation of numerous welfare and social programmes, such as the Child 
Support Grant, is thought to have curbed the progression of poverty, which may have slightly 
decreased since the early 2000s (Friedman and Bhengu, 2008). However, the apartheid legacy is 
still very visible through economic inequalities. Strikingly, there has not been a significant change 
in inequalities measured by the Gini coefficient since the end of apartheid, and South Africa is still 
among the countries with the highest Gini Index (Bradshaw, 2008). 
High unemployment is regularly cited as the most important constraint to both poverty reduction 
and accelerating growth in South Africa. Despite the growth South Africa has enjoyed since 2000, 
unemployment increased up to 2003, reaching levels that have remained steady at an estimated 
31.2% (according to the narrow definition of unemployment as "being able to and wanting to work 
and taking active job seeking steps in the four weeks prior to survey'') or 42.1% (following the 
expanded definition of unemployment: "being eligible to work but not being employed") in 2008 
(Satistics South Africa, 2008b). Two things characterise unemployment in South Africa: it 
predominantly affects young and black people (Bradshaw, 2008), and unskilled workers. A recent 
study on human resources and labour market dynamics in South Africa highlighted the double 
curse of the labour market: a lack of skilled workers and concurrent high unemployment among 
the unskilled (Kraak, 2008). In this study, the lack of skilled workers was described as the 
inadequate response of educational output to the economic needs resulting from the robust 
economic growth that started in the 1990s. 
Despite encouraging results on social development indicators since 1994, South Africa still 
displays large disparities in access to basic services. Although the situation has improved since 
the end of apartheid, access to basic services (health, education) is still limited for some 
population groups. To some extent, these living standards partly mirror the lack of economic 
opportunities of the most disadvantaged groups (CSDH, 2008). Although the percentage of the 
population with more than a primary education has increased from 63.5% in 2002 to 69.4% in 
2007, only 9.8% of the population older than 20 years old has tertiary education, and 23.6% has 
reached grade 12 (Statistics South Africa, 2007). A key determinant of health, access to water 
and sanitation, remains limited in such a wealthy country. Although there has been considerable 
progress made since 2002, 21% of households still did not have access to piped water in 2007 
(Statistics South Africa, 2007). The same year, 15.4% of households were still living in informal 
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dwellings. Gauteng, Western Cape and North West are the three provinces with the highest 
percentage of households living in such housing, representing respectively 25.9%, 21.4% and 
19.9% of their population. 8% of households had no toilet facilities in 2007. 
4.1.3. Health profile 
Despite its wealth, South Africa's population bears a high burden of disease and continues to 
recover from the disparities that resulted from decades of marginalization of the black population. 
In 2008, the life expectancy at birth (52.2 years) was much lower than in other upper middle-
income countries estimated in 1998 (71 years3o) (Statistics South Africa, 2008a). The average 
under-five mortality rate of 67 per 1,000 was more than twice the average in upper middle-income 
countries (28 per 1 ,000). These poor indicators are partly due to the country's HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, which is one of the most severe in sub-Saharan Africa, affecting all sections of society. 
With a prevalence rate of 18.8% amongst adults aged 18-49 years (Satistics South Africa, 
2008a), South Africa is the country with the highest number of HIV-positive people in the world 
(an estimated 5.35 million in 2008). Estimates show that at least 40% of the deaths in the country 
are AIDS-related (Bradshaw et al., 2004, Actuarial Society of South Africa, 2005, Anderson and 
Phillips, 2006). The HIV/AIDS epidemic has partly contributed to the increase in the proportion of 
deaths due to infectious and parasitic causes, which rose from 13.1% in 1997 to 25.5% in 2005 
(Health Systems Trust, 2008b ). 
In terms of maternal health outcomes, the performance of South Africa is also poor compared to 
other upper middle-income countries. Maternal mortality is high, with estimates ranging from 150 
to 400 deaths per 100,000 live births (Chopra et al., 2009a), against an estimated 91 deaths per 
100,000 live births on average in upper middle-income countries (WHO, 2007), and a national 
MDG target in 2015 of 38 per 100,000. Besides, the national average hides important 
inequalities. For example, although there is a high level of utilization of antenatal care services 
and deliveries in health facilities, 27% of the poorest women in South Africa give birth at home 
(Penn-Kekana et al., 2004), with issues of quality of care and staff shortages identified as some 
of the causes of such poor performance (Parkhurst et al., 2005). 
Only a few studies have explored simultaneously the various dimensions of inequality in health, 
where income, racial and geographic inequalities are intertwined (Blaauw and Penn-Kekana, 
2002). 
30 http://www. worldbank .org/depweb/english/beyond/beyondco/beg an2-3. pdf 
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There is an abundant literature showing the correlation between inequalities of income 
and inequalities of health status. Using data from a small survey in a health district in Western 
Cape, a study showed evidence of a large causal effect of income on health status, mediated by 
living standards and nutritional status (Case, 2004). A study on inequalities in maternal health 
showed that the average number of antenatal consultations for the poorest quintile was 5.2 
compared to 8.6 visits for the richest quintile (Blaauw and Penn-Kekana, 2002). This study also 
showed that the poorest African women were 10 times more likely to deliver without a trained 
attendant than African women in the top quintile. 
The effects of discrimination between population groups pre-1994 are still visible in 
inequalities across population groups. For example, the infant mortality rate among the black 
population is four times that of the white population (15.3 vs. 63.6 deaths per 100,000 live birth} 
(Bradshaw, 2008). Likewise, in 1998, black women had an average of 5.7 antenatal-care visits 
compared to 9.9 for Indian and 9.5 for white mothers (Blaauw and Penn-Kekana, 2002). 
Because poorer populations live in rural areas, inequalities are also geographic, with the 
infant mortality rate in rural areas being 1.6 times as high as that of urban areas: 71.2 vs. 43.2 per 
100,000 live births (Bradshaw, 2008). Similarly, while only 5.3% of women delivered without a 
trained attendant in urban areas, 23.6% did so in rural areas (Blaauw and Penn-Kekana, 2002). 
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4.2. The South African health system 
4.2.1. Health system inherited in 1994 
At the end of the Apartheid era, the South African health system was characterised by 
inequalities in coverage and quality of services, where white population groups were favoured, 
whilst certain geographic areas (rural areas, in particularly 'homeland' areas31, and 'township' 
areas) were systematically under-funded (Ntsaluba and Pillay, 1998, Coovadia et al., 2009). 
Mirroring the complex separate administrative structure of the Apartheid regime, the structure of 
the health system was characterised by inefficiency, with a duplication of administrative and 
clinical services (Coovadia et al., 2009). For example, there were four health departments, one 
for each of the population groups recognised by the regime32, and a range of sub-national health 
authorities in the former four provinces and ten homelands. In terms of infrastructure, the 
'separate development' ideology translated into separate curative and preventive care facilities. 
Another characteristic of the public health sector before 1994 was that it was highly biased 
towards hospital-based, curative care (Coovadia et al., 2009). Public funding was also 
disproportionally spent on tertiary services benefiting predominantly the white population, 
concentrated in urban areas. With only 11% of public expenditure dedicated to non-hospital 
primary health care (Mcintyre et al., 1995), primary care infrastructure and capacity had been 
systematically neglected. 
Finally, by 1994, South Africa had a well-developed for-profit private sector, almost exclusively 
used by the white population (Coovadia et al., 2009). If initially private hospitals were mostly non-
profit mission hospitals in rural areas and industry specific facilities such as on-site hospitals at 
large mines, the privatisation and deregulation policies undertaken in the 1980s led to a rapid 
growth of the private for-profit sector, heavily concentrated in urban areas. For example, by 1990 
more than 60% of doctors (both generalists and specialists) were working in private practices 
(Rispel and Behr, 1992). 
31 Representing about 13% of the territory, these 10 geographic areas were established in 1951 by the Bantu 
Authorities Act for the purpose of concentrating members of designated ethnic groups, thus making each of those 
territories ethnically homogeneous as the basis for creating "autonomous" nation states. 
32 In 1950 the Population Registration Act classified the population into 'African', 'Coloured', 'Indian' and 'White' 
population groups. 
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4.2.2. Health system reforms since 1994 
After the first democratic elections in 1994, there was a dramatic restructuring of the health 
department, followed by many reforms to try and make the health system more efficient, more 
equitable and accessible to the disadvantaged population. 
To depart significantly from the past, the African National Congress referred to the equity spirit of 
the Primary Health Care principles proclaimed at the Alma-Ata Conference in 1978 in its key 
founding policy document, The Reconstruction and Development Programme (African National 
Congress, 1994): "the whole national health service must be driven by the Primary Health Care 
(PHC) approach. This emphasises community participation and empowerment, inter-sectoral 
collaboration and cost-effective care, as well as integration of preventive, promotive, curative and 
rehabilitation services." (African National Congress, 1994) 
Soon after, the White Paper for the Transformation of the Health Sector in South Africa 
(Department of Health, 1997) provided the framework for the transformation of the health care 
system, with a special emphasis on equity and primary health care. While the former system was 
mainly focused on the role of hospitals, a new administrative structure was gradually introduced 
that was district-centred and emphasised the importance of, and access to, primary health 
services (Health Systems Trust, 2008b). A direct consequence of that policy was the 
implementation of a vast programme of construction and rehabilitation of health facilities, which 
started from the mid-1990s and resulted in the creation of more than 1,600 new primary level 
facilities (Health Systems Trust, 2008b). As a result a third (35%) of currently existing primary 
health care facilities have been built since the end of apartheid in 1994. The implementation of 
this PHC approach has translated into a greater reliance by the public health service on the 
nursing profession. 
To abolish financial barriers to primary health services, user fees for children aged under six 
years and pregnant women were removed in 1994, and in 1997 user charges at all primary health 
care clinics were abolished (Wilkinson et al., 2001). If this policy resulted in significant increase in 
utilisation of public services, it also generated frustrations amongst health workers who were not 
consulted about the policy change, and had to face increased workload without adequate 
provision of supplies (Wilkinson et al., 2001, Gilson and Mcintyre, 2005). 
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4.2.3. The duality of the South African health system 
In 2005, South Africa spent more on health, measured as a percentage of GOP (7.7%), than the 
average upper middle-income countries (6.2%), even if this has declined from a level of about 8% 
of GOP throughout the 1990s. However, a large part of these expenditures are spent in the 
private sector (equivalent to 59% of all expenses, or 4.55% of GOP in 2005), 
The private sector is a highly specialised urban sector which has continued to grow since 1994 
(Health Systems Trust, 2008a), as shown by data suggesting that 40% of all doctors worked 
there by the end of the 1980s, but 66% of specialists and 62% of GPs by the end of the 1990s 
(Coovadia et al., 2009). This growth of the private sector has also increased the number of 
nursing positions in that sector. Funding of the private sector is operated through medical 
schemes, which are voluntary health insurance schemes run by private companies. Membership 
of medical schemes has become increasingly unaffordable for South Africans, as the increase in 
expenditures in the private sector has been followed by increases in premiums charged by 
medical schemes (Mcintyre et al., 1995). 84% of hospitals in the private sector are under the 
control of three large hospital groups (Netcare, Medi-Ciinic and Afrox/Life Healthcare), who seem 
to use their oligopoly power to avoid price competition with each other and charge excessively 
high prices (van den Heever, 2007). In contrast, health expenditure for the public sector only 
amounts to 3.15% of GOP even though public health care expenditure has grown at a higher rate 
than the GOP in the recent past (Mcintyre et al., 2007). 
These figures reflect the duality of the South African health system, where a well-developed 
private sector primarily caters for a minority of the population. In addition to the wealthier 15% of 
the population who are covered by the medical schemes, an estimated 21% of the population, 
who are not members of medical schemes, use the private sector and pay out-of-pocket 
(Mcintyre et al., 2007). Consequently the remaining 64.2% of the population is entirely dependent 
on the public health sector for their health care services. Even with such optimistic assumptions 
on the use of private providers, the public-private disparities are substantial (Table 4.1 ). 
Table 4.1: Distribution of health care resources between public and private sectors (2005) 
Population per general doctor 
Population per specialist 
Population per nurse 
Population per hospital bed 
Source: (Mcintyre et al., 2007) 
Private sector 
(243) 588* 
470 
102 
194 
Public sector 
4,193 
10,811 
616 
399 
*Data in brackets represents only medical scheme members (14.8% of the population); the main estimates assume that private 
GPs and pharmacists may be used by up to 35.8% of South Africans. 
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4.2.4. Working conditions 
The literature in South Africa identifies five main series of factors that contribute to difficult 
working conditions in the public sector. 
First, violence in the workplace is also often cited as an important factor of distress for South 
African health workers (Xaba and Phillips, 2001 ). According to a recent study (Geyer, 2004), 
South Africa was one of the countries with the highest prevalence of violence in the workplace of 
health care workers, with patients and their families being the biggest perpetrators. Verbal abuse 
by patients, as well as lack of respect from doctors, has also been reported in other studies 
(Mokoka, 2007, Breier et al., 2009). 
Second, several studies have highlighted the indirect negative consequences of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic on nursing staff. Research has highlighted nurses' hopelessness in front of the 
magnitude of the epidemic, and increased psychosocial stress resulting in low morale and 
burnout (Xaba and Phillips, 2001, Hall, 2004). Other studies have highlighted the increased risk of 
occupational exposure to HIV for nurses. These aspects have been cited as push factors that 
contribute to emigration abroad and/or deterring individuals from taking up nursing as a 
profession (Xaba and Phillips, 2001). 
Third, lack of resources, insufficient equipment or poorly maintained buildings and equipment 
have also been regularly identified by nurses' demotivation or contributing to their departures 
(Hall, 2004, Mokoka, 2007). 
Fourth, various studies have recently pointed to failures in the management of human resources 
(Coovadia et al., 2009). The rapid transformation of the health workforce has left insufficiently 
experienced managers to deal with complex transformations and dynamics in the public sector. 
Erasmus found that nurses' burnout and fatigue was directly caused by uncertainty regarding 
their role and job description (Erasmus 1995). This lack of managerial capacity, worsened by the 
shortage of staff in the public sector, has translated into problems of poor attitude, moonlighting 
and absenteeism. 
Finally, several studies have underlined the disastrous consequences of under-staffing and high 
workload as driving factors of nurses' dissatisfaction (Hall, 2004). For example, high workload 
and low recognition (through perceived low remunerations) almost always rank first in the 
negative aspects affecting morale (Erasmus, 1998, Ehlers, 2003, Shisana et al., 2003, Erasmus 
and Brevis, 2005, Penn-Kekana et al., 2005). 
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This series of problems has led to increased levels of stress and burnout amongst nurses in 
South Africa (Erasmus, 1998, Xaba and Phillips, 2001, Ehlers, 2003, Erasmus and Brevis, 2005). 
For example, in a survey of 147 nurses in the public sector (Penn-Kekana et al., 2005), 
researchers found 40% of respondents declared that they dreaded the next day, 50% felt 
unmotivated and 40% intended to leave their job. While nurses regularly mentioned they were 
satisfied with the nature of their work as a nurse, they frequently complain about their working 
conditions, which made them feel powerless and frustrated (Hall, 2004). 
To finish, it is important to note that the duality of the health system highlighted in section 4.2.3 is 
also reflected in differences of working conditions. A recent study investigating the relative job 
satisfaction of nurses in the private and public sectors showed that nurses in the private sector 
were significantly more satisfied with most aspects of their work, compared to their colleagues in 
the public sector (Pillay, 2009). The greatest differences in satisfaction levels were found for 
safety at work, resource availability and workload respectively. 
4.3. Nursing in South Africa 
4.3.1. The nursing profession 
In 1997, the White Paper for the Transformation of the Health System in South Africa was the first 
official document to set out the direction for the development of the health system, and it listed 
training and the development of health personnel as a key priority. 
A major rationalisation of nursing education followed the general restructuring trend in the 
education system after 1994. This involved the development and definition of new curricula for 
nursing education. In line with the National Qualification Framework, established to upgrade the 
South African education and training systems to international standards, the South African 
Nursing Council (SANC) set new standards for the education and training of nurses in South 
Africa. Today, to obtain professional registration from SANC, nurses must follow nursing 
education and training at one of 95 public and private nursing training institutions33 accredited by 
the SANC. 
33 "Nursing education in South Africa takes place in a particularly complex education and training terrain that includes 
universities and technikons (now universities of technology), public stand-alone nursing colleges, nursing schools 
attached to public hospitals, private colleges run by the major hospital groups, private colleges attached to old-age 
homes and private colleges that train for profit." Breier et al. 2009 (p.12) 
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The rationalisation of nursing education led to the distinction between two main categories of 
nurses: Professional or Registered Nurses (PN or RN) on the one hand, and Enrolled Nurses 
(EN) and Enrolled Nursing Auxiliaries (ENA) on the other hand34. 
There are two ways of becoming a Professional Nurse3s. Either nurses have passed a four-year 
programme, or ENs and ENAs have upgraded to professional nurses after a two-year bridging 
programme. This bridging programme can be offered by private as well as public nursing 
education institutions, but the four-year programme is offered by public institutions only 
(universities and public nursing colleges). In public institutions, nursing students are paid 
throughout their studies, as they work in health facilities. 
The Nursing Act No 33 of 2005 introduced new regulations describing the scope of practice of 
nurses, and created new categories of nurses: professional nurse, professional midwife, staff 
nurse, auxiliary nurse and auxiliary midwife. The revised scope of practice meant to reflect a new 
approach to the nursing profession, where PNs ought to be better prepared for primary 
health care settings and trained to practise comprehensively (Breier et al., 2009). Some have also 
noted that the shortage of human resources in the country has led to expand the nurse's scope of 
practice through this Act. 
4.3.2. Distribution of nurses 
According to the SANC register in 2007 there were 103,792 registered PNs, and registers from 
the South African Nursing Council indicates that between 1998 and 2007, the total number of 
registered PNs increased by 6.9%, (see Appendix 4.2). However, these data are not entirely 
reliable, as they are not regularly updated. A recent study estimated that only about 80% of these 
nurses were still active (Breier et al., 2009). Still, even with such optimistic figures on the number 
of active nurses, the density of professional nurses in the South African public sector since 2000 
has decreased by 3%, from 120.3 per 100,000 population in 2000 to 116.6 per 100,000 
population in 200836 (Appendix 4.3). This is the consequence of the slow annual growth rate in 
the number of nurses, failing to match the higher population growth over the same period. 
34 This study focuses on the first cadre of nurses. 
35 "Registration on the SANG register entitles one to be called a registered nurse (RN) or professional nurse (PN). 
These terms are often used interchangeably, but the strict distinction is that the term 'professional nurse' should be 
used only for those who have been through a four-year programme that includes training in community nursing, 
midwifery and psychiatric nursing as well as general nursing. A nurse who has completed a bridging programme is 
qualified to practise only general nursing. In some contexts such nurses are referred to as registered rather than 
professional nurses." Breier et al. 2009 (p.13) 
36 The decline in the nurse-to-population ratio is even bigger if one goes back to earlier years. For example, in 1998, 
there were 149 nurses per 100,000 population. 
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Table 4.2 provides evidence of the public-private imbalance (Health Systems Trust, 2008a). In 
the most urban areas, Western Cape and Gauteng provinces, the proportion of nurses working in 
the public sector is hardly one third. Conversely, in the most rural province, Limpopo, the majority 
of nurses work for the public sector, which supplies the bulk of the health services in those 
remote areas. 
Furthermore, SANC data reveal that nurses are inequitably distributed across the different 
provinces (see Appendix 4.3). With the lowest density for the nursing population, the North West 
province has 0.6 times fewer nurses than KwaZulu Natal, which is a particularly densely 
populated and urban province. These figures understate the extent of the geographic imbalance 
of the nursing population, as they only report statistics about nurses in the public sector. Since a 
large proportion of nurses work in the private sector, almost exclusively located in urban area, 
inequalities in the geographic distribution of nurses are even greater. 
Table 4.2: Evolution of the proportion of Professional Nurses registered with the SANC, 
working in the ~ublic sector 
South 
EC FS GP KZN LP MP NC NW we Africa 
2002 41.9% 42.4% 30.2% 49.4% 82.1% 54.2% 47.7% 47.8% 30.9% 42.5% 
2003 49.3% 42.3% 29.5% 49.8% 79.1% 58.3% 51.2% 46.4% 29.3% 43.0% 
2005 54.5% 49.9% 28.4% 49.0% 76.4% 56.5% 50.4% 47.0% 28.9% 43.9% 
2006 53.2% 49.8% 28.0% 48.5% 75.3% 56.4% 50.5% 45.8% 29.5% 43.5% 
2007 54.3% 48.3% 26.7% 50.1% 73.0% 56.1% 56.4% 42.5% 30.6% 43.5% 
Notes: EC: Eastern Cape FS: Free State GP: Gauteng KZN: KwaZulu-Natal LP: Limpopo MP: Mpumalanga NC: Northern Cape 
NW: North West WC: Western Cape 
Source: data from httQ://www.hst.org.za/healthstats/101/data 
4.3.3. The production of nurses 
Figure 4.2 below shows that between 1996 and 2007 the number of Professional Nurses 
graduating increased by 18%, from 3,715 to 4,391. However this figure hides contrasting 
evolutions. The increase in the number of professional nurses is essentially due to the expansion 
of the bridging programme, and to a lesser extent to the increase of production by universities 
(from 387 to 475)37. Conversely, there has been a steady fall in the number of nurses trained by 
nursing colleges, with a 35% decrease between 1997 and 2006. 
37 It should be noted that the content of nursing training in universities slightly differs from that of nursing colleges. 
Indeed, it provides students with a less clinical, more theoretical training. As a result, n~rsing gra~uates .from 
universities are likely to be more tempted to opt out of general nursing, and pursue careers m academia or pnvate 
pharmaceutical companies. 
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Figure 4.2: Number of Professional Nurses trained (1997-2006) 
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Recent studies suggest that limited capacity of nursing institutions is the key bottleneck to a 
greater production of nurses (Mkhize and Nzimande, 2007, Breier et al., 2009), as training 
institutions have to turn down the majority of applicants. This fall in the capacity of nursing 
colleges has been explained by two problems. First, the rationalisation of nursing education (see 
4.3.1) led to the merging and restructuring of nursing colleges, which translated into a reduction in 
the number of available spaces. Second, nursing colleges have suffered from being funded from 
provincial health budgets, and not the Department of Education (unlike universities). As a result, 
nursing college budgets were never shielded from budgetary cuts happening in provincial health 
budgets (Daviaud and Chopra, 2008). 
As a result of the decline in the production of nurses in the public sector, private hospital groups 
and private hospitals have trained a higher number of ENs and ENAs (they are not accredited to 
train PNs), so that in 2006 70% of ENs and 78% of ENAs had been trained by private institutions 
(Breier et al., 2009). This growing role of the private sector has raised concern over the quality of 
training sometimes provided and the level of fees charged (Breier et al., 2009). 
Having underlined the issues in human resources in several documents without never crafting a 
coherent response, the Department of Health finally showed some commitment in April2006, with 
the publication of the National Human Resources Plan for Health (Department of Health, 2006). 
That document set strategic goals for addressing the shortage of health professionals through 
increased production. For professional nurses, it proposed to bring the annual production from an 
estimated 1,896 (in universities and nursing colleges) to 3,000 by 2011 (a 58% increase). At the 
87 
same time, the annual production of ENs and ENAs was supposed to increase to respectively 
8,000 and 10,000 by 2008. However, to date no specific step has been taken to act on these 
recommendations. 
4.3.4. Emigration 
The flow of nurses leaving South Africa to work overseas is a widely publicised phenomenon 
often cited as the reason for the shortfall of nurses in the country. 
In general, South Africa has relatively high rates of emigration, in particular of its white population, 
towards Anglophone countries38. The brain drain of skilled workers started before 1994, and has 
continued on the same trend after that date (OECD, 2003). Primary reasons given by South 
African emigrants are concerns over violence, poor economic growth, decline in quality of life in 
their home countries and attractive opportunities overseas (Rogerson and Rogerson, 2000, 
Oosthuizen, 2005, Breier et al., 2009). 
Table 4.3: Summary of study findings on the presence of South African nurses overseas 
Study Estimated number Category Applicable 
years 
Data sources 
Stock of nurses overseas 
"'"'"'"""""'""'"""'"""''''"'"''"'''"""'"""''"'''"'"""''"'""'""'"''""'"''"'''''"''"'"''"'"'''"'''"''''"''''"''""""''"'''''''''''''''''"'"''''--::---:------····· .. ---..... ___ , ___________ , _____________ , ____________ , ___ .......... ___ , _____________ .. .. 
(Clemens and 4,844 Professional 2000 Census data of recipient Pettersson, 2007) Nurses countries 
(OECD, 2003) 6,844 nurses and 2001 Employment and population 
midwives surveys, census data 
(WHO, 2006) 13,496 n/a 2004 n/a 
............. __ , ........................................ -......................................................................................................................... _____ ,_, ......... ______ , ______ , __________________________ ,_ .......... _ .. ___ ,_,,_, _______ .,,,_,,, .. .. 
........... ~~-~~-~f ... ~.~-'!~~ .. -~~-i.9T~~-i-~.9. ........................................................ ---------·-----.. ·-·-···-.. -.... -............ _. ________________ ..... _ ........ _ .. _._ ... __ ........... _ ....  
(Statistics South 842 Nursing 1999_2003 Self-declared nursing Africa, 2003) professional professional emigrants 
SANC cited in (Breier 14,462 n/a 2001 _2004 Verification of transcripts by et al., 2009) destination countries 
n/a: not available 
In 2003, based on migration statistics for nurses from 1990 to 2001, a study showed that before 
1997 less than 1% of the nursing workforce was leaving South Africa, and that this proportion had 
slightly grown after this date, with a peak at 2.1% in 1999 (Hall and Erasmus, 2003). The authors 
of the study predicted that this proportion would remain between 1 and 2% each year. Several 
studies have tried to estimate the extent of international migration of nurses, and its effect on the 
workforce of source countries. All studies point to the difficulty of estimating the flow of nurses 
38 According OECD estimates from 2001, countries with a large number of South African immigrants are: the United 
Kingdom (141 ,405), Australia (79,425), United States (68,290), Canada (37,680) and New Zealand (26,061). OECD 
Database on immigrants and expatriates http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/23/34792376.xls 
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precisely, and researchers usually have to triangulate various data sources (Stillwell et al., 2003). 
Table 4.3 below summarises the data obtained from several studies on South African nurses39. 
Factors associated with the context of and life in South Africa have proved to be important driving 
factors for emigrant nurses (Oosthuizen, 2005). In addition, factors associated with the health 
sector have been identified as pushing nurses away from South Africa (Oosthuizen, 2005): poor 
working conditions (heavy workload and lack of resources), lack of career opportunities, lack of 
respect for the nursing profession and of support from managers, low salaries leading to the 
inability to provide good education to one's children. 
While there is virtually no data available on the flow of returning South African nurses, there have 
been private initiatives attempting to attract them back home such as the "Homecoming 
Revolution"40, an association providing different services to returnees to facilitate their 
homecoming. Different private hospital groups have used this association to try and attract South 
African nurses working overseas (Breier et al., 2009). 
4.3.5. Policy interventions in the public sector 
Although several early policy documents identified human resources as a key bottleneck for 
health care delivery in South Africa, the general framework for HR has been essentially shaped 
since 2000 by initiatives taken by the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) 
(Health Systems Trust, 2006). 
In a study by the DPSA, it was noted that between April 2001 and March 2002, the South African 
public service had lost more than 50,000 staff, corresponding to a turnover rate of 8% 
(Department of Public Service and Administration, 2006). The health sector was identified as one 
of the worst affected sectors, with a turnover rate of 24.7% for non-nursing health professionals 
and 10.7% for nurses (Department of Public Service and Administration, 2006). Following this 
report, the government adopted in 2002 a "Scarce Skills Development Strategy for the Public 
Service", which was soon followed by a Scarce Skills Policy Framework for the Public Service 
aimed at providing guidance to technical departments in the development of scare skills 
programmes. 
The translation of the Scarce Skills Strategy in the health sector (the Scarce Skills Policy 
Framework for the health sector) proved challenging. The introduction of differentiated 
39 Many studies present figures on the total number of foreign health workers, not breaking down between nurses 
and doctors for example. 
40 http://www.homecominqrevolution.eo.za/ 
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allowances for different categories of health workers performing their jobs in similar areas 
(doctors receiving a top-up of 18-22% of their salaries, medical technicians, physiotherapists and 
psychologists receiving 12-17% and nurses between 8-12% of their salaries) was perceived 
negatively by nurses, who felt that their job was less valued by the health authorities (Geyer, 
2004). 
To respond to the lack of nurses in the public health sector, the 2005 Nursing Act introduced the 
idea of mandatory "community service" for nurses. This measure was enforced for the first time in 
2008 when the Department of Health made it compulsory for all nurses to complete one year of 
community service in a public health facility, before they could fully qualify as professional nurses. 
In practice, graduate nurses express their wish for particular posts, but the final decision is made 
by the Department of Health. As a result, about 2,000 newly graduated nurses served in the nine 
provinces in 2008 (see Appendix 4.1). 
In 2007, the DPSA finalised a collective national agreement on a new remuneration system for a 
wide range of civil servants, known as the Occupation Specific Dispensation (OSD). Having lost 
many civil servants to the private sector, the intention behind this initiative was to improve the 
government's ability to attract and retain skilled employees through better remuneration. Two 
categories of health professionals were concerned by this agreement: medical doctors and 
nurses. The agreement, implemented in March 2008, led to a 24% increase in entry level salaries 
for Professional Nurses in general nursing, which took effect retrospectively, from July 2007 
(Department of Public Service and Administration, 2008). 
Finally, on the international scene, South Africa has played a significant role in supporting the 
development of a code of ethical recruitment of health professionals for members of the British 
Commonwealth, and in 2002 the South African Department of Health developed a policy on 
Recruitment, Employment and Support of Foreign Health Professionals. It emanated from a 
regional agreement in Southern Africa and was aimed at ensuring that South Africa would not 
participate in the brain drain affecting other low- and middle-income countries. Instead, this policy 
encouraged the setting up of government-to-government agreements, to better control the 
movement of health professionals. As a result, South Africa has recruited health workers (mostly 
doctors) from other countries, such as Cuba, Iran or Tunisia, through government-to-government 
agreements (Couper et al., 2006). 
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4.3.6. The nursing population 
A. Age profile 
More than two decades ago, a study (Cilliers, 1984) warned that if nothing changed, health care 
planners should anticipate a shortage of professional nurses from 2005 when the median age of 
professional nurses could be expected to exceed 50 years of age. That study forecasted that the 
majority of nurses would retire between 2010 and 2015. 
According to data obtained from the SANC, the nursing population average age is just above 45 
years old. Figure 4.3 shows that the great majority of nurses is over 40 years old, meaning that 
7 4% of the nursing population is expected to retire by 2035 (statutory age for retirement in South 
Africa is 65 years old). 
Figure 4.3: Distribution of the nursing population by age group 
4500 .. 
4000 .. 
3500 I 
3000 J 
> 2500 .. u 
c 
QJ 
::J I C" QJ 
2000 1 
"" u. 
1500 .. 
1000 .. 
500 l 
l 
0 
18 30 40 so 
Age 
Source: data obtained from the South African Nursing Council, cited in 
http://www.info.gov.za/aboutsa/health.htm#Statutory 
91 
60 70 
B. Gender profile 
As shown by Figure 4.4, more than 90% of all categories of nurses on the registers of the Nursing 
Council are female. However, according to the SANC in 2008 more than 20% of nursing students 
(studying the four-year programme) were males. To explain this discrepancy, it has been 
suggested that males were attracted to nursing studies by bursaries and student salary offered in 
many institutions, but that they did not intend to pursue a career in nursing (Breier et al., 2009). 
Figure 4.4: Distribution of the nursing population by gender, 2008 
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Surprisingly, a higher proportion of males (9%) is found in the lowest nursing cadre, the nursing 
enrolled auxiliaries (see Appendix 4.4). 
C. Racial profile 
Unlike black doctors who remained a tiny minority of the overall medical profession, black nurses 
were trained during the Apartheid regime in response to a serious shortage of nurses (Coovadia 
et al., 2009), so that in 1990, they represented 42.7% of the nursing population 41 . As a result of 
the opening of education to the black population after 1990, in 2007 black nurses represented 
about 82% of public sector Professional Nurses (see Figure 4.5). Although racial breakdown of 
the private nursing workforce is not available, it is probably not as unbalanced, with a higher 
proportion of white nurses recruited to take care of wealthier patients (Breier et al., 2009). 
41 However "until the 1970s, {black nurses] could not nurse white patients or have white subordinates and, unti/1986, 
had lower salaries than did white nurses". Coovadia et al., 2009 p.829 
92 
Figure 4.5: Evolution of the breakdown of the nursing population by group population 
All sectors, 1990 Public sector, 2007 
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Source: Breier et al., 2009 
D. Prevalence of HIV-AIDS 
In 2004, the prevalence of HIV amongst health workers from a representative sample of public 
and private facilities was 15.7% (Shisana et al., 2004). A more recent study (Connelly et al., 
2007) in two public hospitals in Gauteng showed that nurses had the highest prevalence rate of 
all health workers (13.8%). It also showed that a high proportion was eligible for antiretroviral 
therapy, but not all had access to it. The direct effect of HIV/AIDS on nursing supply is therefore 
considerable, but the exact impact of that phenomenon is difficult to estimate without further data. 
It is also likely that the prevalence of HIV in the nursing population disproportionally affects the 
younger categories of nurses, between the ages of 15 and 49 (Shisana et al., 2004). 
4.4. Conclusion 
This brief presentation of the general situation in South Africa highlights the conditions faced by 
nurses on the labour market. 
On the one hand, nurses are in a favourable position, supplying labour in short supply in difficult 
economic times. On the other hand, the socio-economic inequalities in the South African society, 
the gravity of health problems of the population, as well as the multiple challenges faced by a 
health system in transition contribute to form a very difficult working environment for the nursing 
labour force. 
In addition, it is essential to keep in mind the double inequity in the provision of health services in 
South Africa, which fuels inequalities in the health care system. First, the inequitable geographic 
distribution of nurses has a detrimental impact on the access to health care in remote and rural 
areas. Second, the majority of nurses who work in the private sector only serve a minority of the 
population. 
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Finally, the brief description of the nursing population suggests that the study sample (see Table 
3.3) is broadly representative of the main socio-demographic characteristics of the general 
nursing population. The study population comprises fewer men than the general nursing 
population (14.3% vs. 21.9%), the average age of both populations is comparable (30 years on 
average for the general nursing student population42 vs. 31 years old for the study population), 
and, as in the general nursing population, most of the study participants were black (89%). 
42 http://www.sanc.eo.za/stats/stat2006/Age%20stats%202006 files/frame.htm 
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Chapter 5 · Exploring nurses' altruism 
5.1. Introduction 
As detailed in section 2.2.2, evidence suggests that positive attitudes towards others can provide 
powerful incentives in situations where the self-interest hypothesis predicts the absence of any 
incentives. Similarly, material incentives have been shown to be ineffective when they are not 
compatible with social preferences (Frey, 1997, Frey and Jegen, 2001). 
Chapter 2 presented theoretical evidence explaining why concerns for others are potentially 
relevant to the analysis of job decisions made by health workers. It was underlined that a diverse 
empirical literature has confirmed the importance of such types of motivation, including vocation 
('helping the community') and altruism ('serving others') (Brewer et al., 2000, Le Grand, 2003, 
Perry et al., 2009), while studies on nurses suggest that professional identity directly relates to 
vocational and altruistic motivations (Kingma, 2003, Miers et al., 2007), and that nurses are less 
likely to be influenced by, or interested in, monetary incentives (Kingma, 2003). 
However, study of the influence of such motivational factors faces methodological difficulties to 
capture and measure those "social preferences". Social scientists have traditionally used surveys, 
asking questions that seek to capture either past actions demonstrating some altruism or 
underlying facets of the notion of altruism (see for example the Self-reported Altruism scale 
(Rushton et al., 1981 )), or asking respondents to state how closely they relate to statements 
showing empathy or concerns for others (see for example the NEO Personality Inventory for 
altruism (Costa and McCrae, 1992)). However, because altruism is a socially desirable and 
positively valued behaviour, self-reports on altruistic behaviour or feelings of empathy are prone 
to self-presentation effects. Therefore survey instruments have been criticised for the fact that 
they may not give a true representation of individuals' values, but rather reflect to a certain 
degree the "purchase of moral satisfaction" (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992). 
This is the reason why economic experiments have recently been promoted as measurement 
tools for social preferences (Camerer and Fehr, 2004). In an experimental economics setting, 
individuals are asked to make choices for real money. The presence of actual incentives is 
thought to lead individuals to reveal their true behaviour, and control or limit self-presentation 
biases. 
This chapter uses experimental economic games to measure nurses' altruism in South Africa and 
explore its determinants. It also seeks to compare and contrast these measures with those 
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obtained with traditional survey instruments, and to measures of altruism obtained from the 
traditional subjects in experimental economics (economic students). This component of the 
research is based on the analysis of a classic economic game, the dictator game. Additional 
individual information collected at the same time is also used in the analysis of experimental 
results. 
Before the tools used are presented and analysed, it is useful to first clarify some of the principles 
and standards used in experimental economics. Therefore section 5.2 discusses the principles 
that guide the use of experimental economics, and provides a survey of some of its applications. 
Section 5.3 then presents the tools used in the present work, and the methods used to analyse 
them. Finally, the results are presented in section 5.4 and discussed in section 5.5. 
5.2. What is experimental economics? 
5.2.1. Principles of experimental economics 
A. Characteristics of experimental economics 
Experimental economics is the use of controlled, 'scientifically 'designed experiments (also called 
games) to investigate decision processes under 'laboratory' conditions, where the experimenter 
defines the set of prices, budget, information, and actions available to participants, thereby 
measuring the influence of these factors on individual behaviour. One of the key features of 
experimental economic games is the use of real monetary incentives to elicit decisions. Reporting 
the differences between the behaviours of individuals playing for tokens or real money, Smith 
suggested that hypothetical rewards were "more erratic, unreliable and easily satiated" than 
money (Smith, 1962, Smith, 1976). lncentivising subjects with real financial stakes has become 
the norm in experimental economics, as opposed to experimental psychology for instance. 
Economic games have long been used to test the basic assumptions about the preferences of 
economic agents, on which hinges most economic theories (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). The 
veracity of these assumptions is not observable empirically, as only the resulting choices made 
by agents are observed. Therefore experimental economists have designed simple games to 
identify and measure preferences in a controlled environment, very similar to that of a laboratory 
(Ensminger, 2001, Charness and Rabin, 2002). For example, the dictator game is one of a series 
of experiments that has been developed to test whether individuals behave as utility-maximisers 
(i.e. choosing options that maximise payoffs). This experiment involves two players. The first, "the 
proposer" (or dictator), determines an allocation of some endowment (determined by the 
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experimenter). The second, the "recipient", simply receives the remainder of the endowment not 
kept by the proposer for himself. And individual behaving according to the assumptions of 
standard economic theory is expected to keep all the endowment for himself. 
In order to create a controlled environment, the parameters of the experiments are meticulously 
calibrated. Every experiment is defined by its "environment" and "institution" (Vernon, 1994). The 
environment consists of the monetary incentives (usually initial endowments) and rules (or 
parameters of the game) that will determine the cost of exchange or decision. The institution 
defines the information initially available to participants, the rules governing the possible 
exchange and its enforcement. For example, in the dictator game, game parameters will 
determine the initial amount of endowment given to player one, and how that may be split 
between them and the other player, while different institutions might disclose none or some 
information about recipients (see for example Van der Merwe and Burns (2008) where the name 
of recipients is disclosed), or providing more or less privacy to dictators to make their choices -
see Frey and Bohnet (1995). 
B. Characteristics of the design of economic games 
In experimental economics, "the way in which an experiment is conducted is unbelievably 
importanf' (Camerer, 2003). Indeed, experimental economists have established clear conventions 
to ensure the transparency of experiments - for example, authors are usually asked to provide 
their raw data and game instructions with their publications. Here, the main choices of the design 
of experimental economic games are briefly reviewed and the typical conventions are stated. 
In terms of implementation, the game instructions are the cornerstone of the design of economic 
experiments. Scripts detail the rules to be applied during the experiments (process) and make 
clear to participants how each choice or sequence of choices will lead to particular payoffs. 
Besides, developing clear scripts that experimenters can follow meticulously enables precise 
replication of the experiment conditions. It guarantees for example that the verbal cues and other 
information that might influence decisions (examples given, criteria for answering participants' 
questions, etc.) are the same for all participants. 
Anonymity is another typical feature of economic experiments. Because knowing who the game is 
played with (or against) is likely to influence the decisions made, in particular if there are 
interactions after the game is played, economic experiments usually try to create 'anonymity' -
making it impossible for participants to know who they are playing with. This condition no longer 
holds if the actual objective of the experiment is to test the influence of partial or full information 
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given to participants about the other players. For example, some researchers conceived a trust 
game in South Africa where they gave information about participants' race and showed that 
revealing racial identity has a significant impact on decisions (Haile et al., 2004). 
As noted earlier, economic experiments always use real monetary incentives. The fundamental 
assumption behind this characteristic is that all players have a comparable marginal utility for 
money in the games (Smith, 1976, Camerer, 2003). The question of the size of the payoffs and 
influence thereof is no longer as debated as it once was, since a number of studies have shown 
that large variations in stakes have led to very modest effects (see a review in (Camerer, 2003)). 
Therefore even if there is no rule as to what the right level of incentive is, in developing countries, 
a common practice has been to make sure that on average players will gain one or two days 
worth of income in a game (Barr, 2001, Barret al., 2003). 
Finally, economic experiments normally follow a "between-subject" design (Camerer, 2003). This 
means that different participants are tested in different treatments. However, differences in the 
results obtained across treatments can then be confounded with systematic differences across 
individuals allocated to different groups. The alternative, "within-subject", design where the same 
subjects are subsequently exposed to different treatments (thereby serving as their own control 
group), has rarely been used, probably for fear that successive treatments might alter individual 
behaviour through heightened sensitivity or learning processes (Camerer, 2003). However, 
several authors have recently used an approach close to the within-subject design, sometimes 
termed the "strategy method", where they ask repeated questions to the same subjects. Amongst 
other things, this method has produced richer individual datasets (see more details on that 
approach in section 5.3). 
5.2.2. Applications of experimental economics 
Economic experiments have mainly been used for three purposes. 
First, economists have used lab experiments to "test" existing or new theories, testing 
conclusions and/or assumptions. By comparing the predicted outcomes of the theory to the 
experimental observations, one can test the predictive power of competing theories. Alternatively, 
experiments allow researchers to test the extent to which the assumptions on which a theory is 
built are adequate. For example, the dictator game has been used to test one of the basic 
assumptions made by the homo economicus model of individual behaviour- utility-maximisation. 
If individuals were only concerned with their own economic well-being, proposers (acting as 
"dictators") would keep the entire endowment to themselves and give nothing to the other player. 
In the same spirit, economists have used experiments to assess the impact of different 
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environments or institutions on the predictive power of a theory or assumption, in order to refine 
theories. The literature on social preferences and the various forms of other-regarding 
preferences is one example of such use (Rabin, 1993, Andreoni and Miller, 2002, Charness and 
Haruvy, 2002, Charness and Rabin, 2002, Charness, 2004). 
Second, experimental games have been used extensively to assess the relative advantages and 
effects of regulatory mechanisms. When applied to policy issues, games are usually tailored (and 
designed) to fit real-world situations, so that they can provide simplified models of an economic 
environment where participants are invited to make decisions based on real monetary incentives 
that mimic the ones faced in reality. Therefore they allow the measurement of the relative 
effectiveness of various regulation mechanisms on different outcomes. Interesting examples 
include an experiment in the field investigating the embezzlement behaviour of health workers 
and potential regulatory mechanisms (Barr et al., 2003); or a game designed to measure the 
relative effects of different determinants of corruption (Abbink et al., 2002). 
Finally, experimental economics has recently been used as a measurement tool for values such 
as altruism (Eckel and Grossman, 1996, Bettinger and Slonim, 2005, Fowler, 2006, Andreoni et 
al., 2007), trust (Glaeser et al., 2000, Carpenter et al., 2003, Haile et al., 2004, Holm and 
Danielson, 2005) or preference for equity or fairness (Visser, 2002, Gowdy et al., 2003). Altruism 
has typically been measured as the proportion of money sent by the decider in the dictator game. 
Trust has been measured by the proportion of money the first player in a trust game agrees to 
send to the second player, in the prospect that this second player will return a proportion. When 
experimental games have been used as measurement tools of social preferences, the 
constructed measurements have usually been used in association with other data, to test whether 
the social preferences measured constituted predictive variables of actual behaviours. In Peru, 
Karlan (2005) examined whether behaviour in trust games predicted repayment of loans to a 
group lending micro-finance program. 
5.2.3. Experimental economics 'in the field' 
Some of the critiques addressed to experimental economics have focused on its incapacity to 
speak to 'real' issues, especially due to the artificiality of the conditions used and the particular 
nature of the usual participants. 
The vast majority of economic experiments have taken place in the laboratories of American 
universities, with economics or business students being used as participants. The limitations of 
this practice have been emphasised in the literature (Carpenter et al., 2005, Carpenter et al., 
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2008). A few attempts have been made to improve the 'external validity' of behavioural 
experiments by running them with "real" subjects (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008). For example, 
non-standard pools of subjects have included fishermen (Carpenter and Seki, 2006), workers in a 
factory (Barr and Serneels, 2004,) or health workers (Barret al., 2003). Such economic games, 
which reproduce the classic elements of a lab experiment with non-standard subjects, have been 
termed "artefactual field experiments". By comparing this type of experiment to those set in 
conventional labs, researchers seek to inform the external validity of lab experiments traditionally 
using students, which may not be informative concerning the behaviour of the population. 
The focus of the experiments in wealthy countries has also raised questions about the possibility 
to generalise results from such particular context to other settings, where values and norms might 
be different. This is certainly one of the reasons why the growing body of experiments 
implemented in developing countries has centred on the elicitation of social preferences and 
underlying values (Roth et al., 1991, Carpenter et al., 2003, Carter and Castillo, 2003, Gowdy et 
al., 2003, Ensminger, 2004, Greig and Bohnet, 2005, Holm and Danielson, 2005, Johansson-
Stenman et al., 2005, Schechter, 2007), sometimes in very remote societies (Henrich et al., 2001, 
Henrich et al., 2004b). 
The standard pool of participants in experimental economics has also been considered to be 
biased (Levitt and List, 2007). Indeed, the bulk of the literature draws conclusions from 
behaviours of participants who have volunteered to participate in experiments. Not only are they 
often aware of the discipline (and therefore of the presence of monetary stakes), but they also 
constitute a population of well-educated volunteers, whose characteristics and behaviours may 
systematically differ from those of other groups, as suggested by some studies (Fehr and List, 
2004, List, 2005). 
Despite these caveats, Levitt and List (2007) underline that experimental and traditional 
observations of behaviours are complementary and that "Jab experiments can then be used to 
Jearn qualitative insights about pro-social behaviours. 
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5.3. Designing experimental economic games 
5.3.1. Study population 
The games were played in South Africa with two population groups: 
The first group was composed of the 377 final year nursing students who took part in the 
study described in Chapter 3; 
The second group was composed of 55 third-year undergraduate economic students in their 
second semester, from two universities in Johannesburg (the University of Johannesburg 
and Witwatersrand University). 
None of these students had previous exposure to game theory, behavioural or experimental 
economics. 
5.3.2. Experimental design 
In this research, economic experiments were used to measure different facets of nurses' altruism. 
Tools and instructions were pre-tested in South Africa in November 2007. The following sections 
present the rationale and details of the experiments implemented. 
To construct simple measures of nurses' altruism, the dictator game was chosen, with nurses 
playing the role of allocators (or dictators). This game is supposed to elicit the preference for 
altruism of allocators. As the game is free from strategic considerations or reciprocity (recipients 
ignore the identity of their potential generous donors), allocators' only motive for sharing the initial 
endowment is the propensity to value positively others' well-being. In this study, subjects were 
free to choose one of eleven possible ways to split R100 (see Figure 5.1 below). This payoff was 
chosen with reference to the daily wage of a young nurse43. All study participants were about to 
graduate and would then earn R96,000/year (about R260/day). As the nurses were also 
participating in a second game where the stakes were higher, the R100 stake seemed to be a 
good compromise, which also allowed eleven splits easy to pay with the available denominations 
in Rands. 
The objective was to measure the strength of nurses' commitment towards their patients, 
therefore framing was desirable to improve the external validity of these measures. 
43 See earlier sections explaining that this is the usual stake used in economic games in developing countries. 
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Figure 5.1: Experimental game response sheet 
!STUDY NUMBER: I TASK 1 
For each question (A, B and C), circle the number of the option you choose 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5 Option 6 Option 7 Option 8 Option 9 Option 10 Option 11 
l",i!,'t~ You get 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 
R 100 R 90 R 80 R 70 R 60 R 50 R 40 R 30 R 20 R 10 RO 
l i. 
Another student gets 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
;,f~',,: RO R 10 R 20 R 30 R 40 R 50 R 60 R 70 R 80 R 90 R 100 
YOU CHOOSE: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5 Option 6 Option 7 Option 8 Option 9 Option 10 Option 11 
'ii· 
You get 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 
· .. : 
R 100 R 90 R 80 R 70 R 60 R 50 R 40 R 30 R 20 R 10 RO ~ 
B 
A patient gets 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
RO R 10 R 20 R 30 R 40 R 50 R 60 R 70 R 80 R 90 R 100 
YOU CHOOSE: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5 Option 6 Option 7 Option 8 Option 9 Option 10 Option 11 
You get 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 
R 100 R 90 R 80 R 70 R 60 R 50 R 40 R 30 R 20 R 10 RO 
c 
A poor person gets 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
RO R 10 R 20 R 30 R 40 R 50 R 60 R 70 R 80 R 90 R 100 
YOU CHOOSE: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 I 
-----
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Adopting a similar approach as Branas-Garza (2006), different framings of recipients were used, 
to differentiate nurses' altruism towards different types of recipients, described by a few general 
characteristics: anonymous (fellow) students, patients, and poor persons. Three reasons drove 
these choices. 
First, the fellow student framing was chosen to provide a benchmark in the game. 
Indeed, this conforms to the traditional anonymous beneficiary of most dictator games (DG) 
played in the literature. This framing was therefore meant to provide a "baseline" and control for 
variability in results as a consequence of the manipulation of key factors (Camerer, 2003), here 
the information given about recipients. 
Second, there is evidence that donations to recipients in DG increase with a sense of 
usefulness (Eckel and Grossman, 1996) or the understanding that recipients need it (Branas-
Garza, 2006). While the "poor'' framing was an obvious "needy" recipient, it was less clear how 
respondents would view patients, and to what extent they would view them as more or less needy 
than fellow students or poor persons. 
Finally, these three framings were chosen to test the following two hypotheses: 
Ceteris paribus, the patient identity triggers more altruism than the traditional fellow student; 
Altruistic donations in dictator games are also linked to an element of financial need, 
meaning that the "poor'' framing generates more generosity than the other two. 
To produce individual measures and minimize the cost and length of the experimental session44, 
as well as the risk of contamination that could occur with several rounds and several payoffs, the 
procedural design used response functions (Barret al., 2005, Brandts et al., 2006). This means 
that each participant had to decide for all three framings which allocation they would make, 
knowing that they could be paired with any of three different recipients. The identity of the 
recipient would be determined at the end of the game. Following Brands et al. (2006), one of the 
three identities was randomly selected through a lottery process, and determined the actual 
payoffs to be made to the dictators and to the recipients, according to the choices made by the 
participants for the selected framing. Participants knew in advance that their payoffs would be 
determined by the choices they had made for any one of the recipients. This was particularly 
emphasised in the instructions. 
44 Given that experimental games were administered at the same time as all the other baseline tools, it was judged 
important to find ways to neutralize as much as possible any "fatigue" effect of participants. 
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5.3.3. Experimental procedures 
Due to constraints originally imposed by the ethics committee of the University of Witwatersrand, 
all individuals were first invited45 to participate in a study about job choices, which would involve 
different instruments including a "decision-making" task. In the information sheet or the 
explanation, no mention of the financial stakes in the games was made. If they wanted to join the 
study, they were invited to show up on a set date and time, in a pre-determined classroom. The 
word 'experiment' or 'game' was never used either. This was done to avoid the behavioural 
biases noted by Frohlich et al. who pointed out that if participants to the dictator game viewed it 
as a game, their main motivation would then be to earn money (Frohlich et al., 2001). 
On the day of the study, the experiment was conducted in a classroom. Participants were told 
that the first part of the data collection would involve a simple decision task where real money 
would be used (the introductory script to the experimental session can be found in Appendix 5.1 ). 
Participants were told that they were not allowed to discuss their choices with each other, and 
enough space was left between them to prevent communication. In order to ensure anonymity 
towards the experimenter (and all researchers), the experimental subjects were asked to report a 
study number on their response sheet. 
An envelope containing a response sheet (Figure 5.1) had previously been put on their table. The 
instructions of the game were read out loud to participants by the experimenter, who followed a 
detailed script (see in Appendix 5.1 ). Instructions were phrased as neutrally as possible, as the 
use of language has been shown to be important (Kahneman et al., 1986, Forsythe et al., 1994). 
Following these studies, verbal precautions were used to avoid biases: no reference was ever 
made to a "game" or an "experiment", and participants were invited to "divide" the money (R100) 
they were "allocated" between themselves and another person. Because the tools were used in 
three different countries (and two languages), an effort was made to phrase instructions in 
English that ensured a straightforward translation. As in a cross-country study of bargaining 
experiments (Roth et al., 1991), this led to less abstract and technical terms than sometimes used 
in standard experiments from developed countries in university labs. The experimenter explained 
that the recipient could be any one of three different persons (another student, a patient or a poor 
person who would be paid later, and would remain anonymous. Anonymous meant that would not 
learn anything about the recipients, and recipients would never know anything about their 
"benefactors". Participants were explained that, although their responses were recorded for the 
45 This was imposed by the Ethics Committee to avoid the students feeling compelled to participate to the study. 
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three possible recipients, payment would be made to only one of them, as determined by a 
random drawing at the end of the experiment (see below). 
To ensure easy comprehension of the rules by all (in particular the final random drawing 
procedure), the experiment was explained with a visual support (a PowerPoint presentation) 
which detailed two examples (see Appendix 5.2). To establish the credibility of the financial 
stakes, the money used to make the payments was shown repeatedly and emphatically to 
participants during the instructions (i.e. piles of bills were displayed). This was the result of 
lessons learnt in the pilot study, where participants had initially failed to believe that the game 
was going to be played for real money. Finally, although this may not have prevented scepticism 
or doubts, experimenters reiterated on several occasions that the payoffs would also be paid to 
the recipients. 
At the end of the game, participants witnessed that three different pieces of paper, corresponding 
to the three different recipient identities, were put in the box. The experimenter then asked that 
one of the participants drew blindly one of the three papers that had been put in a box. They were 
told that a researcher would put in an envelope their corresponding gains, and would then pass 
those envelopes on to the other researchers in the classroom. 
Payments to the study participants were made on the day; a researcher would calculate the 
payoffs while the other tools of the study were being administered, and put each individual payoff 
in a sealed envelope marked only by the individual study number. At the end of the data 
collection, each study participant was given the sealed envelope corresponding to their individual 
study number. Payoffs to recipients were made later through donations to different institutions. 
Money was used to contribute to scholarships for students, to health care projects for patients 
and poor populations. 
5.3.4. Additional data collection 
This section briefly recalls some of the tools already described in Chapter 3 that were introduced 
in the data collection in order to analyse and investigate the responses from the experimental 
economic games. 
To analyse the determinants of altruism, individual information was collected on a number of 
standard characteristics (gender, age, parents' profession, background, etc.), but a number of 
attitudinal questions were also inserted specifically to measure their correlation with experimental 
measures of altruism. Three dimensions were of particular interest: 
individual-level measures of altruism or other-regarding concerns 
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societal-level measures of values and attitudes towards poverty and the government's role 
individual measures of vocational motivation (related to nursing) 
Although the use of validated instruments for each of these dimensions would have been 
preferable, this was discarded for two reasons. First, we could not find a validated instrument that 
had been developed for the context of developing countries, where altruistic behaviours might 
differ from those identified in industrialised countries. For instance, in the self-report altruism 
scale (Rushton et al., 1981) respondents rate the frequency with which they have engaged in 
behaviours such as "buying charity Christmas cards", "giving a stranger a lift in [one's] car" or 
"donating blood". This would not be particularly relevant in the context of South Africa and 
therefore the validity of the tool might be compromised. Second, using a validated tool would 
have increased dramatically the length of the data collection. For example, the same self-report 
altruism scale asks respondents how often (on a five-item scale) they have engaged in twenty 
behaviours. Following Carpenter and Myers (2007), a more ad hoc approach was adopted: a 
series of survey questions were taken from the World Value Survey, the British Social Value 
Survey and the self-altruism scale, with the objective of testing the correlation between survey 
and experimental measures of social preferences. Additional questions relating to nursing 
professional ethics (frequently used in the nursing motivation literature) were inserted in the self-
administered questionnaire (see Appendix 5.3). 
Finally, in each study site, two focus group discussions were organised at the end of the session. 
Participants were asked to comment on the tasks they had done, and in particular were invited to 
explain how they had made their decisions during the dictator game. 
5.4. Methods used in the analysis 
5.4.1. Constructing experimental measures of altruism 
The dominant interpretation of the dictator game in the literature on experimental economics is 
that the money relinquished by respondents playing the role of dictators in a dictator game can be 
interpreted as a measure of their altruism. 
In the dictator game played with three different framings, three measures of altruism (A1, Az and 
A3 ) were computed, with 
AJ = qi 
Where q1 is the proportion of money given up to recipient j, with j=1 when the recipient was the 
fellow student, j=2 when the recipient was the patient and j=3 when the recipient was the poor 
person. These measures were computed for nursing and economic students in South Africa. 
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The first step in the analysis of a dictator game usually involves a descriptive presentation of the 
results through two aspects: 
The average proportion of the initial endowments relinquished by the dictators; 
The distribution of choices over all the possibilities given to players. 
These descriptive results are presented for all three frames and for the two different types of 
student populations (nursing and economic). A Mann-Whitney test is used to compare the 
distributions of responses across populations. 
5.4.2. Multivariate analysis 
A. Model specification 
The empirical approach can be summarised as follows: 
Aij = f3Xi + 8Zi + Jli 
where the dependent variable Aii denotes the measure of individual i's altruism for framing j, as 
presented earlier. Explanatory variables are made up of vectors of socio-demographic 
characteristics (Xi) and measures of individual values (Zd, while Jli is a vector of residuals. 
A Tobit was used to estimate the model, in order to correct for the censored nature of the 
dependent variable46. The analysis involved estimating separate Tobit models for each framing. 
Subsequently, a random-effects Tobit regression model was used to compare results across the 
three framings for three reasons. First, it allowed the simultaneous analysis of all three decisions 
in the same model, thereby testing the influence of the framing effect. Second, it provided a 
rigorous test to examine the difference between the determinants of altruism across the three 
framings. Finally, the random-effects specification accounted for serial correlation between the 
three consecutive choices made by respondents. 
For all model specifications, the approach was to estimate a full model first, which included the 
large set of explanatory variables (see below). Then reduced forms were estimated, and a 
parsimonious form was retained based on goodness-of-fit measures (Chi2). Only the restricted 
models are presented in the result section47. 
46 There are lower and upper limits of the amount that can be shared with the recipient. 
47 Full model estimates were consistent with restricted model estimates. 
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B. Explanatory variables 
Constructing attitudinal and value variables 
As mentioned before, the questionnaire contained 30 questions relating to individual motivating 
factors, professional nursing ethics, societal values and altruism (see Appendix 5.3). Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) was used to reduce the number of variables to be used in the 
analysis and to construct proxy variables summarising the main underlying concepts captured by 
the attitudinal questions. Based on an analysis of the variance between variables, this technique 
helps identify some underlying construct in the variables, and produces proxy variables (the 
factors or components) summarising these constructs. Six variables were constructed based on 
the first component of the PCA run on different groups of variables. Table 5.1 summarises these 
variables, explaining their overall meaning and the variables on which they were based. For each 
one, Cronbach's alpha4a is also reported. A more detailed report of the PCA results (explaining 
and justifying the choice of the first components) can be found in Appendix 5.4. 
Other demographic characteristics 
There were very few priors on the direction of influence of socio-demographic characteristics or 
attitudinal characteristics on decisions in the dictator game (see Appendix 5.5). Most of the 
assumptions were based on results obtained from previous experimental literature (Camerer, 
2003). This provided a selection of socio-demographic variables to test in the multivariate 
analysis of the determinants of decisions in the dictator games. 
Table 5.1: Proxy variables constructed with PCA for attitudinal variables 
Variable 
name 
rural 
nursing 
Meaning 
Attitude towards rural 
lifestyle -the higher 
the score the more 
positive people feel 
towards rural lifestyle. 
Vocational motivation 
- a high score is 
associated with a 
greater sense of 
professional ethics 
List of variables included 
(except if stated otherwise, responses were provided on a scale 
of 1 to 6 to express agreement with the statements provided) 
1. "Working in rural areas is not stressful at all". 
2. "Quality of life in rural areas is very good". 
3. "The lifestyle you have in rural areas appeals to me". 
4. "The social life in rural areas is enjoyable". 
5. "Living in a city is stressful". 
1. "I chose my profession to help others". 
2. "I always wanted to be a nurse". 
3. "I am proud to tell people that I am a nurse". 
48 A statistical measure of the internal consistency of an index, comprised between 0 and 1. 
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Cronbach's 
alpha 
0.7039 
0.5645 
extrinsic Extrinsic motivation - 1. "I chose my profession because I can earn money''. 0.4771 people with a higher 2. "I chose my profession because other people value it". 
score will be 3. "I chose my profession because I can always find a job". 
particularly sensitive 4. ''You can earn more money when you work in a rural area". 
to extrinsic motivating 5. ''You can obtain advancement in your career quickly if you 
factors choose a rural position". 
welfare Societal value 1. "Ensure that everyone is provided for". 0.6724 (welfare state) - a 2. "Provide a job for everyone who wants one". 
higher score reflects 3. "Provide health care for the sick". 
the belief that the 4. "Provide a decent standard of living for the old". 
state should be 5. "Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed". 
responsible for the 6. "Give financial help to university students from low-income 
welfare of its citizens families". 
7. "The government should help the poorest" 
pro-poor Societal value (pro- 1. "The government should spend more money for the poor, even 0.3617 
poor) -the higher the if it leads to higher taxes" 
score the more 2. "Cutting welfare grants would damage too many people's lives" 
people agree with 3. "Redistribute income from the better off to those who are less 
pro-poor and well-off' 
redistributive policies 4. "Most important thing for government to do "To get people to 
claim social grants and other benefits to which they are 
entitled" 
conservative Negative judgment 1. "Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they 0.6027 
towards the poor - a really wanted one" 
high score reflects a 2. "Many people who get social grants don't really deserve them" 
more conservative 3. "If social grants and other benefits weren't so generous, 
view of social policy, people would learn to stand on their own feet" 
which emphasize self- 4. (poverty is ) "Because of laziness or lack of will power" 
reliance and individual 
responsibility 
altruism Altruism - a high 1. "Helping others with my time or money is very important to 0.5376 
score shows a greater me". 
propensity to act 2. "Personally assisting people in trouble is very important to me". 
generously, for the 
benefit of others. 
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5.4.3. Results 
A. Descriptive results 
This section shows the key descriptive results summarising the decisions made by nursing and 
economic students in South Africa in the dictator game. 
First, average donations made by nursing students presented in Figure 5.2 are highest 
for the poor framing (53.3%), but are identical for the student and patient framings (34.2% and 
37.7%). 
Second, looking at the whole distribution of decisions made (see Figure 5.3), there is a 
marked difference between decisions taken for the student frame and those relating to the other 
two recipients. While the 'student' distribution is left-skewed - which denotes that nurses have 
kept most of the money for themselves- there is a clear slip toward more altruistic behaviours 
(giving away 50% or more) with the patient and poor frames. 
Finally, despite the observed differences in the three frames, they all present the same 
mode - at the equal split (see Figure 5.3). This is an unusual finding, which highlights a concern 
for fairness in the dictator game, and contradicts the utility-maximising assumption. 
Figure 5.2: Average share of the initial endowment given by nursing and economic 
students to recipients (with 95% Cl), by student groups, for each type of recipient 
.. 1 f' ...... 
60% .. .... - --- -----·-- ·········----·" - .... ------···········---·-·-···--·-·------------·---~- ' r 
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patient poor r 
..... ! 
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of choices in the dictator games played with South African nursing students with the three frames 
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Figure 5.4: Distribution of choices in the dictator games played with South African economic students with the three frames 
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B. Comparing South African nursing and economic students 
Three facts emerged from the basic comparison of the decisions made by nursing and economic 
students in the DG. 
First, economic students were much less generous than nursing ones towards then other 
student and the poor person (Figure 5.2), as clearly demonstrated by the comparison of the two 
cumulative distributions (see Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.7). It is particularly striking with the student 
framing, where the majority of economic students (45.5%) chose to keep everything for 
themselves, while an equal proportion of nursing students (42.7%) chose to share half of their 
endowment. A formal comparison of distributions (with a two-sample Mann-Whitney test), 
confirmed the difference between behaviours of economic and nursing students for both frames 
(p<O.OOO for student frame and p<0.0035 for the poor frame- see Appendix 5.6). 3 
In contrast, there is a surprising similarity of results obtained for the patient frame in the 
two populations (Figure 5.6). The mean donation was identical for economic students (37.8%) 
and nursing students (37.7%), and although the mode of the distribution is different, overall the 
two distributions are not significantly different (p<0.61 -see Appendix 5.6). 
Finally, despite the differences observed, the donations made by economic students 
conserve the same linear progression in donation, underlining the perceived 'deservingness' 
hypothesised in section 5.3.2. 
Figure 5.5: Cumulative distributions of "student" dictator games played with economic 
and nursing students 
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Figure 5.6: Cumulative distributions of "patient" dictator games played with economic and 
nursing students 
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Figure 5.7: Cumulative distributions of "poor" dictator games played with economic and 
nursing students 
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C. Qualitative results 
Focus group discussions held after the data collection with two groups of nursing students in 
each site helped understand the motivations of decisions made by the participants. A few findings 
arise from the analysis of the transcripts of these discussions. 
First, many participants seemed to detach themselves from the relatively abstract framing of the 
experiment and contextualised the decisions to make to cope with the task. They relied on a 
much clearer and precise identity: 
''There was a patient with a very sad story and she had a child she was adoption, and she 
actually didn't have the money to buy formula for the baby. So I thought wouldn't it be nice 
if I had 100 Rands for that patient so you can buy her baby formula." 
"There is a ward for cancer children, so i was thinking more of those children." 
"/ was reminding of the patient that I nursed before, when I was working in a rural area. I 
was thinking of that person." 
"/ made a scenario for each question." 
Second, to justify their decisions, the dictators appealed to a wide array of moral motivations, 
referring to recipients' needs or lack thereof. For example, to justify a large gift, participants 
appealed to moral motives such as "helping the poor" or giving to those who can make a better 
use of the money than themselves: 
"I suppose my mora/led me to give a poor person the entire 100 Rands, because in the 
back of my mind i was thinking 'what would my mother think if I did give the poor person 
nothing?'" 
"With the poor person, you know, I was thinking " on the streets, nothing to eat, nothing to 
drink." 
"I thought of what my feelings would be if I had a patient and I had 100 Rands and I 
thought what my feelings would be if I gave him less than what I'd keep." 
"Some people are poor by choice, but here I was thinking of those who can't really do 
anything about the situation. They are not poor by choice. " 
On the other hand, to justify a split of the money more advantageous to themselves, they 
highlighted that the recipient did not need the money, or that the responsibility to help them 
financially lay with someone else (e.g. the government): 
"For the poor, they don't have the need for the money most of them; if you give them 
money, they always drink it or waste it, so I just give them 20 Rands." 
Finally, to justify a small gift to the patients, they underlined that they were already doing a lot for 
the patients through their work, and did not need to do more: 
"If 100 Rands is the health budget and it's going to be how much is going to nurses' 
salaries and how much is going on equipment and that kind of things?" 
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"For the patient I'd give less [than the student] because they are already taken care of. 
they get something from the government." ' 
"I had to make sure that the patient doesn't get !l1:L. money. " 
"I didn't give anything to the patient because if we give them help, they will have more 
money than us ... the patients, they have care, they have food, they have a bed, they have 
everything! I didn't feel that I give more money to the patients because I felt that the 
government is already doing it. " 
"I am the one who have the needs, to help the patients. To give those patients more, 1 
must think about myself before I can think about them. I must be fit before I can give help, 
you see." 
"I was thinking "let me make some money" because the patient, he gets his own subsidies 
from the government." 
Although there was no evidence of a particular causal link between the decisions made and the 
explanation provided, it seems as though, when playing the game, dictators ascertained and took 
into account the social (Hoffman et al., 1996) and/or moral (Aguiar et al., 2008) distances that 
separated themselves from the recipients. 
D. Multivariate analysis 
To understand how socio-demographic and other individual factors influence the choices in the 
dictator game, both bivariate and multivariate analyses were performed. Results of the bivariate 
analysis can be found in Appendix 5.7. Three main findings arise from the study of determinants 
of altruism across the three framings in the multivariate analysis, as presented in Table 5.2. 
First, some socio-demographic variables seem to be meaningful in determining the 
choices made in the dictator game. More altruistic decisions are associated with older age, being 
a white person (the coefficients for white are significant at the 10% level for the patient and poor 
framings), and having studied in the more urban province (Gauteng). It is likely that the latter two 
variables capture a relatively wealthier socio-economic background, which could not be precisely 
measured with any other variable. In addition, although the coefficients are not significant at the 
5% level, male nursing students tend to be less generous than their female colleagues. 
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Table 5.2: Coefficient estimates from three different Tobit regression models, showing the determinants of individual altruism 
Model1 Model2 Model3 
~recipient=studentl ~recipient=eatientl ~recieient=eoor! 
Coeff. Standard P-value Coeff. Standard P-value Coeff. Standard P-value 
errors errors errors 
Constant 0.219*** (0.045) (0.000) 0.358*** (0.043) (0.000) 0.430*** (0.052) (0.000) 
Aged 25 to 29y.[aged less than 25y.] 0.085* (0.036) (0.020) 0.010 (0.034) (0.762) 0.017 (0.042) (0.693) 
Aged 30 to 34y. 0.085* (0.038) (0.026) 0.028 (0.036) (0.441) 0.039 (0.044) (0.379) 
Aged more than35y. 0.184*** (0.041) (0.000) 0.051 (0.039) (0.193) 0.060 (0.048) (0.215) 
Male -0.033 (0.035) (0.347) -0.056 (0.034) (0.102) -0.065 (0.041) (0.118) 
White 0.131* (0.055) (0.017) 0.077 (0.053) (0.146) 0.118 (0.065) (0.067) 
Does not have children -0.001 (0.029) (0.975) -0.003 (0.028) (0.922) -0.028 (0.035) (0.423) 
Gauteng 0.020 (0.027) (0.449) 0.060* (0.026) (0.021) 0.124*** (0.032) (0.000) 
Born in a rural area 0.023 (0.026) (0.379) 0.002 (0.025) (0.924) -0.007 (0.031) (0.827) 
Studied at university 0.030 (0.036) (0.405) 0.031 (0.035) (0.377) 0.064 (0.043) (0.134) 
Nursing was not 1st choice -0.024 (0.030) (0.424) -0.069* (0.029) (0.017) 0.015 (0.035) (0.660) 
Altruism 0.013 (0.010) (0.183) 0.022* (0.010) (0.023) 0.024* (0.012) (0.040) 
Conservative -0.022* (0.009) (0.016) -0.005 (0.009) (0.546) -0.013 (0.011) (0.221) 
Welfare 0.015 (0.010) (0.153) 0.025* (0.01 0) (0.012) 0.032** (0.012) (0.009) 
Extrinsic -0.006 (0.01 0) (0.540) -0.008 (0.009) (0.360) -0.016 (0.011) (0.163) 
Nursing -0.005 (0.011) (0.663) -0.009 (0.011) (0.419) 0.001 (0.013) (0.932) 
Observations 354 354 354 
Sigma 0.211 *** 0.205*** 0.250*** 
Log-likelihood -20.83 26.04 -54.21 
Log-L (null) -45.15 5.497 -76.34 
Chi2 48.65 41.08 44.24 
*** p<0.001 I ** p<0.01 I * p<O.OS 
Note: for the age dummy variables, the reference category is indicated in brackets. 
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Second, although they are not systematically significant, all value and attitudinal 
variables are correlated in the expected direction with choices made in the dictator game: 
- Individuals who agree more with conservative values and are more sensitive to extrinsic 
motivating factors tend to give, whatever the framing; 
Being more altruistic and in favour of welfare policies is associated with a greater generosity. 
Finally, the characteristics that are significant determinants of altruism seem to differ 
slightly across the three different framings. Age is only significant for the student framing where 
older students appear more generous towards their peers, while a nurse who didn't choose 
nursing as a first study choice would give less to the patient, but that would not be a decisive 
factor for other recipients. 
In order to compare formally the determinants of altruism across framings, a pooled analysis 
using a random-effects model to account for individual effects was carried out. Findings are 
presented in Table 5.3. 
Unlike what the comparison of average results showed, the individual-based multivariate analysis 
shows that more needy or deserving recipients generate greater altruism- nursing students give 
much more to poor people than to patients, and more to patients than to fellow classmates. 
Coefficients Stat. sig. Standard errors 
Constant 0.218 *** (0.047) 
Framing effect (base: student) 
Patient 0.142 ** (0.052) 
Poor 0.214 *** (0.052) 
Interaction terms between individual characteristics and the student framing 
Aged 25 to 29y.[aged less than 25y.] 
Aged 30 to 34y. 
Aged more than35y. 
Male 
White 
Does not have children 
Gauteng 
Born in a rural area 
Studied at university 
Nursing was not 1st choice 
Altruism 
Conservative 
Welfare 
Extrinsic 
Nursing 
0.085 
0.086 
0.185 
-0.035 
0.131 
-0.000 
0.020 
0.022 
0.032 
-0.024 
0.013 
-0.022 
0.014 
-0.005 
-0.005 
* 
* 
*** 
* 
* 
(0.038) 
(0.040) 
(0.043) 
(0.037) 
(0.058) 
(0.031) 
(0.028) 
(0.027) 
(0.038) 
(0.031) 
(0.011) 
(0.009) 
(0.011) 
(0.010) 
(0.012) 
Interaction terms between individual characteristics and the patient framing 
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Aged 25 to 29y.[aged less than 25y.] 0.010 (0.037) 
Aged 30 to 34y. 0.028 (0.039) 
Aged more than35y. 0.050 (0.043) 
Male -0.057 (0.037) 
White 0.078 (0.057) 
Does not have children -0.003 (0.031) 
Gauteng 0.059 * (0.028) 
Born in a rural area 0.001 (0.027) 
Studied at university 0.031 (0.038) 
Nursing was not 1st choice -0.068 * (0.031) 
Altruism 0.022 * (0.01 O) 
Conservative -0.005 (0.009) 
Welfare 0.025 * (0.011) 
Extrinsic -0.008 (0.01 O) 
Nursing -0.009 (0.012) 
Interaction terms between individual characteristics and the poor framing 
Aged 25 to 29y.[aged less than 25y.] 0.016 (0.037) 
Aged 30 to 34y. 0.038 (0.039) 
Aged more than35y. 0.059 (0.043) 
Male -0.065 (0.037) 
White 0.117 * (0.057) 
Does not have children -0.028 (0.031) 
Gauteng 0.122 *** (0.028) 
Born in a rural area -0.006 (0.027) 
Studied at university 0.063 (0.038) 
Nursing was not 1st choice 0.014 (0.031) 
Altruism 0.024 * (0.01 0) 
Conservative -0.013 (0.009) 
Welfare 0.032 ** (0.011) 
Extrinsic -0.015 (0.01 0) 
Nursing 0.001 (0.012) 
*** p<0,001 1 ** p<0,01 1 * p<0,05 
The rest of the results of the pooled model confirm the previous results: 
The older the individuals, the more generous their decisions are in the dictator game with the 
student frame. 
More generous donations to all three recipients are associated with certain individual 
characteristics - being white and from Gauteng - that probably capture a wealthier socio-
economic status. 
Those nursing students who chose nursing reluctantly are clearly less interested in the 
welfare of patients, while a greater professional ethics does not seem correlated with greater 
concern for patients; 
Altruistic decisions in the dictator games are associated with survey measures capturing 
social and ethical values, such as altruism or pro-poor social views. 
118 
5.5. Discussion and conclusions 
5.5.1. Summary of key findings 
This is the first study that measures the altruism of nurses and compares the results with another 
group of participants. 
South African nursing students showed more generosity than economic students. However, there 
is a clear exception when generosity is measured towards patients; in that case, the decisions 
made by nursing and economic students in South Africa are virtually identical. 
Interestingly for nursing as well as economic students there seems to be a clear hierarchy of 
needs or "deservingness" (Branas-Garza, 2006, Carpenter et al., 2008) between students, 
patients and poor people. However, this hierarchy is not so clear for nurses in South Africa, who 
allocate an equal amount to patients and fellow students. 
This is the first research to use experimental economics combined with survey data to compare 
the nature and determinants of nurses' concerns for others, including patients, and explore its link 
to vocational preferences. Findings suggest that different socio-economic characteristics affect 
the choices made in experimental games, while correlations between decisions made in games 
and survey measures of intrinsic motivation and societal values confirm that behaviours in 
economic games are likely to be driven by complex moral and social motivations as well. 
5.5.2. Discussion of results 
A. How do the results compare to other studies? 
Previous findings from economic experiments have shown that the outcome of a dictator game 
(DG) changes considerably depending on the type of information provided to the participants. The 
DG presented here with the student frame is comparable to standard experiments, where, 
although participants are supposed to ignore who they will be paired with, they know recipients 
are fellow students. Several such experiments were carried out with economic students showed 
that the majority of participants (usually about 60%) didn't allocate anything to respondents 
(Hoffman et al., 1994, Hoffman et al., 1996) and the average contribution was about 10% 
(Hoffman et al., 1994, Eckel and Grossman, 1996, Hoffman et al., 1996, Bolton et al., 1998). 
Although other differences in experimental conditions may have influenced the results49, 
49 In particular, the present experiment didn't enforce a double blind procedure as strict as th~ one used in som~ of 
these other studies (where each individual makes his decision in an isolated box). However, m the present sett1ng, 
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economic students in South Africa have made comparable average donations (12.7%), with the 
majority of participants keeping the whole endowment for themselves. These results also concur 
with the ones obtained by researchers who played the DG with undergraduate students from the 
University of Cape Town (Van der Merwe and Burns, 2008) and found that the mean offer was 
15%. 
In contrast, South African nurses were significantly more generous towards their peers (mean 
offer of 34.2%). These results were statistically equivalent to those obtained in Kenya and 
Thailand (nurses gave respectively 36.4% and 36.5%), where the same study was also 
conducted with nursing graduates (see Appendix 5.8 for all results from these two countries). 
These results suggest that, compared to economic students and most other subjects who have 
taken part in dictator games, those who chose nursing as a career have a more generous and 
altruistic attitude towards others. Overall, these findings tend to validate hypothesis H 1so that held 
that more altruistic individuals are likely to self-select into the nursing profession. 
With the patient and poor recipients, experiments reported here used two "moral" framings. Such 
designs have been used in a few studies to allow moral motivations such as fairness and altruism 
to play a prominent role in the decisions (Eckel and Grossman, 1996, Branas-Garza, 2006). 
When dictators were informed that their donation would be given to the Red Cross (Eckel and 
Grossman, 1996}, 31% of them gave part of the money, 17% gave half, while 10% gave the full 
amount. In the study by Branas-Garza, where participants were told that their donations would 
buy medicines for developing countries, 7 4.6% gave away everything, while only 3% kept all for 
themselves (Branas-Garza, 2006). 
The results of the DG present new insights into the driving factors of altruistic concerns. The 
influence of socio-demographic characteristics has been relatively under-researched in the 
experimental economics literature, with studies often not controlling for a large range of 
parameters n(partly due to the lack of variance in study population's socio-demographic 
variables) . A survey of different experimental gamess1 by Camerer pointed out that "demographic 
variables generally have weak effects on ( .. .) dictator behaviour, although they are often 
significant, and always intriguing" (Camerer, 2003). There were mixed results from dictator games 
and similar experiments as to whether or not women were less selfish than men (Camerer, 2003). 
The results obtained in South Africa concur with that ambiguous effect; although the coefficient 
respondents could make their choice anonymously from others, and the experimenter who collected the respondent 
sheet was different from the one putting the money in the envelopes 
50 
"Individuals who are more altruistic self-select into nursing studies". 
s1 Camerer surveys not only results from the dictator games, but also those from the ultimatum and trust games. 
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on male was systematically negative, it was not found significant. The more selfish behaviours 
observed in young participants (or children) in other studies (Harbaugh and Krause, 2000, 
Benenson et al., 2007, Carpenter et al., 2008) are also partly confirmed here, as older 
participants were found significantly more generous than young ones in the student framing. The 
effect of participants' affluence has never been tested in experimental games, therefore it is 
difficult to confidently attribute the significant effect of white and Gauteng to that effect. However, 
the positive effect of being white on the size of offers in the DG was also found in the other South 
African DG reported in the literature (Van der Merwe and Burns, 2008). 
Very few studies have compared results with similar population groups in different settings or 
countries. A study that carried out dictator games in various small societies on different continents 
showed that community level factors seemed to have a greater explanatory power of the variety 
of results observed than individual differences (Henrich et al., 2004b). They concluded that 
distributional norms and altruism were likely to be driven by local phenomena and economic 
conditions. In contrast, the results presented here from South Africa showed a strong similarity 
those obtained with comparable participants in Kenya and Thailand (see results presented in 
Appendix 5.8), despite some fundamental socio-economic differences across countries. The 
reason for such similarity might lie in the more altruistic norms shared within the nursing 
community, which might transcend national differences. 
Finally, the experiments here show some strong differences between nursing and economic 
students. This finding echoes the importance of subject pool differences (Levitt and List, 2007) 
and the limitations of drawing general conclusions in the lab from experiments run with economic 
students. Similar differences have been found in other settings where the dictator game was 
played with different subject pools. Economic students were found more selfish compared to 
members of the population in DG (Carpenter et al., 2008), while the significant impact of gender 
and age found in the general population was not found amongst students (Gueth et al., 2007). 
Yet, in both of these studies, the differences in findings might have been linked to the 
homogenous socio-demographic profile of student populations in developed countries. The 
differences found between two student populations probably suggest not only that economic 
students' behaviour are not representative of the broader national population, but also that they 
might not even be representative of other students' groups, where different social and moral 
norms might prevail. 
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B. Interpreting decisions in the dictator game 
The aim of these experiments was to measure nursing students' altruism or concerns for others. 
The idea that donations in the DG quantify individual altruism stems from the standard neo-
classical assumption that individuals should seek to maximize their own benefits and be selfish. 
Yet, although donations do occur in these experiments, identifying the dictators' reasons for 
giving has often been debated, as only the outcome of the game is usually observed. Several 
hypotheses have been debated to explain these deviations, and what the decisions made in the 
dictator game actually capture. 
Hoffman et al. (1996) account for the increased donations observed in non-anonymous DG by 
pointing to the decreased "social distance" which they define as "the degree of reciprocity that 
subjects believe exists within a social interaction". According to Bolton et al. "dictators might be 
motivated to give a gift for one or more of many reasons: e.g., a sense of moral obligation, 
pleasure derived from giving, to demonstrate kindness" (Bolton et al., 1998). The underlying 
assumption holding these theories together seems to be that the decision to allocate more or less 
money relates to "an expectations phenomenon", not "an autonomous private preference for 
equity'' (Hoffman et al., 1996). There is evidence showing that individuals adhere to broader 
social norms, which expect a particular behaviour from them (Boyd and Richerson, 1992). The 
existence of such social norms, which vary according to groups, has been evidenced by different 
studies. The results presented here suggest that there is a relatively homogenous norm across 
countries within the nursing community, as to what behaviours are "right" towards a poor person 
or a student. This is particularly striking when compared to the much less generous donations 
made by economic students in South Africa. These differences suggest that the "nursing norm" 
(across South Africa, Thailand and Kenya) is stronger than the South African norm, and might 
explain some of the differences observed. 
Extending the notion of social distance and social norms, some authors have recently argued that 
what motivates dictators is a sense of moral obligation, conveyed by the moral distance that 
separate them from the recipients. Carpenter et al. (2008) underline that more generous 
behaviours in behavioural games are often associated with a greater degree of "deservingness" 
of recipients. For Aguiar et al. (2008), when the moral distance is null, the dictator feels she 
"ought to donate all or part of her resources according to her level of well-being". Therefore, more 
than just altruism, behaviours observed in the dictator games reveal the relative adherence to a 
social norm, which itself conveys a sense of moral obligation towards the recipients. Drawing on 
Aguiar et al.'s concept of moral distance, one can analyse the differences in attitudes between 
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the nursing and economic students towards patients as a differential in the moral distance, or the 
degree of moral obligation that they feel they have towards recipients (Aguiar et al., 2008). While 
economic students can only contribute to the well-being of patients within the context of the 
game, nursing students are providing time and efforts to attend to patients. This might explain 
why the greater generosity of nursing students observed for the student and poor framing is not 
observed in the patient framing. On the other hand in the patient DG, South African nurses were 
significantly less generous than their Kenyan and Thai counterparts who took part in the same 
study as the one described here52 (see Appendix 5.8). This raises some concerns about some 
social norms or lack of moral motivation that could exist in the nursing community in South Africa. 
Far from being some anecdotal finding, these results find some echo in the health services 
literature that has highlighted how nurses abuse and treat patients badly (Jewkes et al., 1998, 
Thomas et al., 2007, Chopra et al., 2009b). What is more concerning is that those findings come 
from a population of nurses who are about to enter their professional lives, and that they already 
display less concern for patients in South Africa compared to Kenya and Thailand. Indeed, the 
greater moral distance could be associated with a prolonged exposure to difficult working 
conditions and violence in the workplace (Jewkes et al., 1998). But as most of the nursing 
students from the sample have had little work experience, this assumption does not necessarily 
hold. 
5.5.3. Limitations 
One of the objectives of this research was to use experiments to provide a quantitative measure 
of participants' altruism. However, several critiques have been made against experimental 
economics, and in particular its fundamental assumption that claims that insights and measures 
obtained "in the lab", with abstract rules and controlled environment, can be extrapolated to the 
"real world". It has been argued that several factors could systematically differ in the lab from the 
real world and affect the behaviours observed under experimental conditions (Levitt and List, 
2007). 
First, the lack of anonymity between subjects and experimenters, and between subjects 
themselves (Hoffman et al., 1996), is a potential source of over-estimation of the occurrence and 
magnitude of pro-social behaviours. In the games played here, although the experimental 
procedure was designed to guarantee anonymity, this may have not been achieved for two 
reasons. First, participants might have felt that experimenters would be able to know their choices 
s2 Whilst South African nurses gave on average 37.7% of their endowments, Kenyan nurses gave 46% and Thai 
nurses gave 47.8%. 
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based on their study numbers. After all, those study numbers were displayed on the students' 
desks, and it was indeed possible to link some faces to some study numbers. Although this might 
seem a little far-fetched, this setting undoubtedly protects participants' anonymity less than does 
the secret ballot procedure used by Hoffman et al (1996)53. Anonymity between subjects may 
also have been compromised by the physical proximity between respondents in the classroom, 
which could not have completely prevented respondents to look at each other's responses. 
Second, the fact that participants are under the scrutiny of experimenters may affect their 
decisions. A vast literature from psychology has underlined that study participants are likely to 
modify their behaviours because when they are observed and scrutinized (Harrison and List, 
2004) (i.e. the "Hawthorne Effect"). This effect could be particularly serious when there is a moral 
element in the behaviours observed, which is the case when one focuses on the existence and 
magnitude of social preferences (Levitt and List, 2007). The framing of the experiments held in 
this study probably even increased that potential bias. Yet anonymity in the decisions, albeit 
imperfect, was supposed to limit that bias. 
Third, the very context in which experiments are embedded might exert influence participants to 
perform in a way they would not in everyday life. If the various elements of a game- the stakes of 
the game, the way rules are presented or worded, the general context of where and why the 
game is played, etc. - are, to some extent, controllable by the experimenter, the general 
understanding and context of the game is not. Explaining the variety of their results in different 
settings, Henrich et al. (2004a) show how behaviours in games are shaped by social norms and 
interactions. Unbeknownst to the experimenter, participants will bring their own experiences and 
past interactions to interpret the rules and play the game. A typical illustration of this was given by 
the "contextualisation" explained by participants in the focus group discussions. It is unclear to 
what extent this effect may have compromised the expression of "true" altruism. 
In addition to these generic limitations, the results obtained in the DG reported here may have 
been compromised by two aspects: they may have doubted either the fact that it was going to be 
played for real money, or the existence of actual recipients to their offers. 
The first point was raised quite strongly during the pilot, and a number of measures were 
taken to ensure that subjects believed that the monetary stakes were real. For instance, 
experimenters systematically displayed the money that was ready to be put in the participants' 
envelope. Although no systematic question was asked to all subjects to investigate whether or not 
53 In their design, participants are called one after the other, given an envelope containing a number of notes, and 
sent behind a large cardboard box at the back of a room to decide what they want to leave in the envelope and what 
they keep for themselves. 
124 
they had taken the task seriously, feedback from focus group discussions suggests that the large 
majority of them believed that payoffs were real. 
Furthermore, it was critical that participants believed that another real person's payoffs were 
indeed dependent on their decisions. To ensure that they did, in the majority of games used in 
experimental economics, all players (here dictators and recipients) are physically present in the 
experimental lab or the same venue, or procedures are set up to ensure that participants believe 
the existence of the recipients (for example, by asking participants to put the money in a sealed 
envelope and writing the name and address of a person randomly drawn from a phone book -
(Koch and Normann, 2008)). In this experiment, a different protocol was followed, and it is 
possible that survey participants did not believe that their decisions would actually have some 
real outcome for others. However, since this problem is likely to skew the behaviours towards 
more selfishness, the high donations observed provide evidence that participants most probably 
believed that the games were for real. 
5.5.4. Implications of the results 
This section focuses mainly on the implications of the results for further research. Indeed, at this 
point of the analysis, implications for policy are not straightforward. First, it is unclear whether 
altruism can be modified or whether it is a fixed personality trait. Evidence from the dictator game 
literature suggests the former, as the older subjects are in DG the more generous offers they 
make. If altruism can therefore be shaped, by life and experience, there might also be scope to 
make nursing students more altruistic, for example through appropriate curriculum emphasising 
caring attitudes. Second, if altruism cannot be modified or altered, the question remains to decide 
whether the government should favour the selection of more altruistic individuals. This is 
discussed in greater detail in the final chapter of the thesis, in light of the rest of the findings. 
The results obtained in the experiments presented here are generally supportive of the 
behavioural economic hypothesis that individuals take others' welfare into consideration, and 
confirm the importance of institutions in distribution games (Bardsley, 2008, Carpenter et al., 
2008). In addition, the differences obtained in different countries (South Africa vs. the other two 
countries for the patient framing) and different groups (economic and nursing students), as well 
as the effects of individual factors on the decisions made, emphasise the difficulty of general ising 
findings from particular subject pools in specific contexts (Carpenter et al., 2008). This should call 
for more caution in the interpretation of experimental results that are mostly obtained from 
economic students from developed countries. 
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These results also have broader implications for experimental economics. As Eckel and 
Grossman point out: 
"It is received wisdom in experimental economics that abstraction is important. Experimental 
procedures should be as context-free as possible, and the interaction among subjects should be 
carefully limited by the rules of the experiment to ensure that they are playing the game we intend 
them to play. For tests of economic theory, these procedural restrictions are critical. As 
experimenters, we aspire to instructions that most closely mimic the environment implicit in the 
theory, which is inevitably a mathematical abstraction of an economic situation. We are careful not 
to contaminate our tests by unnecessary context'' (Eckel and Grossman, 1996). 
Experimental economists are usually reluctant to frame the games, as difficulties or biases can 
arise due to differential interpretation between individuals of the proposed "framing" (Levin et al., 
1998, Rege and Telle, 2004). If not a different interpretation, there was most certainly here a 
different appreciation or meaning of the different framing for economic and nursing students. But 
far from ruling out the interest of using framed experiments, the present study underlines their 
usefulness to explore the social norms of different groups in relation to their direct environment. In 
fact experimental methodology provides a very useful tool to explore the importance and 
consequence of context, and of social norms. The development of behavioural economics has 
evolved to take social and psychological factors into account in the study of economic decision 
making. This is particularly true for the investigation of the concern of others in decision-making, 
and, in the context of experimental economics, social factors can only be introduced by 
abandoning some degree of abstraction. 
5.6. Conclusion 
This analysis of the nature and determinants of nurses' altruism in South Africa represents the 
first step in the exploration of the determinants of career choices. 
The evidence presented here suggests that the generosity of nurses in dictator games might be a 
sign of self-selection of altruistic individuals into nursing (hypothesis H1) or of a particular 
altruistic norm in the nursing culture. The results also highlight that there is a large distribution of 
behaviours within the study population, and that some individuals are typically more generous 
than others. The dictator game provides a useful quantitative measure of altruistic concerns 
towards others, which seems validated by the correlations obtained with survey measures of pro-
social behaviours. In the next chapters, this construct is used to explore the impact of altruism on 
career choices. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, to date, all empirical research on nursing labour supply choices has 
only focused on the study of traditional individual characteristics (Antonazzo et al., 2003). Yet the 
recent developments in behavioural economics have started to challenge the merits of this 
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narrow vision and its ability to help one understand the underlying motives at play in individual 
choices. One of the assumptions of this thesis is that social preferences, defined as individual 
concern for others, are powerful incentives that drive individual choices on the labour market. To 
test that assumption, experimental economic games and classic survey tools capture the 
underlying values and pro-social concerns of nursing graduates. The next step of this research 
consists of investigating the determinants of nurses' stated job preferences, and in particular to 
explore the link between these preferences and altruistic and pro-social values. 
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6.1. Introduction 
Chapter 6 · The determinants of nurses' 
job preferences 
In South Africa, the shortage of nurses in the health system has been to some extent highlighted 
by routine statistics (Health Systems Trust, 2007, Health Systems Trust, 2008b) and case studies 
(Hall, 2004). However, there is no detailed longitudinal dataset on the career paths of nurses that 
enables a quantitative analysis of job choices such as the ones carried out in developed settings 
(Shields, 2004). One of the objectives of this thesis is to contribute to addressing this gap, 
through the investigation of the job preferences of South African professional nurses when they 
are about to enter the labour market. 
However one of the challenges of this task is the difficulty of observing actual labour market 
decisions. Usually data collected on decisions made by nurses in the labour market fail to 
illustrate the alternative job offers that were turned down, limiting our understanding of job 
choices. In the South African context, after graduation nurses have to complete a one-year 
compulsory service in the public sector, which means that their decisions regarding job choice 
cannot be immediately observed. Consequently, this research set out to develop a choice 
experiment that would mimic the opportunities available in the labour market after nurses 
graduate. 
First introduced in transport and environmental economics, stated preference techniques, such as 
Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE), have become a popular method to model choice behaviour in 
health economics, and determine the driving factors of preferences that are not observable in the 
market. Broadly speaking a DCE applied o job preferences presents a series of hypothetical job 
choices to respondents, each job being made up of a series of attributes (i.e. job characteristics). 
In this chapter, the choice experiment is used to: 
evaluate the job preferences of newly qualified nurse graduates 
examine the determinants of the labour market choices made by nurses, and in particular 
the extent to which pro-social concerns or altruism affect them; 
predict the future labour market choices of the nursing graduates in the sample. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a detailed account of the methods used 
to develop the discrete choice experiment. Section 3 describes the econometric models used to 
analyse the data collected. Section 4 reports on the descriptive and multivariate results. The last 
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section discusses the results in the light of relevant literature, and examines their implications for 
research and policy. 
6.2. Design of the choice experiment 
Louviere et al. (2000) indicate that the design of choice experiments should satisfy four criteria: 
- cognitive complexity: that the experiment should not represent too complex a task for 
respondents, avoiding fatigue and boredom; 
- market realism: that the choices presented in the experiment, and the experiment itself, should 
be as realistic and close as possible to the choices made in real life by respondents; 
- identification: that the design will allow a correct estimation of the utility function; 
-precision: that the parameters in the analysis will be estimated with enough precision. 
These four principles guided the design of the choice experiment. The first two were used to 
identify the appropriate type of experiment and the choices of adequate attributes and levels, 
whilst the last two led the experimental design. 
6.2.1. Identifying the characteristics of the experiment 
A. Labelled vs. generic choice experiments 
Definition 
Labelled stated choice experiments differ from unlabelled or generic experiments in two ways. 
In an unlabelled experiment of job preferences, alternatives in choice sets are described as 'Job 
A', 'Job B', 'Job C', etc. To date, all the choice experiments on health workers' job preferences 
have been generic (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2009). In these experiments, participants were 
presented with two job descriptions, each defined by various features, such as salary, workload, 
location, facility, etc. In contrast, labelled experiments are designed to study two or more named 
alternatives, where the name given to each alternative conveys meaningful information to 
respondents. In a classic example of a labelled experiment from the transport sector (Hensher et 
al., 2005), respondents had to choose between travelling by bus or with their own car. Each mode 
of transport was also characterised by other features (time, cost, etc.). 
The second difference between generic and labelled experiments is that the latter usually include 
different attributes or levels across alternatives (i.e. alternative-specific levels or attributes). In the 
transport example (Hensher et al., 2005) different levels of travel times were included, according 
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to the transportation means (alternative) used (bus or own car). It is important to note that this is 
neither a necessary nor a systematic feature of labelled experiments. 
Choosing between a labelled or generic design 
In choosing between the type of choice experiment, the objectives of the research and the 
research validity were key considerations (Blarney et al., 2000, Huybers, 2004). Here, a labelled 
design was adopted for two reasons to ensure greater realism in the choice experiment and to 
mimic the real labour market opportunities presented to nurses as closely as possible. 
First, labelled experiments allow more refined analysis, as they enable a differential valuation of 
attributes across alternatives. For example, the type of facility in which a nurse might work 
(hospital or clinic) may be valued differently depending on the sector it is in, as public hospitals 
might convey a different reality or meaning than private hospitals. In the analysis of a labelled 
experiment, parameters can be estimated distinctly for each attribute under each label (or 
alternative). To do so in an unlabelled experiment is feasible, but tedious and demanding. For 
instance, one may have to undertake different experiments for each of the alternatives of interest 
(which would obviously prevent estimating trade-offs between alternatives). Alternatively, one 
could include the alternatives as attributes in a generic experiment, and estimate interaction 
effects between attributes. Whilst possible, this would increase the complexity of the design 
(Street and Burgess, 2007). 
Second, labelled choices appear more realistic in the present research context for two reasons. 
First, an experiment proposing a choice between positions in the private compared to the public 
sector or an overseas posting is more realistic than one offering a choice between "job A" or "job 
B" or "job C". Indeed, job adverts for nurses typically include company logos or distinct features 
that make it obvious whether they are offered overseas, or in private groups or in public facilities. 
Second, a labelled experiment better mimics the actual features of each sub-job market by 
allowing for flexibility in the levels of each attribute. In an unlabelled experiment, the levels of 
each attribute would be the same for all sectors and therefore unrealistic combinations of attribute 
levels would occur in some job descriptions, such as a position in the public sector proposing a 
salary equivalent to those usually earned overseas. Although it is theoretically possible to 
produce unlabelled designs avoiding such problems, for example through nesting of the attribute 
levels (Louviere et al., 2000), this is practically difficult to implement as it imposes many 
constraints on the designs4. A labelled experiment, where attributes and attribute levels are 
54 Nested attributes are attributes that contain two dimensions. See discussion below on design, in particular the 
implications raised by the number of levels in an attribute. 
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defined separately for each alternative, avoids the problem of forcing participants to choose 
between unrealistic scenarios, and hence increases the validity of the method (Louviere et al., 
2000). 
Identifying the labels 
Having decided to use a labelled experiment, the next step in the DCE design was to define the 
appropriate labels. To guide the definition of labels relevant nursing literature was reviewed (see 
sections 2.3 and 2.4) and two Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were conducted in July 2008 with 
14 final year nursing students from Baragwanath nursing college, in Sowetoss (see topic guide in 
Appendix 6.1 ). 
First, the availability of alternative jobs (other than nursing jobs) is both unrealistic and uncommon 
at the beginning of a nursing career. It is too early into their career for opting out of the nursing 
profession in order to take up another post in the public sector, and opportunities in the private 
sector other than nursing (e.g. pharmaceutical or nursing placement companies) are not available 
at such an early stage either. FGD participants viewed these as possible opportunities at a much 
later stage of their career, when they would "not want to be a nurse anymore". Therefore, relevant 
labels were identified as the public sector, the private sector and overseas, for two main reasons. 
These categories cover three clearly distinct choices for nurses. In the literature, public sector 
positions are typically associated with difficult working conditions and poorer patients (Edginton 
and Holst, 1991, De Vries and Marincowitz, 2004, Hall, 2004, Thutse, 2006), but provide job 
security and the social benefits offered by the civil service (pensions and health insurance for 
example). This was confirmed by FGD participants. On the other hand, the working environment 
in private sector jobs is better, with fewer better-off patients (Pillay, 2009). FGD participants 
confirmed that workload is less heavy in the private sector, while patients are typically more 
"demanding" than in the public sector. Finally, positions overseas represent an obvious distinct 
career path, associated with much higher salaries and different working and life environments. 
Furthermore, public jobs were split into two distinct alternatives, rural and urban jobs56 for two 
reasons. First, the literature review as well as feedback from FGD participants suggested that 
opportunities in rural areas differ from those in urban areas in terms of incentives offered (a rural 
allowance is available), work environment (facilities in rural areas are more isolated, under-staffed 
55 Although it would have been better to organise FGDs in both rural and urban settings, this was not possible due to 
time constraints. The FGDs were held at the same time by two different facilitators and similar issues were raised. 
56 No similar break down was made for positions in the private sector because the latter is virtually absent from South 
African rural areas, with the rare exception of GP practices. 
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and usually associated with poorer equipment), and lifestyle. Second, understanding the motives 
for working in rural areas was one of the objectives of this thesis. 
B. Identifying the attributes and the levels 
Identifying the attributes 
The third stage of the DCE design involved identifying the attributes (Hensher et al., 2005) and 
defining attributes and levels which would reflect participants' experiences realistically or 
represent credible new alternatives (Wittink and Cattin, 1989). Two principles guided this process. 
First, it was essential to identify the attributes that play a determinant role in the decision-
making process (Hensher et al., 2005). Indeed, when key characteristics are not included in 
choice sets, respondents may infer levels for these attributes, introducing unobservable biases in 
parameter estimates (Louviere et al., 2000). Furthermore, as the valuation of attributes is 
interdependent, introducing a meaningless or irrelevant attribute in the DCE would bias the 
results for other attributes. 
Second, the number of attributes included was limited by design constraints as there is a 
direct relationship between the number of attributes and the number of choice sets needed to 
obtain an optimal designs?. In order to limit respondent fatigue, the number of choice sets 
administered to each participant is limited to a manageable number, typically between 12 and 16 
(Fiebig et al., 2005, Guttman et al., 2009). A higher number of attributes also increases the 
complexity of the task thereby leading to increased random variability in choices and reduced 
efficiency of estimation (Louviere et al., 2000). 
A review of the literature presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 helped identify meaningful 
attributes, while the FGDs ensured that the study population's perspective and experience was 
accounted for (Coast and Horrocks, 2007). The literature review led to a first list of potential 
attributes: salary, presence of equipment, education opportunities, promotion, type of facility, 
staffing levels, type of management. Focus groups confirmed the importance of the following job 
characteristics: salary, working conditions (in particular workload or staffing levels, presence of 
sufficient drugs and equipment, management support), type of facility (hospital or clinic), 
education opportunities (in particular the possibility to specialise), career prospects and 
geographical location. Furthermore, the FGDs helped clarify the meaning and importance of the 
following aspects: 
57 For example, the introduction of a two-level attribute in one alternative requires the estimation of one more 
parameter, thereby translating into at least one more choice set to be answered by respondents (see design section 
for more details). 
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An overlap was identified between the type of facility (where a job is held) and typical 
working hours: nurses working in a clinic would always have regular hours, while working in 
a hospital would always require some flexibility, through night shifts and rotations. 
Meaningful promotion prospects and further education opportunities were closely related, 
with the latter seen a pre-condition for the former. Participants in FGDs said they wished to 
specialise to obtain a more interesting job (more valued, with more clinical responsibilities) 
and a better salary. It seemed that without further formal qualifications, this would not be 
feasible. 
There was a strong association between staffing levels and the labels. Under-staffing was 
not seen as an issue for overseas or private jobs, whilst working in the public sector was 
always associated by FGD participants with under-staffed facilities. These differences in 
staffing levels between public and private have been confirmed by several studies (Meel, 
2003, Penn-Kekana et al., 2005, King and Mcinerney, 2006, Pillay, 2009). 
Finally, although it did not appear in the literature review as a key dimension, a fifth attribute was 
considered for inclusion, for its relevance for this research objectives. The objective of such 
attribute was to investigate further the extent to which nurses take into account their patients' 
well-being into account, and more precisely the extent to which nurses could choose their jobs 
according to the benefits received by the populations they serve. In addition to being in line with 
this research objectives, this dimension is somehow supported by some studies in the literature 
(see sections 2.3 and 4.2.4). Besides, when explored in the FGDs, participants suggested that 
this was indeed an important aspect of their job, and they contrasted the impact they would have 
in the private sector (i.e. answering the requests of "demanding and well-off' patients) with that in 
the public sector where they would "give back to the community". 
Identifying the levels 
Due to the large number of attributes and alternatives already defined, it was decided to limit the 
number of levels to two per attribute. Although this decision was necessarily going to preclude the 
study of non-linear effects for attributes measured in continuous units (mainly salaries here), it 
was judged necessary to minimise the complexity of the task, and the number of choice sets 
answered by each participant. For each attribute, the base level was anchored to prevailing 
conditions or nurses' expectations in the labour market. These levels were therefore established 
using data collected from official sources and qualitative data collected during the focus groups. 
Additional levels were determined to be a reasonable improvement from the base level. This was 
discussed at great length during the FGDs, as the choice of realistic and meaningful levels has 
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been recognised to increase the precision of parameter estimates (Hall et al., 2006). All levels 
(with the exact wording used in the questionnaire) can be found in Table 6.1. 
Salary levels for the public and private sectors were obtained from official sources and matched 
the salaries of nurses to be recruited in January 2009, correcting for annual inftation (about 10%). 
The second level was determined for each job as an increase of about 25%. Determining the 
salary levels in the overseas alternative was a more delicate task, as they vary a lot from one 
country to another. For example, job adverts were found offering R200,000 to South African 
nurses in Dubai, but €30,000 (about R340,000) for specialised nurses in Ireland. Due to a 
concern that very high salaries might be too attractive to respondents and skew the results, salary 
levels overseas were initially set to R220,000 and R264,000 (essentially based on job adverts 
from Middle-Eastern countries). But these levels were judged unrealistically low by participants in 
the pilot, and therefore were subsequently increased to R250,000 and R325,000, corresponding 
approximately to salary offers in Middle-Eastern countries (for the first) and Western countries (for 
the second). 
Public jobs could either be undertaken in a clinic or a hospital. As mentioned above, these levels, 
clinic and hospital, also encompassed the types of working hours, as well as different types of 
activities (in clinics, nurses essentially do primary health care activities while in hospitals, as 
general nurses, they can work in different wards but would never really have much clinical 
responsibility). Overseas and private sector job alternatives had only one level for the facility 
attribute, as hospitals appeared to be the only obvious option. 
For the attribute 'training opportunities', it was assumed that jobs overseas did not provide any 
formal training, which is why the attribute only had one level, "informal on-the-job training". In the 
private sector, formal training opportunities seem unusual and are not expected by nurses; this 
provided a base level consisting of "informal on-the-job training". However, job adverts for the 
private sector sometimes mention the possibility of support for further training. Therefore another 
level was defined as some time off and some financial support for training. In the public sector, 
the main training opportunity for a nurse is to obtain study leave to specialise. Usually, nurses 
expect to have to wait an average of five to six years before they would be able to take study 
leave. Therefore levels were set to waiting period of six and two years, reflecting the current 
situation and a hypothetical (significant) improvement. 
For the working conditions attribute, in the public sector the issue of the presence of adequate 
equipment and supplies (or lack thereoD was clearly the most critical, and provided both levels. In 
the private sector, the attitude of the management (supportive or not) in the presence of 
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"demanding" patients seemed to be key. Finally, in overseas positions, discrimination at work was 
perceived as an obvious potential issue ("you can be demoted as a foreigner', "not recognized as 
professional nurses"), and was confirmed by numerous studies on nurses from low- and middle-
income countries working in the UK or other developed countries (Culley et al., 2001, Allan et al., 
2004, Likupe, 2006, Obrey et al., 2006, Larsen, 2007, Troy et al., 2007) 
The levels of the 'social impact' attribute were defined differently across alternatives. In the 
private sector and overseas alternatives, only one level was defined, reflecting the idea that 
nurses would attend wealthy populations (see Table 6.1). In contrast, the levels defined for public 
jobs followed FGD comments that in public facilities they felt that they were benefiting "the 
community". The two levels were defined to emphasise that in some positions, they would attend 
usually under-served populations. 
Once the alternatives, attributes and levels were defined, the questionnaire had to be produced 
following experimental design theory principles, as detailed in the next section. 
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Table 6.1: Attribute levels- final design 
Label Attribute 
Overseas Salary 
Facility 
Training opportunities 
Social impact 
Working conditions 
Number First level 
ZAR 250,000 
Hospital 
You will benefit from an interesting on-the-job in-service training 
You will help us provide good quality clinical care to the population of our 
country 
Second level 
ZAR 325,000 
You may not be fully considered as a professional nurse and be Your status as a Professional Nurse will be fully recognised 
....................... ~ .. ··---·~-·-........ ~ ............................................................... . 
2 
sometimes looked down on as a f~~~Jg~-E?..~--------·----·-----·-----··---------·---·····················-·····················-·-··-··-·-··-··-·-··-··-·-·-··-··-·-··-··-·-··-··-·-·-··-··--··-······· ···--······--·--··-·-··-·····--··-··-·-·····---·········-······-····-··--····-3 --ZA"R:--1·3·2:aa·a-·-----·-----------·---·-----·---- ZAR 158,ooo Public, 
rural 
Salary 
Facility Hospital 4 Clinic 
Training opportunities 5 You will be able to get a study leave to specialize within 2 years You will be able to get a study leave to specialize within 6 years 
Social impact 6 Your presence would help us improve access to basic services for Your presence will benefit populations who would otherwise have 
everyone no access to essential services 
Working conditions 7 There is NO lack of basic equipment, medical supplies and drugs. There is regularly a lack of basic equipment, medical supplies 
urban~·-·---·-----·s~'i'~~--....... ...................................... 8 ---;:R:--12o-oaa·------------------·-------------------·-------.. ·--------- ~.~~.-~r.~.9~-:....... ---- ....... -· .. ............. .................. -.................. · ----------· -· · ..... ·· -·-·- -·-·-· 
private ' ZAR 150,000 
Facility Hospital 
Training opportunities 9 You will benefit from an exciting in-service training! 
Social impact Your presence will help us provide advanced care to our clients 
5 days off and a 1 0% contribution to your fees will be provided to 
you for training 
Working conditions 1 0 The hospital management is supportive of its staff Patients are demanding and their satisfaction is a key objective 
u rba_n·,·- . -·- . ··s~'i~~···· ... ......................................... 11 --2AR--12o:oao·-·------·------·-----·----·----·-------------·-----·---·-------------------------·--·· ~~hi4~~n0'69~~-~~! ............ ··· 
pubhc Facility 12 ' Clinic Hospital 
Training opportunities 13 
Social impact 14 
Working conditions 15 
You will be able to get a study leave to specialize within 2 years 
Your presence would help us improve access to basic services for 
everyone 
There is NO lack of basic equipment, medical supplies and drugs. 
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You will be able to get a study leave to specialize within 6 years 
Your presence will benefit populations who would otherwise have 
no access to essential services 
There is regularly a lack of basic equipment, medical supplies 
and drugs. 
6.2.2. Experimental design 
A. Experimental design theory 
Factorial and fractional factorial designs 
The number of attributes and their levels determines the total number of possible alternatives in 
the factorial design. In this choice experiment, there were 15 attributes each with two levels, 
therefore the total number of possible combinations was 21s or 32,768 combinations. As 
respondents cannot answer so many questions, an optimal sub-set of choices sets, called a 
fractional factorial design, must be selected, following the latest developments in experimental 
theory and design methods (Street et al., 2008). 
Experimental design properties 
The identification of the optimal experimental design requires an understanding of the various 
properties the design should meet, as well as a clarification of the questions to be answered in 
the analysis. 
Huber and Zwerina (1996) have described four features of optimal choice designs: 
Level balance: that the occurrence of all levels of every attribute will be the same. Checking 
level balance is easily done by counting the number of occurrences of each level for each 
attribute. 
Orthogonality: the independence of attributes in the design. A simple computation of the 
correlation matrix of the design allows verification of orthogonality. 
Minimal overlap: within choice sets the occurrence of similar combinations of levels should 
be minimised; 
Utility balance: that options within a choice set should be equally attractive to respondents, 
to ensure that respondents will trade between choices. 
While the first three characteristics of optimal choice design are easily verified, the final objective 
is more open to interpretation, particularly in labelled designs. Indeed, without preliminary 
information about individual preferences, it is difficult to assess to what extent some job 
descriptions might be systematically perceived as more attractive than others. Besides, in a 
labelled experiment, heterogeneity of preferences can result in some individuals systematically 
preferring one label. This would not necessarily result in the utility between alternatives being 
systematically unbalanced for all respondents. 
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Efficiency of the design 
Street and Burgess (2007) have underlined that the primary concern of Huber and Zwerina 
( 1996) for orthogonality of the design has overlooked a more important issue, the statistical 
efficiency of the choice design. This ensures that the parameters can be robustly estimated in the 
analysis -the more efficient the design, the greater the ability to minimise the confidence interval 
around the parameters. Street and Burgess (2008) show how the efficiency of a generic 
experiment can be assessed by considering some mathematical properties of the information 
matrix of a model to be estimated using a multinomiallogit modelsa. They show how a D-efficient 
design minimises the overall variance of the parameter estimates. These authors then 
demonstrate that for a given class of unlabelled designs a minimum value of efficiency can be 
computed (Street et al., 2008). The (statistical) efficiency of any design in a given class can then 
be calculated by comparing its D-efficiency to that of the optimal benchmark. By definition, 
efficiency lies between 0 and 1 (the closest to the optimal design), and can be expressed as a 
percentage. 
However D-efficiency measures present several shortcomings. First, the statistical efficiency of 
the choice design (based on the minimisation of the standard errors around the parameter 
estimates) assumes that a multinomial logit model is used in the analysis (Street and Burgess, 
2007), while developments in discrete choice modelling have encouraged researchers to use 
other models (such as mixed log it models), since they account for individual heterogeneity and do 
not assume independence of irrelevant alternatives (Train, 2003). Second, Kuhfeld (2009) has 
underlined that the computation of the D-efficiency relies on an optimal benchmark that can 
sometimes not be satisfyingly calculated, or is based on unrealistic assumptions (all parameter 
estimates are supposed to be zero). Finally, for labelled designs, it is unclear how to calculate the 
D-efficiency, since the methods developed by Street and Burgess specifically refer to generic 
designs (Street and Burgess, 2007). 
Here, no priors were used to estimate the design. It means that one assumed that all coefficients 
would be equal to zero in a MNL model. SAS identified a linear design that 100% D-efficient. 
sa 0-optimality is measured by computing the determinant of the variance-covariance matrix. D-optimal designs will 
minimise this measure. 
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Utility specification 
Finally, to construct a design, one has to consider the form of the utility function to be estimated. 
Specifically, the researcher has to decide whether to estimate main effects (the impact of each 
job attribute on job utility) or whether interaction effects will also be evaluated (the role of the 
interaction between a combination of two or more attributes on job utility). Most choice 
experiments in the health literature use a main effects design. Such designs require fewer choice 
sets and ensure that all the main effects are uncorrelated with each other. The main effects are 
correlated with all the interaction effects· which are assumed to be non-significant (Hensher et al., 
2005). 
B. Design of the discrete choice experiment 
Strategy used for constructing the choice experiment 
In a comparison of four methods to design optimal choice experiments, Street and Burgess found 
that the results obtained with the macros developed by Warren Kuhfeld in SAS (Kuhfeld, 2009) 
often provided the best results (Street et al., 2005). Therefore, this design was generated using 
SAS v9 and the SAS macros (Kuhfeld, 2009). 
With a 215 design, a balanced, efficient experimental design capable of estimating main effects 
can be produced in a minimum of 16 choice sets59. Indeed, an optimal 215 design requires that 
the number of choice sets be divisible by 2 and 4 (to ensure an equal number of occurrences of 
the levels, or level balance) and be at least equal to the number of coefficients to estimate (one 
for each attribute - here 15) plus a constant. 
However, such a factorial design cannot estimate any interaction effect between attributes. So in 
the present case, for example, a main effects design would not allow an assessment of whether 
nurses who are more sensitive to having a greater social impact are also less sensitive to 
remuneration. When the design was constructed, it was decided to allow for the estimation of 
some of the two-way interactions6o. Consequently, it was decided to use an efficient design in 
more than the minimal number of 16 choice sets. 
sg In SAS, the macro %MktRuns indicates whether an efficient orthogonal design can be achieved for a given design 
based on the numbers of choice sets (Kuhfeld, 2009). 
so Due to the limited sample size, it was never planned to test all the two-way interactions. This would have required 
a large number of choice sets, and, hence, would have been unfeasible in practice. 
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A 100% efficient linear design was generated in 24 choice sets61 using the SAS macro %MktEx. 
The SAS macro %Markteff provides the properties of the design -see the design produced in 
Appendix 6.2. The design was orthogonal and provided level balance (Huber and Zwerina, 1996). 
Following the method described by Henscher et al. (2005), the correlation matrix of all the main 
effects and interaction terms was computed (see Appendix 6.3), and three two-way interactions 
were found to be un-confounded with the main effects. Attribute labels were re-arranged to allow 
the estimation of some specific interactions. However, since this aspect was not further explored 
in the analysis, it is not presented here. 
Blocking the design 
There were a total of 24 choice sets, each composed of four jobs, to be evaluated by 
respondents. To limit the cognitive burden on survey participants, the choices were split into two 
sets (blocks) of 12 questions each. Indeed, all studies involving health workers have used a 
maximum of 16 choice sets (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2009), and several have blocked their design 
to decrease the number of choice sets down to five or six (Scott, 2001, Ubach et al., 2003, 
Wordsworth et al., 2004). Although some studies found that the number of choice sets only has a 
marginal impact on responses in choice experiments (Dellaert et al., 1999, Stopher and Hensher, 
2000), other studies have found that the number of choice sets matters. For example, Ortuzar et 
al. (2000) decided to block a design as they found that presenting respondents with 16 choice 
sets led to confusion, boredom and inconsistencies in their responses. Even though there is no 
agreement in the choice experiment literature as to the maximum number of choice sets 
respondents can handle it was important within the current study to minimise the length of the 
task. As explained in Chapter 3, respondents completed the choice experiment after having 
undertaken three prior tasks (two behavioural experiments lasting about an hour, and another 
choice experiment presented in the next chapter). 
Organising the questionnaire into choice sets 
In contrast to a generic experiment, the linear design of a labelled experiment directly produces 
all the choice sets needed to evaluate respondents' preferences. Most of the recent 
developments in designing optimal choice experiments have focused on the design of generic 
experiments, but very little has been published on how to maximise the efficiency of a choice 
design in a labelled experiment. Consequently, it was assumed here that the most efficient linear 
design would also be the choice design that would lead to the greatest statistical efficiency. 
61 This was based on an orthogonal array of 220 . 
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C. Finalising the questionnaire 
Four outstanding questions needed to be answered in order to finalise the questionnaire: 
Should the choice sets be framed? 
What question are participants asked? 
Should there be an opt-out option? 
Should tone introduce a test for internal consistency? 
Framing the task 
Following Louviere's principle of market realism (Louviere et al., 2000), it was decided to frame 
the choice sets as job adverts. 
The formatting used to present the four alternatives in each choice set mimicked styles of typical 
newspaper adverts (see Figure 6.1 ). During the pilot, respondents reported that this made the 
task more interesting, realistic and easier. 
However, framing the task as job adverts raised challenges in terms of the presentation of the 
working condition attribute. Indeed, a real job advert would never illustrate the difficult working 
conditions of the job. Therefore, during the preparatory FGDs, nurses' job search strategies were 
investigated. Most participants explained that when applying for a job, they would use their 
network or visit the health facility to find out more informally about the working conditions. This 
informal strategy was introduced in the questionnaire as a means of generating information about 
the job's working conditions, and was presented separately from the job advert. This was judged 
to be credible during the pilot, but was not seen as more credible or influential than the rest of the 
information. It was only seen as a complementary piece of information about the position. 
Furthermore, consistent with usual practice, it was decided to produce four versions of the 
questionnaire with different orders of the questions, to control for a potential order effect. 
However, the order of the alternatives within the choice sets was the same in all choice sets (as it 
is in Figure 6. 1). It is possible that this identical ordering of alternatives might have increased the 
use of heuristic rules by respondents. Yet this risk was weighed against the benefit in terms of 
cognitive simplicity provided by a unique ordering of alternatives. Due to the length of data 
collection and recognizing the cognitive difficulty of the task, it was decided to have a unique 
ordering of the four alternatives across choice sets. 
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Question format 
In a DCE, respondents can be asked to rank options or to choose their preferred one. Hensher et 
al. (2005) provide a virulent argument against ranking. First they argue that asking people to rank 
alternatives is inherently different from making choices. When they rank options, individuals 
reveal their preferences in a utility space that might be very different for each individual, therefore 
precluding a meaningful aggregation of individual responses. Second, they argue that when 
people choose their favourite option, they take into account various constraints, which they do 
less or not at all when asked to rank alternatives. Finally, they underline that ranking is not 
realistic; in reality respondents choose the option they like most, but they hardly ever select a 
second best item, or express the full ranking of their preferences (Chapman and Staelin, 1982). In 
addition to these arguments, it could be argued that ranking alternatives instead of choosing the 
favourite one is moving away from a realist task as well as moving away from Lancaster's theory 
of consumer choice. 
Despite these arguments it was decided to ask respondents to rank the four jobs, for two 
reasons. 
First, it was felt that an appropriate framing of the task could limit some of the issues 
highlighted by Hensher et al. (2005). Indeed, the task was framed as a job search (see Figure 
6.1), at the end of which respondents would have selected four relevant job adverts. They were 
then asked to say where they would apply first, which would be their second choice, etc. In this 
way, respondents were encouraged to take their personal constraints into account and the task 
was realistic. 
Second, although ranking might not be a realist option in choosing between different 
products, in the context of a job search, this is probably close to an actual decision made by 
individuals. Since they have to apply to competitive jobs, they run the risk of being turned down 
for some jobs but not others, and need to be able to order their options. 
Third, ranking alternatives provides more information than choosing a preferred option. 
Indeed, ranking alternatives provides information both on the favourite choice, but also on the 
trade-offs made when comparing the second-best with the remaining options. In the current study 
there was a high risk that respondents would never choose one of the four alternatives if they 
were only asked to choose their preferred option. If the choice between alternatives is both 
random and independent, the probability of not choosing a given alternative is 0.75 for every 
choice set. Therefore, the probability of never choosing a given alternative is (0.75) 12=0.0316. 
Whilst this is a small risk, it assumes random independent choices which are unlikely to hold. If it 
is assumed instead that one option has a two times lower probability of being chosen than the 
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other three options62, then the probability of not choosing that option increases to 
(0.857)12=0.157. This higher probability of 16% is probably quite reasonable (even under-
estimated) given that people certainly do not have random preferences over labels. Therefore 
asking individuals to rank the alternatives would reduce the risk of never obtaining information on 
the trade-offs made over the attributes of the least preferred alternative. 
Rank-ordered choices have recently been used in a few generic DCEs to provide analysts with 
richer preference datasets (Lancsar and Louviere, 2008, Scarpa et al., 2009). However, there are 
two differences between these studies and the current one. 
First, some of these studies were based on new design approaches used with unlabelled 
DCEs (Louviere and Lancsar, 2008). Instead of asking respondents to rank all the alternatives 
proposed, respondents were asked to choose their preferred option, then their least favourite out 
of the remaining options, then their second best option, then the second worst, etc. The current 
study did not follow this approach, as the task was written, and administered to a large group (not 
computerised or administered individually and face-to-face) making it difficult to ensure that 
respondents would understand what was expected of them. Indeed, such studies in the literature 
have been administered face-to-face (Scarpa et al. 2009) or computerised (Lancsar and 
Louviere, 2008). 
Second, these studies were designed to make possible the estimation of respondent-
specific preferences. While it is still unclear whether this analysis would have been possible here 
(as the implications for the design have only been studied in the case of unlabelled choice 
experiments), it could not be performed as the questionnaire was administered in two blocks. 
To opt-out or not to opt-out 
In a DCE, an opt-out option gives respondents the option of not selecting any of the alternatives 
("choose neither"). In most real life contexts individuals would not have to choose an alternatives 
and forcing a decision is likely to make the task less realistic, and inflate the parameters obtained 
(Hensher et al., 2005). 
However, including an opt-out option provides several disadvantages. First, when respondents 
choose the opt-out option, they do not provide any trade-off information to the analyst. Second, 
the more complex the task, the more respondents might be tempted to opt-out because it would 
be less demanding. Prior research (Dhar and Simonson, 2003) - indicates that forced choice 
62 If one of the 4 alternatives is half as likely to be chosen as the others, then the probability of it being chosen is 
0.143 (the chance of choosing any of the others being 0.286). Therefore the probability that this option would not be 
chosen is 1-0.143= 0.857. 
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under preference uncertainty can produce conflict and psychological discomfort and lead to 
selection of options that reduce the need to make "hard choices". In an experimental setting, 
where a choice task might be less involving than an actual decision, preference uncertainty and 
possible concerns about being evaluated have been identified as factors that can enhance the 
tendency to select default options that are less likely to be seen as errors. Therefore when the 
opt-out option is chosen, it might be difficult to distinguish between a true or false 'non-
responder'. 
Here, considering the potential complexity of the task and the length taken by all the data 
collection activities it was decided not to have an opt-out option, to avoid the risk of fatigue 
pushing respondents down the easier "neither" route. 
144 
Figure 6.1: Example of choice set 
Seeking 
Professional Nurse 
Location: OVERSEAS 
Facility: HOSPITAL 
Salary: R 325,000 per year 
Training opportunities offered: 
You will benefit from an 
interesting on-the-job in-service 
training 
Social impact: 
You will help us provide good 
quality clinical care to the 
population of our country 
I 
For the position described above, you 
have learnt through your own 
1 investigation that: 
I You may not be fully recognised 
I 
as a professional nurse, and may 
sometimes be looked down on as 
j a foreigner 
D 
Exciting position available ih the 
public sector for a Professional 
Nurse 
Location: RURAL AREA 
Facility: HOSPITAL 
Salarv: R 132,000 per year (incl. 
R12,000 for rural allowance) 
Training opportunities offered: 
You will be able to get study leave 
to specialise within 6 years 
Social impact: 
Your presence will benefit 
populations who would otherwise 
have no access to essential 
services. 
I 
For the position described above, you I 
have learnt through your own , 
1 investigation that: I 
I I I 1 I There is NO lack of basic I 
I equipment, medical supplies or I 
1 drugs. I 
I I 
i D I 
I 
For the position described above, you 
1 
have learnt through your own 
I investigation that: 
I 
D 
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PROFESSIONAL NURSE 
POSITION 
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
LOCATION: URBAN AREA 
FACILITY: CLINIC 
SALARY: R 144,000 PER YEAR 
TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES 
OFFERED: 
YOU WILL BE ABLE TO GET 
STUDY LEAVE TO SPECIALISE 
WITHIN 6 YEARS 
SOCIAL IMP ACT: 
YOUR PRESENCE WILL BENEFIT 
POPULATIONS WHO WOULD 
OTHERWISE HAVE NO ACCESS 
TO ESSENTIAL SERVICES. 
I For the position described above, you 
J have learnt through your own 
1 investigation that: 
I 
I 
There is NO lack of basic 
equipment, medical supplies or 
I drugs. 
I 
D 
I 
Testing for internal consistency 
It is usual practice in DCEs to introduce an additional choice set where one "dominant" alternative 
is superior to the other(s) on all characteristics. Some authors have claimed that this was a way 
to test the "internal consistency" of the responses provided by respondents (Mangham et al., 
2009), in particular to check whether they had understood the task correctly and not answered 
randomly. Others have seen in such tests a way to validate some of the axioms of consumer 
theory (monotonicity or non-satiation) upon which rely DCEs (Lancsar and Louviere, 2006). In 
either case, individuals are expected to choose the best alternative over the dominated one(s). 
Some authors have chosen to exclude from the analysis respondents who fail that test, although 
this is a disputed issue (Lancsar and Louviere, 2006). 
The possibility of introducing a "dominant" option relies on the capacity to construct "an option in 
which all levels of all attributes are deemed by the researcher to be worse (or no better) than 
other alternatives in the choice sef' (Lancsar and Louviere, 2006). In a labelled experiment, 
constructing such dominant option may not be possible for two reasons. 
First, in a labelled DCE each alternative is explicitly labelled. Since it is reasonable to 
assume that individuals make inferences based on the attributes but also on the labels, 
constructing a dominant option means establishing a clear ordering between the labels (e.g. 
overseas is better than private which is better than urban which is better than rural). It is not 
always feasible to establish that ranking, as exemplified in the present case. 
Second, the existence of alternative-specific levels for the same attribute means that all 
levels might not be easily compared. In a generic DCE, even if the ranking of levels for a specific 
attribute is unclear, it is always possible to construct alternatives that will present similar levels for 
that particular attribute, but will differ for all other attributes whose levels can be clearly ordered. 
In a labelled DCE, this choice may not be possible as the levels of the same attribute may be 
different under each alternative (for example, here the management levels of the overseas 
alternative and the urban/public ones do not overlap). 
Due to both problems, no additional choice set was introduced to test for internal consistency. 
6.2.3. Data collection 
A. Questionnaire administration 
The questionnaire was the third task to be administered during the survey (after the economic 
game presented in Chapter 5 and the other DCE presented in Chapter 7). The task was briefly 
explained to study respondents and an example of a choice profile was projected onto a large 
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screen. Participants were invited to imagine that the proposed choices were taken from 
newspapers adverts, and that they had to report the order in which they would choose to apply for 
the jobs. 
Following a minor error in the preparation of fieldwork, only one block of 12 questions (block 1) 
was printed, instead of two. Before that problem was spotted, 315 study participants answered 
the same block of 12 questions (instead of half of them answering 12 questions - those forming 
block 1 -and the other half of respondents answering the other 12 questions of the design, or 
block 2). This problem jeopardised the need to obtain an equal number of block 1 s and 2s in 
order to carry out the analysis (with all the questions of the design). Three steps, described in 
detail in Appendix 6.4, were taken to address this issue: 
After the mistake was spotted, the 12 'block 2' questions were administered to all remaining 
51 respondents; 
10 study participants who had received the block 1 and provided an email address were 
invited by email to complete and send back the block 2 questions. Two replied and 
completed a new questionnaire. 
A second administration of the DCE was organised in two nursing colleges where only the 
block 1 questions had been administered. All198 students who had taken part in the study 
in the first round were invited to fill in the block 2 questions at the end of a lecture; by the 
end, 166 of them completed the block 2 questions. 
In the end, a total of 377 questionnaires were collected in the first (normal) data collection round, 
51 of which were block 2 questionnaires. An additional 111 questionnaires were gathered in the 
second round of data collection (comprising internet and new administration of the DCE), all of 
which were block 2 questionnaires. A total of 326 students completed the block 1 questions and 
221 students completed block 2 questions (see Appendix 6.4). 
B. Data cleaning 
Cleaning the data involved two stages: the exclusion of incomplete questionnaires and the 
reconstitution of a sample containing only one questionnaire per individual. 
A questionnaire was deemed incomplete when one or more of the 12 questions had not been 
correctly completed, with a full ranking. The proportion of incomplete questionnaires was slightly 
higher during the second round of questionnaires (6.5% vs. 2.1 %). A total of 19 incomplete 
questionnaires from the two rounds of data collection were excluded (see Appendix 6. 4). 
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The second step was to reconstruct a sample of questionnaires whereby each individual would 
appear only once. This meant selecting randomly one of the two questionnaires for those 
individuals who had filled the two blocks of questions, whilst ensuring a balance between the final 
number of block 1 and block 2 responses. A summary of the characteristics of the original and 
final sample used is presented in Table 6.2 below, more details can be found in Appendix 6.4. 
Table 6.2: Description of final sample 
Nursing college Overall Overall Block 1 Block 2 
distribution of distribution of 
original sample reconstructed 
sam~le 
Ann Latsky College of Nursing 125 125 41 84 (Johannesburg) 
S.G. Lourens Nursing College 71 70 68 2 (Pretoria) 
University of Johannesburg 20 20 17 3 
North West University (Mafikeng 42 
campus) 41 0 41 
Mmabatho Nursing College 37 37 37 0 
Excelsius Nursing College 73 (Kierksdorp) 73 25 48 
North West University (Potchefstroom 9 9 0 9 
campus) 
TOTAL 377 375 188 187 
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6.3. Methods for analysing discrete choice data 
6.3.1. Theoretical framework 
The analysis of choice experiments builds upon three main bodies of work. 
First, it builds upon the neo-classical theory of consumer behaviour that relies on several axioms 
about individuals' preferences. These axioms posit that preferences can be represented by a 
numerical scale (utility), alternative goods can be ordered by an individual's preference function, 
and that individuals behave in a rational manner (choosing to consume the goods that maximise 
their utility). It is also assumed that individuals have complete63 and consistent preferences. 
Violation of this latter axiom means that preferences may be constructed at the time they are 
being elicited, and be driven by contextual or heuristic factors (Swait et al., 2002). Finally, 
individuals are assumed to employ compensatory decision-making. This means that individuals 
take all available information into consideration in order to make a rational decision, and are 
ready to trade over attributes (accepting less of one attribute for more of another). This 
assumption also implies that individuals will not use simple "shortcuts" or heuristic rules to avoid a 
complex choice task, nor have lexicographic preferences (that is not being willing to trade over 
one particular attribute). 
Second, choice experiments follow the assumptions developed by Kelvin Lancaster (Lancaster, 
1966), who hypothesized that the demand for a product is effectively a demand for the 
combination of product characteristics. 
Finally, choice models are analysed within the random utility framework developed in economics 
by McFadden (1974). According to this framework, the utility derived by individual i from the 
consumption of an alternative k in a choice set C can be decomposed into two parts: a 
deterministic component (V) which is a function of the attributes of the alternative (Xik) and a 
random component (Eik). The random component represents unmeasured variation in preferences 
that stems from unobserved attributes, individual heterogeneity in tastes or measurement errors 
affecting choices. 
( 1) 
As a result, utility-maximising rational individuals choose alternative k if and only if it maximises 
their utility amongst the set of J alternatives proposed. From equation (1 ), one derives that 
alternative kis chosen over alternative m if and only if: 
63 Individuals have well-defined preferences between alternatives; in other words they cannot be indifferent. 
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Inequality (2) shows that the distribution of individual error terms determines the distribution of the 
difference between utilities. The various econometric models developed to analyse individual 
choices mainly differ in the assumptions they make about the distribution of the error terms. 
Discrete choice modelling has been one of the most dynamic areas of econometrics research in 
the past decade. Increased computing power has allowed the development of new models 
improving the behavioural realism of choice modelling, liberating researchers from the simpler 
assumptions of the early models. This section presents the models that can be used to analyse 
ranked data, and briefly summarises their properties. 
A. Rank-ordered log it model 
The rank-ordered log it model is a generalization of the multinomial log it (MNL) model64 for choice 
data introduced by McFadden (see Appendix 6.5 for more details) that has been used in the 
economics literature (Beggs et al., 1981, Hausman and Ruud, 1987) In the marketing literature it 
is referred to as the exploded log it model (Chapman and Staelin, 1982). 
The rank-ordered log it model considers the ranking of J alternatives as a sequence of J-1 choices 
made by the respondent. Because of the assumed independence between choices deriving from 
the iid assumption of the log it model (see Appendix 6.5), the likelihood of a certain ranking of the 
alternatives in the entire choice set k is the product of J log it probabilities, that is: 
n exkj(J 1 ( ' ) Pr CY1 = r1,Yz = rz, .. ·Yj-1 = rj-1 I X) = · 
"'' 'l xkj'(J 1=1 L..f=l AkJJ'e 
where the dummy variable AkJf equals zero when alternative j' in choice set k has a better ranking 
than alternative j, and one otherwise. 
In relation to the present study, the ranking of the four alternatives is made through three 
independent decisions (e.g. choosing the overseas post (0) as the 1st, the private facility position 
(P) as the 2nd, the public rural position (R) as the 3rd and the public urban position (U) as the 
final choice). Because in a log it model the utility of each alternative is distributed iid extreme value 
(see Appendix 6.5), then the probability of this particular ranking (O,P,R,U) can be expressed as 
the log it probability of choosing 0 from the whole set of options, multiplied by the log it probability 
of choosing p from the sub-set of three (P, R, U), multiplied by the log it probability of choosing R 
64 Because the rank-ordered logit relies entirely on the MNL, one refers to the MNL and its limitations a lot in that 
section. 
150 
over U from the last two remaining options. Therefore, the probability of a particular ranking is the 
joint probability of three independent decisions, or the product of three probabilities: 
Pr (Yt = 0, Yz = P, Y3 = R I X) = 
Pr CY1 = 0 I X) X Pr (y2 = P IX,y1 = 0) X Pr (y3 = R IX,y1 = O,y2 = P) 
With the utility of a given alternative J expressed as uki = xki ~ + Eki with Eki iid extreme 
value, it follows in this example: 
' 
exkof3 
Pr (y1 = 0 I X) = , ~ xk "{3 
L..''=OPURe 1 1 I I I 
And finally: 
This expression for the ranking probability is a direct consequence of the nature of the extreme 
value distribution (Luce and Suppes, 1965). 
Also deriving from this property, the model presents two main limitations: 
The restrictive assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (I lA), which 
precludes the existence of cross-substitution patterns between alternatives; 
The incapacity of the model to account for correlation between decisions made by the same 
individual (i.e. intra-correlation that can be found in panel datasets). 
The IIA assumption means that if one introduces or suppresses an alternative, the choice 
probabilities of the remaining alternatives should all change in the same proportion, thereby 
assuming that one alternative is never more of a substitute to an existing one than any other 
alternative65. In the present labour market example, it means for example, that if regulation made 
it impossible for South African nurses to work overseas, the model would predict that the take-up 
rate of the three main job categories would automatically increase by the same proportion, and 
not that nurses would choose one particular alternative as a preferred substitute (e.g. work in the 
private sector). This assumption of equal competition and proportional substitution patterns 
between alternatives can be unrealistic when looking at job alternatives, as it is likely that some 
ss One can easily show formally that the ratio of choice probabilities of any two alternatives is unaffected by other 
alternatives. 
151 
jobs might be better substitutes than others66. If this is the case, it has been shown that the MNL 
performs poorly (Brownstone and Train, 1999). This problem can be avoided by using more 
complex modelling, presented below. 
The other restriction of the model is the absence of adjustment for serial correlation across 
individual observations. Because each respondent is asked to answer a sequence of choices, 
DCE data should be analysed with panel data estimators accounting for the fact that the within-
individual variation across choices may not be random. To adjust for that, a random parameter 
that is correlated within an individual's choices but not across individuals has to be added. For 
individual i this means that the utility from a particular choice is given by: 
Uni = Vni + Eni + Jli 
where Eni is the random error term that includes random variation across individual choices, while 
Jli is the random error term across respondents and is constant for each individual. 
Although more sophisticated models are increasingly being used (see below), the MNL remains a 
popular choice in the DCE literature (Fiebig et al., 2005, Guttman et al., 2009). In the current 
study, a first estimation was made with the rank-ordered log it model in Stata v10. 
B. Rank-ordered mixed log it model 
With the development of computing power, new estimation techniques (simulated maximum 
likelihood estimation) have been developed, and with them the introduction of a model evaluated 
through numerical simulations, the Random Parameter Log it (RPL) or mixed log it model (Hensher 
and Greene, 2003). The mixed logit model proposes a general modelling framework that 
addresses the main limitations encountered in the MNL. First, it solves the IIA assumption issues 
and allows alternatives to be uncorrelated, without constraining groups of alternatives to be 
similar. Second, it proposes a way to model the serial correlation across choices. Finally, it seeks 
to introduce more heterogeneity of preferences at the individual level through the use of random 
parameters that infer a distribution rather than a point estimate. The random parameter 
specification requires each coefficient~ associated with an attribute of an alternative to have both 
a mean and a standard deviation - coefficients are treated as random instead of fixed 
parameters. The standard deviation of a parameter ~ introduces preference heterogeneity into 
the sampled population. However this specification presents a challenge in that the distribution of 
66 For example, all domestic jobs might be better substitutes of each other, in comparison with the overseas 
alternative. 
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the parameter is unknown. It is up to the researcher to determine the form of the distribution that 
should be fitted. Deciding which distributional form to choose is complicated, as coefficients can 
be drawn from any distribution such as normal, lognormal, uniform or triangular distributions 
(Hensher and Greene, 2003). So far, researchers have mostly favoured the choice of normal 
distributions, which present several mathematical advantages when trying to estimate some 
results, such as willingness-to-pay estimates (Greene et al., 2006, Balcombe et al., 2009). 
To address the limitations of the rank-ordered logit model exposed above, one can use a rank-
ordered mixed log it model (Train, 2003). This model uses the same approach as the rank-ordered 
logit model (i.e. one person's ranking is a product of logits), except that it uses random 
parameters in the same manner as the mixed logit model. This solves the IIA problem and 
accounts for serial correlation between observations and decisions within the choice set (Train, 
2003). As the examination of heterogeneity of individual preferences is not the priority here, and 
because the computational requirements for the rank-ordered mixed logit model are quite 
significant67, the use of random parameters is limited to salary variables, and normal distributions 
are used. 
The mixed log it model was estimated with NLOGIT 4.0, an extension of the statistical software 
LIMDEP designed for choice modelling. 
6.3.2. Model specification 
The model evaluates the utility provided by each job k for a given individual i. Utility is influenced 
by job characteristics (Xik), socio-economic and educational characteristics influencing tastes 
(Zik), concern for others (Vik), and a random component of utility (Eik) accounting for the 
analyst's inability to accurately observe individual behaviour (McFadden, 1986): 
Three separate regression models were estimated using a rank-ordered logit model. The first 
model included the main job characteristics. The second model examined how preferences are 
associated with respondents' demographic/socio-economic and educational characteristics. The 
third model augmented the second one with individuals' altruistic values and concerns for others. 
For job attributes, quantitative attributes were coded as they appear, while qualitative attributes 
were converted into dummy variables (see Table 6.3). 
67 It took about 10 hours for the computer to run the estimated model. 
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With dummy variables, it is essential to remember that each intercept (here the alternative 
specific constants) will incorporate the base level category of each attribute (Mark and Swait, 
2004). For alternative-specific constants, one alternative has to be left out and the urban 
alternative was chosen as the reference category. 
Table 6.3: Independent variables- job characteristics 
Variable Description and coding 
Interaction terms for the "overseas" alternative 
Alt.-specific constant 1 if overseas alternative, 0 otherwise 
Salary 250, 325 (x R1 ,000) 
Working conditions 1 for "fully recognised as a PN", 0 for "not fully recognised and 
looked down on" 
Interaction terms for the "public rural" alternative 
Alt.-specific constant 1 if public rural alternative, 0 otherwise 
Salary 132, 158 (x R1 ,000) 
Training Numbers of years nurses have to wait until they get study leave (2 
opportunities or 6 years) 
Social benefit 1 for "benefit populations who would have no access otherwise", 0 
Type of facility 
Working conditions 
for "basic services for everyone", 
1 for "clinic", 0 for "hospital" 
1 for "no lack of supplies", 0 for "regular lack of supplies" 
Interaction terms for the "private" alternative 
Alt.-specific constant 1 if private alternative, 0 otherwise 
Salary 120, 150 (x R1 ,000) 
Training 1 for "time off and contribution to fees", 0 for "exciting in service" 
opportunities 
Working conditions 1 for "supportive management", 0 for "demanding patients, 
Interaction terms for the "public urban" alternative 
Salary 
Training 
opportunities 
Social benefit 
Type of facility 
Working conditions 
120, 144(x R1,000) 
Numbers of years nurses have to wait until they get study leave (2 
or 6 years) 
1 for "benefit populations who would have no access otherwise", 0 
for "basic services for everyone", 
1 for "clinic", 0 for "hospital" 
1 for "no lack of supplies", 0 for "regular lack of supplies" 
Expected 
si n 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
? 
? 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
+ 
The second and third models included all the main attributes and several interaction terms that 
multiplied each alternative-specific job characteristic with selected socio-demographic variables 
(see Table 6.4). For example, the interaction between the rural label and gender measures the 
extent to which the preference for rural jobs depends on gender. The inclusion of individual 
characteristics (see Table 6.4) intended to test three series of assumptions: 
The role of "nature", i.e. the impact on job choices of socio-demographic characteristics such 
as gender, age or place of birth, has been underlined in the nursing and labour economics 
literature (Antonazzo et al., 2003, Chopra et al., 2008). In addition, some studies in South 
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Africa have emphasized the racial dimension of emigration decisions (Xaba and Phillips, 
2001, Oosthuizen, 2005). 
The role of "nurture", or the impact of training characteristics (place and type of training 
institutions) on job preferences (Brewer et al., 2000, Coomber and Louise Barriball, 2007), in 
particular when it comes to choosing between rural and urban postings (Brooks et al., 2002, 
Dussault and Franceschini, 2006, Lehmann et al., 2008). 
The role of other-regarding preferences or altruism on labour market preferences (see 
Chapters 2 and 3). To avoid problems of collinearity between survey and experimental 
variables capturing similar constructs, two models were estimated separately. 
Table 6.4: Independent variables- individual demographic and attitudinal variables 
Variable 
Male 
White 
Socio-Demographic characteristics 
Young (<25 y.) 
Born in rural areas 
Training characteristics 
Trained in university 
Trained in NW province 
DG student 
DG patient 
DG poor 
Attitudinal variables and individual values 
Positive attitude towards 
rural lifestyle 
Conservative attitude 
Pro 'Welfare state' attitude 
Pro-poor attitude 
6.4. Results 
6.4.1. Descriptive results 
Rural 
+ 
? 
? 
+ 
? 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Expected sign 
Private 
? 
? 
? 
? 
+ 
? 
? 
? 
? 
+ 
Overseas 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
? 
? 
+ 
One of the disadvantages of ranked experiments is the difficulty respondents have completing a 
task which presents a high number of choice sets, each of them being a complex combination of 
several alternatives (in this case four) made up of numerous similar attributes (here five in each 
alternative) (Hausman and Ruud, 1987, Ophem et al., 1999). The complexity of the task can lead 
to poor data quality due to low response rates, incomplete ranking, less reliable responses for the 
lower ranks, or non-compensatory decision-making (simple heuristics). Task complexity might 
also lead individuals to develop lexicographic preferences (or non-compensatory decision-
making), whereby they are not ready to substitute one characteristic for another, violating some of 
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the assumptions underpinning DCE analysis. This section presents some descriptive information 
on the data collected, in order to investigate briefly issues around the complexity of the task and 
detect the potential presence of lexicographic preference orderings. Issues around the reliability 
of lower ranks are discussed in section 6.5.2. 
A. Data quality 
Table 6.5 reports results about response rates and completeness of questionnaires. The 
proportion of fully ranked choice sets was particularly high (96.5% for all questionnaires 
collected). 
Table 6.5: Proportion and type of incomplete ran kings 
Number of First round - Percentage Second round - Total 
missing of respondents (N=377) Percentage of (N=547) 
answers a resEondents iN=170} 
0 97.9% 93.5% 96.5% 
3 0.5% 0.0% 0.4% 
4b 0.3% 1.8% 0.7% 
Sb 0.3% 0.6% 0.4% 
12b 0.0% 0.6% 0.2% 
22C 0.3% 0.0% 0.2% 
36C 0.8% 1.2% 0.9% 
47 0.0% 0.6% 0.2% 
48 0.0% 1.8% 0.5% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 
a An "answer'' is defined as a rank associated with a job. Each questionnaire is made up of 12 questions where respondents are 
asked to provide a full ranking of their job preferences (hence 4 answers per questions). There is a total of 48 answers in a 
questionnaire. 
b this corresponds to cases where one question (asking to rank the 4 alternative jobs) was skipped or left blank. 
c this corresponds to cases where only one or two ranks were filled in a question (usually the first rank), for example [ 1 - 2 -] . 
Although a slightly lower proportion of fully ranked choice sets were compiled during the second 
round, as respondents completed the questionnaire on their own without the presence of the 
researcher to provide clarification, the proportion of fully completed questionnaires was still very 
high (93.5%). There was little indication of boredom or respondent inability of ranking the four 
alternatives fully; only 1.1% of all questionnaires were returned with only the first rank or the first 
two ranks completed. 
B. Choice patterns 
The analysis of the choice patterns of respondents provides a second indication of the ability of 
respondents to perform the task and presents some evidence of the presence of lexicographic 
preferences. High occurrences of rankings with ties (i.e. two or more jobs were given the same 
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rank), or a high frequency of identical choice patterns could be considered as signs of a difficult 
task. 
Table 6.6: Preference ranking for job choices by surveyed respondents 
Preference Number of Percentage 
order choice sets 
1232 1 0.0002 
1321 1 0.0002 
1322 1 0.0002 
2131 1 0.0002 
3122 1 0.0002 
3141 1 0.0002 
4112 1 0.0002 
4131 1 0.0002 
4142 1 0.0002 
4211 1 0.0002 
4311 1 0.0002 
4314 1 0.0002 
4331 1 0.0002 
1132 2 0.0004 
2413 23 0.0051 
3412 39 0.0087 
2431 40 0.0089 
3421 43 0.0096 
3214 47 0.0104 
2314 49 0.0109 
2341 55 0.0122 
1432 68 0.0151 
1423 78 0.0173 
1324 99 0.0220 
3124 100 0.0222 
2134 103 0.0229 
3241 109 0.0242 
1342 121 0.0269 
2143 125 0.0278 
1243 168 0.0373 
1234 177 0.0393 
4213 180 0.0400 
3142 200 0.0444 
4312 223 0.0496 
4321 384 0.0853 
4123 421 0.0936 
4231 632 0.1404 
4132 1001 0.2224 
TOTAL 4500 1.0000 
Note: the ordering of options was systematically: 0 (overseas) I R (rural) I P (private) I U (urban) 
157 
The use of the same response pattern across all twelve choice sets could be a sign of 
lexicographic preferences (individuals have a clear hierarchy of preferences across the four job 
sectors and are not willing to substitute one job type for another). Table 6.6 summarises all the 
possible choice patterns that were found, and how often they occurred. The first column indicates 
the ranking given by respondents to the four options presented in each choice set. For example 
"2413" means that the first option presented in the choice set (overseas) is given the rank "2", the 
second option from the left (the rural job) is given the rank "4", the third alternative from the left 
(the urban job) is given the rank "1" and the final option in the choice set (the one on the right, i.e. 
the private job) is given the rank "3". The second column indicates how often that particular 
ranking pattern was observed. For example the first row of the table "1232" indicates that there 
was one of the 4,500 choice sets answered68, a respondent ranked the overseas option first, 
ranked the rural public job second, the private job third and the urban public job second again 
(hence the ranking pattern "1232"). 
A few results emerge from Table 6.6: 
Only 15 choice sets were not ranked according to the guidelines that had been given to the 
respondents. In these 15 instances, respondents either failed to correctly apply the 
guidelines, or had incomplete preferences (or an equal preference for two of the options). 
This represents a very small and virtually insignificant proportion of answers, suggesting that 
respondents had complete preferences. 
Although there are theoretically 24 ways of ordering four alternative choices, the majority of 
the choice sets (75.2%) were answered with only 9 response patterns. If all the orderings 
had been made at random, on average the 9 patterns should have accounted for 37.5% of 
the answers. 
The most popular ordering (overseas ranked 4th, rural ranked 1st, private ranked 3rd and 
urban ranked 2nd) represented 22.2% of the answers, or more than five times what one 
would expect from a random occurrence. 
This last point could suggest that some respondents systematically used the same ranking to 
answer the 12 choice sets, hence displaying lexicographic preference ordering. A more refined 
analysis allows the identification of response patterns at the individual level. Table 6.7 shows that 
only 2.4% of respondents (nine individuals) systematically used the same ranking to answer all 
12 choice sets, and can be said to have 'complete' lexicographic preferences (individuals who 
base their decisions on the label only and who have a complete preference ordering of the four 
labels). 
sa Since each of the 375 respondents stated their preferences for 12 sets of job descriptions, a total of 4500 ran kings 
were observed. 
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Further descriptive analysis showed that 0.3% of respondents (1 individual) systematically ranked 
the private job first across the 12 choice sets, 1.1% the urban job, 3.2% the overseas job and 
5.1% the rural position. Therefore a total of 9.6% of individuals could be said to have 'incomplete' 
lexicographic preferences69 , with one favourite label (never traded against any other job 
characteristic), but possibly more indifference between the other three labels. 
Table 6.7: Individual choice patterns 
Maximum number of identical 
ran kings repeated throughout the 
12 choice sets 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Actual 
Percentage 
(N=375) 
0.53 
12.80 
24.27 
17.07 
16.27 
8.00 
5.87 
4.53 
3.47 
2.93 
1.87 
2.40 
Overall, the presence of alternative-specific levels for all attributes makes the identification of 
lexicographic preferences (based on labels or attributes) difficult. Indeed, because levels of a 
same attribute may vary differently across alternatives, it is not necessarily possible to distinguish 
hierarchical preferences over labels from those over attributes. For example, in the DCE 
constructed here salaries in overseas positions are systematically the highest. Therefore ranking 
the overseas job systematically in the first position could have been the result of a "dominant" 
preference for salary or of hierarchical preferences between labels (with a systematic preference 
for the "overseas" position). 
In any case, Lancsar and Louviere (2006) argue that lexicographic preferences provide useful 
information as they clearly denote strong preferences that should be accounted for in the 
analysis, and that all observations should be kept for the analysis. 
69 Obviously the 2.4% of individuals with complete lexicographic preference are included in these 9.6%. 
159 
6.4.2. Regression results with the rank-ordered logit model 
Effects of job characteristics on labour market preferences 
The results presented in Table 6.8 show the effect of job characteristics on the labour market 
preferences of nurses. 
Table 6.8: Results from the rank-ordered logit regression Oob characteristics only) 
Alternative 
Private job 
Overseas job 
Rural job 
Urban job 
Variable 
Alternative-specific constant 
Salary (in R 1,000) 
Supportive staff [demanding patients] 
Support for external training [on-the-job training] 
Alternative-specific constant 
Salary (in R 1,000) 
Status recognised overseas [not fully recognised] 
Alternative-specific constant 
Salary (in R 1,000) 
Clinic [hospital] 
No shortage of supply/drugs [regular shortages] 
Waiting time (per year) to get study leave 
Service for underserved [services for all] 
Salary (in R 1,000) 
Clinic [hospital] 
No shortage of supply/drugs [regular shortages] 
Waiting time (per year) to get study leave 
Service for underserved [services for all] 
Note: N=18,000; Log-L: -11945; x2(18)= 4692 (p<O.OOO) 
Coeff. 
-0.593 
0.021 
0.261 
0.060 
-0.038 
0.004 
0.827 
0.820 
0.018 
0.219 
0.459 
-0.119 
-0.029 
0.023 
0.219 
0.360 
-0.104 
-0.009 
St. Error 
0.327 
0.001 
0.045 
0.045 
0.339 
0.001 
0.057 
0.369 
0.002 
0.047 
0.047 
0.012 
0.047 
0.002 
0.045 
0.045 
0.011 
0.045 
~-value 
0.070 
0.000 
0.000 
0.178 
0.911 
0.000 
0.000 
0.026 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.542 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.844 
Proportion of 1st choices correctly predicted: = 48.33%; proportion of first 2 choices correctly predicted=33.93%; 
proportion of full ranking correctly predicted: 22.24%. In addition to the predictive power of the model based on the 
first choice only, a statistical measure (see Appendix 6.6) evaluating the degree of correspondence between rankings 
was computed. The result of this test shows a significant degree of correlation between the observations and the 
model predictions: Kendall's -c= 0.4262. 
First, the negative but insignificant alternative-specific constant terms for overseas and private 
jobs indicate no general preference for urban public jobs compared to these two alternatives. 
Interestingly, the significant alternative-specific constant for rural jobs suggests that there is a 
positive vision of rural jobs compared to the urban ones. However the interpretation of the 
constant terms is not straightforward as these terms also capture the base categories of the 
dummy variables for each relevant alternative-specific attribute. For example the overseas job 
constant encompasses the baseline level of "working conditions" in this position, that nurses are 
not fully recognised as professionals. This is a particularly strong level, which might explain why 
the coefficient on this alternative specific constant is so large (and negative). 
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The utility of jobs increases with higher salaries (for all jobs) and better working conditions (no 
lack of drugs and supplies for jobs in the public sector, and a supportive managerial environment 
in overseas and private jobs). These results conform to theoretical expectations. 
Interestingly, salaries are not valued in the same way across the four job options. Indeed, a 
model using a unique salary variable (as opposed to alternative-specific salaries) was formally 
rejected (see Appendix 6.7). Taking the valuation of salary in a rural post as a reference (see 
Table 6.9, second column), R 1,000 in the private sector are "worth" 15% more to nurses, while 
R1 ,000 in an urban (public) post is worth 23.5% more. However, nurses value R1 ,000 overseas 
about 75% less than the same amount for rural positions. 
Table 6.9: Marginal rates of substitutions between salaries across jobs 
Rural 
Urban 
Private 
Rural 
1 
1.24 
1.15 
Urban 
0.81 
1 
0.93 
Private Overseas 
0.87 
1.07 
1 
4.21 
5.20 
4.84 
Overseas 0.24 0.19 0.21 1 
Note: each marginal rate of substitution is obtained by dividing the alternative-specific salary coefficient 
with each other. For example, in the urban job R1 ,000 of salary increases a worker's utility by about 0.018 
which is 0.81 less than the impact on utility of the same amount in the urban job (0.023). Note that this 
table was calculated with the actual coefficients of the regression, not rounded to the third decimal. 
Willingness to be compensated for different job characteristics 
In DCEs, the monetary valuation of job attributes can be computed by dividing the coefficient of 
each variable by the income coefficient (Scott, 2001 ). Due to the presence of the labels and their 
significant effect on the interpretation of the alternative-specific attributes, it is the utility of each 
job separately that is evaluated by individuals, and reconstructed in the regression model. 
Therefore, to compute the monetary value of each job characteristic, one has to consider each 
job separately, and use the coefficient of the relevant alternative-specific salary. 
In public and private positions, the characteristic with the highest monetary value per unit of 
change was the one relating to working conditions (see Table 6.10). Nurses would be willing to 
relinquish 19% of their annual salary to work in a job where there would no shortages of drugs 
and medical supplies in rural areas. Conversely this means that they would require a 
compensation of 19% in rural posts and 13% in urban posts to work in posts where there would 
be regular shortages. The model also predicts that nurses would need to be compensated a 
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substantial amount of money (R220,000, or nearly 90% of the typical overseas salary) to accept a 
position overseas where they would not be fully recognised as a professional nurse. 
The next most important job characteristic for public positions was the type of facility where the 
job was based. Nurses value working in a clinic more, therefore they would require an increase of 
about 9% of the current salary base to accept a job in a rural hospital, while they would expect an 
increase of about 8% of the base salary in urban areas to work in a hospital there. 
Table 6.10: Absolute and relative monetary values of job characteristics (based on 
coefficient estimates presented in Table 6.8) 
Monetary value of job Value of job 
characteristic (Rands)* characteristic 
[95% confidence as% of current 
intervals] base income 
offered** 
Rural job 
Working in a clinic 12,222 [ 8,849; 14,483] 9.3% 
No shortage of drugs and medical supplies 25,652 [ 25,576 ; 25,703] 19.4% 
Waiting one more year to get study leave - 6,664 [- 9,900 ; - 4,495] 5.0% 
Serving underserved populations - 1,592 [- 8,358 ; 2,942] 1.2% 
Urban job 
Working in a clinic 9,454 [ 6,683 ; 11,461 1 7.9% 
No shortage of drugs and medical supplies 15,577 [ 13,972; 16,739] 13.0% 
Waiting one more year to get study leave - 4,480 [- 6,477;- 3,034] 3.7% 
Serving underserved populations - 386[- 5,029 ; 2,975] 0.3% 
Private job 
Supportive management 12,353 [ 9,528 ; 14,492] 10.3% 
Limited support for external training 2,846 [ -1,508; 6,142] 2.4% 
Overseas job 
Professional status not fully recognized -219,614 [-310,434; -179,544] 87.8% 
* This should be interpreted as the amount of money nurses would require to compensate them for the job 
characteristic 
** The reference salary chosen for each category corresponds to the lower level in the DCE, which is also the current 
(typical) salary for a nurse graduate: R120,000 in the private sector and in the urban public sector, R132,000 in the 
rural public sector and R250,000 in positions overseas. 
Finally, nurses would require approximately an extra R6,600 per year (5% of the current base 
salary) to compensate them for each additional year they have to wait to obtain study leave. In 
urban areas, nurses would only ask for a compensation of about R4,500 per year. The relative 
findings also show that nurses would be willing to accept a job in rural areas with a regular lack of 
drugs, if they had a shorter waiting period (four years less than the base period) for study leave. 
Finally, for both categories of public job, the "social impact" of the job was not found to have a 
significant impact on nurses' job preferences. The absence of significance of the "social impact" 
attributes in the public jobs may result from a lack of perceived difference between the two levels. 
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Indeed, the difference between "Your presence would help us improve access to basic services 
for everyone" and "Your presence will benefit populations who would otherwise not have access 
to services" is possibly too subtle to have retained nurses' attention. 
Impact of "nature" and "nurture" on job preferences 
Table 6.11 shows the regression results for the interactions of the labels with the nurses' personal 
characteristics. Using the odds-ratios make the interpretation of the table easier, and the following 
results are based on them. 
Preferences between the two main types of public jobs differed according to socio-economic 
characteristics. The younger nurses, who were born in rural areas, were more likely to choose 
public sector positions in rural than urban areas. For example, nurses who were less than 25 
years old had 1.27 more chances than older nurses to opt for a rural job rather than an urban 
one. A male nursing graduate was also 1.2 times more likely than a female to choose a public 
sector job in a rural rather than an urban area. Jobs in the private sector were preferred to public 
positions in urban areas by the young (less than 25 years old). Preferences for the private sector 
did not vary according to race, gender or place of birth. Confirming the results found in the South 
African emigration literature, it was found that white nurse graduates were more likely than other 
population groups to favour a job overseas compared to a job in the public sector in an urban 
area. Furthermore, young males were more likely to consider emigration than a job in the public 
sector in urban areas. Finally, as expected, there was a positive correlation between a positive 
attitude towards rural areas and preferences for jobs in the public sector in rural compared to 
urban areas. The model also shows that those who were more positive towards rural areas were 
less likely to be attracted by positions overseas (compared to public posts in urban areas). 
The impact of "nurture" was also key in shaping job attractiveness. Students who had trained in 
universities were more likely than nursing college students to be attracted by overseas jobs or 
private jobs compared to urban public positions. However, they were less likely to favour public 
positions in rural areas. Finally, students who were trained in North-West province (a more rural 
province than Gauteng) were more likely to choose any job rather than a public urban job. 
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Table 6.11: Results from the rank-ordered logit regression 
Alternative Variables in utility functions Modell Model II 
Coeff. St. Error p-val. Odds· Coeff. St. Error p-val. Odds· 
Ratios Ratios 
Private job Alternative-specific constant -1.054 0.350 0.003 0.349 -0.905 0.351 0.010 0.405 
Salary (in R 1 ,000) 0.022 0.002 0.000 1.023 0.023 0.002 0.000 1.023 
Supportive staff [demanding patients] 0.280 0.046 0.000 1.323 0.292 0.048 0.000 1.339 
... _.§_~e.P.9..rt.J9E.~~!~.~.?l.J~~l~.i!.!9...l2!.!~-tb.~::J9..~--!.r.9..i.~.i.~.9l. ............. _ .... _________ Q:Q~_§ ___________ o. Q_~6 o.331 1.046 ________ QilJZ_ -·· _ Q:_Q4? _____ o.576 _____ 1:Q~L 
Male 0.147 0.081 0.072 1.158 0.073 0.085 0.392 1.076 
White 0.218 0.129 0.090 1.244 0.210 0.131 0.109 1.233 
Young (<25 y.) 0.209 0.073 0.004 1.232 0.202 0.074 0.006 1.224 
Born in rural area 0.019 0.065 0.770 1.019 -0.046 0.067 0.497 0.955 
Trained in university 0.224 0.084 0.008 1.251 0.218 0.086 0.012 1.243 
___ I!._~.!.~.~q ... !.~ ... ~.Y.! .. P.~.2Y..!ng~·-·-···--··········-·-··-················-··--·········-·······-···--·--·-·····-·····-······-····--·------9-=~-~~--------Q:Q_~~-- o.o11 ________ !~!!_~_ o_~134__········-···········Q:Q~~------_Q:~_1_ ___ _J_:!_~--
Positive attitude towards rural lifestyle 0.009 0.020 0.660 1.009 0.020 0.020 0.313 1.020 
Conservative attitude 0.052 0.022 0.021 1.053 
Pro 'Welfare state' attitude -0.021 0.020 0.281 0.979 
Pro-poor attitude 0.026 0.027 0.332 1.027 
DG student 0.413 0.155 0.008 1.512 
DG patient -0.078 0.185 0.675 0.925 
DG poor 0.090 0.153 0.559 1.094 
Overseas job Alternative-specific constant -1.383 0.371 0.000 0.251 ·1.214 0.368 0.001 0.297 
Salary (in R 1 ,000) 0.005 0.001 0.000 1.005 0.005 0.001 0.000 1.005 
.... §.~9t~~T~~2g~i~~~ . .9Y~~~~9~ .. [nqt f~_lly__r.~~29~i~~g] . ___________ 9:~~~--------Q~Q-~Q___ 0.000 _________ 2.681 _____ Q~.~~~-- ·- _ Q:Q~1_ ______ Q:QQQ ___ ?_:~~~--
Male 0.846 0.092 0.000 2.331 0.786 0.097 0.000 2.194 
White 0.806 0.145 0.000 2.239 0.801 0.147 0.000 2.229 
Young (<25 y.) 0.753 0.084 0.000 2.124 0.755 0.086 0.000 2.128 
Born in rural area 0.069 0.080 0.389 1.071 0.000 0.083 1.000 1.000 
Trained in university 0.431 0.096 0.000 1.539 0.439 0.099 0.000 1.550 
___ T~~~~~qJ~ .. ~.'!!._P.~.2Y.!.~.~~------····-······--·-··-··-···---·····-··-··-····-··-··············-········-·-···---·---Q:~~~---·------_Q:Q!_~_ o.ooo -----~-~~~~ ___ _9-=~-~~-·-···-·· ........ Q~Q~Q····----·--Q.:QQ.Q _____ ,_~.:!~~ 
Positive attitude towards rural lifestyle ·0.121 0.024 0.000 0.886 -0.113 0.025 0.000 0.893 
Conservative attitude 0.064 0.027 0.018 1.066 
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Pro 'Welfare state' attitude 
Pro-poor attitude 
DG student 
DG patient 
DG poor 
0.163 
0.090 
0.020 
0.192 
0.225 
0.184 
0.396 
0.690 
0.914 
1.177 
1.094 
1.020 
-0.044 
0.020 
0.024 
0.033 
0.068 
0.559 
0.957 
1.020 
Rural job Alternative-specific constant -·-----------·-----·-----·-----·----· .. ·--·----o~T62-----·----o·:392 0. 795 -------r1o7 ·---··a~-2Ef1-··· . " ··a:39s···-- 0 .508 ... --·--1.299 
Salary (in R 1 ,000) 0.020 0.002 0.000 1.020 0.019 0.002 0.000 1.020 
Clinic [hospital] 0.242 0.048 0.000 1.274 0.239 0.050 0.000 1.269 
No shortage of supply/drugs [regular shortages] 0.491 0.048 0.000 1.633 0.491 0.050 0.000 1.634 
Waiting time (per year) to get study leave -0.122 0.012 0.000 0.885 -0.123 0.012 0.000 0.884 
...... § ..~_~jg~_.f~! ... ~.~-~-~E~~-~~-~--1~~-~.!~~-~--!~! ... 9.1J] .......................................................................... ~Q:Q? .. ?. _________ ~Q_48 0.566 _______ 9~~..?_~------·--:9~9_1~-- _ _ _Q.Q?Q _____ Q} 1 Q _____ _Q. 982 _ 
Male 0.231 0.082 0.005 1.260 0.175 0.085 0.040 1.191 
White 0.171 0.129 0.185 1.187 0.218 0.132 0.098 1.244 
Young (<25 y.) 0.238 0.074 0.001 1.269 0.261 0.076 0.001 1.298 
Born in rural area 0.413 0.065 0.000 1.511 0.440 0.068 0.000 1.552 
Trained in university -0.421 0.086 0.000 0.656 -0.453 0.088 0.000 0.636 
..... I~~J.~.~~ .. ..i.~ .. ~.'!! ... P.r..~Y.!.~~-~---·················································-····-·············-··········-·································---··--Q:~9 .. ~ ................... __ ..Q: .. Q_~~--- o.ooo ______ '!:!~.. ··-·----~-~!-~---·················9:.Q.~.! ........................ .Q~_QQ _______ ~..:L~ 
Positive attitude towards rural lifestyle 0.117 0.020 0.000 1.124 0.114 0.020 0.000 1.121 
Conservative attitude -0.022 0.022 0.332 0.979 
Pro 'Welfare state' attitude -0.014 0.020 0.485 0.986 
Pro-poor attitude 0.057 0.027 0.037 1.059 
DG student 0.051 0.155 0.745 1.052 
DG patient -0.123 0.185 0.506 0.885 
DG poor 0.272 0.153 0.076 1.312 
---·-------------------·-----·----···---------·----··---------------·-----·- ---------·----·······--·-···----·-·-·-···· ........................................ ·---·---····--·-···----·-----··---
Urban job Salary (in R 1 ,000) 0.024 0.002 0.000 1.025 0.024 0.002 0.000 1.025 
Clinic [hospital] 0.235 0.047 0.000 1.265 0.230 0.048 0.000 1.258 
No shortage of supply/drugs [regular shortages] 0.378 0.047 0.000 1.460 0.373 0.048 0.000 1.452 
Waiting time (per year) to get study leave ·0.111 0.012 0.000 0.895 -0.112 0.012 0.000 0.894 
Service for underserved [services for all] -0.028 0.047 0.554 0.973 -0.030 0.048 0.528 0.970 
Modell: N=17,520; Log-L: -11, 118; x2(48)=5,583 (p<O.OOO); Proportion of 1st choices correctly predicted: 51.3%; proportion of first 2 choices correctly predicted: 32.4% ; proportion of full 
rankings correctly predicted: 22.4% ; Kendall's t= 0.4627 
Model II: N=16,656 ; Log-L: -1 0,559; x2(48)=5,329 (p<O.OOO) ; Proportion of 1st choices correctly predicted: 51.5%; proportion of first 2 choices correctly predicted: 30.9% ; proportion of full 
rankings correctly predicted: 21.3%; Kendall's t= 0.4644 
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Effects of other-regarding preferences on labour market preferences 
Due to problems of collinearity between the two measures of social preferences (survey and 
experimental), two separate models were estimated. The results of the two regressions indicate 
that job preferences vary as a function of the level of individual concern for others. Model II (with 
survey measures) performs better than the model with experimental measures (it presents a 
smaller log-likelihood for an identical number of parameters estimated). 
Modell in Table 6.11 shows the impact on preferences of the measures of altruism obtained with 
the economic behavioural games reported in Chapter 5. Most of these measures were not 
associated with significant differences in job preferences. However there are two interesting 
findings. First, nursing students who were more generous towards their peers preferred private 
jobs to public urban ones (p<0.006). Second, although the coefficient estimates are not significant 
at the 5% level, the sign of the interaction terms between labels and results in the poor framing 
confirms an intuitive result - individuals who were more generous towards the poor were more 
likely to prefer rural jobs (over urban ones, p<0.08), and they were also more likely to prefer 
public positions over private ones (negative signs on the interactions with the private and 
overseas labels). 
The results obtained with survey measures of pro-social concerns (see section 5.4.2 in Chapter 5 
for a complete explanation of how these measures were constructed) are presented in model II of 
Table 6.11. Unlike what was found with the experimental measures, many of the survey 
measures capturing social norms and attitudes towards the poor were associated with differences 
in job preferences. Nursing students with more pro-poor attitudes favoured public sector jobs in 
rural compared to urban areas, consistent with their concerns for the well-being of more needy 
individuals. In contrast, those who indicated a more conservative role for government favoured 
jobs in the private sector and overseas, over jobs in the public sector in urban areas. 
6.4.3. Rank-ordered mixed /ogit model 
Table 6.12 below presents the results obtained with the rank-ordered mixed log it for the same two 
sets of variables presented in Table 6.11. Results concur with those of the rank-ordered logit 
model, which means that the results explained in the section above (Table 6.11) are robust to 
serial correlation between observations. The only notable exception pertains to the role of gender 
in the preference for rural jobs. The rank-ordered mixed log it model does not find that males are 
more attracted by public sector posts in rural compared to urban areas. 
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Table 6.12: Results from the rank-ordered mixed logit regression 
Alternative Variables in utility function Modell Model II Coeff. St. Error p-value Coeff. St. Error p-value 
Private job Alternative-specific constant -1.060 0.455 0.020 -0.907 0.449 0.043 
Salary (in R 1,000)* 0.023 0.002 0.000 0.024 0.002 0.000 
Standard deviation of random parameter distribution 0.013 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.000 
Supportive staff [demanding patients] 0.278 0.059 0.000 0.290 0.059 0.000 
Support for external training [on-the-job training] 0.042 0.057 0.463 0.023 0.058 0.692 
·····-··-.. -·····-··-·-··-·······"'''•" ·-·-·--------------Male 0.148 0.085 0.082 0.074 0.080 0.358 
White 0.223 0.181 0.219 0.214 0.175 0.223 
Young (<25 y.) 0.207 0.064 0.001 0.200 0.064 0.002 
Born in rural area 0.022 0.067 0.740 -0.043 0.067 0.518 
Trained in university 0.221 0.156 0.157 0.217 0.130 0.097 
Trained in NW province 0.168 0.099 0.090 0.137 0.096 0.156 
·············-·-·········· .. 
-·-·---·····-··-----------·-·-
Positive attitude towards rural lifestyle 0.008 0.018 0.671 0.020 0.019 0.304 
Conservative attitude 0.052 0.019 0.006 
Pro 'Welfare state' attitude -0.021 0.019 0.263 
Pro-poor attitude 0.027 0.026 0.293 
DG student 0.414 0.132 0.002 
DG patient -0.072 0.172 0.673 
DG poor 0.088 0.154 0.566 
................................................ -··-·-·~·----------··-~---~-
Overseas job Alternative-specific constant -1.371 0.438 0.002 -1.197 0.430 0.005 
Salary (in R 1,000)* 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.000 
Standard deviation of random parameter distribution 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Status recognised overseas [not fully recognised] 0.986 0.060 0.000 0.987 0.059 0.000 
................................................ ·-·-·-·-·-·-----~---·--·-·-·- ---·-
Male 0.831 0.075 0.000 0.773 0.070 0.000 
White 0.800 0.139 0.000 0.796 0.136 0.000 
Young (<25 y.) 0.756 0.056 0.000 0.757 0.055 0.000 
Born in rural area 0.066 0.056 0.242 -0.003 0.056 0.959 
Trained in university 0.435 0.162 0.007 0.442 0.130 0.001 
Trained in NW province 0.967 0.109 0.000 0.866 0.089 0.000 
·-·-·-···- ... ··-··-·-··-··-·-··-··-·-···-····-··-··· 
---------·--·------·-
Positive attitude towards rural lifestyle -0.119 0.018 0.000 -0.111 0.018 0.000 
Conservative attitude 0.063 0.017 0.000 
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Pro 'Welfare state' attitude -0.043 0.017 0.011 
Pro-poor attitude 0.017 0.022 0.443 
DG student 0.166 0.124 0.180 
DG patient 0.091 0.157 0.565 
DG poor 0.019 0.141 0.894 
................................. ~-~---··-·· <M•-·-·---·-·-·--• 
Rural job Alternative-specific constant 0.081 0.485 0.867 0.242 0.485 0.618 
Salary (in R 1 ,000) 0.021 0.002 0.000 0.020 0.002 0.000 
Standard deviation of random parameter distribution 0.011 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.000 
Clinic [hospital] 0.240 0.064 0.000 0.237 0.064 0.000 
No shortage of supply/drugs [regular shortages] 0.493 0.063 0.000 0.494 0.064 0.000 
Waiting time (per year) to get study leave -0.123 0.014 0.000 -0.124 0.014 0.000 
Service for underserved [services for all] -0.025 0.058 0.668 -0.015 0.058 0.796 
............................................ 
·-·--·----------·- -----Male 0.212 0.087 0.015 0.156 0.084 0.063 
White 0.166 0.190 0.382 0.212 0.186 0.254 
Young (<25 y.) 0.239 0.068 0.000 0.262 0.068 0.000 
Born in rural area 0.409 0.056 0.000 0.436 0.058 0.000 
Trained in university -0.418 0.129 0.001 -0.449 0.119 0.000 
Trained in NW province 0.606 0.110 0.000 0.578 0.104 0.000 
.................................... 
---·-·-------------------·-Positive attitude towards rural lifestyle 0.119 0.017 0.000 0.116 0.017 0.000 
Conservative attitude -0.022 0.018 0.220 
Pro 'Welfare state' attitude -0.014 0.017 0.431 
Pro-poor attitude 0.055 0.021 0.010 
DG student 0.052 0.138 0.708 
DG patient -0.120 0.167 0.475 
DG poor 0.268 0.156 0.085 
········-·······-··············-······ 
__________ , ___________________ 
Urban job Salary (in R 1 ,000)* 0.025 0.002 0.000 0.026 0.002 0.000 
Standard deviation of random parameter distribution 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.011 
Clinic [hospital] 0.236 0.057 0.000 0.230 0.059 0.000 
No shortage of supply/drugs [regular shortages] 0.379 0.053 0.000 0.374 0.056 0.000 
Waiting time (per year) to get study leave -0.112 0.014 0.000 -0.113 0.014 0.000 
Service for underserved [services for aiiJ -0.029 0.057 0.606 -0.033 0.060 0.586 
Modell: N=13,140; Log-L: -10,244.; x2(52)= 15,941 (p<O.OOO); McFadden Pseudo R2=0.437 
Model II: N=12,492; Log-L: -9,803.; x2(52)= 15,029 (p<O.OOO) ; McFadden Pseudo R2=0.434 
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6.4.4. Modelling the deployment of nursing graduates in the labour market 
Based on the parameter estimates obtained from model II presented in Table 6.1270, one can 
predict the relative market shares of each of the four job alternatives. Using the original equation 
estimated, the parameter estimates obtained from the model are used to compute the utility 
associated with each job described by a number of characteristics. The estimations are made for 
a representative individual who would have the average socio-economic characteristics of the 
populations. These simulations are produced automatically by LIMDEP. 
Two types of simulations are presented in Table 6.13 below: 
The expected deployment of nurses given the typical job offers found by South African nurse 
graduates (see Appendix 6.8 for a detailed presentation of these base scenarios); 
The predicted deployment of nurses in the labour market under a number of simulated 
scenarios (e.g. salary increases, etc.). 
Table 6.13: Predicted market shares of the four main labour market destinations 
Scenario description % uptake of each type of post 
Overseas Rural Private Urban 
Base scenario (current conditions) 11.95 30.74 28.46 28.83 
Changes in the public sector 
Increase in salary in rural post (R150,000) 11.19 35.21 26.80 26.80 
Increase in salary in urban post (R150,000) 10.12 26.12 24.26 39.49 
Better salaries in both public posts 9.51 30.47 22.99 37.03 
Better training opportunities in rural post (wait 2 10.89 years) 36.94 26.15 26.02 
Better training opportunities in urban post (wait 2 
years) 10.84 28.04 25.91 35.22 
Better training opportunities in both public posts 
34.16 23.93 32.00 (wait 2 years) 9.89 
Better working conditions in rural posts 10.89 36.93 26.16 26.03 
Changes in the private sector 
10.94 29.29 32.64 27.12 More supportive management 
Increase in salary (R150,000) 9.66 26.94 38.90 24.51 
Changes to overseas positions 
22.18 27.86 24.28 25.67 Marketing campaign (status recognised) 
Increase in salary (R300,000) 14.68 29.96 27.37 27.99 
The simulation shows that, under current market conditions, approximately 31% of the nursing 
graduates would choose rural posts in the public sector, 29% would choose urban public 
10 It was necessary to use results from the rank-ordered mixed logit mod~l, as the I lA assumption no longer holds, 
thereby allowing for more flexible cross-elasticity patterns between alternatives. 
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positions, 28.5% would opt for the private sector and 12% would choose to work overseas. Some 
simple simulations show that these choices could be altered in favour of the public sector by 
increasing salaries in rural and urban areas. Indeed, almost 70% of newly graduated nurses 
would take up posts in the public sector if salaries were to increase. Solving the problem of drug 
and medical supply shortages would attract about 20% more nurses to rural areas (36.9% 
compared to 30.7%). A similar effect would be achieved by offering study leave earlier. These 
simulations also confirm the importance of the status of nurses overseas. The willingness of 
nurses to take a position overseas virtually doubles when they are guaranteed that they will not 
be discriminated against, a much greater effect than a higher salary. 
6.5. Discussion 
6.5.1. Summary of key findings 
This chapter presented the analysis of a labelled discrete choice experiment, looking at the stated 
preferences among newly qualified nurses in South Africa for various job opportunities. 
A descriptive analysis of the results showed little indication that respondents may have found the 
task particularly difficult to complete. There was evidence that a minority of individuals 
systematically chose the same ranking of the four alternatives or had the same first choice across 
the twelve choice sets they answered. Although this could be the sign of lexicographic 
preferences contradicting the assumption of compensatory decision-making, the complexity of the 
labelled design made it difficult to confirm that fact. 
Overall the results conformed to the theoretical expectations of the DCE (e.g. salaries increasing 
the utility of jobs, poor working conditions decreasing utility). Interestingly, the analysis showed a 
differential valuation of salaries across the different job opportunities. 
Various socio-demographic characteristics were found to be particularly significant for job 
preferences. Nurses coming from rural areas or having a positive attitude towards rural areas 
were more likely to choose positions in rural areas than in urban areas. Younger graduates were 
more likely to choose a private job than a public urban one. Being white, young and male 
constituted favourable factors for choosing a job overseas rather than one in the public sector in 
urban areas. Findings also showed a the correlation between selfless and pro-poor values 
(measured through surveys) and a preference for public sector jobs, while more conservative and 
individualistic societal views are associated with a greater preference for private jobs. 
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The analysis also confirmed the importance of "nurture" as university students were found to 
favour private jobs more than nursing college students. Those trained in a more rural area (North 
West province rather than Gauteng) were significantly more likely to reject a job in urban areas. 
Finally, the predicted choices of nurses in the labour market show that, under what can be 
considered the current market conditions, 12% of nursing graduates would choose to work 
overseas, while those remaining in South Africa would split approximately equally between the 
three main employment opportunities. Simple simulations show that about 35% of nurses would 
choose the public sector if salaries were higher (instead of 30.7% under current circumstances), 
and 37% more nurses would choose a public sector position in rural areas if working conditions 
were better. These simulations also confirmed the importance of the status of nurses overseas. 
6.5.2. Discussion of results 
The results obtained provided mixed evidence to contradict or support some of the hypotheses of 
this research. 
The positive effect of rural backgrounds on rural job choices provided some evidence supporting 
hypothesis H671 . The results partly supported hypothesis H272 as they showed a correlation 
between selfless and pro-poor values (measured through surveys) and a preference for public 
sector jobs, while more conservative and individualistic societal views are associated with a 
greater preference for private jobs. However, the findings also showed that altruism measured 
with economic experiments (presented in Chapter 5) was generally not significantly correlated 
with any preference for a particular job. One exception was the positive association between 
generous offers to poor recipients in the DG and a preference for public jobs, especially in rural 
areas, which also supports H373. One reason behind this finding could be that respondents 
considered working conditions in public (rural) jobs not good enough to provide good quality care 
to the patients (which is an underlying assumption of H474 and H575). This might have 
discouraged their pro-public (rural) choices, thereby blurring the difference in preferences 
between them and more selfish individuals. In fact, a preference for private jobs over public ones 
was found amongst individuals who had been more generous in the DG towards their peers, 
which offered partial support to hypothesis H4. Unfortunately, the design was not set out to test 
71 Nurses from rural areas are more likely to choose rural posts than other nurses 
72 Ceteris paribus, altruistic nurses are attracted by jobs in the public sector. 
73 Ceteris paribus, altruistic nurses are attracted by rural jobs. . . . . . . 
74 Ceteris paribus, more altruistic nurses will choose private jobs 1f workmg cond1t1ons 1n the public sector are 
sufficiently poor . . . . . 
75 If altruistic individuals perceive public (rural) jobs as offenng poor cond1t1ons, they Will opt for pnvate (urban) ones. 
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these two hypotheses further (for example through the investigation of interaction effects with the 
working condition attribute, or through an exploration of what was understood in the labels). 
The work undertaken also contributes to several bodies of literature. 
First, this study builds on a growing body of work using DCEs to study health workers' job 
preferences. A recent review of the literature showed that only nine studies using DCE 
techniques have addressed HR issues (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2009). Four of them (Gosden et al., 
2000, Scott, 2001, Ubach et al., 2003, Wordsworth et al., 2004) were from the developed world 
(all in the United Kingdom) and the other five were carried out in developing countries: Indonesia 
(Chomitz et al., 1998), South Africa (Penn-Kekana et al., 2005), Malawi (Mangham and Hanson, 
2008), Ethiopia (Hanson and Jack, 2008) and Tanzania (Kolstad, 2010). The majority of study 
participants were doctors, although three studies focused on nurses (Penn-Kekana et al., 2005, 
Hanson and Jack, 2008, Mangham and Hanson, 2008). Because the relative importance and 
quantitative estimates of job attributes in a DCE depends on the presence of other types of 
attributes, it is difficult to compare results across choice experiments, in particular the size of 
effects. Yet, some more generic comments can be made. For example, the influence of study 
leave on nurses' preferences in the DCE presented here echo the three other nursing DCEs in 
developing countries where education opportunities were identified as a key motivating factor 
(Chomitz et al., 1998, Mangham and Hanson, 2008, Kolstad, 2010). Furthermore, although this is 
different to other findings in the DCE literature where health workers in developing countries tend 
to favour jobs in hospitals over those in smaller facilities (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2009), the 
preference for clinics over hospitals in this study probably reflects a preference in South Africa for 
better working hours (with no nightshift or weekend work) and sometimes more independent 
work. The DCE presented makes a novel contribution to this growing field, as it differs from 
previous studies in two respects. First, none of the other studies used a labelled design. Second, 
all previous DCEs exploring HR issues were restricted to a particular sector (i.e. public or private), 
and did not attempt to assess the impact of sector preferences. By enabling the calculation of 
market shares between the different sectors, the DCE presented here demonstrates some new 
possible applications of choice experiments to labour issues (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2009). 
Second, the results relating to the impact of job characteristics on health workers' job preferences 
complement the empirical literature presented in Chapter 2. The detrimental impact of poor 
working conditions in the public sector in South Africa has been highlighted by a large body of 
work (Thutse, 2006, Kekana et al., 2007, Nyathi and Jooste, 2008, Pillay, 2009), including a 
discrete choice experiment (Penn-Kekana et al., 2005). However, the present study is the first to 
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explore in a quantitative manner the relative importance of job characteristics across sectors. In 
particular, the marginal rates of substitution between salary valuations presented in Table 6.9 
provide some interesting insights. The differential valuation between jobs in rural areas and 
elsewhere in South Africa76 provides some empirical justification to the theory of compensating 
wage differentials described in section 2.1.2 (Garen, 1988, McNabb, 1989, Borjas, 2005), which 
posits that job offers differ in salary to compensate workers for unpleasant working conditions. 
Accordingly, the findings presented here suggest that graduate nurses expect to be compensated 
for harder working conditions (in rural areas) or when there are hidden costs (leaving one's family 
and country to accept a job overseas). 
Third, some results confirm the respective roles of nature and nurture as pull factors attracting 
people away from rural areas. The greater preference for rural posts of male compared to female 
South African nurses reported in the current study is consistent with literature from developed 
countries on other cadres (Brooks et al., 2002, Chopra et al., 2008, Wilson et al., 2009a) . The 
impact of having a rural background on preference for working in rural areas is also supported by 
a number of studies (Brooks et al., 2002, Laven and Wilkinson, 2003, Lea and Cruickshank, 
2005, Matsumoto et al., 2005), including one about South African medical students (De Vries and 
Reid, 2003). Location and type of training received are also shown in the literature to influence 
preferences for rural sector jobs. (Laven and Wilkinson, 2003, Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaiboon, 
2003, Matsumoto et al., 2005, Chopra et al., 2008). The role of curriculum content, which has 
also been shown to influence preferences for job location (Brooks et al., 2002), is confirmed to 
some extent here by the negative impact of universities as training centres. However, this could 
also hide a "nature" effect, as university students are usually better-off than nursing college 
students. A wealthier background has been shown to be negatively correlated with willingness to 
work in rural areas in a developing setting (Zaidi, 1986). Some of the results obtained are 
surprising and should be investigated more. In particular the interest of younger nurses in rural 
posts is relatively unexpected. 
Fourth, since this study is the first to try to quantify the relative attractiveness of overseas 
compared to domestic jobs for health workers, it is difficult to compare it to other studies. 
Nonetheless, the weight respondents attached to the lack of recognition they might experience 
overseas is consistent with high levels of distress reported by some nurses working overseas 
(Taylor, 2005, Likupe, 2006, Obrey et al., 2006, Leroi, 2007). Furthermore, some of these results 
relating to preferences for positions overseas echo the literature on emigration decisions. The 
76 Results presented earlier in this chapter suggested that R 1,000 in a rural public sector job was equivalent to R810 
in an urban public sector post and to R870 in the private sector (see Table 6.9). 
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lower valuation of salaries in overseas positions is consistent with the theoretical models of 
emigration decisions (Borjas, 2005): to make the decision to leave one's country, the expected 
marginal gain from emigration should be greater than the sum of the costs incurred in emigrating, 
such as the cost of re-locating, higher living costs and/or the pain of separation from family. The 
discrete choice results showed that individuals expected higher salaries in overseas positions, 
which can be interpreted as a willingness to be compensated for all the costs incurred through 
emigration. The results also indicated that young, white workers are more likely to emigrate from 
South Africa (Xaba and Phillips, 2001, Oosthuizen, 2005). This can be explained by the fact that 
the costs they face are less significant - they often already have relatives overseas, and/or they 
don't have partners and children to relocate with them. Unfortunately it was not possible to test 
that assumption in the analysis as no information on the presence of friends or family overseas 
was available about respondents. 
Whilst the results obtained on individual preferences for emigration are consistent with the 
literature, the predicted uptake of nursing positions overseas (about 10%) is at odds with the 
estimated emigration flows of nurses of between 1-2% per year, despite the fact that this baseline 
simulation was done under the assumption that nurses are expecting difficult situation where their 
professional status might not be recognised. This contradiction begs the question of the capacity 
of DCEs to provide an adequate framework to assess preferences, when all the consequences of 
a choice are not clearly specified. Whilst it might be tempting to choose 'on paper' a lucrative offer 
overseas, in reality the administrative and emotional difficulties associated with leaving one's 
country (which were implied in the DCE, but not clearly stated) would prevent an individual's 
actual departure. Another possible explanation for the discrepancy between our findings and the 
emigration statistics is that the DCE measures the potential supply of nurses for overseas jobs 
under perfect market conditions, but international labour market imperfections result in a number 
of barriers that reduce the actual supply. In particular, in contrast to the DCE where information 
regarding the overseas position is readily available, in reality nurses lack information about 
overseas positions and/or face costs associated with the job search. Nurses also have limited 
international mobility due to administrative barriers to entry into certain national labour markets, 
whereas the DCE did not refer to such barriers, implying their absence. 
Finally, this research also contributes to the economic literature on altruism, through the empirical 
investigation of its role in (stated) job preferences. Despite the lack of significance of experimental 
measures of altruism, the results indicated that pro-social attitudes, measured with survey 
questions, are correlated with distinct job preferences. In particular, more selfless and pro-poor 
values are correlated with a preference for public sector jobs, while more conservative and 
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individualistic societal views are associated with a preference for private jobs. This is in line with 
the literature on 'public service motivation' which has shown a correlation between such other-
regarding disposition and public service ethos (Rainey, 1982, Perry and Wise, 1990, Perry, 1996, 
Wright, 2001, Buurman et al., 2009, Perry et al., 2009). This research takes the existing literature 
one step further by highlighting that, everything else being equal, a concern for the poorest 
members of society will result in a greater willingness to work in the public sector positions, 
preferentially benefitting the poorest (in the present case posts in rural areas, where nurses 
generally provide services to more disadvantaged populations than they do in urban settings). 
6.5.3. Limitations 
The validity of the results may be limited by several biases arising from issues in the design of the 
choice experiment and its administration, as well as unanswered questions about the validity of 
DCEs in general. 
First, the absence of an opt-out option in the choice experiment precluded participants from 
expressing a preference for other professional career paths. Indeed, although it seems that the 
majority of graduating nurses start their career as a nurse, some might actually tum to research 
or education (in particular when coming from universities). As a result, the simulated market 
shares of the different jobs might have been mis-estimated, although it is difficult to assess either 
the direction or the size of the potential biases. However, the opt-out option was ruled out on the 
grounds that a non-nursing career would actually only concern a tiny minority at this stage of their 
career, which gives us good reason to believe the bias, if any, would be minimal. Besides, 
including an opt-out option would have increased the cognitive difficulty of the task and might 
have driven some respondents to choose the "easy" way out (i.e. opting-out) to avoid making a 
difficult (or tiresome) choice (Ryan and Skatun, 2004). 
Second, two particularities in the data collection process might have led to possible biases. 
First, too many 'block 1' questionnaires were initially administered, and additional 'block 
2' questionnaires had to be administered by email or at the end of a lecture. Fundamental 
differences between the two rounds in the context in which the task was administered 
(with/without privacy and explanations; time available to complete the questionnaire, etc.) might 
well have influenced the way people responded to the task. Studies in behavioural economics 
and psychology have shown how differences in contexts can have an influence on individual 
decisions (Kahneman, 2003). 
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Second, the choice experiment described in this chapter was administered immediately 
after another choice experiment (presented in the next chapter). The first DCE presented to 
respondents was purposefully designed to make rural positions more attractive than they 
currently are. Therefore, there is a risk that this first DCE might have created some positive pre-
conceptions about rural posts, leading respondents to rank them higher than they would 
otherwise have in the current DCE. Unfortunately it was not possible to measure the effects of 
either one of these issues. In the first case the 'administration' effect was confounded with the 
'block' effect. Furthermore, because the design was blocked, it was not possible to infer 
preferences from the choice sets of one block in isolation from the choice sets in the second 
block, neither was it possible to compare answers provided by the same individual to the choice 
sets in each of the blocks. Concerning the second issue, it was not possible to determine the 
extent of any potential ordering effect, as the order of the two choice experiments was not varied 
during data collection. However, the differences in the formatting and framing of the two tasks 
reduce the likelihood of such an ordering effect to have occurred. 
Third, the additional complexity of ranking compared to choosing the preferred option may have 
affected respondent ability to accurately complete the task, thereby violating the statistical 
assumptions inherent in the models used. Respondents may have successfully chosen their 
preferred option, but may have failed to dedicate enough attention to lower ranks. Indeed, some 
studies in the literature have shown that lower rankings may provide less reliable preferences 
(Chapman and Staelin, 1982, Hausman and Ruud, 1987, Bradley and Daly, 1994). To test 
whether the use of the full ranking was appropriate here, four model specifications were 
estimated with variations in the number of ranks included77 . This was in line with some studies 
which suggested that computing results obtained from fewer ranks would generate possibly less 
efficient but equally consistent estimators (Ben-Akiva et al., 1992, Bradley and Daly, 1994). 
Equally, because the violations commonly occur in the responses given for middle ranks, it is 
possible to use only the information provided by the extreme ranks (in the present case, the 1st 
and 4th ones). This additional analysis showed that the higher the number of alternatives/ranks 
included in the model the lower the standard errors around the parameter estimates (Appendix 
6.9). This reflects the increased statistical efficiency obtained by the use of more information to 
estimate the parameters. At the same time, the more ranks included in the analysis, the greater 
the log-likelihood of the model, suggesting that more ranks are associated with an increased 
amount of unexplained variance (i.e. people not knowing how to rank all alternatives). However, 
the good performance of the model using only extreme choices (see Appendix 6.9) also suggests 
77 Complete ranking, only the first choice, only the first two choices, using the first and fourth choices. 
176 
that individuals have stronger views about extreme choices. Finally and most importantly, the 
results presented in this chapter are robust to these different specifications. Overall, these results 
lend credibility to the full ranking given by respondents. 
Fourth, the cognitive complexity of the task may have introduced biases. The DCE presented 
here is one of the few choice experiments in the field of health economics to propose as many as 
four alternatives in each choice set to respondents, and each alternative comprised five 
attributes. Not only was this a demanding task, but it also took place towards the end of a long 
session of filling in questionnaires and making choices7a. Therefore, this increased the cognitive 
burden and a fatigue effect might have accentuated some of the possible caveats commonly 
associated with DCEs. For example, some have suggested that respondents may in fact be using 
simple decision heuristics to choose rather than trading between attributes (Scott, 2002). This 
might have been aggravated by the presence of labels and the framing of the job descriptions as 
adverts. For example, the systematic formatting of each type of job with a designated font size 
and style (see Figure 6.1) could have resulted in some people's choice making being influenced 
by the appearance of the job advert. 
Finally, because they rely on responses given about hypothetical scenarios, DCEs might suffer 
from hypothetical biases and mis-represent individual preferences. This relates to the main 
criticism addressed to stated preference techniques, where individuals virtual decisions, with no 
real consequence. This problem has been particularly recognised in the contingent valuation 
literature, where there the lack of financial implications of answers often led to over-estimating 
willingness-to-pay79. Because DCEs more closely mirror actual choices and real situations, they 
are often thought to be less prone to hypothetical biases. However, the external validity of DCEs, 
defined as their ability to predict real choices (or revealed preferences) remains under-
researched. The majority of studies that have explored the "external validity" of stated preference 
methods, including choice experiments, come from transport economics and marketing. Louviere 
(1988) describes several studies where the predictions of DCEs (brand market shares, individual 
choice predictions) are well correlated with actual measures or revealed preferences. However, it 
is not obvious that these results carry over into DCEs done in health economics, where similar 
work is still missing (Ryan and Gerard, 2003, Ryan et al., 2008). Most of the DCE sceptics 
underline the hypothetical bias that is likely to arise from choice experiments: because the 
78 This choice experiment was the fourth task respondents had to undertake. It was administrated about an hour and 
15 minutes after the beginning of the interview, following two experimental economic games and another DCE 
(presented in the next chapter). . . . . 
79 As Harrison and Rutstrom (2008) put rt: "As a matter of logtc, tf you do not have to pay for the good but a htgher 
verbal willingness to pay response increases the chance of its provision, then verbalize away to increase your 
expected utility!" 
177 
scenarios are fictitious, people will not pay attention as much as they would do in a real situation. 
This bias might be even more problematic in situations where respondents are not familiar with 
the scenarios presented. However, because choosing between job offers is relatively natural, this 
bias might be less problematic in DCEs eliciting job preferences compared to DCEs eliciting 
preferences for different health states. To limit the hypothetical bias even further in the DCE 
presented here, a real effort was made to frame the task in a very realistic way. Although this was 
certainly better achieved in this choice experiment than in any other job DCEs of this nascent 
literature, doubts subsist concerning the external validity of the tool. 
These caveats highlight the caution required when interpreting the results and particularly when 
drawing policy recommendations. 
6.5.4. Implications for policy and research 
A. Implications for policy 
The findings presented in this chapter have some direct implications for three major health policy 
concerns in South Africa: the loss of nurses to emigration, the lack of nurses in the public sector 
in general and the shortage of nurses in rural areas in particular. 
First, the results of the DCE point to a number of concrete policy measures that could be taken to 
tackle the acute issue of health worker emigration. Their lack of status in overseas positions 
deterred nurses from choosing these positions in the DCE. Yet, very often the image emigration 
candidates have in mind is an idealised work environment conveyed by international recruitment 
agencies. Allowing returning nurses to share publically the challenges encountered when working 
overseas and allowing these stories to resonate through the media as much as the more idealistic 
portrayals of overseas work could help curb the enthusiasm of South African nurses for overseas 
jobs and positions. 
Second, the results of the DCE indicate possible strategies for the recruitment of nurses into the 
public sector. The findings emphasised that improved working conditions could increase the 
willingness of nurses to take up such posts. The DCE found that nurses wanted to be 
compensated by an additional R25,500 to take up a position in rural areas with regular shortages 
of drugs or medical material, and they would require R6,600 more every year to work in hospitals 
in rural areas. Beyond the job characteristics, the analysis showed that students from universities 
were less likely to choose the public sector. This result could be explained by a selection bias of 
university students, who probably come from better-off and more educated families, which could 
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explain higher salary expectations or different career expectations. This result could also mean 
that some aspects of the training approach (the content of the curriculum or the nature of practical 
exposure) might shape job preferences and expectations. A final important result exposed here 
was the link between pro-social norms and public sector motivation. To capitalise on this, 
individuals demonstrating such pro-social norms during the selection process (for example during 
an interview) could be particularly encouraged or sponsored to undertake training. Alternatively, 
nursing training could attempt to cultivate and reinforce these values within the nursing culture, 
through mentoring arrangements for example. 
Finally, the DCE has highlighted that a number of individual and training characteristics are 
associated with a greater willingness to choose to work in rural areas. These findings can serve 
as a basis for designing policies to attract more nurses to rural areas. The preference for rural 
sector posts of those born in rural areas is particularly significant. This indicates the value of 
offering scholarships to students originating from rural areas, or reserving quotas for them, as has 
been implemented already in some countries (see Table 2.3). The greater preference of nursing 
college students for rural posts than university students suggests that the increased production of 
nurses should emanate from nursing colleges rather than universities. The training capacity of 
these institutes should therefore be strengthened. Finally, locating nursing colleges in rural areas 
will increase nursing graduate willingness to work in rural areas, as has also been evidenced in 
other countries, such as Thailand (Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaiboon, 2003). 
B. Implications for research 
The study presented here has shown how DCEs can be used to better understand the job 
preferences of health workers, as well as try to predict their deployment in the labour market. As 
such, these methods could allow researchers to investigate labour market issues in developing 
country settings where alternative datasets (such as labour market surveys or longitudinal 
datasets providing detailed information on career paths) are scarce or non-existent. Moreover, 
this research suggests that greater use could be made of labelled experiments in the analysis of 
labour market issues. These designs indeed provide more flexibility and scope to address some 
of the reputational effects that characterise different types of employment. 
Furthermore, as noted before, one of the unanswered questions about DCEs is their capacity to 
predict actual preferences (Ryan and Gerard, 2003, Fiebig et al., 2005, Ryan et al., 2008). Yet, if 
DCE outputs are to inform health policies, it is essential to know whether they can predict actual 
choices made by individuals. Comparisons between stated and revealed preferences have been 
done in transport economics or marketing (Louviere, 1988). One of the reasons why this has not 
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been done in the health economics literature is the greater difficulty to observe the revealed 
preferences corresponding to the choices presented in the DCEs. Indeed, DCEs in health care 
have often been used to value non-marketed goods or services, whose demand, by definition, 
cannot be observed. However, in their application to labour markets, there are more opportunities 
to compare revealed and stated preferences. The DCE presented in this chapter is particularly fit 
for this purpose, as the objective of the design was to try and reproduce some of the main 
opportunities offered to nurses in the labour market. The project within which the current DCE is 
embedded will provide an opportunity to do so, by following up nurses over time and gathering 
information on their actual career choices. 
6.6. Conclusion 
Initially, this thesis highlighted the theoretical role of concern for others on individual behaviour. 
Having measured altruism and pro-social concerns amongst nurses (Chapter 4), the present 
chapter set out to explore their role on the job preferences expressed by South African nurses, as 
well as to understand the role of other individual characteristics. The chapter has revealed a 
series of interesting and useful findings in order to address some of the key HR issues in South 
Africa. 
However, because the tools used were not specifically designed to assess the potential 
effectiveness of policy levers, the policy implications may seem quite general. The next chapter 
aims to provide further insight into the likely effects of various policy options to address the 
shortage of nurses in rural areas. 
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Chapter 7 · Effects of policy interventions to attract 
nurses to rural areas 
7 .1. Introduction 
Although available data do not allow breakdown by rural and urban areas, the disparities between 
the different provinces in South Africa provides indirect evidence of the rural/urban imbalance in 
the distribution of nurses. For example, while Western Cape and Gauteng have a nurse-to-
population ratio of 123.4 and 111.7 per 100,000 population respectively, the more rural province 
of North-West only has 81.1 nurses per 100,000 (see Appendix 4.3). 
As noted in Chapter 4, redressing the imbalance in the geographic distribution of health workers 
has been a priority for the National Department of Health since the end of Apartheid (De Vries 
and Reid, 2003). In recent years, health policy initiatives have included the recruitment of foreign 
doctors to rural posts (Kotzee and Couper, 2006), the creation of incentives for national health 
workers including rural allowances representing 10% monthly salary and finally, the introduction 
of mandatory community service for nurses (De Vries and Reid, 2003, Gilson and Erasmus, 
2005). 
Whilst there has not been any systematic evidence collected as to these policies' effects, large 
geographical inequalities in the distribution of staff have persisted. Therefore, finding a way to 
address this issue is still key to ensuring equitable access to health services. Beyond the 
identification of different policy levers that could be used to attract nurses to rural areas, there are 
theoretical and empirical reasons (see respectively Chapters 2 and 6) to believe that there might 
be heterogeneity in preferences between individuals. This is important to explore, as it could 
mean that some individuals are naturally more inclined to choose rural areas, and need less 
strong incentives to accept a job there. Therefore, selecting these individuals into the nursing 
profession (i.e. "upstream measure) is another strategy that can be adopted. 
This chapter aims to study the effectiveness of various potential policy options that could be 
designed to alter the geographic distribution of nurses in the public sector in South Africa. The 
chapter builds upon stated preference data from a discrete choice experiment designed to reflect 
possible policy scenarios, and builds a Markov model to model the distribution of nurses on the 
South African labour market and to predict the effects, in the long run of various policy options. In 
terms of empirical approach, the use of stated preferences is justified in two ways. First, there is 
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no data allowing the evaluation of existing interventions. Second, stated preferences give the 
possibility to introduce hypothetical interventions. 
7 .2. Data and methods used 
This section briefly presents the stated preference methods used to predict the effects of policy 
interventions. It will start by highlighting some of the study context under which these methods 
were developed. The presentation of the methods themselves, as well as the econometric tools 
used for their analysis will be relatively brief, as detailed discussion of those issues were already 
presented in Chapter 5. 
7.2.1. Context of the study 
Unlike the model presented in Chapter 5, the Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) choice 
experiment presented here was developed in collaboration with others for purposes other than for 
this thesis (see Table 3.2 for a presentation of my role in the development of the tool). One of the 
objectives of this project was to use similar methodologies in the three countries involved in the 
project (South Africa, Kenya and Thailand), for the purposes of comparative analysis. This 
translated into a common design for a DCE with similar attributes and levels. Although the 
objective of this work is not to provide an account of the constraints and objectives of this other 
project, the presentation of the main design characteristics of the choice experiment in this 
section will sometimes need refer to them. 
7.2.2. Design of the choice experiment 
A. A labelled discrete choice experiment 
One of the objectives of the 'cohort study' project was to help policy-makers craft policies that 
would improve the uptake of rural positions, in the public sector (Blaauw et al., 2007). Stated 
preference methods were used to allow the researchers in each country to introduce some policy 
options that were not yet available, but viewed as possibly relevant and effective. 
In addition, it was decided to utilise a labelled choice experiment for the following reasons (for a 
more in-depth discussions of similar motives, please refer to the previous chapter): 
The labelled experiment allowed researchers to introduce alternative-specific attributes and 
levels, thereby providing a flexible framework to develop specific policy packages for rural 
areas. Because the objective would be to develop policies specifically crafted for attracting 
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nurses to rural positions, some attributes and/or levels would only be relevant to rural 
positions. 
It was assumed that individuals would have different valuation of the same attributes across 
alternatives. For example, it was hypothesised that clinics in urban areas would be valued in 
a different manner as clinics in rural areas. 
The labelled experiment enabled the calculation of market shares of the available job 
options, under different simulated conditions. In a generic experiment, the probability of 
choosing a particular job can be simulated, but one cannot at the same time define what the 
other job alternative would be. 
Moreover, it was decided that respondents would be asked to choose between a rural and an 
urban job, both in the public sector. Restricting the job choices to public positions only was made 
for several over-lapping reasons: 
The importance of other job market options varied a lot from one country to another, so that 
no compromise was ever found acceptable. For example, in Thailand, virtually all beginning 
nurses work in the public sector, with the private sector not being a very realistic option in 
most areas. In addition, an "overseas" label would only have made sense for South African 
respondents. 
Although it could have increased its market realism in some countries, including other 
options would have added too much complexity to the design of the choice experiment. 
Indeed, for a given number of task choices done by each respondent (for example 16), 
adding one additional label (e.g. a "private position") would have decreased the number of 
policy scenarios to be tested for rural jobs. Alternatively, a blocked design could have been 
used, but budget constraints prevented the possibility of using a bigger sample size. 
In the end, it was agreed that the choice experiment would rely on the assumption that it 
would reflect the choices made by nurses, who would have chosen the public sector. 
Furthermore, the rural and urban labels were then chosen because of their policy relevance 
in all three countries, where there is an imbalance in nurse distribution and where the 
primary health policy objective is to make rural positions more attractive. 
Finally, an opt-out option was discounted for several reasons: 
For fear that respondents would choose that option out of fatigue or boredom, more than 
because neither option would appeal to them (see discussion in the previous chapter); 
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Because in one country (Kenya) there is an over-supply of nurses compared to the shortfall 
of positions in the public sector, so that any available position would be accepted by nurses 
there, hence the "neither'' option was not felt to be relevant; 
Given that the choice experiments would at least represent the current conditions in the 
public sector (and some improvements), it was argued that the choice experiment was 
meant to represent the potential trade-offs that a nurse who would have decided to work in 
the public sector could then make. 
B. Definition of attributes and levels 
The DCE design involved several steps. The literature review from developed and developing 
countries presented in section 2.5 allowed the project team to draw a list of possible policies that 
had been used in other settings to influence employment preferences. These possibilities were 
then discussed in each country with policy-makers and key stake-holders to assess their 
feasibility and desirability in each context. Finally, FGDs took place in Baragwanath Nursing 
College in Johannesburg where nurses were asked to comment on possible ways that the 
government could improve the attractiveness of rural positions. The objective of the FGDs was to 
inform the perceived relevance and opportunity of the list of policies envisaged, as well as to 
understand what wording would be most appropriate for the nurses. 
The final DCE also partly reflected the compromises made to accommodate the need for a 
unique design across the three countries for the project. For example, although it would have 
been meaningful to add an attribute on working conditions in Kenya and South Africa (e.g. lack of 
equipment and drug supply, which is usually cited as one of the key disincentives for rural 
positions in those countries), it was excluded because 1) it was not relevant for Thailand and 2) it 
was decided to focus only (if possible) on attributes that would be actionable HR policy levers. 
For South Africa, the following seven attributes were retained (see Table 7.1 below for a quick 
summary): 
The type of facility, either a hospital or a clinic. This was kept in all countries, and was 
deemed a determinant job characteristic. 
The salary offered, which presented four levels: basic salary (for urban and rural positions), 
and a rural allowance of 10%, 20% or 30% of the basic salary. 
The number of years nurses would have to work at the describe post before getting study 
leave to specialise. What was agreed to be the current state of practice (six years) was 
opposed to a better situation (two years) in rural areas. 
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Subsidised housing available with the position offered. In urban positions, there was either 
nothing or just a flat shared with someone else. In rural areas, the two levels were either the 
shared flat or a self-contained two-bedroom house. 
The time nurses would have to spend in the position offered before they could be promoted. 
In South Africa, the rule is that nurses move up the salary scale every two years. This was 
the base level, and a better one was proposed with a promotion obtained only after one 
year. 
Some jobs in rural areas also included a monthly car allowance which is a perk not usually 
available to professional nurses (so far only doctors are eligible for it). This was meant to 
capture a financial benefit, to which a particular symbolic value would be associated (i.e. a 
better status). 
The organisational culture and management style in the facility. This attribute was chosen to 
reflect findings from a number of studies showing that health workers were more likely to be 
attracted by and remain in a position where the management is supportive. The common 
situation in South Africa would be a management that is more formal and emphasize rules. 
The full factorial design of the experiment produced 211 x 41 =8, 192 possible profiles. The use of 
the SAS macros to produce a fractional factorial design with 16 profiles ensured an orthogonal 
design maximising D-efficiency (Street et al., 2005). This design assumed that the interaction 
effects between attributes were not significant (main effects design). Four versions of the 
questionnaires were produced and randomly allocated to respondents, to avoid order effects of 
the questions. As shown in the example of the questionnaire below, the framing of this 
questionnaire was very neutral. 
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Table 7.1: Attributes and levels of the 'policy' discrete choice experiment 
ATTRIBUTES LEVELS 
RURAL POSITION URBAN POSITION 
Type of facility 1. Clinic 1. Clinic 
2. Hospital 2. Hospital 
----·---··-·-------·----·-----·--.. --·------·------·----.. ·------·-----·------·---................. , ... ___ , _______ ,, ........... ___________ _ 
Annual salary 1. R120,000 I year 1. R120,000 /year 
2. R120,000 + an additional R12,000 /year 
3. R120,000 +an additional R24,000 I year 
4. R120,000 +an additional R36,000 I year 
___ , ___ , ___ ,,_., ___ , _____ , .. ,_ .............. -........................................................................................................... ,_ .................... _ ........................................ ___________ _ 
Provision of subsidised 1. Basic: single room with a shared kitchen 1. None 
housing and shared toilet. 2. Basic: single room with a shared 
kitchen and shared toilet. 2. Superior: small two bedroom house for 
you and your family. 
------------·--·-·---·----·----"-"""""'""""""'"""""'"""""""'"""""'""""""'""""""'""""""'"""""'""""""'""""""'"""""" ___________ _ 
Time to wait 
before getting study 
leave to specialise 
1. Normal: 6 years 1. Normal: 6 years 
2. Improved: 2 years 
----------·-·--.. --.. -.......................................................................................................................................................................................... ___________ _ 
Car Allowance 1. None 1. None 
2. R500 per month 
-----·-----.. ·-·-·---·-.................................................................................................................................................................................. ___________ _ 
Number of years to be 1. Normal: 2 years 1. Normal: 2 years 
spent in the facility until 2. Improved: 1 year 2. Improved: 1 year 
being eligible for 
promotion 
------------·-------·--·-"'"""""'"""""'""""""'""""""'"""""'"""""-'"""""'""""""'"""""'""""""""'""""'"""""'""""""'""""""" ___________ _ 
Workplace management 1. Hierarchical: this facility is formal and 
and culture structured. The managers emphasise 
stability, following rules, and keeping 
things running smoothly. 
2. Relational: this facility is personal and 
supportive. The managers emphasise 
teamwork, loyalty, and developing the 
full potential of staff. 
1. Hierarchical: this facility is formal 
and structured. The managers 
emphasise stability, following rules, 
and keeping things running 
smoothly. 
2. Relational: this facility is personal 
and supportive. The managers 
emphasise teamwork, loyalty, and 
developing the full potential of staff. 
The introduction to the questionnaire used during the data collection can be found in Appendix 
7.1. These instructions emphasised that respondents were to imagine that they were about to 
enter the job market and choose a position in the public sector. 
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Figure 7.1: Example of a question posed to respondents in the choice experiment 
Question 1 :Which of these two public sector facilities would you choose to work in? 
Type of facility 
Monthly salary 
Rural allowance 
The number of years you would have to work 
before getting study leave to specialise 
The housing provided 
The number of years you would have to work 
before being eligible for promotion 
The car allowance offered 
RURAL Facility 
Clinic 
R120,000 per year 
An additional R12,000 per year 
2 years 
You can choose to stay in the subsidised 
accommodation provided which is a single room 
with a shared kitchen and shared toilet. 
2 years 
None 
This facility is formal and structured. The 
The workplace culture and style of management I managers emphasise stability, following rules, and 
keeping things running smoothly. 
Which facility would you choose? Rural Facility D 
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URBAN Facility 
Hospital 
R120,000 per year 
None 
2 years 
None 
2 years 
This facility is personal and supportive. The 
managers emphasise teamwork, loyalty, and 
developing the full potential of staff. 
Urban Facility D 
7.2.3. Analysis of the choice experiment 
This section presents the methods used to analyse the data obtained from the choice experiment. 
A. Description of the Random Parameter Model 
To analyse this binary choice experiment it was decided to use a Mixed Logit or Random 
Parameter model. This model controls for serial correlation between the choices made by 
respondents. This feature was shown to be important in the estimation of better (unbiased) 
results in terms of overall fit and welfare estimates (Carlsson et al., 2003, Lusk et al., 2003, Morey 
and Rossmann, 2003). The RPL model also allows for heterogeneity in tastes in various ways 
(Layton and Brown, 1998, Greene et al., 2006). In an RPL model, there are two sources of 
heterogeneity. The first one is random unobserved heterogeneity, which is captured by the 
random parameters. In a MNL model, the utility that individual j receives from the choice S in 
choice set N defined by L attributes is defined as follows: 
Ujsn = ajn + pA xj~n + ... + pL xj~n + zj + ejsn 
Instead of estimating a single parameter f3A at the population level representing the impact of 
attribute A on the utility, the RPL model allows for individual heterogeneity, and estimation of 
individual parameters pf: 
flj1 = P: + (JkVjk 
Where P: is the population mean and Ujk is the source of individual heterogeneity - that is a 
random variable following an a priori defined distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Finally m is the standard deviation of the distribution of /Jjk around the population mean /3k· This 
means that if m is not significant, there are homogenous preferences in the population. 
The second source of heterogeneity in a RPL is conditional on respondents' characteristics. It can 
be included in two ways in a model: 
Through interaction terms, as in a traditional conditional logit model. Interaction terms are 
created between respondents' social, demographic and attitudinal characteristics and one of 
the alternative (here the constant term for rural jobs) to estimate general preferences for 
these jobs. 
Through heterogeneity in the mean of the distribution of random parameters, by introducing 
an additional term that is conditional on individual characteristics. 
Formally, this means in the former example: 
flj1 = P: + o: zj + (Jkvjk 
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where Zi: are observed individual characteristics. 
Due to the complexity of its specification, the interpretation of model estimates is not 
straightforward (Greene, 2007). Indeed, the RPL model aims to identify the parameters of the 
distributions from which the individual-specific parameters are drawn - the model identifies {Jk ~ 
and m. Yet, it is essential to examine the distribution of CPj11 zj, vjk) across all observations in 
the sample (Greene, 2007). To do that, Greene suggests computing the average of the 
conditional individual means E CPA I Zj, vjk), as an approximation of the population mean effect 
of attribute A. It is also possible to compute the variance of the population estimates as follows 
(Greene, 2007): 
V(Pj11 Zj, Vjk) = E[V(PAI )] + V(Pj11) 
which is the average of the conditional variance plus the variance of the conditional means. 
Finally it is possible to examine the distribution of conditional means with a kernel density 
estimator. In the results, this is done across different population groups to illustrate the significant 
differences found. 
B. Definition of the random parameters 
There are two main issues with the specification of an RPL model: 
Which parameters should have a random distribution? 
What is the underlying distribution that those specified random parameters should follow? 
Here, as the objective was to provide good estimates of policy intervention effects and 
understand the heterogeneity in sensitivity to these incentives, only attribute parameters for rural 
jobs were potential candidates to be random parameters. It was also decided to investigate only 
the heterogeneity in sensitivity to policy incentives that 1) was found initially significant for the 
whole sample and 2) was easily actionable. The first criterion excluded the promotion coefficient 
which was not significant, and the second criterion excluded the management and facility 
variables. Therefore the parameters that were set random are salary (the three levels), car 
allowance, housing and training. 
The problem associated with the ex ante selection of the coefficient distributions' functional forms 
have been highlighted in the literature. The random parameters can follow a number of pre-
defined functional forms (Hensher et al., 2005, Train and Sonnier, 2005): normal, lognormal, 
triangular, Weibull, gamma, beta, uniform, dome, etc. So far, researchers have favoured the 
normal distribution for random terms, while problems with the use of normal distributions 
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regarding the potential length and sign of the tails of the distribution of willingness-to-pay 
estimates have motivated some researchers to try to use bounded distributions, such as the 
triangle distribution or the log-normal ones (Balcom be et al., 2009). However, the latter have also 
been criticized, particularly in regards to their interpretation (Greene, 2007). 
Several distribution specifications were tested here. Log-normal distributions were used for the 
salaries, and triangle distributions were used for all coefficients. Since the choice of distributions 
did not modify the results obtained, normal distributions were eventually chosen due to the ease 
of interpretation and computation of population-level coefficients (Greene, 2007). 
C. Model specification 
In the present case, the RPL model was used to investigate whether the impact of different policy 
packages varies across individuals and in particular whether the policy effects were affected by 
pro-social attitudes (altruism) and rural backgrounds. 
Table 7.2: Effects associated with independent variables 
Variable Expected sign 
Job characteristics 
Higher salary 
Clinic [hospital] 
Waiting longer for promotion 
Informal type of Management 
Better housing 
Car allowance 
Waiting longer for study leave 
Socio-Demographic characteristics 
Male 
White 
Young (<25 y.) 
Born in rural areas 
Training characteristics 
Trained in university 
Trained in NW province 
DG student 
DG patient 
DG poor 
Attitudinal variables and individual values 
Rural lifestyle score 
Conservative attitude 
Rural 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Pro 'Welfare state' attitude + 
Pro-poor attitude . + . 
n/a: not applicable (the urban category is the reference category 1n the regression) 
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Urban 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
All quantitative job attributes (car allowance, years to wait until promotion or study leave) were 
kept quantitative (see Appendix 7.2). A notable exception was the salary variable, which was 
dummy-coded to investigate non-linear effects. The model was augmented by individual-level 
characteristics, as used in the analysis of labour market preferences (see Table 6.4). Attitudinal 
variables and experimental measures of social preferences were also included in the models. As 
in the previous chapters, to avoid problems of collinearity between survey and experimental 
variables capturing similar constructs, two models were estimated separately. 
The models included all the main attributes and several interaction terms that multiplied each 
alternative-specific job characteristic with each variable of interest (see Table 7 .2). For example, 
the interaction terms between the rural label and gender measures the extent to which the 
preference for rural jobs depends on gender. 
The RPL model was estimated using NLOGIT 4.0. Distribution simulations were based on 100 
Halton drawsso. 
D. Predicting the uptake of rural positions 
Based on the parameter estimates obtained from the RPL model, it is possible to simulate the 
market shares predicted by the model for the alternatives. For example the predicted market 
share, or proportion of nurses who would take up a rural position, is predicted by the model as 
follows: 
Where Pir is the probability that individual i will choose a particular rural job (r1) vs. a given urban 
job (u1), based on the utilities derived from job r1 and u1. 
What matters in the present analysis is the effect of various policy packages, compared to the 
current situation. Therefore, market shares are initially calculated for the circumstances that 
reflect current conditions both for urban and rural jobs (the base scenario, see below) and then 
compared to predicted shares calculated for a number of policy scenarios. The base scenario 
reflects the current conditions of employment offered in the public sector in South Africa. This 
means a similar salary in urban and rural areas (R120,000/year), a similar average waiting time 
until nurses get promoted (two years in post), no car allowance, a basic housing opportunity 
so This is recognised as being enough to provide robust estimates. 
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offered in rural areas but nothing offered in urban areas, the possibil ity to obtain study leave after 
six years in a post, and a hierarchical style of management. 
Because there are 128 ways to combine the six policy leverss1 presented in the rural alternative 
of the choice experiments, it was decided to model the effects of only a sub-set of these . The 
following choices were made: 
Not to use "type of management" as a policy lever, as it appeared unclear what steps would 
have to be taken to enforce a change in management style; 
To simulate the effects of all single-incentive policies. In other words, the effect of each 
policy lever (except the management one) would be simulated separately; 
To simulate the effects of a few "thematic" policy packages that could be provided at 
different cost levels (as the cost-effectiveness of each policy package would later be 
computed -see Chapter 9). 
The final job attribute to be defined in the simulations was the type of facility where the job is 
offered. The difficulty is that no particular level can be considered as reflecting the current 
situation more than the other, as there are jobs available both in clinics and hospitals, for urban 
and rural areas. Furthermore, because the type of facility is a significant attribute, it is not 
possible to ignore it either, setting its level to one particular type of facility (e.g. clinics) . Making a 
particular decision about where the two job offers in the base scenario should be could potentially 
lead to particular results. For example, as it appears that clinics are increasing the utility 
associated with a job, if one job opportunity was situated in a hospital and the other in a clinic, the 
former would attract fewer nurses, all other job characteristics being equal. In fact, on the South 
African labour market, nurses would have to choose between all four types of offers: jobs in rural 
clinics, jobs in urban clinics, jobs in rural hospitals, jobs in urban hospitals. Although here the 
choice is only made between a pair of jobs, it is important to reflect this diversity. Therefore all 
four possible combinations of pairs of jobs82 were used to simulate the effects of different policy 
scenarios. 
81 Salary (4 levels), car allowance (2 levels), training opportunities (2 levels), housing provision (2 levels), promotion 
paths (2 levels), type of management (2 levels). . . . . . 
82 Rural clinic vs. urban clinic, rural clinic vs. urban hosp1tal , rural hosp1tal vs . urban cl1n1c and rural hosp1tal vs. urban 
hospital. 
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7.3. Results 
7.3.1. Results from a random parameter model 
Table 7.3 presents the results of the analysis of the choice experiment. Modell and model II differ 
in the way individual altruistic motives were incorporated in the analysis (through experimental 
measures in model I and survey measures in model II). Whilst model II appears a slightly better 
model (predicting correctly a greater number of observations), both sets of estimates are similar. 
All coefficients of the job characteristics are in the direction hypothesised in Table 7.2 which is a 
satisfying result with regard to the theoretical validity of the method. All job characteristics have a 
significant impact on the utility associated with a job in rural areas, except for two: being offered a 
promotion quicker does not seem to have an impact on a rural job's utility, while the type of 
management is barely significant in both specifications. Furthermore, the standard errors 
associated with the random coefficients of salary increases of 20% and 30%, car allowance and 
training opportunities are all highly significant, which means that individuals in the sample have 
different sensitivity to these incentives. 
The salary coefficients also show a non-linear effect: the utility of a rural job is increased by 1.4 
on average at the population level for a 10% increase in salary, by 2.1 for a 20% increase but 
only by 2.4 for a 30% increase in salary. 
Interaction terms between individual characteristics and rural label show that people with rural 
background and positive attitudes towards rural areas are more likely to prefer rural jobs than 
others. Having trained in a more rural province (North-West rather than Gauteng) is also 
associated with a greater preference for rural jobs. However, all other individual characteristics in 
the model do not appear to have a significant impact on preferences for rural jobs. For instance, 
even a more altruistic nature (either measured by survey or experimental tools) does not correlate 
to a greater willingness to take up rural jobs. 
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Table 7.3: Random Parameter model estimates 
Variable Modell Model II Description 
Coeff. St. Error p-value Coeff. St. Error p-value 
Rural job - determinants of job characteristics 
FIXED PARAMETERS 
Alternative-specific constant -2.349 0.326 0.000 -2.451 0.284 0.000 
Being posted in a clinic [hospital] 0.320 0.081 0.000 0.295 0.083 0.000 
Time to wait for promotion (in years) 
-0.104 0.082 0.206 -0.124 0.084 0.142 
Relational management [rule-oriented management] 0.160 0.077 0.038 0.150 0.079 0.058 
RANDOM PARAMETERS 
Salary increase by 1 0% Population average effect 1.427 0.238 0.000 1.449 0.153 0.000 
Random parameter mean 1.431 0.111 0.000 1.452 0.113 0.000 
Random parameter standard deviation 0.246 0.289 0.394 0.161 0.377 0.669 
Salary increase by 20% Population average effect 2.068 0.834 0.007 2.030 0.791 0.005 
Random parameter mean 2.090 0.138 0.000 2.072 0.140 0.000 
Random parameter standard deviation 0.782 0.182 0.000 0.742 0.191 0.000 
Salary increase by 30% Population average effect 2.386 0.597 0.000 2.388 0.546 0.000 
Random parameter mean 2.369 0.132 0.000 2.383 0.135 0.000 
Random parameter standard deviation 0.600 0.195 0.002 0.554 0.204 0.007 
Better housing Population average effect 0.391 0.070 0.000 0.408 0.037 0.000 
Random parameter mean 0.393 0.080 0.000 0.408 0.082 0.000 
Random parameter standard deviation 0.072 0.195 0.710 0.039 0.193 0.840 
Car allowance Population average effect 0.175 0.065 0.004 0.178 0.054 0.001 
Random parameter mean 0.175 0.015 0.000 0.178 0.015 0.000 
Random parameter standard deviation 0.071 0.028 0.011 0.060 0.031 0.052 
Time to wait to obtain study Population average effect -0.416 0.237 0.040 ·0.412 0.234 0.040 
leave (in years) Random parameter mean -0.407 0.028 0.000 -0.411 0.028 0.000 
Random parameter standard deviation 0.330 0.021 0.000 0.330 0.021 0.000 
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Rural job- Demographic, Education and attitudinal individual characteristics 
Male 0.077 0.188 0.683 -0.004 0.194 0.982 
White 0.235 0.282 0.405 0.251 0.288 0.384 
Young (<25 y.) 0.179 0.163 0.271 0.267 0.168 0.112 
Born in rural area 0.514 0.147 0.001 0.538 0.152 0.000 
Trained in university 
-0.178 0.196 0.364 -0.262 0.200 0.190 
Trained in NW province 0.647 0.149 0.000 0.641 0.150 0.000 
Rural lifestyle score 0.281 0.045 0.000 0.270 0.046 0.000 
Pro 'Welfare state' attitude 0.023 0.045 0.606 
Pro-poor attitude 0.079 0.061 0.197 
Conservative attitude -0.064 0.049 0.190 
DG Student 
-0.355 0.346 0.305 
DG patient 0.460 0.406 0.257 
DG poor 
-0.268 0.337 0.427 
Urban job - determinants of job characteristics 
Being posted in a clinic [hospital] 0.361 0.080 0.000 0.346 0.082 0.000 
Provision of housing [no housing] 0.472 0.085 0.000 0.489 0.087 0.000 
Time to wait to obtain study leave (in years) 
-0.446 0.022 0.000 -0.448 0.023 0.000 
Time to wait for promotion (in years) -0.310 0.079 0.000 -0.317 0.081 0.000 
Relational management [rule-oriented management] 
-0.427 0.082 0.000 -0.452 0.084 0.000 
Note: for dummy variable in job characteristics, the reference category is indicated in brackets. 
Modell: LL=-2766.488 LL(null)= -4065.308 MacFadden's pseudo R2=0.311s correctly predicted: 64.60% 
Model II: LL= -2619.098; LL(null)= -3866.375; MacFadden's pseudo R2= 0.32; 1s correctly predicted:64.76% 
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7.3.2. Exploring heterogeneity of tastes 
To investigate further the source of heterogeneity detected by the random parameter distribution, 
another model was estimated to test whether rural backgrounds influenced the sensitivity to the 
various policy incentives (see Table 7.4). Other models were tested to see whether altruism had 
an influence, but as in models presented in Table 7.3, no other individual characteristics was 
found significant. 
The model reveals that individuals from rural backgrounds have a different sensitivity to policy 
incentives compared to people from urban backgrounds. Indeed, the statistical significance of the 
rural background dummy in the mean of the random parameters means that the sensitivity if 
people from rural backgrounds to some rural job characteristics is different from that of individuals 
from urban backgrounds. More specifically, the results show that people who come from rural 
areas are significantly less sensitive83 to a salary increase by 10% or 30%, to the possibility of 
obtaining a better accommodation or to obtain a car allowance. A graphic illustration of this 
variation in job preferences between rural and urban nursing graduates is shown clearly in the 
bimodal distribution of coefficients (beta) associated with an increase in salary by 10% and 30% 
(see Figure 7.2). 
Otherwise, the results in Table 7.4 are very similar to model II in Table 7.3. The only notable 
difference is that male nursing graduates are found to be significantly more attracted by rural 
posts in Table 7.4. People with pro-social attitudes are still equally likely to prefer rural posts as 
people who are less concerned with others' well being. Another consistent finding comes from the 
role of rural background on the general preference for rural posts. Overall, people from rural 
backgrounds are more likely to choose a rural job than people from urban backgrounds (the 
interaction term of rural background with rural label is highly significant). Associated to the results 
on the lesser sensitivity to policy levers highlighted above, these results suggest that because 
people from rural backgrounds are naturally more inclined towards rural areas and thus, they 
require less incentive to be sent there. They also support a differentiated sub-group analysis for 
people with rural backgrounds and those with urban backgrounds (this analysis is presented in 
Appendix 7.3). 
aJ The parameters associated with rural background in each of the random parameters are highly significant. 
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Table 7.4: Influence of rural background on the effects of policies- estimates from a 
random parameter log it model 
Variable Description Coeff. St. P-
Error value 
Rural job -job characteristics 
FIXED PARAMETERS 
Alternative-specific constant 
Post in a clinic [hospital] 
Time to wait for promotion (in years) 
Relational management [rule-oriented management] 
RANDOM PARAMETERS 
Salary increase by 
10% 
Salary increase by 
20% 
Salary increase by 
30% 
Provision of 2-bed 
house [shared flat] 
Car allowance 
Population average effect 
Random parameter mean 
Random parameter standard deviation 
Heterogeneity in mean - Being born in rural areas 
Population average effect 
Random parameter mean 
Random parameter standard deviation 
Heterogeneity in mean - Being born in rural areas 
Population average effect 
Random parameter mean 
Random parameter standard deviation 
Heterogeneity in mean - Being born in rural areas 
Population average effect 
Random parameter mean 
Random parameter standard deviation 
Heterogeneity in mean - Being born in rural areas 
Population average effect 
Random parameter mean 
Random parameter standard deviation 
Heterogeneity in mean - Being born in rural areas 
-2.823 
0.256 
-0.106 
0.170 
1.477 
1.647 
0.146 
-0.786 
2.036 
2.134 
0.566 
-0.171 
2.398 
2.765 
0.475 
-0.786 
0.407 
0.607 
0.197 
-0.438 
0.309 
0.083 
0.084 
0.079 
0.172 
0.151 
0.348 
0.227 
0.565 
0.172 
0.241 
0.239 
0.616 
0.175 
0.219 
0.227 
0.235 
0.108 
0.179 
0.157 
0.179 0.071 
0.204 0.020 
0.077 0.026 
-0.056 0.028 
Time to wait to 
obtain study leave 
(in years) 
Population average effect -0.413 0.233 
Random parameter mean -0.442 0.038 
Random parameter standard deviation 0.330 0.022 
Heterogeneity in mean- Being born in rural areas 0.047 0.053 
Rural job • Demographic, Education and attitudinal individual characteristics 
Male 0.054 0.196 Rural job 
White 0.427 0.293 
Young (<25 y.) 0.320 0.169 
Born in rural area 1.168 0.255 
Trained in university -0.445 0.200 
Trained in NW province 0.649 0.151 
Rural lifestyle score 0.273 0.047 
Pro 'Welfare state' attitude 0.031 0.045 
Pro-poor attitude 0.090 0.061 
Conservative attitude -0.054 0.049 
Urban job- job characteristics 
Being posted in a clinic [hospital] 0.342 0.081 
0.087 
0.022 
0.082 
0.084 
Provision of housing [no housing] 0.548 
Time to wait to obtain study leave (in years) -0.445 
Time to wait for promotion (in years) -0.342 
Relational management [rule-oriented management] -0.484 
0.000 
0.002 
0.206 
0.032 
0.000 
0.000 
0.674 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.019 
0.474 
0.000 
0.000 
0.030 
0.001 
0.042 
0.000 
0.273 
0.005 
0.006 
0.000 
0.003 
0.042 
0.038 
0.000 
0.000 
0.383 
0.781 
0.145 
0.059 
0.000 
0.026 
0.000 
0.000 
0.483 
0.138 
0.273 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
Note: tor dummy variable in job characteristics, the reference category is indicated in brackets. 
LL=-2618.83 LL(null)= --3866.37 ; x2=2495.084 ; MacFadden's pseudo R2=0.32 ; 1s well predicted: 64.8% 
197 
Figure 7.2: Illustration of the heterogeneity in the distribution of random parameter 
estimates for salary increases (model R1) 
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7.3.3. Simulating policy effects 
A. Policy effects on the sampled nursing population 
To illustrate the effects of the different HR interventions, the relative uptake of rural and urban 
posts under different conditions was calculated. These distributions were calculated based using 
the results of model II presented in Table 7.3. The effects of different interventions were 
simulated by changing the job characteristics offered In posts in rural areas. The job scenario in 
urban areas was unchanged, and kept to what is thought to reflect the current situation (as 
detailed earlier). Table 7.5 presents the simulated average distribution of nurses between rural 
and urban jobs (the average being calculated across all four possible facility combinations, while 
Appendix 7.4 reports the complete results of the four series of simulations) in the base scenario 
and in simulated conditions mimicking different policy interventions. The base scenario 
corresponds to the most commonly found situation at the moment (equal salaries of 
R120,000/year in both urban and rural areas, promotion and study leave opportunities 
respectively within two and six years, hierarchical type of management, no housing in urban 
areas and possibility to have a room in a shared house in rural, no car allowance in rural areas). 
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Table 7.5: Simulated effects of different policy scenarios on rural job uptake 
Predicted (average) Impact measures on 
Scenario description distribution proportion of rural uptake 
%in rural %in urban Absolute relative 
posts posts changea change (%)b 
Base scenario 31.36 68.64 
SINGLE INCENTIVES 
Salary increases 
1 0% rural allowance 51.30 48.70 19.94 63.58% 
20% rural allowance 59.16 40.84 27.80 88.66% 
30% rural allowance 64.19 35.81 32.83 104.69% 
Additional allowances 
Car allowance of R500/month 45.50 54.50 14.14 45.09% 
Housing opportunities 
2-bedroom house 36.23 63.77 4.87 15.52% 
Better training opportunities 
Study leave in 2 years 55.57 44.43 24.21 77.20% 
Better career path 
Promoted after 1 year in post 32.69 67.32 1.33 4.23% 
Better management 
Relational type of management 33.49 66.51 2.13 6.80% 
MULTIPLE INCENTIVE PACKAGES 
Financial packages 
1 0% salary increase + car allowance 66.06 33.95 34.70 110.63% 
20% salary increase + car allowance 72.69 27.32 41.33 131.78% 
30% salary increase + car allowance 77.08 22.92 45.72 145.79% 
"Status" packages 
Better housing + car 51.18 48.83 19.82 63.19% 
Better housing + car + 1 0% increase 71.35 28.65 39.99 127.53% 
Better housing + car+ 20% increase 77.41 22.59 46.05 146.84% 
Career-related packages 
Quick promotion +car 46.98 53.02 15.62 49.80% 
Quick promotion + 10% salary increase 52.81 47.19 21.45 68.41% 
Quick promotion + 20% salary increase 60.59 39.41 29.23 93.20% 
Quick promotion + 10% increase +car 67.43 32.57 36.07 115.03% 
'Education' packages 
Study leave soon + car 74.48 25.52 43.12 137.50% 
Study leave soon + 10% increase 81.00 19.01 49.64 158.27% 
Study leave soon + 20% increase 86.35 13.65 54.99 175.35% 
Study leave soon + 1 0% increase + car 91.53 8.48 60.17 191.85% 
a the absolute change is measured as the difference in percentage points between the proportion of nurses in rural 
areas in the base scenario and in the simulated scenario. 
b The relative change is calculated as the increase in the percentage of nurses who are in rural areas in the policy 
scenario, compared to the base scenario (Pscenario- Pbase)/Pbase. The calculation in this column is based on the 
average proportions presented in this table. 
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Several results emerge from these simulations. First, under the conditions defined in the base 
scenario (reflecting the current situation) , the model predicts that the majority of nurses would 
choose urban areas (68.6%). Second, several policy interventions that would improve the rural 
job offers have little effect on this distribution. Indeed, informal management, better housing and 
accelerated promotion increased the uptake of rural posts, but by less than 5% . Third , financial 
incentives (salary increases and car allowance) have strong effects. Interestingly, although the 
car allowance represents half the money offered than a 10% salary increase, both incentives 
have comparable effects. This is certainly because the car allowance also provides a "status" 
effect, as this is currently only offered to doctors. The non-linear effect of the salary increases are 
reflected here by the close effects obtained by an increase in salary by 20% or 30% (respectively 
59.2% and 64.2% of nurses choosing rural jobs). Finally, the impact of offering study leave to 
nurses sooner is the third most effective intervention (see Figure 7.3 where some of the single 
incentives are ranked from the least to most effective). 
The simulated effects of different combinations of incentives are presented in the second half of 
Table 7.5s4. Three of the four most effective policy packages selected here are the ones that offer 
better training opportunities and direct financial incentives. The combination of several incentives 
suggests that a high level of rural post uptake can be achieved. 
Figure 7.3: Relative uptake of rural vs. urban jobs under different policy scenarios (single 
incentives) 
iii URBAN 
i'.il RURAL 
84 The effects of the combination of two or three incentives are different that the sum of effects of the three individual 
incentives taken separately. For further evidence of that, see Appendix 7.5. 
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B. Policy effects on simulated nursing populations 
Given the impact of rural backgrounds on the preferences for rura l jobs, it was important to 
investigate the impact of potential "upstream" interventions (i.e. selecting more nurses from rural 
graduates), without or in combination with downstream policy interventions. To do that, four 
populations that varied in the proportion of individuals from rural backgrounds were simulated 
(see Appendix 7.6 provides further detail on how that was done) and the uptake of rural positions 
was predicted under different policy scenarios, using the estimates of model II from Table 7.3. 
Table 7.6: Simulated effects of different policy scenarios on rural job uptake for different 
nursing populations 
Scenario description 
Base scenario* 
Single incentive policies 
Salary increases 
10% rural allowance 
20% rural allowance 
30% rural allowance 
Additional allowances 
Car allowance of R500/month 
Housing opportunities 
2-bedroom house 
Better training opportunities 
Study leave in 2 years 
Better career path 
Promoted after 1 year in post 
Better management 
Relational type of management 
Multiple incentive policies 
Financial packages 
10% salary increase+ car allowance 
20% salary increase + car allowance 
30% salary increase + car allowance 
"Status" packages 
Better housing + car 
Better housing +car+ 10% increase 
Better housing + car+ 20% increase 
Career-related packages 
Quick promotion + car 
Quick promotion+ 10% salary 
Quick promotion + 20% salary 
Quick promotion+ 10% increase+ car 
0% rural, 
100% urban 
20.46 
41.43 
48.61 
57.76 
35.63 
27.40 
40.20 
21.58 
22.27 
59.26 
65.69 
73.67 
44.19 
67.53 
73.22 
37.08 
42.97 
50.15 
60.76 
Predicted uptake of rural posts(%) 
25% rural, 
75% urban 
25.73 
46.19 
53.76 
60.79 
40.38 
31 .60 
47.73 
26.96 
27.71 
62.49 
69.07 
75.20 
47.46 
69.24 
75.16 
41 .85 
47.72 
55.25 
63.93 
Original 
sample 
31 .36 
51.30 
59.16 
64.19 
45.50 
36.23 
55.57 
32.69 
33.49 
66.06 
72.69 
77.08 
51 .18 
71 .35 
77.41 
46.98 
52.81 
60.59 
67.43 
75% rural, 
25% urban 
38.08 
57.45 
65.74 
68.26 
51 .63 
41 .70 
65.12 
39.53 
40.42 
70.35 
77.09 
79.29 
55.57 
73.82 
80.10 
53.14 
58.95 
67.09 
71.65 
100% rural , 
0% urban 
43.81 
62.57 
71.21 
71 .53 
56.76 
46.30 
73.11 
45.36 
46.31 
73.81 
80.67 
80.97 
59.15 
75.71 
82.20 
58.28 
64.05 
72.51 
75.05 
Training packages 
Study leave soon+ car 65.29 69.77 74 .48 80.30 84.97 
Studyleavesoon+10%increase 73.50 77.17 81 .00 85.77 89.55 
Study leave soon+ 20% increase 80.04 83.17 86.35 90.37 93.55 
Study leave soon+ 10% increase+ car 88.69 90.04 91 .53 93.38 . 94.77 
Note: as for the sampled populations, the figures in this table represent an average of the results obta1ned for four 
different combinations of facilities (see rationale in section 7.2.3.0 and Appendix 7.7 for the complete results. 
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Three findings emerge from these results. First , the more rural nurses in the population the higher 
the proportion of nurses who will choose to work in rural areas (see Table 7.6). This means that 
with a more "rural" population than the one surveyed (the original sample had about 50% of 
nurses from rural areas), the proportion of graduates who choose a job in rural areas is 
systematically higher under all scenarios, as evidenced by the comparison for single incentives 
plotted in Figure 7.4. 
Figure ~ . 4: Proportion of nurses choosing rural jobs under different policy scenarios, by 
population type 
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Second, policy interventions are relatively less effective to increase the proportion of nurses in 
rural areas when it comes to people with rural backgrounds. For example, the car allowance 
increased the uptake of rural posts in the sampled population by 45% (from 31.4% to 45 .5%), 
while it only increased it by about 30% amongst a population comprise of rural nurses only (from 
43.8% to 56.7%). Obviously, this is due to an initial strong preference for rural jobs, which limits 
the marginal effectiveness of incentives. This differential in initial preferences for rural jobs also 
means that smaller incentives will be needed to obtain a given uptake of rural jobs with a 
population composed by a greater number of nurses of rural origins (see Figure 7.5) . For 
example, a 60% uptake of rural jobs is enabled by a 30% rural allowance if the population is 
composed of only 25% of rural graduates -an effect which is achieved (by a 10% increase only) 
if all the nursing population comes from rural areas. 
The third finding relates to differences in the relative effectiveness of policy interventions. As 
noted earlier, nurses with rural backgrounds are less sensitive to financial incentives and more 
sensitive to educational opportunities. Amongst 'single' incentives, the most effective policy lever 
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in the general population is the 30% salary increase, followed by the 20% salary increase, and 
finally the study leave offered after two years in post. For a population composed entirely or 
mostly of nurses with rural backgrounds, the highest uptake of rural posts is achieved for the 
education policy, followed by the 20% and 30% salary increases. The latter two are almost 
identical , even though the 30% increase in salary is less effective. 
Figure 7.5: Proportion of nurses choosing rural jobs with 3 types of financial incentives, 
by population type 
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7 .4. Discussion 
7.4.1. Summary of key findings 
Overall, the relationships between utility and job characteristics obtained in the analysis concur 
with the assumptions made in Table 7.2. This correlation provides theoretical validation of the 
tool. In particular, a modest job promotion and a change in management style were not found 
significant. In contrast, while effect of salary increases was found to be non-linear (decreasing 
effects), all other possible policy levers were found to be potentially powerful incentives to attract 
nurses to rural jobs. 
Very few socio-economic and individual characteristics were found to be significantly associated 
with a preference for one type of job or another. Males, individuals with rural backgrounds, those 
who had trained in a more rural province or who had positive attitudes towards rural areas were 
more likely to prefer rural jobs than others. However, gender and race were not significant, nor 
was altruism or any other measure of pro-social attitude (although a pro-poor attitude was 
associated with a preference for rural posts, at p<0.13). 
The use of complex modelling of individual preferences in a mixed logit model revealed the 
presence of heterogeneous tastes within the population regarding the different policy levers. A 
further analysis showed that the origin of nurses was a key factor in producing that heterogeneity. 
In effect, people from rural areas are significantly less sensitive to most of the incentives used to 
attract nurses to rural areas. 
The estimated model was then used to predict different uptake of rural vs. urban posts. Under 
baseline (current) conditions, 70% of nurses choose a position in an urban area, while 30% would 
choose one in rural areas. As expected from the regression results, different management or 
quicker promotion would not affect this distribution much. In contrast, financial incentives (salary 
increases and car allowance) have strong effects, and the guarantee to obtain study leave four 
years sooner than is usual provides the third most powerful policy lever (after the salary increases 
of 20% or 30%). The simulations also showed that a combination of different incentives could 
lead to high uptakes of rural posts can be achieved. 
To conclude with the analysis, different policy simulations were undertaken with various 
populations, which varied in their proportion of rural nurses (0%, 25%, 75% or 100%). This 
analysis clearly demonstrated the potential positive effect of upstream policy measures that would 
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seek to recruit more rural graduates. Indeed, it showed that the more rural nurses in the 
population the higher the proportion of nurses who will choose to work in rural areas. 
7.4.2. Discussion of results 
The predictions of the model under current circumstances show that more than two thirds of 
nurses would choose a position in urban areas. Unfortunately, the scarce data available on the 
geographic distribution of nurses in South Africa cannot contradict or confirm this result. Indeed, 
data at the provincial level presented in Chapter 4 do not reflect well the urban/rural divide. That 
said, as noted in Chapter 4, the unequal distribution of public nurses between provinces suggests 
that the majority of nurses choose posts in more urban settings. 
This study is the first to use a labelled DCE to simulate the effects of policy interventions on the 
uptake of rural posts, yet some of the results presented here echo those found in other DCE 
studies in developing countries. A study on clinical officers in Tanzania concluded that 
educational opportunities and salary increases were also some of the most influential policy 
levers to attract clinical officers in rural and remote areas (Kolstad, 201 0). Other DCE studies 
from low and middle-income countries have underlined the effects of salary increases, usually 
unmatched by other job characteristics (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2009). 
The results from the DCE analysis also confirm the role of rural backgrounds as a positive factor 
associated with greater preference for rural posts (see hypothesis H6). This has already been 
stated in various reviews of evidence on developed countries (Brooks et al., 2002) and 
developing countries (Lehmann et al., 2008). However, this dimension has not been investigated 
precisely by the recent DCE literature as no model was computed allowing for interactions 
between rural backgrounds and a rural attribute (Chomitz et al., 1998, Penn-Kekana et al., 2005, 
Hanson and Jack, 2008, Mangham and Hanson, 2008)85. However the findings from this study 
provide some complementary elements to the results found in a DCE study on clinical officers in 
Tanzania (Kolstad, 2010). In concert with the present study, they found that people from rural 
areas were less sensitive to incentives designed to attract them to rural areas (Kolstad, 2010). 
The author hypothesised that this finding might be related to the initial preference of clinical 
officers with rural origins for rural areas. The findings presented here concur with this assumption. 
as Indeed, none of these recent studies employed a labelled design. Therefore testing the effects of rural 
backgrounds on preference for rural jobs in a generic design requires introduction of an interaction term between the 
rural background variable and a location attribute that contains the level "rural" (or a similar level). 
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7.4.3. Limitations 
Several limitations in the design of the DCE should be recognised, along with the questions on 
the external validity of DCEs already mentioned. 
A first problem that might compromise the reliability of the policy effects modelled relates to the 
possibility that respondents may have followed non-compensatory decision-making rules, for 
example through heuristic rules. This is a classic problem that has been underlined several times 
in the DCE literature (Scott, 2002, Lloyd, 2003), and several reasons make it a likely issue here. 
First, the length of the questionnaire (16 choice sets) might have contributed to respondents' 
fatigue, which makes them more likely to choose simple heuristics to answer difficult tasks. 
Second, respondents might have followed the cue provided by the various rural incentives and 
followed what they thought was expected of them (framing bias). Finally, the use of labels might 
increase the occurrence of non-compensatory decision-making, as attributes unknown to the 
researchers and strongly associated with the labels can be used by individuals to make 
inferences and ignore other attributes. Yet, as indicated in the last chapter (section 6.4.1.B), 
establishing lexicographic preferences in a labelled DCE is difficult as there is often an overlap 
between the labels and alternative-specific levels. Besides, if this is an issue here, it is a minor 
one since only 2.7% of respondents systematically chose the urban option across the 16 choice 
sets, while 4.6% systematically chose the rural option (see Appendix 7.8). Overall, it is difficult to 
identify the existence of compensatory decision-making that might have compromised some of 
the consumer theory axioms. Besides, some authors have argued that heuristics or "irrational" 
decisions might in fact be more rational than researchers can identify and should therefore be 
considered as legitimate representations of individual preferences (Lancsar and Louviere, 2006). 
Second, the design employed for this DCE might be unbalanced. This issue can arise when the 
utility of alternatives presented to the respondents is systematically unequal. In this DCE, the 
rural jobs all presented better employment conditions than the ones offered in the alternative. By 
transforming the rural jobs into (unrealistically) attractive alternatives, these incentives may have 
altered the utility balance between alternatives. As a result, there is a risk that this utility 
imbalance might have compromised the compensatory decision-making behaviour by creating 
'inferior' and less attractive urban jobs. Yet, the descriptive analysis presented above showed that 
this might only have been the case for 2.7% respondents. Utility imbalance can also violate some 
of the assumptions on which the DCE analysis relies, decreasing the efficiency of the choice 
design and ultimately, compromising the statistical efficiency of parameter estimates (Huber and 
Zwerina, 1996). Overall this suggests that the effects of rural incentives might have been over-
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estimated. However, offering more attractive positions in rural areas was motivated by the need 
to compensate the 'natural' disadvantages inherent to rural jobs, thereby restoring the utility 
balance between urban and rural job offers. The difficult working conditions and negative utility 
associated to rural positions are encapsulated in the label, and the negative sign of the 
alternative-specific constant associated with the rural alternatives provides evidence of that 
assumption. In sum, it is unclear whether the design suffers from utility unbalance or not, but it is 
possible that the statistical estimates of policy effects might not be robust. 
A third problem of the DCE design is the absence of an opt-out option, which forces respondents 
to choose between a rural and an urban public position. Estimates of policy effects may be biased 
since they implicitly rely on the assumption that all individuals in the sample would indeed have 
chosen the public sector, had they been given the choice to opt out. Although the two choice 
experiments are not comparable, in particular due to the differences in rural jobs proposed in the 
two designs, the findings of the choice experiment presented in Chapter 5 clearly contradict this 
assumption. Indeed, in this choice experiment which was more representative of the conditions 
on the labour market, only around half of respondents chose public jobs. Consequently the 
'forced choice' design is likely to have over-estimated the effects of rural incentives to attract 
nurses to rural areas. Although this is a major drawback of the choice experiment, the Markov 
model was constructed in an attempt to remedy this flaw. By replacing the findings of this "policy" 
DCE into the broader perspective of the whole labour market given by the other "market" DCE, 
there is an attempt to rectify the estimations of effects provided by the forced choice design. 
Finally, as in the case of the DCE presented in the last chapter, the results and policy 
formulations are limited by the lack of certainty concerning the external validity of these stated 
preference tools. The reservations detailed in the last chapter still hold (see section 6.5.3), and 
the hypothetical bias described there might be more an issue in this DCE compared to the one 
presented in the last chapter. Indeed, while the DCE in Chapter 6 was purposefully mimicking the 
real labour market, the one in this chapter decisively deviates from working conditions currently 
offered in public jobs to test the effect of potential future incentives. Hence it is possible that 
respondents might have envisaged to take up rural positions that seemed more advantageous 
"on paper'', without taking into consideration the more difficult living and working conditions. In 
order to limit that effect, a short description of some of the difficult conditions that could be 
expected from "rural areas" was given in oral and written instructions (see Appendix 7.1 ). It is 
hoped that this will have limited the hypothetical bias, although it is likely that individuals will have 
over-estimated their willingness to take up rural posts. 
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7.4.4. Implications for policy and research 
A. Implications for policy 
The analysis of the choice experiment and the policy simulations leads to concrete 
recommendations for the recruitment of nursing students and the implementation of H R policies 
to attract nurses to rural areas, both through upstream and downstream measures. 
The investigation of preference heterogeneity has demonstrated that there is scope for policy-
makers to increase the uptake of rural positions by increasing the proportion of certain groups of 
nursing students. Amongst those, students from rural background seem to be the most obvious 
group. The analysis presented here has demonstrated that they are not only more inclined to take 
rural posts in general, but also need less incentive to work in those areas. The increase of 
nursing (or medical) students with rural origins has been actively sought in several countries 
through the creation of training centres in rural areas or the creation of bursaries or quotas 
(Rabinowitz, 1988, Inoue et al., 1997, Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaiboon, 2003). Similar actions 
could be taken by the South African government. The creation of training centres in rural areas is 
also supported by findings showing that nurses who trained in the North-West province (more 
rural than Gauteng) are more likely to accept rural positions. 
In addition, the results of the DCE identify a set of policy levers that would increase the availability 
of nurses in rural areas. In particular, offering higher salaries and study leave to nurses earlier in 
their careers will increase the number of nurses in rural posts. Yet, some of these levers are not 
equally easy to implement. For example, it should not be forgotten that the success of education 
policies relies on the government capacity to be able to deliver such promises. This is not a 
negligible guarantee, as suggested by the current low proportion of students from rural areas who 
specialiseas. Being able to implement such policy might mean introducing quotas in specialised 
courses for rural students, or creating and upgrading training courses in rural nursing colleges. 
Such initiatives would certainly contribute to the global improvement of career paths in rural 
areas, and thereby participate in addressing the rural-urban gap in the public sector. 
B. Implications for research 
The work presented here sought to build upon the DCE to simulate the effects of potential HR 
levers on the labour market dynamics of nurses. However, some of the limitations of the DCE 
design (absence of opt-out option in the choice experiment, lack of market realism of the 
as See Chapter 8 for more information provided in interviews with key stake-holders. 
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rural/urban choice) might preclude the generalizability of the results. To a large extent, these 
design characteristics are relatively typical of what has been done in the DCE literature applied to 
HR problems (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2009). In particular, most applications of DCE in low and 
middle-income countries have presented job choices in the public sector only. Yet, this practice 
raises concerns about the extent to which the absence of some alternatives (e.g. private jobs) 
may have biased the overall choices and in particular, in the context of a labelled choice 
experiment (where the labels may drive some of the choices). The effect of the choice 
architecture, or menu effect on individual decisions has been underlined by behavioural 
economists (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001, Benartzi et al., 2007), but remains untested for labelled 
choice experiments. 
These issues highlight the need for researchers using DCEs for labour market decisions to try 
and improve the market realism of their design, which is the only way to enhance the 
generalizability of market simulations, on which to base robust policy recommendations. At the 
same time, more market realism can increase the cognitive burden on respondents (more job 
characteristics, more job profiles, more choice sets) or, at the very least, can make DCEs more 
unwieldy and expensive as bigger sample sizes would be required. Yet market realism is needed 
to limit the risks of hypothetical bias posed by DCEs. As long as this external validity of DCEs 
remains uncertain, it is important to design the choice sets and frame the task in a way that 
increases market realism and decreases the risk of hypothetical bias. 
Finally, the study of the heterogeneity of preferences would provide another critical area for future 
research. Recent developments in choice experiments have attempted to develop individual-level 
models to reflect individual-level preferences perfectly. So far, applications have focused on the 
effects on willingness-to-pay and welfare estimates (Lancsar and Louviere, 2008), but an 
extension to predicted probabilities is easily feasible. That would give more flexibility to the 
computation of predictions, and would most certainly better account for the disparity of individual 
tastes. However, such analyses often require more demanding87 designs (e.g. besUworst 
designs), as there is a need to collect a lot of information for each survey respondent. Finally, so 
far, such designs have mainly been developed for unlabelled experiments. 
a1 Both in terms of sample size and challenges to administer them in a simple manner. 
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7 .5. Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the interest of stated choice preferences for the design of policy 
interventions. This is a particularly appealing tool in a resource-constrained setting, as such 
surveys are relatively cheap and easy to carry out, and most important, provide useful information 
that can help policy-makers tackle some of the key HR problems. 
However, the analysis presented here is limited in two ways. First, as the model only pertains to 
the nurses' decision to take a job or not, its predictive capacity is limited to the immediate effects 
of policy decisions. This leaves the question of how long they would remain in their rural job 
unanswered. In other words, the modelling predicts short-term outcomes of job preference but not 
the long-term distribution of nurses. Second, in order to make an informed choice between 
alternative interventions, policy-makers need to know the cost implications of their various 
options. Computing the costs of most interventions presented here also requires predicting how 
many nurses still work in rural areas after a few years. Indeed, some of the incentives provide 
some differed benefits (e.g. study leave after two years, promotion after one year). The next 
chapter takes up this question and sets out to build a model upon the simulated probabilities that 
predicts the distribution of nurses on the labour market over time. 
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Chapter 8 · Projecting the long-term effects of HR 
interventions 
8.1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, a stated preference method was used to predict the potential effects of policy 
interventions on the location chosen by nurses. Those predictions can only simulate the 
immediate impact of those policies, through the predicted probabilities of taking up a job in a rural 
area. Yet, future consequences of those policies should also be taken into consideration. Indeed, 
some of the policy interventions simulated have distant implications that could have an impact on 
the future distributions of nurses. For example, allowing nurses to obtain study leave earlier will, 
ceteris paribus, decrease the number of nurses working in rural areas sooner (i.e. during their 
year of training). It is also likely that if a large proportion of nurses who choose to specialise leave 
the public sector to work in the private sector where more lucrative opportunities are available. 
Hence policy interventions that look effective in the short run, might not be so effective in the long 
run. 
Furthermore, to be able to carry out a cost-effectiveness study based on the simulated effects of 
various policies, it is essential to go beyond the immediate effects, considering that the costs of 
the incentives offered are not necessarily incurred immediately. In particular the education and 
promotion incentives both contain the seeds of future costs for governments, which can only be 
more accurately assessed by modelling the future distribution of nurses. 
Finally, as underlined in the presentation of the choice experiment, the predicted market shares 
assume that all nurses in the sample will have chosen to work in the public sector. But it is 
evident that in South Africa this assumption does not hold, considering that currently half of the 
nursing population work in the private sector. Therefore, to be able to model the effects of the HR 
policies and understand their repercussions on the overall distribution of nurses at the national 
level, one should use a framework that would better mimic the structure of the labour market and 
not be restricted to the public sector. 
To better predict the effectiveness of HR policies, one should be able to forecast the future 
distribution of nurses across segments of the South African health care job market over time. To 
do so, one needs to model the movements of nurses from one segment of the health care job 
market to another. In the literature on manpower planning (Bartholomew et al., 1991 ), most of the 
models used to predict the flows of individuals within the structure of a dynamic system are based 
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on Markov models. This chapter presents the construction of a Markov model designed to predict 
the dynamics of the labour market for nurses. 
8.2. Using a Markov model to model the effects of HR policies 
8.2.1. Model structure and data 
Markov models, commonly used in the study of the dynamic evolution of diseases, are basically 
constructed on the following elements (Sonnenberg and Beck, 1993): 
A set of mutually exclusive (health) states (here the health care labour market); 
An initial distribution of individuals across the various states of the model (initial 
probabilities); 
A transition probability matrix that determines movements between one state to another over 
time; 
An absorbing state (typically death). 
The cycle length; 
The first step in the construction of a Markov model is to determine the various states of the 
model. In the present application, the definition of the various states was governed by the need to 
mimic the health care labour market and, within it, predict correctly the presence of nurses in rural 
posts. Considering the current distribution of South African nurses (see Chapter 4), there were 
four obvious segments of the health care labour markets that seemed to encompass the large 
majority of nurses' positions: public rural, public urban, private and overseas. In addition, some 
nurses decide to leave the labour market, voluntarily (for example to take up a position as a 
nursing lecturer) or because they retire or die. This state can be assumed to be an absorbing 
state, which means that once nurses enter it, they no longer move back to any of the other 
segments of the health care labour marketsa. 
Finally, because the population of interest consists of professional nurses, there is one last 
element to consider: the fact that a non negligible proportion of nurses will choose to specialise, 
through a one-year training course. Neglecting this flow would overestimate the presence of 
nurses in the other various sectors, as, by definition, when nurses do specialise, they are no 
longer in post. 
In summary, the Markov model used here included six states: public rural, public urban, private, 
overseas, study leave (training) and exit. The diagram below summarises these various states. 
88 Although this assumption is probably not realistic, it is used here to make the model tractable. 
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Figure 8.1: Markov model structure 
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The next key parameter in the Markov model was the initial distribution of individuals across the 
various segments of the model. Although there were some data on the current distribution of 
nurses across some of these segments, this distribution represented the result of the 
accumulated flows and movements of nurses over time. It might provide some indication of the 
current equilibrium of the system, but it did not necessarily provide any indication relative to the 
initial choices made by nurses when they graduate (unless one assumes that they never move, 
which is the very assumption the Markov model tries to avoid). 
In the absence of actual data on the choices made by nurses over time, and in particular at the 
beginning of their career, the stated preferences of the cohort of graduate nurses that are part of 
the present study are a good second best. Indeed, the choice experiment mimicking the current 
labour market conditions provides the predicted choices nurses would make between 
employment in the public sector, and private and overseas jobs. The second choice experiment 
(presented in the first half of this chapter) also provides specific elements on the allocation of 
nurses between rural and urban public jobs, under different policy simulations. Under the (very 
plausible) assumption that no one is either training to specialise or already out of the nursing 
labour market just after the graduation, these stated preference results provide the elements to 
compute the initial probabilities (for a more detailed discussion of the assumptions made by the 
use of such data, please refer to the appropriate section below). 
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The final set of parameters in a Markov model is the matrix containing the probabilities of moving 
between different states of the system, i.e. the transition probabilities. In the present application to 
the labour market, estimating the actual transitions between the states identified was not possible 
because of the lack of accurate data on human resources in South Africa. Therefore a number of 
assumptions were made and are described below. 
To finish, it was assumed in this model that each cycle lasts for one year. This seemed a 
reasonable assumption to make, as it fit with the main career stages of a nurse in the public 
sector (promotions and salary scales are based on a yearly calendar), as well as the length of the 
post-basic training courses. 
8.2.2. Parameters of the Markov model 
A. Initial distribution of individuals 
The first step in a Markov model is to determine the initial distribution of individuals across the 
different states before the first cycle starts. The starting point of the model corresponds to the 
entry of Professional Nurses in the labour market, after their graduation, when they make a 
decision about their first employment position. It was assumed that no nurse has yet left the 
labour market or gone on study leave. While the latter assumption is quite obvious, it could be 
argued that the former one is less evident. However, for simplification purposes, and because 
there is a shortage of nurses in the labour market, we assumed that initially no graduating nurse 
would leave the market (or die). 
As noted above, this initial distribution was modelled as a two-step decision rule, as presented in 
the figure below. Upon graduation, nurses decide to work in the public sector, in the private sector 
or overseas. The results of the DCE presented in Chapter 6 were used to allocate individuals 
between public jobs (aggregated) and private and overseas positions. Once the choice of taking 
up a public position is made, individuals are then influenced in their allocation between rural or 
urban jobs by the prevailing conditions in those jobs. The result of the second DCE (Chapter 7) 
were used to model the distribution between the two public job alternatives. 
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Figure 8.2: Summary of the initial decision model 
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Formally, the initial distribution across the five states of the Markov model is: 
Noverseas= No= P1 x N where P1 is the market share obtained from Table 6.13 
NPrivate = Np = P2 x N where P2 is the market share obtained from Table 6.13 
As a result: 
NPublic = Npu = P3 X N = (1- P1- P2) X N 
Then it follows: 
Nurban = Nu = (P(Urban) I P3) x N = (P31 x P3) x N where P31 is obtained from Table 7.5 
NRural = Nr = (P(Rural) I P3) x N = (P32 x P3) x N where P31 is obtained from Table 7.5 
This approach applied in all instances, that is for the base scenario (corresponding to the current 
market conditions), or whether it simulates the distributional effects of a possible HR policy. If it is 
fairly reasonable to think that this 2-step approach can hold for the base scenario (as both the 
first and second stated choice experiments used are supposed to reflect the current market 
conditions). However, the modelling is less obvious in a case where the second choice 
experiment departs from the current market conditions. Indeed, the underlying assumption of this 
two-step decision-making model is that the initial choice between public and other positions is 
independent from the prevailing working conditions in the two public jobs, therefore unaffected by 
a change in those working conditions. In other words, the policies to attract nurses to rural public 
positions are assumed not to have an effect on the probability of choosing a position overseas or 
in a private facility. Although this remains a restrictive assumption, the results of policy 
simulations presented in Chapter 6 (see Table 6.13) suggested that the cross-elasticity between 
public jobs is quite high, while substitution patterns between public jobs and private or overseas 
ones are much less significant. 
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B. Decomposition of the transition matrix 
Given the six states of the model described in Figure 8.1, there are four groups of parameters in 
the transition matrix, which determines the movements of individuals between states. 
The first parameter of the Markov model is the exit rate (E), defined as the proportion of 
individuals, in any state, who leave the nursing labour market, either because they die, retire or 
decide to give up work as a nurse. For simplification purposes, it is assumed that this rate is the 
same for all working states in the Markov model. Another hypothesis is that this rate varies over 
time. Therefore a unique exit rate Et is defined for a given cycle t. 
The second set of parameters relate to the training uptake rates (TU). They are defined as the 
proportion of nurses currently working who decide to specialise, and as a result join the "training" 
state for one cycle. Similarly to the retention rates, the probability of specialising changes over 
time. Consequently for nurses in a given state i during period t of the model, the training rate is 
noted TUit. 
A set of parameters then determines the destination of nurses after they have specialised -the 
post-training destination rates (PT; ). By definition, nurses can only go into one of the four 
'working' states of the model after they have trained - they do not exit the labour market nor do 
they keep on training. Therefore for a given class of nurses who specialise, they are divided into 
the ones who take a position in a rural area in the public sector (PTr), those who decide to work 
in urban areas in the public sector (PTu), those who choose the private (PTp) sector and those 
who emigrate (PTa). By definition, the four proportions sum to one (PTa+ PTp + PTu + PTr =1). 
For simplification purposes, it is assumed that these preferences remain constant over time. 
Considering the structure of the model, those individuals who do not exit the nursing labour 
market or decide to specialise, can only decide to remain in the state where they are or take a 
nursing job in one of the three other "working" states. Therefore, the next important set of 
parameters is the turnover rates {T), defined as the probability for an individual who is currently in 
a working state to leave for another working state in the next cycle. Therefore, by definition, the 
proportion of nurses who remain in their current working employment (sometimes called retention 
rate) is equal to 1-T. For the other four states, it is assumed that the probability of a nurse to 
remain in a particular state varies over time (more details on this assumption will be given below). 
Therefore for a particular state i and a given period t the retention rate is noted 1-Tic· 
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The final set of parameters is given by the mobility rates (Mij}, defined as the proportion of 
individuals who will move from a working state i to another working state j. This proportion is 
obtained by multiplying the turnover rate for a particular working state i {Tit), by the proportion of 
leavers from that state i who choose to work in working state j. The latter proportions are called 
the destination rates {dj}. 
Mijt= Tit X dij 
To simplify, it is assumed that the destination rates dij remain constant over time. In other words, 
when working in a given sector, a nurse is always attracted in the same way by job opportunities 
in the other three sectors if they decide to leave. Yet, because Tit varies with time, in the end the 
mobility rates vary with time as well. By definition, all destination rates sum to one, meaning 
therefore: 
'Vi I dij = 1 
j 
Table 8.1: Summary of transition matrix parameters 
Destination Rural Urban 
public public Private Ori in 
Rural public 1-Trt Mrut Mrpt 
Urban public Murt 1-Tut Mupt 
Private Mpr Mput 1-Tpt 
Overseas Mort Mout Mopt 
Training PTr PTu PTp 
Exit 0 0 0 
Overseas Training Exit 
Mrot TUrt Et 
Muot TUut Et 
Mpot TUpt Et 
1-Tot TUot Et 
PTa 0 0 
0 0 1 
Table 8.1 summarises the various parameters that determine the movements of individuals in the 
Markov model. The rural public sector is noted r, the urban public sector is noted u, the private 
one is noted p, and finally o denotes the overseas destination. 
The following section presents in detail the data sources and assumptions that were used to 
determine each of these parameters. 
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8.2.3. Defining transition matrix parameters 
A. Exit rates 
Given the absence of data that can provide such information, some assumptions have to be 
made. First, as stated before, the proportion of nurses leaving the labour market can be assumed 
to be the same across origin states. Indeed, retirement and mortality rates should be roughly the 
same across all sectors, and nurses should also have equal opportunities to move on towards 
more senior and administrative functions as their experience increases. Second, as noted before, 
the probability of leaving the nursing labour market, and in particular to retire or die, is clearly an 
increasing function of time. To model the exit rate, it is easier to model its complement, the 
probability of remaining in the labour market, as a simple exponential function of time: 
Ec =1- e-At 
Due to the lack of data, as well as the complexity of the model dynamics, defining a value of A is 
not straightforward. To do so, assumptions are based on post-hoc observations of the model 
predictions. In other words, given some available information, some a priori assumptions can be 
formed on the proportion of nurses who will have left the nursing labour market after 40 years. 
Overall, it is safe to assume that by the time a given cohort reaches the end of the model time 
horizon (40 years), the quasi-totality of the initial generation of nurses should have retired, died or 
stopped working as a nurse (nurses do not start their career as professional nurses before the 
age of 25 years, while the retirement age is 65 years old}. 
Figure 8.3: Evolution of the proportion of working nurses leaving the labour market each 
year (exit rate) over time 
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Using the Markov model, the parameter A was adjusted so that at the end of the model, about 
95% of nurses have left the nursing labour market. This is achieved for A =0.0025. The resulting 
exit rate is plotted in the Figure 8.3. 
B. Training uptake rates 
In the absence of data on the proportion of students specialising each year, some facts were 
gathered to try and approximate the shape of the training uptake curves, defined as the evolution 
over time of the turning uptake rate for a given cohort. An interview realised with people in charge 
of post-basic training in Gauteng provided a number of elements to base the assumptions of the 
model. 
First, the interview provided some clarifications about key 'structural' facts: 
The vast majority of students who attend post-basic courses in nursing colleges are from the 
public sector (either rural or urban areas). From this information, it can be assumed for 
simplification purposes that TUpc=O and TUac=O Vt. 
From the interviews it was found that it is more difficult to obtain study leave and therefore to 
specialise when working in a rural area89. Therefore it can be assumed that TUrc < TUut. 
Second, information gathered in the interview provided some useful elements to determine the 
shape of training uptake rates over time: 
Nurses cannot specialise before they have completed two years of work. This means that for 
t=O and t=l, TUu=O and TUr=O. 
Most nurses specialise between five to 10 years into their career. Applications for 
specialised training decreases with age, but they are never totally non-existent (older nurses 
aged 50 to 60 years have also applied successfully for post-basic training). 
This means that the training uptake curve will be left-skewed, and therefore suggests that 
the training uptake function follows a distribution similar to the lognormal distribution. 
Approximately 50% of a given class of nurses specialise at some point in time, the rest 
remaining in general nursing. This final element is used to calibrate the parameters of the 
function. 
B9 This lack of opportunities is partly due to geographical preference in post-basic training selection criteria that is 
detrimental for nurses from rural areas where there are fewer nursing colleges. For example in nursing colleges in 
Gauteng, they have to give priority to candidates from Gauteng province, although they train from the whole of the 
former Transvaal. Therefore they can only take a minority of students from the more rural areas (5-7%). 
219 
To account for these different constraints, the following functional form was used to mimic the 
evolution of the rate of training uptake from urban areas over time: 
V't > 1 
Where cp (x) is a normal density function with mean 11=0 and standard deviation a=0.7, defined 
as: 
1 (-xz) 
cp(x) = e 2cr2 
xa...f2rr 
(t-1) Therefore f 4 -Log-normal (11, a) with 11=0 and a=0.7 
These values of 11 and a were chosen to obtain the required shape for the curve. A brief 
graphical illustration of other coefficients can be found in Appendix 8.1. 
Because the basic functional form of a log-normal distribution cannot provide very well a training 
uptake curve corresponding to these specifications, some functional arrangements are used: 
t-
1 is used instead of t to allow the function to spreads nicely over the interval of interest, 
4 
which is tE [0;40], with a left-skewed distribution. 
a scaling factor 11 is introduced to decrease the training uptake rates by a proportional factor 
over the entire period. This parameter is set so that the uptake rates are not too high and 
therefore guarantee plausible estimates. The value of 11 is set to 11 =0.4 
Finally it is assumed that the rural training uptake is proportional to the urban training uptake: 
with y = 0.5 so that by construction there is two thirds of urban 
students for one third of rural students. With such parameters (and other assumptions presented 
in this chapter for the other base parameters), 49.6% of nursing students end up specialising. 
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The resulting training uptake curves are shown below. 
Figure 8.4: Evolution of post-basic training uptake in the public sector 
·----·------·-----·--·--
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C. Post-Training destination rates 
Next, one must define the post-training destination rates, which govern the destination of nurses 
who will have specialised. To simplify, it is hypothesised that nurses can choose between the four 
sectors of employments (rural, urban, private, overseas) but cannot leave the market at that 
stage. As noted earlier, it is also postulated that the career preferences of specialising nurses will 
not vary with age and experience. 
Based on information collected in nursing colleges and from the Department of Health, it was 
found that: 
The quasi-totality of nurses benefit from study leave to specialise; 
A student who gets study leave to specialise has to stay for at least one year in the public 
sector. 
To simplify, assume that all nurses who specialise benefit from study leave. The consequence is 
that after the training state, they enter a "tunnel state"90, composed of two sub-states: rural areas 
for the students initially coming from rural areas and urban areas for the others. 
go Individuals in that state cannot move to other states of the model 
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Once nurses get out of the tunnel state, they can make a decision where to work. These post-
training destination rates were defined based on the following information: 
Before the government decided to increase the salary of nurses, a large proportion of nurses 
who had specialised would go overseas or to the private sector for monetary reasons. The 
strong push in public salaries decided in 2007 seems to have rendered these two sectors 
seem less financially attractive. 
Nurses who have done a Primary Health Care specialty (which represent 15-20% of the 
class each year) would be likely to work in rural areas after their specialty, but others would 
be less likely to apply for a job there. 
Taking into account this information, the following assumptions are made: 
PTr=0.15 to reflect the proportion of nurses choosing a rural-oriented specialty; 
PTp=0.40 and PTu=0.35 to reflect the fact that the new salary structure in the public sector 
makes urban posts almost as attractive as private positions; 
PTa=O.l 0 to reflect the attractiveness of overseas positions after specialising, but 
accounting for the fact that the decision to emigrate still remains a minor option. 
D. Turnover rates 
In the absence of any observational data to identify the average retention rates of nurses in each 
of the four working states of the Markov model, turnover rates had to be approximated based on 
a series of information. 
First, based on the standard theoretical framework and stylised facts on nursing turnover 
developed in the health care literature (Price, 1997, Tai et al., 1998, Antonazzo et al., 2003, 
Hayes et al., 2006), it was assumed that retention rates would be based on the evidence 
available on intentions to leave and job satisfaction (Hall, 2004, Uys et al., 2004, Walker and 
Gilson, 2004, Erasmus and Brevis, 2005, Penn-Kekana et al., 2005, Lephoko et al., 2006, 
Thutse, 2006, Xego, 2006, Klaas, 2007, Mavhandu-Mudzusi et al., 2007, Mokoka, 2007, Pillay, 
2009), as well as what is known of the distribution of health personnel in South Africa at the time 
of the study: 
Working conditions are better in the private than the public sector (Pillay, 2009), so the 
probability of leaving one's job when working in the private sector will be lower than in the 
public sector (therefore the retention rate will be higher in private jobs); 
Working conditions are more difficult in rural areas than elsewhere, where health personnel 
are reportedly less supported and have to cope with more difficult working conditions 
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(shortage of drugs and medical supply). Therefore the lowest retention rates should probably 
be for rural posts. 
A limited number of studies report that foreign nurses working in Anglophone countries are 
faced with difficulties. There is also anecdotal evidence suggesting that nurses who have left 
South Africa stay overseas for a few years and then come back with better experience 
(Breier et al., 2009). Therefore the retention rate in foreign positions will not be very high. 
The following inequality can therefore be hypothesised about the turnover rates on the four 
market segments: 
Tr > Tu > T0 > Tp 
Second, to anchor those values on some real estimates, some studies from the nursing literature 
quantifying retention rates were investigated (Jones, 1990, Gray and Phillips, 1994, Toyoshi-
Hamada, 2007, Chen et al., 2008, Christmas, 2008, Karlowicz and Ternus, 2009). These studies 
report annual turnover rates, ranging from 7.5% to 54% in the public sector. Yet, due to the 
variety of time frames and definitions used, it was difficult to use any particular number91. 
Nonetheless, this suggests that at the very least, half of the personnel would remain in post every 
year. 
As a first approximation, the following assumptions were formulated about the turnover rates on 
the four segments of the labour market for South African nurses: 
Tr= 0.20 
Tu= Ku * Tr With Ku =0. 90 therefore Tu = 0.18 (1) 
To= Ko * Tr With Ko =0.85 therefore To= 0. 17 (2) 
Tp= Kp * Tr with Kp =0. 75 therefore Tp = 0. 15 (3) 
The equalities (1) to (3) linking the turnover rates to each other are assumed to remain constant 
over time (see the evolution of departure rates over time in Figure 8.5): 
Tut= Ku * Trt, To= Ko * Tr and Tp= Kp * Tr 
Assuming constant retention rates would not be justified, as empirical evidence from labour 
economics and other social sciences show that departure rates are a decreasing function of the 
years of experience (Borjas, 2005). In other words, health workers are more likely to leave a job 
when they are young. To model this effect, and avoid a crude linear trend, the probability of 
leaving each state over time can be modelled as a smoothed exponential function92: 
Trt =ite-..1.zt 
91 Some studies refer to the turnover rate without further definition; others report the resignation rate, or the leaving 
rate. Overall it is difficult to ensure that the statistics provided actually measure the same phenomenon. 
92 Squaring the parameter f.. in the exponent provides a smoother effect. 
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with the parameter A-=0.2 defining the initial retention rate (for t=O),as defined above. 
Figure 8.5: Evolution of turnover rates over time 
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E. Destination rates 
The final parameters to be defined are the destination rates dij which determine the destination of 
nurses who leave their current working state for another working state. 
According to the few reliable data available, only a small proportion of South African nurses 
choose to emigrate, as reflected by the low rate of emigration (1-2% of nurses every year). It is 
likely that this flow originates mainly from nurses coming from urban areas, most likely from the 
private sector (nurses dissatisfied with their jobs in the public sector would first try to take up a job 
in the private sector). 
Furthermore, few nurses will decide to move to a position in rural areas when coming from any of 
the other three labour market segments if this choice was not made before, even less so for 
nurses returning from overseas - the only motive could be seeking a more rural lifestyle, or 
getting closer to one's family. 
Finally, it is possible to assume that the majority of nurses leaving rural areas (and public 
positions) might first do so through internal promotion in the public sector. Joining the private 
sector, which would constitute a double change (in living and working environment), might come 
at a later stage. 
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This series of hypotheses led to broad assumptions on the 'destination matrix' presented in Table 
8.2. 
Table 8.2: Distribution across possible destinations of nurses who leave their current 
working state 
--------------- Destination 
Origin --------
Rural public 
Urban public 
Private 
Overseas 
Rural 
public 
0.20 
0.15 
0.05 
Urban 
public 
0.50 
0.75 
0.10 
Private 
0.475 
0.75 
0.85 
F. Impact of policies on the model parameters 
Overseas 
0.025 
0.05 
0.10 
All model parameters presented above provided the structure of the base scenario, which was 
the situation modelling the current conditions in the labour market. This section explains why and 
how some parameters were modified under the new conditions defined by simulated policy 
interventions. 
Impact of policies on initial probabilities 
The first model parameter affected by the policy scenarios is the initial set of probabilities 
allocating nurses across the six states. As explained by the two-step decision-making model 
detailed in section 8.2.2, it is assumed that the initial breakdown between public and other jobs 
will not change (this hypothesis being made mainly because of lack of simultaneous data on all 
four labour market segments). Therefore, only the distribution between rural and urban jobs in the 
public sector will be affected by the change of working conditions conveyed by the new rural 
incentive policy. 
This new breakdown in the public sector is provided by the predicted probabilities relative to the 
new working conditions of interest (i.e. the rural job description corresponding to the policy 
package simulated), based on the DCE presented at the beginning of this chapter. 
Impact of policies on transition matrices 
Making the rural positions more attractive for nurses is likely to affect other parameters than just 
the initial probabilities of taking up a position in a rural area. Hence two other types of parameters 
that would be affected to reflect a greater attractiveness of rural public jobs: 
The willingness of nurses to leave their current positions to take up a position in a rural area 
could increase; 
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The retention rate of in rural positions could increase (or the turnover rate decrease). 
To simplify the model, the greater attractiveness of rural positions is assumed to only impact 
initial choices. In other words, if a nurse is not sensitive initially to the incentive package, there is 
no reason to be more attracted later. Therefore one assumes that the destination matrix 
established in Table 8.2 will remain unaffected by the various policy scenarios. 
However, the policies are likely to affect the propensity of nurses who chose to take up rural 
positions to stay in these rural positions. Because rural jobs are more attractive, it is reasonable 
to assume that, ceteris paribus, nurses will be less likely to leave. The increased attractiveness of 
the rural job is measured by the change in the proportion of nurses who initially take up rural 
positions, denoted r. Therefore, a simple modelling of changes in turnover rate over time could 
be: 
r;t = (1 - T) Trt 
where 1: is the policy effect, so that if the policy increases the initial probability of choosing rural 
areas by 50%, the turnover rate will be reduced by the same amount for each cycle. But this 
model is rather crude, because it assumes that the effect would be constant over time (while the 
benefits of the policy might seem less attractive after they have been in place for a few years). 
A more sophisticated option consists in modelling smoother effects, decreasing over time. Such 
effects can be modelled easily as follows: 
T;t = Trt X ( 1- T(l+~)) 
Where the exponentiated term ( 1 + ~) introduces the desired smoothed effect (see Figure 8.6). 
This modelling leaves one problem, arising when 1: > 1. In order to solve that issue, it is possible 
to rescale all the policy effects on an index comprised between 0 and 1. This is achieved by the 
following transformation of a given policy effect 'ts for scenario S: 
Ts 
r'- ----...,..-
s - (mr-x Ti +E) 
where (maxi ra ensures that all policy effects are rescaled according to the one policy that has 
the biggest effect. The additional term E is introduced to avoid having values of the recalibrated 
policy effects 1 ' too close to 1. Indeed, the closer,;' is to 1, the stronger the hysteresis effect on 
the turnover rate (see Appendix 8.2 for an illustration). Therefore, here E was set to E=0.5. 
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Figure 8.6: Impact of a policy intervention on rural turnover rates 
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Note: For a given distribution of the propensity of leaving over time (base curves), the graph represents the effects in 
rural areas of a policy that increases initial uptake of rural jobs by •=0.73, transformed into •'=0.33 
Impact of policies on the decision of nurses to specialise 
The last parameter that is likely to be affected by some policies is the proportion of nurses who 
decide to specialise. The decision to specialise is unlikely to be affected by most policy packages. 
For example, there is no reason why the provision of better housing would increase the 
willingness to specialise. Moreover, given that specialising relies on the availability of study 
leave93 only new structural conditions guaranteeing access to study leave (sooner or not) can 
affect the proportion of nurses who specialise. 
Therefore, only the policy packages that entail an "education component" guaranteeing study 
leave after two years in rural positions should see an increase in training uptake. It is assumed 
that the majority of nurses who choose rural positions with these education incentives do so to 
benefit from the training opportunity. It is thus assumed that the additional nurses who want to 
specialise after two years (in the education scenario compared to the baseline scenario) will 
equal the difference in the number of nurses who initially choose a rural career in the education 
scenario and the corresponding figure in the base scenario. Formally, if Nr(S) denotes the 
number of nurses initially choosing a rural post under the conditions offered by scenario S, then 
93 The vast majority of nurses coming from the public sector specialise only when they are offered study leave (due to 
lack of financial resources), as resigning from one's position and specialising with one's own resources is exceptional 
for nurses from the public sector. This represents probably less than 1% of all post-basic students according to the 
person in charge of training in a Gauteng nursing college. 
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for a given education package E there is an additional NT nurses who will specialise, with NT 
defined as follows: 
NT = 8 (Nr(E)- Nr (B)) 
where 8 is an adjustment factor accounting for the fact that not all nurses will eventually want to 
specialise or not all will obtain study leave. Assume for the time being that 8=0.85. 
G. Summary of parameters 
Table 8.3 summarises the assumptions made about each parameters, and recapitulates the 
value of some of the fixed parameters in the functions used. 
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Table 8.3: Summary of all parameters used in the Markov model 
Name Description 
Np 
No 
N,. 
Nu 
Initial distribution rates 
Number of nurses choosing the private sector 
Number of nurses choosing overseas 
Number of nurses choosing the rural public sector 
Number of nurses choosing the urban public sector 
Exit rate 
Et Proportion of nurses who die/retire/quit nursing 
Training uptake rates 
TUut Training uptake in urban areas 
TU,.t Training uptake in rural areas 
Post-Training destination rates 
PT,. Proportion of nurses choosing the private sector 
PTu Proportion of nurses choosing overseas 
PTp Proportion of nurses choosing the rural public sector 
PTo Proportion of nurses choosing the urban public sector 
Turnover rates 
T,.t Turnover rate in the rural public sector 
Tut Turnover rate in the urban public sector 
Tpr Turnover rate in the private sector 
Tot Turnover rate in overseas posts 
Destination rates from the rural public state 
dru Proportion of nurses leaving rural for urban posts 
drp Proportion of nurses leaving rural for private posts 
dro Proportion of nurses leaving rural for overseas posts 
Varying parameter or function 
Np=Nx P1 
No=NxP2 
N,.=N X (1-PrP2) X P,. 
Nu=N X {1-P1-P2) X Pu 
Er =e-At 
TUut= 11· <t> (tn e:1)] 'Vt > 1 
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TUrt = y TUut Vt > 1 
T _, -il.2t rt -Ae 
Tut= Ku * Trt 
Tot= Ko * T,-t 
Tpt= Kp * Trt 
Set parameters 
N=2000 
P1=0.28 and P2= 0.12 (from Table 6.13) 
P,. and Pu are found in Table 7.5, and vary 
according to policy scenarios 
A =0.0025 
TUuo = TUu1 =0 11=DA 
<f>(X)- N (J.!,a) with 11=0, a=0.7 
TUro = TUrl =0 
y=0.5 
PTr = 0.15 
PTu= 0.35 
PTp= 0.40 
PTa= 0.10 
}..=0.2 
Ku =0.90 
Ko=0.85 
Kp=0.75 
dru=0.50 
drp =0.475 
dro =0.025 
Destination rates from the urban public state 
dur Proportion of nurses leaving urban for rural posts 
dup Proportion of nurses leaving urban for private posts 
duo Proportion of nurses leaving urban for overseas posts 
Destination rates from the private state 
dpr Proportion of nurses leaving private for rural posts 
dpu Proportion of nurses leaving private for urban posts 
dpo Proportion of nurses leaving private for overseas posts 
Destination rates from the overseas state 
dar Proportion of nurses leaving overseas for rural posts 
dou Proportion of nurses leaving overseas for urban posts 
dop Proportion of nurses leaving overseas for private posts 
'ts 
T(t 
E 
e 
Impact of policies 
Increase in the proportion of nurses in rural areas in scenario s 
New turnover rate in rural areas in scenario s 
Adjustment factor to policy effect on turnover rate 
Proportion of additional nurses who will specialise 
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nS _ f>.B 
•r r 
Ts = f>.B 
T 
Tit= Trt [1-r~(t+f)] 
dur=0.20 
dup=0.75 
duo=0.05 
dpr=0.15 
dpu=0.75 
dpo=0.10 
dor=0.05 
dou=0.10 
dop=0.85 
' Ts T = 5 
m;:tXTi + E 
l 
E = 0.5 
e =0.9 
8.2.4. Model outputs 
A. Flows vs. stocks of nurses 
By definition, a Markov model forecasts the dynamics over time of a cohort of individuals, who 
can move through a defined number of states. If the predictions of such a model provide essential 
insights into the trickling-down effects of policies over the career of nurses, they do not give a 
clear picture of the likely equilibrium in the labour market. In other words, in addition to showing 
the career paths of a cohort of nursing graduates, one needs to predict the cumulative effects of 
the simulated policies by modelling a series of subsequent cohorts of graduating nurses, in order 
to obtain the long-term distributional effects of the policies in the labour market. 
Here the (strong) underlying assumption is that all graduating cohorts starting after the 
implementation of the policy reforms will be affected in exactly the same manner by the policies. 
In terms of modelling, this simply means that, to obtain the number of nurses who will be working 
in a particular state on a given year T, one needs to calculate the cumulative sum of the annual 
stocks of nurses as follows: 
Nr = ~T Nt 
Lt=O 
where Nt is the number of nurses predicted to be in the state of interest during cycle t of the 
Markov model. 
For example, after 3 years, three cohorts will have started: the first year, there are No nurses 
(from cohort 1) in rural areas, the second year there are No (from cohort 2) and N1 (from cohort 1) 
nurses in rural areas; and the third year there are No (from cohort 3) N1 (from cohort 2) and N2 
nurses (from cohort 1) overall in rural areas. 
Given that the Markov model was originally defined with a 40 year horizon, the distribution of 
stocks of nurses across the different labour segments will be calculated for T=40, or 40 cohorts 
that will have started working. All 4o simulated cohorts were set up to 2,000 nurses, which 
correspondents to a small increase in the current production of the South African education 
system. 
Finally, it should be noted that headcounts were used as outcome measures, not only because 
they were the obvious outputs of the models, but also because part-time work does not appear to 
be a relevant option in rural areas (where moonlighting is typically not possible due to the 
absence of private sector). Therefore using alternative measures such as Full-Time Equivalent 
would not have made sense. 
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B. Distribution of nurses in the health sector 
In this chapter the objective is to understand the impact of policies on the distribution of the 
nursing workforce between the different segments of the labour market. Various dimensions are 
interesting in this respect: 
The distribution of South African nurses across all four main career opportunities: overseas 
(No) , private sector in South Africa(Np), in public rural positions (Nr) and in public urban 
positions (Nu); 
The breakdown of the nursing workforce in the domestic labour market between the private 
sector (Np), the public sector in rural areas (Nr) and the public sector in urban areas (Nu); 
The rural (Nr) vs. urban divide (Np+Nu) within South Africa; 
The private (Np) vs. public divide (Nr+Nu) in the domestic labour market 
Therefore, the outcomes of interest of the Markov model will be the number of nurses in each of 
the four labour market segments. 
In addition, in order to capture the short-term and long-term effects of policy interventions, these 
measures are done at regular intervals in time: 
Nrt, Nut, Not and Npt fortE [0;5;10;15;20;25;30;35;40]. 
C. Probabilistic Sensitivity analysis 
Since a large number of assumptions were made to construct the Markov model, it is necessary 
to account for the uncertainty around the model parameters. The probabilistic sensitivity analysis 
(PSA) used here is concerned with parameter uncertainty only. This means that structural 
uncertainty, which relates to the assumptions imposed by the modelling framework presented 
here, is not accounted for. This PSA also treats the data as homogeneous, meaning that it does 
not account for heterogeneity in individuals' preferences and parameters. However, computing 
the results of a particular sub-group in the population (individuals with rural backgrounds) 
provides some insight into heterogeneity of results. 
To account for parameter uncertainty, the PSA follows standard assumptions to reflect the 
possible distribution of parameters, while accounting for probability constraints emerging from the 
model structure. Table 8.4 below summarises the different parameters accounted for in the PSA 
as well as the assumptions made. 
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Table 8.4: Summary of parameter distributions used in the probabilistic sensitivity analysis 
Name Description 
Initial distribution rates 
Pp Proportion of nurses choosing the private sector 
Po Proportion of nurses choosing overseas 
Ppu Proportion of nurses choosing the public sector 
Pr Proportion of nurses choosing the rural public sector 
Pu Proportion of nurses choosing the urban public sector 
Exit rate 
Et Proportion of nurses who die/retire/quit nursing 
Training uptake rates 
TUut Training uptake in urban areas 
TUrt Training uptake in rural areas as a proportion of urban training uptake 
Post-Training destination rates 
PTr Proportion of nurses choosing the private sector 
PTu Proportion of nurses choosing overseas 
PTp Proportion of nurses choosing the rural public sector 
PTo Proportion of nurses choosing the urban public sector 
Turnover rates 
Trt Turnover rate in the rural public sector 
Tut Turnover rate in the urban public sector 
Tpt Turnover rate in the private sector 
Tot Turnover rate in overseas posts 
Destination rates from the rural public state 
dru Proportion of nurses leaving rural for urban posts 
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Parameter value 
Pp= 0.36 
Po= 0.08 
Ppu=0.56 
P r varies for each scenario 
Pu =1- Pr 
A =0.0025 
Tj=0.4 
a=0.7 
y=O.S 
PT, = 0.15 
PTu= 0.35 
PTp= 0.40 
PTa= 0.10 
A.=0.2 
Ku=0.90 
Ko=0.85 
Kp=0.75 
dru=0.50 
Distribution in the PSA 
Dirichlet distribution 
Beta distribution 
Beta distribution 
Beta distribution 
Beta distribution 
Beta distribution 
Dirichlet distribution 
Beta distribution 
Beta distribution 
Beta distribution 
Beta distribution 
Dirichlet distribution 
drp Proportion of nurses leaving rural for private posts 
dro Proportion of nurses leaving rural for overseas posts 
Destination rates from the urban public state 
dur Proportion of nurses leaving urban for rural posts 
dup Proportion of nurses leaving urban for private posts 
duo Proportion of nurses leaving urban for overseas posts 
Destination rates from the private state 
dpr Proportion of nurses leaving private for rural posts 
dpu Proportion of nurses leaving private for urban posts 
dpo Proportion of nurses leaving private for overseas posts 
Destination rates from the overseas state 
dar Proportion of nurses leaving overseas for rural posts 
dou Proportion of nurses leaving overseas for urban posts 
dop Proportion of nurses leaving overseas for private posts 
Impact of policies 
e Proportion of additional nurses who will specialise 
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drp=0.475 
dro=0.025 
dur=0.20 
dup=0.75 
duo=0.05 
dpr=0.15 
dpu=0.75 
dpo =0.10 
dor=0.05 
dou=0.10 
dop=0.85 
e = o.9 
Dirichlet distribution 
Dirichlet distribution 
Dirichlet distribution 
Beta distribution 
Two types of parameter distribution are used: 
- Beta distributions for binomial data. This applies to any parameter that estimates the 
probability of a given event to occur (e.g. the probability of leaving a rural job each year). The 
parameter which is assumed to be equal to a given proportion p* can then be drawn from a 
beta distribution beta (a,~) where a=p* and ~=1- p*. 
- Dirichlet distributions for multinomial data. This distribution is used to model interdependent 
probabilities that model more than two events. Typically, transition probabilities that model the 
destination of a given group of individuals are such parameters. The Dirichlet distribution, 
which is a generalisation of the beta distribution, is then used to model these parameters 
(Briggs et al., 2006). 
All the results below represent the average outputs obtained from the 2,000 Monte-Carlo 
replications based on a random draw of each of the parameter in the model. 
8.3. Results 
8.3.1. Dynamics of nurses' career paths 
The following results describe the output of the Markov model projecting the distribution over time 
of nurses under the current working situation (with the target values of all parameters). These are 
important to understand as they provide the structural elements of the model. First the dynamic of 
a single cohort is described, and then the cumulative effects of 40 stacked cohorts are detailed. 
A. Dynamics for one cohort 
Figure 8.7 below provides a detailed account of the distribution of individuals across the six states 
of the model over the simulated 40 periods. Because some of the model parameters were 
calibrated to obtain the results below (e.g. the training uptake profile or the exit rate94), these 
results do not contain 'new' information. Yet, to understand the structure of the model, it is 
interesting to unpack the dynamics of the nursing workforce in each of the working states. 
94 In particular, the exit rate was adjusted so that at the end of the 40 time periods, less than 10% of nurses would 
still be on the nursing labour market. 
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Figure 8.7: Career paths of a cohort of nurses under baseline conditions 
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Three trends emerge. First, all working states except the private sector have their maximum 
number of nurses at the beginning of the period. This reflects the influence of the high turnover 
rates, and that the flow of leavers is not compensated by a higher flow of entrants (except in the 
private sector until the 8th period). Second, there is a sharper decrease in the number of nurses in 
rural and urban areas in the public sector around the 3rd period, induced by the uptake of 
specialised training. Third, this sharp outflow of nurses from rural and urban areas seems to feed 
into the private sector, as the number of nurses rises in this sector soon after the observed 
decrease in the public sector. 
These dynamics suggest that if the assumptions about turnover rates are correct, it is important 
to try and attract as many nurses as possible immediately after their graduation. Indeed, the long-
term dynamics suggest that there is no gain in the long run for rural areas, as outflows 
systematically dominates inflows. 
This effect is confirmed by Figure 8.8, which shows the same dynamics for a cohort of nurses 
who were offered a salary top-up of 30% for rural posts, compared to the baseline situation 
(represented in dotted lines for the three domestic job opportunities). Despite the short-term 
effects in the distribution of nurses (the proportion of nurses choosing rural posts increases from 
18.7% under 'normal' conditions to 27.4%), the graph shows that the increase in the presence of 
nurses in rural areas almost reverts back to the "baseline" situation after about 15 years. This 
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derives from the model assumption that turnover rates are initially lower in rural areas for some 
time (due to the policy effect modelled), and then gradually return to their baseline levels. 
Figure 8.8: Career paths of a cohort of nurses, when a 30% rural allowance is offered 
""'" ----·-------------- ""''"'""'"""''"''"""'""""'""" _______________________ '""'"'"''"''"""''"'"---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ' --------------- ----- --
2 ,0 0 0 ~----------------------- " "'""""""""""'""'""'"'"'''"'-"'"''"'"'""'""""- """"" '"" .. ,, 
~ ! Vl1,800 ¥ - -- --------------------·----- ,-
------·- --------------------------,.J'!' ___ _ 
... 
:::::1 
c 
4-1,600 
0 
..0 
z 1,400 
1,200 
1,000 
;#' 
" 
" 
1------------------ ;;"-"-- i = ::~:~·:::% "--------------------------------------------- -------------~-------------1 
/ 
Private +30% 
: ~ i-Overseas 
, ------- .,_ -,, -------- ------- ---- ------ -----------------------·-·---------------------~r----- --------------------------------------------------- -- - -- ·j 
~ !- -Exit 
::: r;:>::~:;;;. · · ·· :~~-~-~,~:=~~~-1 = :~·:~,':: ... ) 
•••••• ~ ""' ! ...... Urban (base) 
400 ---------------------------------:~~ -----1-- · · · · · Private (base) 
200 
1 11 21 31 Periods 41 
The graph also displays the crowding-out effect of rural incentives on the uptake of public urban 
posts. This dynamic, particularly salient at the beginning of the model, is a direct consequence of 
the structure of the Markov model (which assumes an independence between choosing public 
jobs or not). In contrast, the crowding out effect that is observed on the uptake of private jobs is 
an indirect effect of rural incentives, as it is a consequence of the lower attractiveness of urban 
positions (fewer nurses in urban posts leaving their public jobs for private ones). 
B. Dynamics for forty cohorts 
As noted before, a cohort fails to provide an adequate perspective on the equilibrium of the labour 
market. This is obtained through the analysis of the cumulated effects of successive (identical) 
cohorts of nurses. Figure 8.9 presents this result for the base model, the long-term equilibrium in 
the labour market, through a graphic presentation of the distribution of nurses across the six 
states of the Markov model over time. This graph underlines the importance of anticipating the 
long-term effects of attrition of the nursing workforce due to voluntary or involuntary exit from the 
nursing profession. It also provides some clearer vision of the long-term imbalance between the 
different working states. Based on this output, it is possible to calculate the distribution of new 
nurses trained in South African across the four main employers (see Figure 8.1 0). 
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Figure 8.9: Distribution of nurses from 40 successive cohorts in the different states of the 
Markov model 
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Figure 8.10: Distribution of nurses in the international labour market 
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Figure 8.10 indicates that after 40 years of producing successive generations of nurses who 
respond in the same fashion to the job offers95, the majority of working nurses are in the private 
sector (46%), followed by the public sector in urban areas (31.4%), in public areas (about 13%) 
and lastly overseas positions (9.5%). This result contrasts with the initial distribution of nurses at 
95 Under baseline conditions. 
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the beginning of the model, where nurses were almost equally distributed between the three 
domestic options. 
Similar outcomes can be computed for each policy, putting the results of the DCE presented in 
the last chapter into the broader context of the labour market. 
8.3.2. Effects of rural incentives in the broader labour market context 
The first advantage of building the Markov model is that it places the policy levers into the 
broader context of the labour market dynamics. Table 8.5 shows the distribution of nurses in the 
labour market immediately after the implementation of various policies. Compared to the results 
presented in the previous chapter, the policy levers attract fewer nurses to rural areas since the 
modelling here takes into account other job opportunities (private or overseas positions). The 
most effective policy only increases the proportion of nurses in rural posts up to 39.3% (in the 
domestic labour market), and ten out of 19 policies increase that proportion to more than 30%. 
The identical proportions of nurses in private and overseas jobs underline the assumption made 
in the model that public and private career choices are independent (see Figure 8.2). Otherwise, 
the results concur with previous results: the most effective policies are the packages that include 
study leave and salary increases. 
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Table 8.5: Average distribution of nurses immediate!~ after policy implementation, ranked in ascending order of rural post uptake 
Policy ID Rural incentives Domestic market International market 
Rural Urban Private Rural Urban Private Overseas 
Base Base scenario (no incentive) 
21.22% 46.45% 32.32% 18.69% 40.90% 28.46% 11.95% 
#1 Promoted after 1 year in post 21.62% 46.05% 32.32% 19.04% 40.55% 28.46% 11.95% 
#2 2-bedroom house 22.69% 44.99% 32.32% 19.98% 39.61% 28.46% 11.95% 
#3 Car allowance of R500/month 25.47% 42.21% 32.32% 22.43% 37.16% 28.46% 11.95% 
#4 Quick promotion + car allowance 25.91% 41.76% 32.32% 22.82% 36.77% 28.46% 11.95% 
#5 Better housing + car allowance 27.18% 40.50% 32.32% 23.93% 35.66% 28.46% 11.95% 
#6 1 0% rural allowance 27.21% 40.47% 32.32% 23.96% 35.63% 28.46% 11.95% 
#7 Quick promotion + 1 0% salary increase 27.67% 40.01% 32.32% 24.36% 35.23% 28.46% 11.95% 
#8 Study leave in 2 years 28.49% 39.18% 32.32% 25.09% 34.50% 28.46% 11.95% 
#9 20% rural allowance 29.57% 38.10% 32.32% 26.04% 33.55% 28.46% 11.95% 
#10 Quick promotion + 20% salary increase 30.00% 37.68% 32.32% 26.42% 33.17% 28.46% 11.95% 
#11 30% rural allowance 31.08% 36.59% 32.32% 27.37% 32.22% 28.46% 11.95% 
#12 1 0% salary increase + car allowance 31.64% 36.03% 32.32% 27.86% 31.73% 28.46% 11.95% 
#13 Better housing + car all. + 10% increase 33.23% 34.44% 32.32% 29.26% 30.33% 28.46% 11.95% 
#14 20% salary increase + car allowance 33.64% 34.04% 32.32% 29.62% 29.97% 28.46% 11.95% 
#15 Study leave soon + car allowance 34.17% 33.50% 32.32% 30.09% 29.50% 28.46% 11.95% 
#16 Better housing + car all. + 20% increase 35.05% 32.62% 32.32% 30.86% 28.73% 28.46% 11.95% 
#17 Study leave soon + 1 0% increase 36.13% 31.55% 32.32% 31.81% 27.78% 28.46% 11.95% 
#18 Study leave soon + 10% increase + car all. 37.74% 29.94% 32.32% 33.23% 26.36% 28.46% 11.95% 
#19 Stud~ leave soon+ 20% increase 39.29% 28.38% 32.32% 34.60% 24.99% 28.46% 11.95% 
Note: results obtained from 2,000 Monte-Carlo simulations. 
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8.3.3. Long-term effects of policy interventions 
This section presents the main expected output from the Markov model: the long-term effects of 
HR policies. 
A. Downstream interventions 
The results of the effects of downstream interventions over time (with the cumulative effect of 
cohorts) are summarised in Figure 8.11, which shows the proportion of nurses in the domestic 
labour market who are in post in rural areas (all data can be found in Appendix 8.3). 
Three facts emerge from the results summarised by Figure 8.11. 
First, time erodes the positive effects of policy interventions. For all nineteen policy interventions 
(and the base scenario) the proportion of nurses present in rural areas decreases over time. 
Second, the hierarchy in policy effectiveness changes over time. In particular, if education 
policies are particularly effective at the beginning of the cycle, they are less effective in the long 
run. This is a consequence of the adverse effects of education policies. Indeed, although new 
graduates are attracted in rural areas, once they obtain their study leave and specialise, the 
majority are likely to move away from rural areas and take up positions in urban areas or in the 
private sector (see section 8.2.3.C in this chapter on the post-training destination rates). 
Third, although there are some clear differences in the policy effects in the short run (there are 
17.7 percentage points of difference between the least and most effective policies at the 
beginning), these disparities are less important in the long run (the same gap is only of 9.8 
percentage points). 
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Figure 8.11: Proportion of nurses in rural iobs in the domestic labour market, at 10-year intervals, for the 19 simulated policies 
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B. Upstream interventions 
Similar results can be computed for upstream policy interventions, which involve intervening 
before the entry of nurses on the labour market, here through the selection of more graduate 
nurses likely to choose rural posts (see Chapters 2 and 7). 
The modelling of upstream interventions hinges on a change in the initial distribution of nurses 
across the four states of the model. The new distributions are obtained by running new 
simulations with both DCEs with a sub-sample of the population, as explained in section 
7.3.3.896. 
Table 8.6: Average distributions of nurses in the labour market with different population 
structures (under current circumstances), with cumulated cohorts 
Rural Urban Private Overseas 
Original sample (46.9% rural) 
Initial distribution 18.69% 40.90% 28.46% 11.95% 
Distribution after 1 0 years 14.83% 32.98% 41.83% 10.36% 
Distribution after 20 years 13.45% 31.14% 45.42% 10.00% 
Distribution after 30 years 13.12% 31.26% 45.95% 9.67% 
Distribution after 40 years 13.04% 31.40% 46.02% 9.54% 
Sample #3 (75% rural) 
Initial distribution 22.71% 36.93% 28.20% 12.16% 
Distribution after 1 0 years 16.53% 31.52% 41.51% 10.44% 
Distribution after 20 years 14.47% 30.29% 45.20% 10.04% 
Distribution after 30 years 13.96% 30.56% 45.76% 9.71% 
Distribution after 40 years 13.83% 30.75% 45.85% 9.57% 
Sample #4 (100% rural) 
Initial distribution 26.16% 33.56% 28.13% 12.15% 
Distribution after 1 0 years 18.00% 30.30% 41.30% 10.40% 
Distribution after 20 years 15.35% 29.59% 45.05% 10.01% 
Distribution after 30 years 14.69% 29.99% 45.64% 9.68% 
Distribution after 40 years 14.51% 30.21% 45.73% 9.55% 
Note: average results obtained from 2,000 Monte-Carlo simulations 
As expected, the results in Table 8.6 indicate that selecting more individuals from rural 
backgrounds increases the proportion of nurses in rural areas in the short run as seen in Chapter 
7, but also in the long run, although that benefit decreases with time. There would be an increase 
by 4 percentage points in the uptake of rural posts if 75% of nurses were from rural origins (that 
increase drops to less than 1 percentage point after 30 years). 
ss Simulations of the "policy" DCE for each sub-sample are found in Chapter?· Simulati.ons for the "labour market" 
DCE (presented in Chapter 6) with different population structures can be found m Appendix 8.4. 
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Interestingly, increasing the proportion of rural nurses from about 50% (the current proportion in 
the sample) to 75% is a more effective way to increase the number of nurses in rural areas after 
10 years than offering a car allowance a better housing or a quicker promotion (see Figure 8.12). 
Similarly, selecting only individuals from rural backgrounds is more effective than many 
incentives, including offering study leave sooner. This suggests that upstream measures could be 
effective to increase the number of rural nurses. This point will be discussed further in the next 
chapter. 
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Figure 8.12: Proportion of nurses in rural jobs in the domestic labour market, at 10-year intervals, for the 19 downstream policies and two upstream 
policies 
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8.4. Discussion 
8.4.1. Summary and discussion of the results 
This chapter presented an innovative use of Markov models that was built upon the predicted 
probabilities of two choice experiments to infer the long-term effects of policy interventions in the 
labour market, accounting for the movements of individuals from one sector to another. The 
objective of the chapter was to build the model in detail and reflect on the methodology, rather 
than scrutinise the comparative strengths of the different interventions. However a few results 
emerge from the model. 
Overall, the modelling of policy interventions underline the importance of considering long-term 
effects as well as immediate ones, to account for potential adverse effects. First, the effects of 
policy interventions to attract staff to rural areas wane over time. Due to movements across 
sectors, and in particular the low retention of staff in rural areas hypothesised in the model, most 
positive effects disappear after ten years after initiation of the policy. As a result of this erosion 
effect, the ranking of policy options according to their effectiveness evolves over time. For 
example, if education policies are particularly effective at the beginning of the cycle, they are less 
effective in the long run. Similarly, the absolute difference in effectiveness between alternative 
policy options diminishes over time. In the few results presented, although their effects decrease 
over time, salary increases and education opportunities are the most effective options to increase 
the number of nurses in rural posts. The results also show that some upstream interventions 
(selecting more individuals from rural areas) are more effective that other simple downstream 
incentives. 
This is the first study in the health care literature that tries to predict the effects of different HR 
interventions on the uptake of rural jobs, but also on the distribution of health workers between 
different sectors over time. If some DCE studies have been able to comment on the likely effect of 
policy interventions to increase the uptake of rural positions (Blaauw et al., 2010, Kolstad, 2010), 
there are too many differences to compare their results to this study. First, unlike the work 
presented here, these two DCE studies have not taken into account the impact of other job 
opportunities available in the labour market, thereby over-estimating the uptake of rural posts. 
Second, the other major contribution of this work is to have used a (series of aggregated) Markov 
model to assess the effects of policy interventions on the distribution of health workers between 
different sectors over time. To summarise, the modelling presented in this chapter proposes a 
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novel use of stated preference outputs, as it seeks to extend the simulation capacity of these 
tools to inform the long-term effects of policy interventions in the labour market. 
By computing the movements of health personnel in the short and long-term, Markov models can 
be seen as innovative tools for researchers and policy-makers to better understand and predict 
staffing dynamics and shortages, in addition to their more standard applications. They do not 
require sophisticated computing skills, as everything can be relatively easily modelled in Excel. 
Combined with DCEs, they can assess the effectiveness of policy levers to increase the 
availability of nurses in rural areas. This analysis could easily be combined with cost estimates of 
policy interventions to produce an assessment of the cost-effectiveness of different options. 
8.4.2. Limitations 
The methods employed in this chapter present a number of limitations that might affect the quality 
and reliability of the presented findings. 
First, a number of simplifying assumptions had to be made to model the effects of different policy 
scenarios. One structural limitation of the Markov model is the assumption of independence of 
choices made between the public jobs and others. This hypothesis was imposed by the stated 
preference data available on the effects of policy interventions97. An alternative would be to 
assume some cross-elasticity rates between different employers. Yet, this would have required 
making further 'educated guesses' as to what these rates might have been, given that existing 
data sources in South Africa would not have provided any indication of their real value. Another 
structural limitation of the model is the fact that 'everything else remains equal' for non rural jobs 
in the policy simulation. For example nothing changes in the working conditions offered in private 
and overseas jobs, or if they do the changes do not affect the proportion of nurses choosing 
these jobs. Although this simplification can be seen as unrealistic, it enables the isolation of the 
effects of rural incentives and their consequences. 
Second, whilst the model outputs are greatly influenced by some key parameters of the Markov 
model, there is a lot of uncertainty surrounding the reliability of these parameters. Some 
parameters of the Markov model are particularly critical in the model outputs. For example, the 
influence of turnover rates and destination matrices is critical in the determination of nurses' long-
term movements. Similarly, the effects of the policies modelled are composed of three cumulative 
effects: the increase in initial rural post uptake (determined by the DCE prediction), the decline in 
97 See preceding chapter for a more extensive discussion on that limitation. 
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turnover rates in rural areas by some decreasing rate (linked to the DCE output), and sometimes 
the increase in training uptake. Therefore by construction the model outputs partly depend on the 
one hand on the quality (or reliability) of the assumptions made about various model parameters, 
and on the other hand on the validity of DCE predictions. Until further research is carried out (see 
below), there are unanswered questions about the reliability of the DCE predictions on the one 
hand (for a longer discussion of the latter issue, see section 7.4.2 in the last chapter) and of some 
of the model assumptions on the other hand. To address this problem and account for the 
uncertainty around these model parameters, a probabilistic sensitivity analysis (PSA) was used, 
and the results presented are the average obtained from 2,000 simulations. Although the results 
presented here did not specifically present that level of uncertainty (the next chapter uses that 
feature more clearly), the PSA contributes to address that limitation. 
Third, even though the PSA tried to account for the uncertainty of the model parameters, two 
sources of uncertainty were not well accounted for. First, some effects of structural uncertainty 
(relating to the assumptions of the model) were left unexplored. In particular, one did not 
investigate the effect of the strong assumption that policy interventions did not have an effect on 
the initial uptake of private and overseas jobs. Second, the heterogeneity in respondents' 
preferences was only moderately investigated. Heterogeneity of preferences was somewhat 
investigated through the DCE analysis, which emphasised the differences in taste of nurses with 
rural origins. This information was not directly incorporated in the generic Markov model, but 
instead separate simulations were run with hypothetical populations made up of different rural-
urban distributions. Yet overall, estimates of the model do not adequately account for 
heterogeneity in preferences. 
Fourth, the Markov model relied on a simplified structure, which obviously limits its ability to 
model reality. One of these simplified features is that the Markov model is not an individual-level 
simulation model. Therefore its ability to account for preference heterogeneity is limited. Another 
structural limitation of the model is the assumption made that each of the successive cohorts will 
behave exactly in the same manner as the first one. This means that the policies have the same 
effects for the graduates who enter the labour market 30 years after the policy was introduced as 
they had the first time they were implemented. Obviously, this assumption is unlikely to be 
correct, as preferences are likely to be adaptive and to follow some form of ratchet effect, where 
individuals revise their expectations based on past conditions. 
Finally, due to the absence of data a large number of assumptions had to be made, without much 
more insight than the informed opinions of key individuals. This comes from the absence of 
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available evidence from routine information systems or personnel databases, such as the 
turnover rates or the proportion of nurses who leave rural areas after one compulsory year 
following their specialty training. Therefore, the dearth of existing data on nurses' distribution and 
career choice dynamics weakens the evaluation of long-term effects of policy interventions, as 
one relies on educated guesses to compute the transition rates between the private and public 
sectors. Despite these caveats, it is important to highlight that all these assumptions were built as 
much as possible on existing information or data collected in interviews, so that the 'guesses' 
would be as educated as possible. In addition, as mentioned before, uncertainty around the 
parameter estimates was accounted for with the use of sensitivity analysis. 
8.4.3. Implications for policy and research 
A. Implication for policy 
The results presented here have confirmed the policy recommendations already indicated in the 
last chapter. Two types of strategies could be considered by the government of South Africa 
(either separately or in combination) to attract nurses to rural areas: 
recruiting nursing students from rural backgrounds (upstream policy); 
offering study leave sooner to nurses who agree to take up rural posts (downstream 
policy). 
More details on how this could be implemented and the caveats of such recommendations can be 
found in section 7.4.4. 
B. Implication for research 
This chapter has presented an innovative use of DCE results, to infer complex effects of policy 
interventions. It would be interesting to further explore this application in two ways: 
First, it is hoped that routine data can be available in the future to provide more information on 
which to calibrate some of the model parameters. Given their importance in the model 
construction and its effect, it is urgent to obtain better data on turnover rates and in general about 
nurses' career paths that would inform the construction of transition matrices. Ad-hoc studies in 
hospitals or retrospective longitudinal studies could be used to estimate these model parameters. 
Similarly, further research on the capacity of DCEs to predict accurately individuals' actual 
choices9a will provide more strength to the modelling presented here. 
ga See discussions presented earlier, for example in section 6.5.4 
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Second, a more sophisticated model could be built, in order to evaluate more refined and realistic 
effects. For example, the heterogeneity of behaviours could be built into the model with the use of 
individual-level estimates of policy effects, which could be obtained with mixed log it models. The 
corollary extension would therefore be an individual-level modelling of the entire population in the 
Markov model, such as compartment models used in epidemiology to model infectious diseases 
(Kramer et al., 2009). Another improvement to the model could be a propagation effect whereby 
the willingness of an individual to take up a rural post would be an increasing function of the 
proportion of nurses already present in rural areas. Finally, one could simulate the effects of 
policy interventions not only with respect to the number of future nurses, but also integrating the 
existing stock of. Obviously, some assumptions on the way they would react to the newly 
introduced incentives would have to be made. For example, their sensitivity to policies could be 
based on their work experience, or age. Such extension would be useful to increase the realism 
of the model and more clearly model the consequences for health services delivery in South 
Africa. 
8.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented in detail a new tool to estimate the effects of policy interventions that 
could be used to attract health staff to rural areas. The results of this model show that policies 
based on direct financial incentives (such as salary increases) and better education opportunities 
are the most effective methods of attracting workers to rural areas. However it should be noted 
that some of these policies might be easier to implement than others. 
In addition to their 'implementability', the financial implications of the different strategies should be 
taken into account, in order to inform policy-makers' decisions. Indeed, although some financial 
incentives might be more effective to attract rural nurses, it is reasonable to assume than other 
policies might be less effective but also less costly. For example, it was already underlined that 
although a 10% increase in salary is more effective than a car allowance, the latter is half as 
costly. This calls for further systematic examination of the policy initiatives envisaged here, not 
only for their effects but also for their costs. 
The next chapter addresses this question and presents the cost-effectiveness analysis of the 
various policy scenarios presented here. 
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Chapter 9 · Evaluating the cost-effectiveness of HR 
policy interventions 
9.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapter used a Markov model building on choice experiments to simulate the 
relative effectiveness of potential policy interventions to address the distribution of nurses 
between rural and urban areas in South Africa. By modelling their short-term and long-term 
effects, it highlighted the importance of taking into account the dynamics of the labour market to 
better ascertain the effects of possible policies. It also showed the dominance of a number of 
strategies to increase significantly the presence of nurses in rural areas, while certain job 
advantages showed no particular effectiveness. Yet these simulations are not sufficient to inform 
policy-makers on the best course of action regarding the HR interventions they should take into 
consideration. Information about the relative cost-effectiveness of policy interventions is essential 
for discussions over budgetary choices and trade-offs, within the framework of the Ministry of 
Health budget but also more broadly within the context of government spending. 
In the previous two chapters, analysis has highlighted that the number of nurses working in rural 
areas could be increased through a selection of students with a greater preference for rural posts 
(those with rural background) and/or through the use of different financial and non-financial 
incentives. This range of policy levers suggests a wide variety of cost implications. 
The present chapter aims to measure the cost-effectiveness of these various policy packages, 
and thereby provide direct policy recommendations about the desirability and feasibility of 
implementing some of these scenarios. A secondary objective is to assess the political and 
financial feasibility of these policy options in regard to the size and evolution of the budget 
allocated to health by South Africa. 
The chapter starts with a presentation of the structure of the cost-effectiveness framework as well 
as the data used. Then it provides a detailed explanation of the methods and assumptions used 
to cost the incentive packages. The second half of the chapter presents the findings of the cost-
effectiveness analysis, and discusses the results in the light of a sensitivity analysis and 
limitations of the methods used. 
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9.2. Methods 
9.2.1. The decision problem 
The primary objective of this chapter is to evaluate the relative cost-effectiveness of various policy 
options that could be implemented by the South African government to redress the current 
shortage of nurses in rural areas. More precisely it aims to evaluate which incentive packages are 
the most cost-effective to increase the number of nurses in rural positions. To evaluate the 
incremental cost-effectiveness of HR policies, a decision-analysis model needs be constructed. 
The analytic approach is designed to permit the evaluation of the cost effectiveness of discrete 
'rural' policies. It is not concerned with the broader cost-effectiveness of configurations of 
governmental HR policies in the labour market (e.g. attracting more nurses to the public sector). 
As standard economic evaluation of health policies, this study is embedded in the framework of 
welfare economics. In this framework, it is assumed that in the public urban sector, the marginal 
value of a nurse is equal to the marginal cost of a nurse, while in the rural sector the marginal 
value of a nurse if greater than its (current) cost. Therefore it is hypothesised that there is no loss 
of welfare (for urban patients) in attracting urban nurses to rural posts. This assumption is 
discussed later in the chapter. This section presents the different interventions considered for the 
analysis, as well as the data used in the analysis. 
A. Downstream measures 
As explained in Chapter 2, downstream measures refer to policy levers that can be employed on 
the current nursing population. These policies are the same rural incentives that were presented 
in Chapter 7, whose effects were simulated in the stated choice experiment. They are briefty 
outlined here, along with their estimated costs. 
No intervention 
The strategy without any intervention follows the current conditions prevalent in the public sector. 
It means that when the nurse enters the labour market after graduation and has to choose 
between four alternative jobs, with the rural jobs characterised by an annual salary of R132,000, 
no car allowance, a normal promotion schedule (nurses automatically move up the ladder every 
two years), the possibility to benefit from a subsidised housing opportunity (shared fiat), the 
guarantee to go on study leave on average after about six years spent in the post and a 
hierarchical type of management. 
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Immediate financial incentives 
A number of the rural incentives entail a variety of direct financial incentives. Four of these 
interventions are modelled in the present cost-effectiveness study: 
Three different policies that would increase rural annual salaries respectively by 10%, 20% 
or 30% (all other job characteristics remaining unchanged compared to the base scenario); 
A policy that would offer a car allowance worth R500 every month (all other job 
characteristics remaining unchanged compared to the base scenario); 
Deferred and indirect financial incentives 
Some policy interventions modelled comprise indirect financial incentives. This means that each 
of these strategies offers some advantage which translates into some form of financial 
advantage, either immediate or deferred: 
A housing policy offers a better housing opportunity - instead of a shared flat, this policy 
offers a two-bedroom house to nurses. 
An education strategy guarantees study leave to rural nurses after two years in post. This 
involves the cost of nurses' salaries to be covered during the study leave, as well as the cost 
of providing the education; 
A quicker promotion track, which gives rural nurses the possibility to access the next grade 
quicker, after one year instead of two (this only applies to the first promotion).This translates 
into higher salaries offered to rural nurses. 
Mixed packages 
Chapter 7 showed the relative effectiveness of different policy scenarios to attract nurses to rural 
positions. The results highlighted the interest of using mixed incentives to achieve larger effects 
(see Table 7.5). It is equally interesting to try and assess the cost-effectiveness of these 
packages. 
B. Upstream measures 
As explained in Chapter 2, upstream measures are the ones that seek to alter the structure of the 
nursing population, and attract more individuals who would be willing to work in rural areas, with 
or without a particular incentive. The analysis so far has demonstrated the existence of 
heterogeneity of preferences for rural jobs within the nursing population in South Africa, with 
nurses from rural background more eager to take up rural positions. Building upon some of the 
simulations in Chapter 7, this analysis looks at the cost-effectiveness of selecting more rural 
individuals into nursing, up to a proportion of 75% and 100% (compared to 46.9% in the sample 
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population) . It is assumed that the selection of more rural students through a purposive selection 
process in training colleges does not generate additional costs. Given the high number of 
applications received and discarded by nursing colleges each year, it is reasonable to think that 
there are good applicants from rural areas for whom quotas could be reserved , as has been done 
in other countries (see Chapter 2). 
All the downstream measures presented above are simulated with these two hypothetical nursing 
populations. 
C. Data used 
The economic evaluation presented in this chapter builds upon two major elements: the Markov 
model presented in the last chapter provides the measures of effects, and a costing model that 
provides unit costs for all resource items. 
Figure 9.1: Relationship between the Markov and cost model 
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The relationship between the Markov and cost models is shown in Figure 9.1. For a given HR 
strategy, the Markov model produces as outputs the annual number of nurses who work in rural 
areas and the annual number of nurses who decide to specialise. These results serve as an input 
for the costing model, which then estimates the yearly costs of nurses in rural areas. 
9.2.2. Outcome measures 
In Chapter 8, the Markov model simulated the effects of different policy interventions. The primary 
outputs of the model were the number of nurses in any given year in the various segments of the 
labour market. Other outcomes presented were a transformation of those outputs, showing the 
distribution of nurses at different points in time. 
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For the purpose of the economic analysis, a unique measure of effectiveness that can capture the 
long-term effects of each policy is needed. Because the objective is to evaluate the capacity of 
policies to increase the number of nurses in rural areas, a simple approach is to sum the number 
of nurses in rural areas over time. Because Markov model outputs are for each year, the measure 
is in fact a number of rural nurse-years. 
The Markov model was calibrated as indicated in Chapter 899. 
9.2.3. Costing policy interventions 
Following the description of the decision problem in the first part, this section presents the final 
steps and assumptions of the costing model. It follows the final steps of the costing methodology 
usually described in the literature: 
Identification and measurement of the resource items; 
Calculation of their monetary value. 
A. Overview of resources used 
The first step in a costing exercise is to list the various elements required to implement the 
interventions of interest, in order to measure the costs that are relevant and decisive for the policy 
question of interest. In the present case, considering the perspective taken, only the actual costs 
incurred by the government to pay nurses in public positions are considered. 
Here, all interventions of interest are individualised incentive packages for nurses1oo. It is 
assumed that any administrative costs to implement the interventions do not represent an 
additional cost to the usual functioning cost of the Department of Health services at the central 
and regional levels, or are negligible compared to other costs incurred by the HR policies. 
Similarly, the costs of health facilities where nurses work (both building and functioning costs) are 
not taken into account in this costing. Indeed, these costs are part of the provision of health 
services, which is exogenous to the HR interventions considered here, or at least not included in 
the perspective taken here. 
Therefore, the cost of the interventions to the government depends on the job characteristics of 
the posts offered. As a result, five different elements drive the cost of the interventions: 
The salary level; 
99 Size of each cohort: 2000 nurses; time horizon: 40 years. 
100 Indeed, the selection of more students with rural background is assumed to be cost-free, as indicated before. 
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The type of subsidised housing offered; the subsidy is going to be proportional to the quality 
of the housing offered; 
The provision of a car allowance; 
The possibility to be promoted sooner, as this modifies the salary offered in the future; 
The provision of post-basic training to nurses. This entails both direct and indirect costs 
J 
which are detailed further later. 
This list excludes the potential costs incurred by the type of management used in the facility. It is 
assumed that the type of management is the one currently often found in the South African health 
system (hierarchical style). Therefore the cost of providing these working conditions (if any) are 
not relevant to the policy interventions considered here since they are not affected by these 
interventions. To summarise, the cost items can be grouped into three categories: 
Salary costs, 
Other financial benefits (housing and car allowance), 
Training costs. 
The next section presents in detail the assumptions made and data used to estimate the costs 
under the different interventions modelled. 
B. Salary costs 
Unit costs in the base scenario 
Salary costs are certainly the main cost drivers of HR policies. Therefore, it is important to 
estimate them as accurately as possible. 
As explained above, the outputs produced by the Markov model are used as inputs into the cost 
model. For each cohort of nurses simulated, the output is the distribution of the numbers of rural 
nurses over the 40 simulated years. Therefore to calculate the total costs of all nurses in a cohort, 
several types of information are needed: 
The average annual salary of a nurse, which evolves over the course of one's career; 
The benefit package paid by the government in addition to the salary (employers' 
contribution to pension and medical insurance). 
The first difficulty relates to the absence of a typical career for nurses, and the fact that the 
succession of yearly salaries is a direct function of the type of career a nurse can have. For 
example, a nurse who stays a general nurse and either refuses or is not offered any promotion 
will have a very steady increase in salary, as her career path will basically be constituted by the 
legal salary increments. Conversely, a general nurse who obtains or seeks promotions can move 
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quickly up the salary scale. Finally, a Professional Nurse who enters the market in South Africa 
can decide to do a post-basic year of training to become a specialised nurse. That choice, when 
made at an early stage of the career, will lead to a significant jump in salary. Some of these 
possible scenarios of Professional Nurses' career paths are represented in the Figure 9.2 below, 
which highlights some of the career "jumps" that can be made through promotions. 
Unfortunately, there is no data about what can be considered as the typical career path of a 
professional nurse, nor is there any information about the proportion of nurses in each grade. 
Therefore, in the absence of information about the typical career paths of nurses in the public 
sector, the only way to compute the average annual cost of a nurse's base salary for a given year 
t (sf) is to compute a weighted average of a number of career paths for each year: 
sf= I wksZt 
k 
where sZt is the cost to the government of a rural nurse on career path kin year t, and wk is the 
proportion of nurses on this career path (or the 'weight' of the career path in the average 
constructed career). 
Therefore, to compute st assumptions had to be made regarding: 
The number and shape of hypothetical career paths 
The weight allocated to each typical career path. 
The choice of simulated career paths was based on the concern to be able to account for a 
sufficiently wide range of costs to avoid a systematic under or over-estimation of salary costs. 
The idea was to avoid modelling only steady career paths to avoid the under-estimation of costs 
associated with better careers (more costly for the employers). At the same time, the weight 
allocated to the more rapid career paths had to be carefully chosen, to avoid over-estimation of 
salaries. In the end, five career paths were generated that are depicted in Figure 9.2: three for 
general professional nurses who do not decide to specialise (T1, T2 and T3), and two for nurses 
who would specialise {T 4 and T5) -see Appendix 9.1 for greater details on each 'stylised' career 
path. 
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Figure 9.2: Structure and distribution of 'typical' career paths for South African nurses 
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The following guiding principles were chosen to assume the weights indicated on Figure 9.2 for 
each career path: 
As indicated in Chapter 8, information collected during an interview suggested that about 
50% of a given cohort would specialise. This means that the three non-specialist tracks (T1, 
T2 and T3) represent at best 50% of the weights; 
The "fast track" path (T3) is unlikely to be frequent, and therefore a weigh of 0.05 was 
attributed to it; 
Since it is unlikely that many nurses not be promoted at all during their career, T2 is 
assumed to represent 30% of the cases, and T1 only 10%; 
Finally the last two specialist tracks, T4 and T5 are split into almost equal weights, although 
a greater influence is given to T5 since the majority of nurses, from interview data, appear to 
specialise five to 10 years into their career. 
Personnel costs include not only salary, but also fringe benefits and other employment costs that 
are paid by the employer. In the public sector in South Africa, this includes the employers' 
contribution to medical insurance and a pension contribution. The actual costs of these benefits 
are complex to estimate, as they depend partly on choices made by the employees and partly on 
the experience and age of the employee. These additional costs to the employer are assumed 
proportional to the salary level. Therefore the actual cost to the employer is: 
5 
-b ~ b St = L wk(1 + p) skt 
k=l 
where pis the "fringe benefit" rate. Based on some official documentation (Department of Public 
Service and Administration, 2006), the fringe benefit rate was approximated at p =0.25. 
Unit costs under the different policy incentives 
The policy incentives can alter the calculations of the salary costs of a rural nurse-year in three 
different ways. 
A first change occurs whenever a policy intervention involves an increase oi (expressed in % 
change) in the salary offered to nurses in rural posts. The unit costs are then adjusted in the 
following way: 
st = I wk(1 + p)Skt 
k 
with Skt = (1 + oaskt and 01 = 0.1 ; Oz = 0.2; 03 = 0.3. 
It is assumed that the career path weights remain unaffected by the change in salary levels. 
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A second modification occurs when a policy proposes a quicker promotion. This means that 
instead of staying for two years in the first salary grade, rural nurses achieve the first salary 
increment after just one year. It means that instead of using the vector of salary levels 
(So, Sv ... S39), over the span of a 40-year career, the simulations are made using a slightly 
modified vector: (sg, Sf ... Sf9 ) where sf = Sf+1 'V t. For example: sg = Sf ; sf = Sf , etc. 
This is as if the career paths presented in Figure 9.2 are shifted to the left by one period. 
A third modification changes the salary costs when nurses are offered guaranteed study leave 
sooner (after two years in post instead of six). As indicated before, this incentive increases the 
number of nurses who choose to specialise. Consequently, there should be an increase in the 
proportion of nurses who specialise at an early stage of their career. This change is simply 
modelled through a new set of weights (wD, where the weight corresponding to the specialist 
paths is greater: 
5 
Sf = L wk(l + p)skt 
k=l 
With wk > wk tor k E { 4,5} which corresponds to the two simulated "specialised nurse" career 
paths. More details on how these weights are calculated are provided in section E. 
C. Housing allowance 
Some rural incentives offer a housing allowance, either for "a single room in a shared flat" or for a 
self-contained "two-bedroom house". The cost of this subsidy to the government was valued with 
estimates of the monthly rent paid for similar properties on the South African real estate market 
obtained from seven cities (see Appendix 9.2). 
In the absence of further data on the sample used to produce the average costs reported for each 
city, a simple unweighted average was calculated. Estimates of the annual cost of a shared flat 
are given by the bachelor accommodation average cost (Hf=R1 ,872) and that for a two-bed 
house is provided by the same average estimates from (Hh=R2,871 ). 
Although the conditions of the housing allowance were not precisely mentioned in the choice 
experiment, it was decided to calculate this additional benefit on top of the monthly housing 
allowance currently received by all South African nurses (amounting to R500). Therefore the cost 
of housing takes into account the difference between the current allowance and the amount 
needed to provide the accommodation proposed in the DCE: 
H = qJ(1f X 12(Hf- 500) + 1h X 12(Hh- SOD)) 
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where 1f is an indicator function that takes the value 1 when the housing option offered is a flat 
and zero otherwise. Accordingly, 1h is the indicator function for the two-bedroom house option. 
The parameter <p represents the subsidy paid by the employer - although the DCE mentioned a 
"subsidised" housing option, it remained silent on the proportion of the housing cost to be 
subsidised by the employer. It was decided that a subsidy <p=50% would be a reasonable 
proportion of the rent. 
D. Car allowance 
The rural jobs sometimes offered a car allowance whose value was clearly stated in the choice 
experiment: c = R500 per month. It was hypothesised that this would remain constant over the 
years, and this monthly value was simply recalculated over the year, representing a R6,000 
additional benefit to the salary. 
E. Costs of training 
It was explained in Chapter 8 that all nurses specialising obtain study leave from the government. 
Therefore, training always generates some costs for the MOH which depend on the number of 
nurses obtaining study leave101. Those costs are the direct costs of training involved in the 
provision of the actual course during one year, and the payment of nurses' salaries on study 
leave. But there are also indirect costs triggered by education policies. Indeed, guaranteeing rural 
nurses the possibility to go on study leave changes the relative weights of the different nursing 
career paths. 
Direct education costs 
The first direct cost of providing training benefits to rural nurses is the salary paid to nurses who 
receive study leave. The unit cost of this salary is calculated as follows: 
-v ~ 
Lt = L WkSkt 
k<4 
where k < 4 ensures that one only takes into account the average annual salary cost of a nurse 
who will not have specialised yet (one only takes the non-specialist paths into account). The 
monthly rents are multiplied by 12 months in order to compute consistent annual costs. 
The second direct cost involved in providing study leave is incurred through the provision of the 
one-year training to the nurses. Broadly speaking, these expenditures involve essentially 
teachers' time and support costs encompassing administrative and infrastructure costs. 
101 Under "normal" conditions, some nurses obtain study leave as well, and therefore some costs are already 
incurred. 
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To ascertain this, data on budgets obtained from the South African Nursing Council and some 
nursing colleges were used. Appendix 9.3 provides some detailed explanation about how costs 
were computed. In brief, it was found that the salary of lecturers represent the main cost of 
nursing training institutions. All other costs can therefore be reduced to overheads paid on top of 
lecturers' salaries. A lecturer's annual salary was approximated to about R220,000 and 
overheads were estimated to an additional 25%. With an average estimated ratio of 18 students 
per lecturer in specialty courses (see Appendix 9.3 for a full justification), a unit cost per student 
can be estimated as a function of the total number of students taking the course on a given year 
Nf11 (see Figure 9.3 below). Therefore the annual indirect unit cost of study leave on a given year 
(L~) can be expressed as follows: 
where f(x) = llxll returns the nearest integer of x. 
Figure 9.3: Indirect cost of providing specialist as a function of the number of students 
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Indirect education costs 
As explained before, because the education policies guarantee access to study leave for rural 
nurses, it is likely that these interventions will change the relative weights of the suggested career 
paths (in Figure 9.2). Indeed, as explained in the previous chapter, many nurses will come to rural 
areas with the objective of specialising. Therefore the proportion of specialist career paths should 
increase accordingly. This is an indirect effect that needs to be accounted for, since it increases 
the costs to the government (as higher salaries need to be paid). 
To compute this effect in a relatively simple manner, the difference in the number of nurses who 
specialise in a given cohort is computed, between the baseline scenario and each of the different 
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education packages. The increase in the proportion of specialist nurses in a given cohort {n:) can 
thereby be calculated for a given scenario: 
Lt Nail (S) 
1[ = =----:~-Lt Na11 (B) 
Where Nan (S) is the total number of nurses from a cohort specialising over the 40-year horizon 
under conditions set by scenarioS, while Na11 (B) is the corresponding number under conditions 
defined in the base scenario. 
This increase is applied to the proportion of nurses who follow a specialist track {T4 and T5), and 
it is assumed that this proportion is taken from career path T2, where there is the biggest 
reservoir of nurses susceptible to specialise: 
w~ = rrwk for k=4 and k=S 
w~ = w2 - (w~- w4)- (w~- w5) 
To obtain the total cost of rural nurses to the government, the sum of all direct and indirect costs 
in each scenario (see Appendix 9.4) is computed. 
9.2.4. Modelling the cost-effectiveness of interventions 
A. Discounting outcomes 
For each given year over a n-year period, the costing model and the Markov model generate raw 
numbers of nurse-years in rural areas and their corresponding cost for the government. To be 
able to make comparisons between different streams of future costs and benefits, and account for 
time preference, the costs incurred over n future periods are usually discounted to present 
values, with the following calculation: 
In Cn p-- (1 + r)t 
t=O 
where r is the discount rate. The choice of the discount rater, also called the social discount rate 
in the analysis of public programmes, has been a widely debated issue (Drummond et al., 2005). 
It is usually advised to choose a central social rate of time preference that is consistent with the 
current practice in the field and/or has been a government recommended rate. This study 
therefore adopted as social discount rate r = 0.03, which is the standard rate in public health 
interventions, also adopted in South Africa (Russell et al., 1996). This figure corresponds to the 
real discount rate, which does already account for future anticipated inflation. 
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Another area of debate regarding discounting relates to whether or not the outcomes should be 
discounted and if so, whether they should be discounted at the same rate as costs are. To 
simplify to be able to compare costs and effects adequately, it was decided to discount both costs 
and effects. Indeed, it makes perfect sense for a government to value the presence of rural 
nurses in the short term more than that in the long term, as it can obtain direct electoral benefits 
from addressing rural shortages while in power. 
Applying the social discount rate r to the total cost incurred in any given year t, the present value 
of future outcomes X[ (this can be future annual costs or future effects) is given by: 
40 xr 
xr- ~ t 
L (1 + r)t 
t=O 
B. Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios 
In the case of mutually exclusive options presented here, identifying the policy that is expected to 
provide the highest level of benefits for a given level of cost can be done by calculating the 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) of each policy relative to the next best strategy 
(Drummond et al., 2005). Before calculating the ICER, it is important to identify and exclude any 
dominated strategy, which is more expensive and less effective than another option. Options 
subject to extended dominance should also be discarded; those options are identified by the fact 
that a combination of other options can provide a higher benefits for the same cost (Barton et al., 
2008). For any two scenarios 81 and 82, an ICER can then be calculated as follows: 
ICER = Cs1 -Csz 
Ns1- Nsz 
where Ns1 is the total number of rural nurse-years under scenario 81 and Ns2 is the number of 
nursing years in scenario 82, while Cs1 and Cs2 are the related costs of each policy. 
The optimal strategy is the one with the highest ICER below the cost-effectiveness threshold, 
usually noted A. (Drummond et al., 2005). This threshold represents the maximum amount that the 
decision-maker is willing to pay for a particular outcome (maximum acceptable ceiling ratio). Only 
if the intervention falls below this threshold, is it deemed cost-effective. In the present context, 
there is no obvious threshold. Yet, knowing that the salary of a beginning nurse in a rural area is 
currently R132,000, and because it is hypothesised that the marginal value of a nurse is greater 
than this current cost, the monetary threshold of the government is necessarily greater than that 
level. In fact, it is possible to assume that the government would be ready to pay much more to 
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attract nurses to rural areas, considering that the average cost of a nurse over her career is the 
discounted value of all her salary flows, and is necessarily higher than the starting salary. 
C. Probabilistic sensitivity analysis 
As in the previous chapter for the Markov model, a lot of assumptions have been made 
throughout the costing of rural nurse-years. Therefore, in addition to the model parameters 
involved in the computation of effect outcomes (described at great length in the previous chapter), 
it is important to account for uncertainty introduced by assumptions on costs. Table 9.1 below 
summarises the main cost parameters of the model to be used in the Probabilistic Sensitivity 
Analysis. 
Table 9.1: Parameter distributions 
Name Description 
Salary costs 
wl Weight associated (career path P1) 
Wz Weight associated (career path P2) 
w3 Weight associated (career path P3) 
w4 Weight associated (career path P4) 
Ws Weight associated (career path P5) 
Housing allowance 
<p Subsidy level 
Hf Average cost of a fiat 
Hh Average cost of a 2-bedroom house 
Car allowance 
Min Parameter Max Distribution a 
mean 
w1= 0.10 
w 2= 0.30 
w 3= 0.05 
w4= 0.30 
w 5= 0.25 
0 cp = 0.50 
Hf=R1,872 
(sd=474) 
Hh=R2,871 
(sd=588) 
1 
Dirichlet 
distribution 
Beta 
distribution 
Gamma 
distribution 
Gamma 
distribution 
50 
16 
24 
50 
120 
121 
c = R500 Gamma 500 1 
c Monthly car allowance (sd= 25) distribution 
Note: the distributions are chosen according to the standard practices used in economic analysis 
(Briggs et al. 2006). 
Note that this list excludes the following parameters: 
The "fringe benefit" rate (p) remains unchanged (25%). Indeed, although this is based on 
some approximation, it is probably not too far from the real rate (Department of Public 
Service and Administration, 2008); 
The discount rate(~. as it is unusual to put the discount rate directly in the PSA; 
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The non-standard weights (those used in the training interventions) because they are 
indirectly affected by the random draws of the standard career path weights, and therefore 
are influenced by these latter parameters; 
The probabilistic analysis is undertaken by randomly sampling from each of the parameter 
distributions and calculating the expected costs and expected number of rural-nurse years. This 
is done for 2,000 replications. 
Cost-Effectiveness Acceptability Curves 
Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves (CEAC) were developed in order to illustrate the 
uncertainty surrounding the estimate of cost-effectiveness (Briggs and Gray, 1999, Fenwick et al., 
2001, O'Brien and Briggs, 2002), as an alternative to producing confidence intervals around 
ICERs (Van Hout et al., 1994, Briggs and Fenn, 1998).The use of these curves to summarise 
information uncertainty in cost-effectiveness analysis has now become widespread (Barton et al., 
2008). In the case of multiple options, a separate CEAC can be plotted for each option and each 
curve shows the probability of each option being cost-effective at different levels of money 
decision-makers are ready to spend to improve the outcome of interest (Briggs et al., 2006). 
Following the method suggested by Briggs et al. (2006), this probability was estimated by 
identifying, for each of the 2,000 replications, the option with the highest net monetary benefit 
(NMB}, defined as: 
NMB='AE-C 
where c is the total expected cost and E is the total expected effect, and of A is a particular cost-
effectiveness threshold. 
For a given A, one can then equate the probability that a strategy is cost-effective as the 
proportion of the 2,000 iterations for which that particular option had the highest net benefit. This 
calculation is replicated for various values of A comprised between RO and R500,000 (by intervals 
of R1,000). One can then plot the cost-effectiveness acceptability curves for each intervention 
providing the probability of an intervention to be cost-effective (y-axis) for different values of A (x-
axis). 
Cost-Effectiveness Acceptability Frontier 
If the objective is to maximise the benefits of an intervention, researchers have argued that 
relying on the probability of an option to be cost-effective, as CEACs do, can be misleading 
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(Fenwick et al., 2001). Instead, decisions should be taken on the basis of expected net benefits, 
regardless of the uncertainty associated with the decision. 
It is therefore possible to find a situation where the strategy with the highest probability of being 
cost-effective (highest CEAC) is not the optimal option (Fenwick et al., 2001 ). To address this 
issue, it is recommended to use Cost-Effectiveness Acceptability Frontiers (CEAF). At different 
levels of A, a CEAF only plots the probability that the optimal option is cost-effective, ignoring all 
other strategies. 
To produce the CEAF, the mean cost and mean effect for each option is calculated over the 
2,000 replications and one identifies which option has the highest net monetary benefit over a 
range of values of A. Once the optimal option is identified (for each value of A), one reports the 
probability of this option being cost-effective, as determined by the CEAC. 
From the CEAF one can deduce: 
The range of values of cost-effectiveness thresholds over which a given strategy is cost-
effective; 
The ICER between different options102, which correspond to the "switch points" on the 
CEAF, when there is a change in the identity of the optimal option; 
The probability of making a wrong decision (error probability) at any value of the threshold A., 
which is equal to one minus the probability given by the CEAF. 
D. Investigating heterogeneity in cost-effectiveness 
In Chapter 7 it was found that nurses from rural areas were less sensitive to policy interventions 
than their urban counterparts. In this chapter, the consequences of these results for the relative 
cost-effectiveness of interventions are investigated. More precisely, results for nurses from urban 
backgrounds are compared to those from rural backgrounds. 
102 The lower value of A. for which each option was optimal denotes the ICER for that particular option, and the upper 
value denotes the ICER for the next most costly option. 
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9.3. Results 
9.3.1. Cost analysis 
Table 9.2 provides details of the costs incurred by the government to fund the presence of nurses 
from a given cohort in rural areas over a 40-year period. This clearly demonstrates that salaries 
are the main cost, as they systematically represent at least 90% of all costs. The second biggest 
cost is housing, representing 2.5 to 5.5% of all costs. The cost of providing education is quite 
minimal, although the figures do not provide a detailed account of the additional salary costs 
incurred indirectly as a result of education strategies (through the change in nurses' salary 
structure). Similar figures can be found in Appendix 9.5 for 40 simulated cohorts. 
Table 9.2: Structure of costs by strategies (calculated over one cohort) 
Salary Car Education Housing direct cost cost 
Base scenario 95.20% 0.00% 1.63% 3.17% 
10% rural allowance 95.50% 0.00% 1.60% 2.91% 
20% rural allowance 95.73% 0.00% 1.59% 2.68% 
30% rural allowance 95.95% 0.00% 1.57% 2.49% 
2-bedroom house 93.03% 0.00% 1.58% 5.38% 
Car allowance 92.98% 2.29% 1.58% 3.15% 
Promoted faster 95.30% 0.00% 1.61% 3.09% 
Study leave soon 94.58% 0.00% 2.23% 3.19% 
Quick promotion+ car 93.12% 2.24% 1.57% 3.07% 
Quick promotion+ 10% salary increase 95.57% 0.00% 1.60% 2.83% 
Quick promotion+ 20% salary increase 95.81% 0.00% 1.58% 2.62% 
10% salary increase + car allowance 93.44% 2.10% 1.58% 2.88% 
20% salary increase + car allowance 93.82% 1.93% 1.59% 2.65% 
Better housing + car 90.83% 2.26% 1.57% 5.35% 
Better housing + car+ 10% increase 91.47% 2.06% 1.58% 4.89% 
Better housing + car+ 20% increase 92.06% 1.90% 1.55% 4.50% 
Study leave soon + car 92.13% 2.27% 2.48% 3.12% 
Study leave soon + 10% increase 94.63% 0.00% 2.52% 2.85% 
Study leave soon + 20% increase 95.00% 0.00% 2.43% 2.56% 
Study leave soon + 10% increase + car 92.72% 2.02% 2.49% 2.77% 
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9.3.2. Economic analysis of downstream measures 
A. Expected costs and effects 
For each policy intervention, Monte-Carlo simulations drawing parameters of the model 
generated 2,000 pairs of expected incremental costs and number of rural-nurse years (compared 
to baseline). The results from these replications for four education-related scenarios are 
presented in Figure 9.4, together with the deterministic estimates for each scenario. 
The wide dispersion of points in the figure illustrates the uncertainty surrounding the estimates of 
expected costs and expected effects associated with the different interventions. The dispersion of 
points above the x-axis and to the right of the y-axis indicates that in general all these 
interventions are more effective than the current situation, but that they are also more expensive. 
Since the gains in outcomes are achieved at a higher cost, then the critical issue is to understand 
how much (if any) the decision-maker is prepared to pay for an additional rural nurse-year. Using 
these 2,000 replications, average expected costs and effects can be calculated for each 
intervention (see Table 9.3). First, the dominated strategies were identified (these are the ones in 
highlighted rows). Once strategies are ordered from the least to the most costly, dominated 
strategies are the ones for which it is possible to identify a cheaper strategy that produces better 
outcomes. It is interesting to note that most of the strategies relying almost entirely on direct 
financial incentives are dominated. Second, the various HR options subject to extended 
dominance were identified. This left only four possible cost-effective options, which were the 
interventions offering study leave to rural nurses within two years, sometimes accompanied by 
salary increases. This is not entirely surprising considering the sensitivity of nurses to these 
incentives underlined in the previous two chapters, as well as the fact that the associated costs of 
training are not very high (see Table 9.2). The relevant incremental cost effectiveness ratios were 
calculated for these four options, for one and 40 cohorts. Results are presented in Table 9.4. 
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Figure 9.4: Scatter plot showing the incremental costs and effects between policy interventions and baseline using 2,000 bootstrap replicates (for 1 cohort) 
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Table 9.3: Expected costs and effects of downstream policy interventions ranked by costs (over 2,000 simulations) 
Analysis for one unique cohort Analysis for 40 cumulated 
Scenario Scenario 
cohorts 
Expected 
Expected costs Expected Expected costs effects effects 
Base scenario R 1,326,214,432 4,738 Base scenario R 23,078,084,747 89,595 
Promoted faster R 1,372,338,929 4,802 Promoted faster R 24,017,154,750 91,142 
2-bedroom house R 1,384,951,431 4,874 2-bedroom house R 24,325,723,137 92,843 
Car allowance R 1,447,248,864 5,153 Car allowance R 25,726,095,201 99,186 
Study leave soon {E1) R 1,455,099,614 5,253 Study leave soon (E1) R 25,943,261,881 101,480 
Quick promotion + car R 1,492,668,724 5,199 Quick promotion + car R 26,639,296,643 100,272 
Better housing + car R 1 ,528,185,694 5,363 Better housing +car R 27,421,466,688 103,895 
1 0% rural allowance R 1,634,305,738 5,367 1 0% rural allowance R 29,188,199,496 103,867 
Quick promotion + 10% salary increase R 1,691,435,081 5,431 Quick promotion + 1 0% salary increase R 30,340,853,899 105,345 
Study leave soon + car (E2) R 1,720,202,762 6,100 Study leave soon + car (E2) R 31,216,476,662 119,315 
10% salary increase + car allowance R 1 ,873,210,394 6,128 20% rural allowance R 34,135,286,171 112,215 
20% rural allowance R 1,883,615,891 5,723 1 0% salary increase + car allowance R 34,166,953,297 120,426 
Quick promotion + 20% salary increase R 1,955,340,586 5,805 Quick promotion+ 20% salary increase R 35,453,295,562 113,597 
Better housing + car + 1 0% increase R 2,018,287,438 6,496 Study leave soon + 1 0% increase R 37,005,442,590 129,201 
Study leave soon + 10% increase R 2,042,458,931 6,607 Better housing + car + 10% increase R 37,070,510,507 128,181 
30% rural allowance R 2,127,752,057 5,997 30% rural allowance R 38,737,984,811 117,964 
20% salary increase + car allowance R 2,192,576,910 6,612 20% salary increase + car allowance R 40,271,339,908 130,671 
Study leave soon+ 10% increase+ car (E4) R 2,280,913,118 7,183 Study leave soon+ 10% increase+ car (E4) R 41,180,078,966 139,831 
Better housing + car + 20% increase R 2,362,769,901 7,011 Better housing + car + 20% increase R 43,624,123,843 138,889 
Study leave soon + 20% increase (E5) R 2,746,664,183 7,971 Study leave soon + 20% increase (E5) R 48,856,995,580 153,481 
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Compared to the current situation, the cost of an additional rural nurse-year is slightly more than 
R241,073 if the government decides to offer study leave to rural nurses after two years in post, 
and R250,065 if one considers only one cohort. With an additional car allowance offered, the cost 
per additional rural nurse-year goes up to about R295,666 (or R313,096 in one cohort), while it 
increases to more than R485,655/R517,831 and R562,395/R590,988 when direct financial 
incentives are added (see Table 9.4). It is interesting to note that the ICERs for the 40 cumulated 
cohorts are lower than the ones computed on one unique cohort. This is probably due to the fact 
that in the cumulative model, the last cohorts that are aggregated in the model are effective at 
bringing many rural nurses years (it had been highlighted before that the number of nurses in 
rural areas are the highest at the beginning of the cohorts), who are less costly since they are 
only at the start of their career. 
Table 9.4: ICER of the cost-effective downstream interventions 
Strategy ID ICER for 1 cohort ICER for 40 cohorts 
Study leave soon E1 R 250,065 R 241,073 
Study leave soon + car E2 R 313,096 R 295,666 
Study leave soon + 10% increase + car E4 R 517,831 R 485,655 
Study leave soon + 20% increase E5 R 590,988 R 562,395 
Ignoring the interventions including study leave, the more cost-effective strategy would then be to 
provide a car allowance (an additional cost of R 291,541 per additional rural nurse year, based on 
figures for one cohort). The ranking of all possible downstream interventions by ascending ICER 
(calculated against the current situation) underline that although financial incentives seemed very 
attractive for their effects (see results in Chapter 7), they are much less so when costs are 
factored in (see Table 9.5). 
Table 9.5: ICER of all downstream measures except those that include study leave (one 
cohort) 
Policy measures 
Single interventions 
Car allowance 
2-bedroom house 
10% rural allowance 
20% rural allowance 
30% rural allowance 
Promoted faster 
Policy packages 
Better housing + car 
ICER of each intervention compared 
to current (baseline) situation 
272 
R291,541 
R 431,326 
R 489,868 
R 566,016 
R 636,437 
R716,515 
R 323,419 
Quick promotion+ car 
1 0% salary increase + car allowance 
Better housing + car + 1 0% increase 
Better housing + car + 20% increase 
20% salary increase+ car allowance 
Quick promotion + 10% salary increase 
Quick promotion+ 20% salary increase 
R 360,908 
R 393,565 
R 393,628 
R456,119 
R 462,324 
R 527,181 
R 589,423 
Although they are based on the average expected costs and effects obtained through 2,000 
simulations, these results do not reflect well the uncertainty associated with the estimated cost-
effectiveness of an option. This is the reason why cost-effectiveness acceptability curves are 
needed. 
B. Cost-Effectiveness Acceptability Curves and Frontier 
Figure 9.5 presents the cost-effectiveness acceptability curve of all listed interventions for one 
cohort. The curves indicate the probability of the different policies being more cost-effective than 
the current situation for a range of possible amounts that the government is willing to pay for an 
additional rural nurse-year. Figure 9.5 demonstrates that if the government is willing to pay 
approximately R250,000 per rural nurse-year, there is a 50% chance that the education strategy 
is more cost-effective than the current situation. At a figure of about R265,000 per rural nurse-
year, this probability rises to nearly 60%. 
To present simultaneously the optimal option and the level of uncertainty associated with that 
option, the associated CEAF was plotted (Figure 9.6), vertical lines representing the ICERs. Prior 
to the first vertical line (A.<R250,000), the current situation is optimal, i.e. more cost-effective than 
offering study leave to rural nurses who have been in post two years. The next strategy (study 
leave after two years and a car allowance) only becomes optimal (more cost-effective than just 
offering a study leave) if the government is ready to spend between R315,000 and R517,000 (for 
one-cohort simulation). 
Furthermore, the CEAF is disjointed around some of the threshold values. For example, at the 
third vertical line of the top graph (A.= R 517,831) the probability of option E2 being cost-effective 
is 43%, whereas the corresponding probability for option E4 is 38%. Moreover, at this point, not 
only does the optimal option (E4) not have the highest probability of being cost-effective, but 
there is a 62% probability that it is not the most cost-effective option. This arises because the 
CEAF determines the optimal option by the highest expected net benefit, whereas the CEAC 
simply represents the proportion of iterations over which each option had the highest net benefit. 
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Figure 9.5: Cost-Effectiveness Acceptability Curves of HR scenarios for one cohort 
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Figure 9.6: Cost-Effectiveness Acceptability Frontiers of HR scenarios for one cohort 
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9.3.3. Economic analysis of upstream measures 
Since the effects of interventions vary between nurses from rural and urban backgrounds, this 
section estimates the cost-effectiveness of some upstream measures, whereby a greater 
proportion of individuals from rural background would be selected into nursing training and enter 
the labour market. Simulations were carried out in which the selection process was hypothesised 
to have successfully enrolled 75% and 100% of individuals from rural backgrounds. In addition to 
this recruitment strategy, the different interventions presented previously were also simulated with 
these new populations. 
The (mean) expected costs and effects of the different interventions can be found in Appendix 
9.6. For each sub-population, an analysis similar to the one presented above was carried out, and 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratios were calculated for the non-dominated options. Two findings 
emerge from the results presented in Table 9.6. First, 'simple' upstream measures consisting in 
the selection of more individuals from rural backgrounds are more cost-effective than any of the 
downstream measures presented so far. Indeed the ICERs of these simple interventions are 
smaller than the ICER relating to a "study leave" policy with the current population. Selecting 75% 
of rural nursing students (instead of about 50% at the moment) would be cost-effective if the 
government was willing to pay at most R213,000 per rural nurse-year (taking the conservative 
estimate of one cohort), while it would cost R250,000 per additional rural nurse-year if the 
government offered study leave sooner to the current population of nurses. 
Table 9.6: ICER of cost-effective upstream strategies with more rural nursing populations 
(obtained over 2,000 simulations) 
Strategy 
Results for sample #3 (75% rural nurses, 25% urban nurses) 
Recruiting 75% of rural nurses 
Recruiting 75% of rural nurses +study leave soon 
Recruiting 75% of rural nurses + Study leave soon+ car 
Recruiting 75% of rural nurses +study leave soon+ 10% increase+ car 
Recruiting 75% of rural nurses + Study leave soon + 20% increase 
Results for sample #4 {100% rural nurses, 0% urban nurses) 
Recruiting 100% of rural nurses 
Recruiting 100% of rural nurses + study leave soon 
Recruiting 100% of rural nurses + study leave soon + car 
Recruiting 1 00% of rural nurses + study leave soon + 10% increase + car 
Recruiting 75% of rural nurses + study leave soon + 20% increase 
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ID 
B3 
E1 
E2 
E4 
E5 
B4 
E1 
E2 
E4 
E5 
ICER for 1 
cohort 
R 213,170 
R 252,608 
R 318,519 
R 558,983 
R 800,428 
R 211,270 
R 252,994 
R 327,968 
R 607,832 
R 1,574,226 
ICER for 40 
cohorts 
R 210,875 
R 327,324 
R 239,019 
R 522,584 
R 758,942 
R 200,215 
R 242,089 
R 310,331 
R 565,197 
R 1,471,745 
In addition, the selection of more rural area-friendly individuals coupled with additional incentives 
would also remain more cost-effective than equivalent measures undertaken with the current 
population. In fact, as clearly demonstrated by Figure 9.7, there seems to be an almost linear 
relationship between the cost-effectiveness of options and the proportion of rural students. 
The cost-effectiveness frontier of the entirely rural population completely dominates all the policy 
options that can be undertaken with a population of only 75% of rural individuals, which in turn 
offers policy-makers options that are all more cost-effective than those currently available. 
Interestingly, the interventions deemed cost-effective with the new nursing population structure 
are the same as those found cost-effective for the entire nursing population. This tends to 
reiterate the interest of using attractive incentives that may not be based entirely on financial 
rewards. 
Figure 9.7: Cost-effectiveness plane showing the average expected incremental costs and 
effects of interventions with different populations (for 40 cohorts) 
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Note: the incremental costs and effects are all calculated in reference to the current situation (in terms of 
job conditions and population structure) 
To put these results in context, some additional simulations were undertaken to understand what 
the effect would be if an undesired change in the structure of the nursing population, where fewer 
people from rural background would become nurses (0% or 25% only of the nursing population 
was simulated to be from rural backgrounds). The results, presented in Appendix 9.7, show that 
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this change in population would decrease the number of rural nurses-years1o3, and that 
increasing the number of rural nurse-years from its present level would be very costly (about 
R350,000 per additional rural nurse-year if the population was entirely urban). 
9.4. Discussion 
9.4.1. Summary of key findings 
This chapter presented an economic analysis of HR policy interventions, based on outcomes 
generated by stated preference techniques and embedded in a Markov model, and costs 
estimated with secondary data. The analysis assessed a variety of policies that tried to alter the 
working conditions of nurses currently working (downstream measures), as well as interventions 
based on the selection of more individuals likely to take up rural posts (upstream measures). 
Several clear messages arise from the findings. 
First, most of the strategies relying almost entirely on direct financial incentives are strictly 
dominated by other interventions, meaning that better outcomes can be achieved at a lower price. 
Second, amongst all the simulated downstream measures, the ones that were most cost-effective 
offered the possibility of study leave to rural nurses after two years in post. This result confirms 
the importance of this incentive, and the small additional cost it represents (compared to salary 
costs) makes it the most financially attractive option. Finally, the analysis clearly showed that 
upstream measures, based entirely on the selection of more nursing students who are more likely 
to accept positions in rural areas (people with rural backgrounds), are more cost-effective than 
downstream ones. Furthermore the analysis showed that all of the interventions would be most 
cost-effective if the proportion of rural nurses was higher. 
9.4.2. Discussion of results 
This study is the first to try and evaluate the cost-effectiveness of different policy interventions to 
attract nurses to rural areas. The economic analysis presented here represents a significant 
improvement from a situation where none of these policy decisions was informed by a 
transparent attempt to estimate costs and effects. Due to the lack of similar existing studies, it is 
difficult to compare the ICER obtained to equivalent studies. However, it is possible to calculate 
the average discounted cost of a rural-nurse year (see details on the calculation in Appendix 9.8). 
Assuming that the cost of a nurse relates only to salary (excluding the cost of specialist training 
103 In the absence of intervention or even with study leave offered to nurses in rural posts if the population were 
entirely urban. 
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for example), then the present value of an average rural nurse-year is R238,324. This means that 
the willingness to pay for a rural nurse year is currently at least equal to that value. Assuming that 
the government is not ready to pay more than that threshold (therefore Amin=R238,324) the cost-
effective interventions are the simple upstream interventions104 (ICERu<A.min). However this 
threshold is certainly under-estimated because it does not incorporate training costs paid to some 
of the nurses who are already currently offered study leave to specialise. Besides, if the South 
African government is willing to increase access to health services in rural areas, it implies the 
value of a rural nurse-year (to the government) is higher than this. Given that the cost per 
additional rural nurse year under the most effective downstream policy is just slightly higher than 
an under-estimated willingness-to-pay threshold of the government (ICERE1= R 241,073> Amin= 
R238,324) it is reasonable to believe that offering study leave to rural nurses is probably a cost-
effective downstream measure. 
The particular findings for South Africa suggest that guaranteeing to nurses the possibility to 
specialise later is the most cost-effective "downstream" measure. Such policies have been used 
in different settings, but mostly for doctors, who had to work in a rural area before being able to 
specialise. Yet such experiences have been closer to coercive measures than actual incentives. 
In some developing countries, efforts have been made to promote education opportunities for 
staff in rural areas (Mauritius Ministry of Health and Quality of Life, 2003, Wibulpolprasert and 
Pengpaiboon, 2003, Drager et al., 2006), but guaranteeing some (paid) study leave to specialise 
remains to be introduced. In addition, despite this range of experiences, neither the cost nor the 
effect of these policies have ever been calculated. Yet the modelling presented here suggests 
that despite possible adverse effects (specialist nurses not returning to rural areas or the public 
sector generally), such interventions are more cost-effective than any alternative. 
Furthermore, the work presented here indicates that financial incentives are only relatively cost-
ineffective options to attract health workers to rural areas. Direct financial incentives were found 
to be dominated options in all configurations, even when one excluded the possibility of offering 
study leave to nurses. This is a critical finding which contrasts with most attempts in developed 
and developing countries to attract health workers to under-served areas (see the literature 
review in Chapter 2). Although the findings presented here are specific to a particular sample of 
the nursing workforce in South Africa, it is likely that similar results could hold for other cadres 
and other settings. All it takes is the identification of some intervention that would be much less 
costly than salary increases and whose effects would be quite important. The case of the car 
104 Selecting more nurses from rural backgrounds, without any form of incentive. 
278 
allowance here is quite interesting. Although it is a financial incentive, its effect is certainly greater 
than an equivalent amount of money because it encompasses some "status" effect. 
In addition, the results presented here have underlined the importance of understanding the 
heterogeneity of job preferences amongst health workers, as they can have important 
consequences for policy planning. In the case of South Africa, the differences in job preferences 
between individuals from rural and urban backgrounds directly translate into the possibility of 
addressing an acute policy issue (staff shortages in rural areas) with more cost-effective policies. 
There is enough evidence in the literature to suggest that selecting individuals from rural areas is 
probably an effective way to address rural shortages (Brooks et al., 2002, Lehmann et al., 2008). 
Here it was demonstrated that it was also the most cost-effective policy. More in-depth 
information about the heterogeneity of preferences might be able to reveal other (cost-effective) 
policy levers for policy-makers. 
Finally, this work provides some insight into the complexity underlying the costing of national 
policies where resources are individuals, whose costs are driven by complex dynamics. There 
has been very little done to cost the financial resources needed to employ health professionals 
under different situations and positions. Some recent efforts in several low- and middle-income 
countries to cost HR policies have highlighted the difficulties in accessing good quality data 
(McCoy et al., 2008, Vujicic et al., 2009). These studies highlight the challenges involved if 
researchers want to undertake more refined cost estimates, which could help develop more 
refined, individual-based, cost-effectiveness models. 
9.4.3. Limitations 
As the first study undertaken to assess the relative cost-effectiveness of various policy 
interventions to attract more health workers to rural areas, it is important to highlight potential 
limitations with the analysis. 
First, the costs may have been under-estimated. 
For downstream measures, all cost-effective interventions comprised the possibility to 
obtain study leave earlier. Whilst particular efforts were made to estimate the cost of providing 
that year of education to nurses, these estimations assumed that no infrastructure or equipment 
cost would be incurred as a result of the interventions (i.e. there would not be a need to build new 
buildings or classrooms). However, if the policies are successful, large numbers of students 
cannot probably be accommodated within existing infrastructures, and there could be an 
additional cost. However, this cost would be shared by other government interventions (e.g. 
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regular nursing training). Another aspect that was not casted in the economic analysis is the 
expenditures that would be incurred if the health authorities decided to replace rural nurses while 
they are on study leave. In the present circumstances, the South African government does not 
hire additional nurses when some leave their post to undertake a one-year specialist training. 
This is partly explained by the fact that during their one-year training, nurses continue to work in 
some facilities during rotations. At present, due to the limited number of nurses from rural areas 
who are offered study leave, the provision of care in under-served areas is not disturbed much. 
However, if a systematic effort was made to guarantee study leave to rural nurses, this situation 
could change. In that case, it is possible that the government could wish to employ 'replacement' 
nurses to cover for those would be on study leave. On the other hand, if such nurses were to be 
hired, their costs would be mitigated by the benefit of having them in rural areas. Although the 
model did not take the replacement cost into account, it did account for the loss in rural nurse-
years resulting from the study leave. It is possible that these two could have balanced each other 
out, and that the absence of replacement nurses does not invalidate the results of the model. 
Similarly, the cost of upstream measures also systematically hypothesised that the 
selection of more individuals from rural areas would not create additional costs. This assumed 
that achieving a proportion of 75% rural graduates would just require a particular effort in the 
selection of students already applying to nursing studies. However, barriers might exist that 
prevent individuals with rural backgrounds from applying to higher education (information barrier, 
financial costs, etc.). These barriers could be overcome by additional bursaries, or information 
campaigns, but those would have a cost, which has not been accounted for here. Another way to 
attract more rural graduates, adopted by many countries, has been to decentralise training 
institutions to rural areas (Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaiboon, 2003, Grobler et al., 2009). This 
would also be a way to ensure a higher proportion of rural nursing graduates, which would incur 
non-negligible costs. 
Second, the perspective taken for the cost-effectiveness analysis might have overlooked some 
detrimental effects. It is usually recommended to adopt a societal perspective, because it can 
detect cost shifting between sectors if they occur. For example, it is reasonable to assume that 
public policies offering higher salaries for nurses in rural areas could introduce distortions on the 
labour market, and increase the marginal cost of a nurse overall. Consequently, this could lead to 
a reduction of the nursing workforce in the labour market as fewer nurses could be hired (if 
budgets were held constant), which would lead to a reduction in the well-being of patients. Such 
adverse effects suggest that the overall effect might not necessarily be positive, unlike that seen 
when taking a limited government's perspective. Furthermore, adverse effects on urban nurses 
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were not accounted for, despite the structure of the Markov model whereby initial increases in the 
number of rural nurses automatically decrease urban nurses. Despite these issues, there are 
reasons to reject a societal perspective, and consider a government perspective only. First, in 
practice, it would be difficult to evaluate all the relevant costs and benefits to be included in an 
economic evaluation taking a societal perspective. For example, to evaluate the financial loss 
incurred by the private sector of a nurse, further assumptions would have to be made on the 
monetary value of a private nurse compared to a public nurse. Second, the potential effects that 
are excluded from a government perspective are likely to have little impact on the overall results. 
Possible negative effects in the private sector could only lead to minor costs to patients (e.g. 
increase in premiums to pay for higher salaries to nurses), which would be negligible compared to 
the ones modelled here. Regarding negative effects for the patients consulting public facilities in 
urban areas, it is possible to assume that the benefits gained by patients in remote under-served 
areas would have been greater than the loss to patients in urban areas, which are neither short of 
facilities nor of staff. Of course, such an argument can only be held on the condition that the 
policies do not create shortages in urban areas, by draining all the public staff there. The results 
of the Markov model described in detail in the previous chapter provide some reassurance about 
that, as they showed that the proportion of staff in urban areas was never smaller than that in 
rural areas. 
A third series of limitations in this economic analysis relates to the lack of data to model the costs 
of interventions. As a result, many assumptions had to be made to gauge the costs of the 
interventions simulated. Some assumptions were made relative to the cost of housing (for 
example, no detailed data could be found on the weighted average costs of housing). Others 
were made on the cost of providing education for nurses. For this intervention, it is likely that the 
costs used might have under-estimated the actual costs of providing education, in particular when 
many more students take-up post training courses as in education strategies. Indeed, having 
more students is likely to increase fixed costs such as the cost of building bigger facilities or the 
administrative costs induced by the management of more students. But the most important 
hypothesis concerned the salaries paid to nurses, by simplifying the possible career paths to five 
possible options. As expected, the results showed that salaries are the most important costs, 
representing more than 90% of all costs in these interventions. Therefore, under-estimating the 
costs of paying the nursing salaries would directly under-estimate the cost of the interventions. 
But the major problem is that it is difficult to ascertain whether the salary costs were over- or 
under-estimated. Although three of the five career paths were specifically chosen to try and 
represent some of the more costly nursing careers in the public sector, the absence of data on 
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that topic prevents definitive conclusions. Besides, even if the probabilistic sensitivity analysis has 
avoided some of these pitfalls by drawing various estimates of the weights given to each one of 
the five career paths, the actual salary structure of these paths was never changed. These 
caveats suggest that the cost estimates might have been inaccurate. However, the relative cost 
of one policy to another was systematically based on the same assumptions. Even if they were 
inaccurate, the relative change in costs would only have been caused by the change in effects 
(the number of nurses to be paid), but the structure of the underlying costs would have remained 
the same. Therefore, providing the change in effects between one option and another was 
relatively well modelled, the relative cost-effectiveness of one option compared to another should 
have be well estimated as incremental costs would not have been biased by inaccurate cost 
estimates. 
A fourth caveat in this analysis pertains to the way the model values the outcomes of the policies. 
In terms of effects, the model assumes an equal benefit whether the nurse staying in the rural 
area is young and inexperienced, or older and experienced. Both are equivalent to one rural-
nurse year. This hypothesis may therefore reduce the benefits provided by the presence of 
experienced and productive nurses. Taking into account their productivity and knowledge, it could 
be argued that the value of a nurse is an increasing function of time, up a certain point. This 
limitation is particularly critical as the costs in the model do reflect the differences in the 
productivity and role of nurses. Because they are mostly based on salaries, which increase with 
experience, the costs of a nurse towards the end of a cohort is higher than that of a beginning 
nurse. It would be desirable to address this issue, given that the results of the model prove that 
policies that are cost-effective are the ones that are particularly good at attracting young and 
inexperienced nurses (e.g. education policies attracting nurses before they specialise). It is also 
an important issue considering the underlying structure of the model, where the high turnover 
rates at the beginning of the work life suggest that the majority of rural (young) nurses leave for 
urban areas and private facilities. A related issue concerns the assumption made about upstream 
measures, where it is implicitly assumed that more rural individuals can be recruited into the 
nursing profession without decreasing the selection standards (and obtain an equal 'quality' of 
nurses). Although the high number of applications suggests that this is not an unreasonable 
assumption, it remains to be confirmed. 
A fifth limitation stems from the exclusive reliance on stated preference outputs coupled to 
numerous assumptions made to set up the Markov model. A detailed discussion on the external 
validity of DCEs can be found in section 6.5.3, while a broader discussion on the various 
limitations of outcome measures can be found in the discussion section of the last chapter. 
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Although they do not fix all the problems, the use of PSA and CEAFs contribute to taking into 
account the uncertainty of these parameters in the model estimates. 
Finally, the model presented here fails to take into account the complexity of the reality in general, 
and that of policy implementation in developing countries in particular. 
First, one of the critical underlying assumptions is that there is a demand for nurses in 
rural areas, which remains constant over time. Therefore this implies that such demand remains 
constant and is neither mitigated by the successes of the policies, nor by potential population 
movements between rural and urban areas which would decrease the demand for nurses in the 
former areas. Although this might be a restrictive and unrealistic assumption, it is reasonable for 
the purposes of the modelling to consider only the supply-side decisions of nurses and consider 
that 'all things remain equal' on the demand side. 
Second, the model used is unlikely to help policy-makers understand the heterogeneity in 
preferences and policy effects that could stem from the diversity of rural areas. For example, it is 
likely that some results could be applicable to certain rural areas (for example those around the 
regional capital of Mmabatho, in the North West province), but not in the most remote areas of 
the Northern Cape Province. This heterogeneity was not captured by the cost-effectiveness 
model, which assumed homogeneous effect for all rural areas. Therefore the model might have 
over-estimated the effects of policy interventions, if respondents had in mind an "average" rural 
area that might be more attractive than more remote ones. 
Third, the economic analysis did not incorporate the potential costs and inefficiencies 
involved in the implementation of such policies. In the real world, failure to implement the 
proposed policies adequately can lead to increased costs, possible frustrations and adverse 
effects (Penn-Kekana et al., 2004, Walker and Gilson, 2004). Applied to the simulated policies, it 
is plausible to imagine that the government's failure to guarantee study leave to rural nurses 
within two years (as indicated in all the cost-effective policies) could create resentment and 
frustration amongst the nursing profession, and all projected effects might wane. Similarly, 
upstream policies based on quotas favouring the recruitment of certain groups of the population 
could face a lot of political obstacles, and the social and political costs of implementing them 
might outweigh the expected benefits. Indeed, groups who would be discriminated, or even 
nursing trade unions, would certainly oppose reforms that would create inequalities of 
opportunities between individuals. In the particular political context of South Africa, this issue 
might not be taken lightly. 
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Overall, despite its simplicity, this cost-effectiveness model provides an invaluable framework to 
analyse a difficult policy problem. The fact that other problems might derail the effects of policies 
envisaged here is somehow another issue, which pertains to broader governance problems, 
requiring separate analyses and answers. 
9.4.4. Implications for policy and research 
A. Implication for policy 
Because this study is the first to use stated preference techniques to inform these policy issues, 
and because the model presented a number of limitations both for the evaluation of costs and 
effects, some caution should be taken when considering the policy implications of the findings. 
Nonetheless, the work presented here has several implications for HR policies to attract health 
workers to rural areas and leads to considering new ways to improve the planning and design of 
human resources policies in general. 
In principle, in any economic analysis the alternative with the lowest cost per achievement gain 
would be the most desirable. However, it is important to consider whether differences in cost-
effectiveness ratios are large or small. If the differences are small, it is probably wise to weigh 
more fully other criteria in making the decision such as the ease of implementation or previous 
experiences. If the differences in cost-effectiveness are large, it is advisable to give greater 
confidence to the cost-effectiveness criteria while still considering other factors that were not 
considered in the analysis. In the present case, the results suggest that with an additional cost 
per rural nurse-year of just R213, 170, the South African government should try to increase the 
proportion of rural nursing students up to 75% to attract staff to rural areas. The more cost-
effective option of enrolling into nursing only individuals from rural background was used here to 
illustrate the effect of selecting more "rural-friendly" individuals, but it is certainly not an option that 
could be politically envisaged. 
Failing to adopt upstream interventions, the government should guarantee study leave sooner to 
rural nurses, as this is cost-effective if the government is ready to spend at least about R250,000 
per nurse in rural areas each year. Alternatively1os, the government could decide to offer a car 
allowance of R500 every month to rural nurses, which would increase rural staff at a cost of about 
R291 ,000 per additional nurse-year. The large difference between these two ICERs suggests that 
it is reasonable for the South African government to use the first option. Yet, further consideration 
1os If providing study leave sooner could not be proposed. 
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should be given to other aspects, such as the problems that might be encountered by the 
government, if it was seen as granting an undue advantage to rural nurses. 
The results summarised above therefore suggest that in South Africa policy-makers should 
design policies that give priority access to health workers from rural areas to specialist training 
and study leave. This seems to be not only one of the most effective incentives to attract them to 
rural areas, as underlined in the previous chapter, but in fact the most cost-effective. The 
economic analysis also rules out the use of strong financial incentives. This is a key result for 
policy-makers, as direct financial incentives have been one of the most widely used policies to 
address rural shortages both in developed and developing countries (Dussault and Franceschini, 
2006, Grobler et al., 2009). Even allowing for more uncertainty due to the various caveats of the 
model used, this study has clearly demonstrated that salary increases are highly unlikely to be 
cost-effective. This should be taken into account by policy-makers in contexts where addressing 
the issue of health personnel in rural areas is critical, while budgetary resources are scarce. 
Finally, despite the emphasis given to human resources for health in the past few years in 
developing countries, the lack of rigorous planning tools and data is regularly brought up as a 
reason why governments fail to address the HR crisis effectively. Despite its relative complexity, 
this work demonstrates that it might be feasible to inform the design of policy options, as well as 
provide information on their financial desirability. This complements recent efforts that have been 
carried out to improve prospective HR planning (WHO, 2006, Vujicic et al., 2009). Further work 
should be pursued in closer collaboration with governments to refine the tools developed here 
and adapt them more precisely to the needs of policy-makers. Such engagement could also 
provide a valuable opportunity to improve the model features and assumptions. 
B. Implication for research 
The research presented here suggests at least three different further explorations of the cost-
effectiveness of HR policy interventions. 
First, further research would be welcome to refine the model presented here. In particular, the 
costing of policy interventions was not informed using particularly accurate data. Further data on 
salary costs could be collected to obtain a more reliable estimation of the ICERs. This attempt to 
improve the model could also benefit from better data to estimate a structural Markov model. In 
particular, it would be desirable to understand better the movements from one sector to another 
to improve the reliability of the transition matrix used. It is hoped that this will be achieved by 
following up over time the group of nurses who took part in this research. Although the sample is 
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small (377 nurses at baseline), it should be sufficient to develop better assumptions for various 
model parameters. 
Second, as noted in the previous chapter, several simplifications were made regarding the 
effectiveness of the policies. It would be interesting to remove some and test whether the results 
still hold. Various assumptions could be tested. The effects of policy interventions could be 
modelled to decrease with time and successive cohorts. This would certainly be a more realistic 
approach. One could thereby test how the cost-effectiveness of different scenarios varies 
according to the time horizon chosen. This is particularly relevant to real decision-making 
processes of government who might prefer options cost-effective in the short-term over those 
optimal in the long run. 
Third, this research provides helpful insight for the future use of DCEs to inform economic 
analysis of policy options. Initially, the DCE used here to simulate the effects of policy 
interventions was not designed purposefully to serve as input into a cost-effectiveness analysis. 
As a result, some attributes and levels introduced in the DCE provided ambiguous or incomplete 
information for the costing of interventions. For example, the housing attribute was not clearly 
defined. The wording in the DCE mentioned "subsidised" housing, but it was never clear the 
amount that would be subsidised, neither whether the cost of housing was expected to be 
different from one place to another. As a result, various assumptions were made to cost that 
policy. It is also unclear what respondents might have had in mind when they read that element. 
Future research using the results of DCEs to measure the effects of policy intervention should 
have this objective from the beginning and make sure that attributes are clearly defined, not only 
for the purpose of respondents' understanding of the DCE, but also for costing purposes. 
9.5. Conclusion 
Although choice experiments have been recently used to predict the uptake of jobs or specific 
health programmes (Gerard et al., 2008, Hanson and Jack, 2008, Kolstad, 2010), those studies 
never used such outputs from DCE studies to further investigate the cost-effectiveness of 
interventions modelled. This chapter therefore proposed an innovative use for choice experiment 
results, as inputs to a cost-effectiveness model, measuring the effects of possible policy options. 
It is likely that this application could open new possibilities for researchers and policy-makers 
alike to design effective interventions. Indeed, carrying out impact evaluation studies to obtain 
precise and rigorous measures of effects is not always feasible or desirable, due to cost, ethical 
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or practical constraints (Ranson et al., 2006). This is particularly true in the case of complex 
interventions, where various incentives are combined. In this context, DCEs can play a crucial 
role as an alternative cheap and quick means to develop the evidence base, and help 
governments make informed decisions. 
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Chapter 10 · Discussion and Conclusion 
10.1. Key findings 
This thesis set out to explore the determinants of job choices in the context of the nursing labour 
market, with a view to discuss the design of efficient policies to address the shortage in rural 
areas. Results were based on data from the middle-income country setting of South Africa. This 
section brings together the main findings from the results chapters, presenting them according to 
the overall objectives of the thesis. 
10.1.1. Exploring nurses' altruism (Objective 1) 
According to the conceptual framework, altruistic individuals were hypothesised to self-select into 
the nursing profession (H1 ). The first objective of the thesis was therefore to test this hypothesis 
before embarking on an empirical analysis of the determinants of nurses' job choices. The aim 
was to measure, compare and contrast South African nurses' altruism to that of other individuals 
and other groups of nurses. 
Altruism was measured quantitatively by playing the dictator game, a behavioural economic 
game. Nurses had to decide whether they wanted to allocate part of a sum of money 
(corresponding to the daily salary of an early career nurse) between themselves and an 
anonymous recipient. 
The results suggest that altruistic individuals probably self-select into the nursing profession. 
Indeed, nursing students are always systematically more generous than economic students (in 
South Africa), and, from the literature, other participants who have played the dictator game. The 
similarity of results obtained from nurses in South Africa, Kenya and Thailand strengthen the 
hypothesis of a common altruistic nursing culture. 
However, when altruism towards patients specifically is measured, the decisions made by nursing 
and economic students in South Africa are virtually identical. The results also suggest that, unlike 
other survey participants in other settings, South African nurses do not see patients as more 
"deserving" (Branas-Garza, 2006, Carpenter et al., 2008) than their peers. 
Finally, findings show that some socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age) and societal 
values affect the generosity displayed in experimental games, in a way that is in agreement with 
other empirical findings and the expected effect of moral and social motivations. 
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10.1.2. Studying the determinants of nurses' career preferences (Objective 2) 
The conceptual framework was built upon the hypothesis that preferences for jobs differ across 
individuals. In particular, altruistic nurses were hypothesised to be more attracted by public jobs 
than other jobs, and within public jobs to favour rural jobs. This was derived from the assumption 
that more altruistic nurses increase their utility through the increase in the marginal benefits to 
patients derived from their presence. It was also hypothesised that individuals from rural areas 
would be more likely than others to choose rural posts. 
These hypotheses were tested empirically through the use a labelled discrete choice experiment 
specifically constructed to replicate the four main job opportunities of South African nurses when 
they enter the labour market (private job, overseas job, rural and urban jobs in the public sector). 
The choice of a stated preference technique was justified by the lack of appropriate data on 
actual choices, and a desire to understand the trade-offs made between the different options. 
As expected, good job characteristics were found to be associated with an increase in the utility 
of a job, conversely for bad working conditions or job characteristics. The results also showed 
that individuals valued money differently across the different job opportunities. This suggests that 
they expect employers to apply the theory of compensating wage differentials and compensate 
them for the various unpleasant non-financial aspects of the jobs. In particular, South African 
nurses expect higher salaries overseas, probably to be compensated for the cost of leaving one's 
family and country, and to cope with the higher cost of living. A higher compensation was also 
expected in rural areas, possibly to compensate for the lack of amenities and difficult working 
conditions. 
The analysis confirmed the hypothesis (H6) that individuals with rural backgrounds or having a 
positive attitude towards rural areas were more likely to choose positions in rural areas than in 
urban areas. Having trained in a rural province instead of an urban one was also found to be 
significantly associated with rejecting a job in urban areas. This confirms the hypothesis that 
enjoying life in rural areas (through childhood, training or other channel) increases the utility 
derived from a job located there. 
The role of altruism in job choices was less clearly demonstrated. Overall experimental measures 
of altruism were not significantly correlated with particular job preferences. However, greater 
altruism in the dictator game towards poor recipients was associated with a preference for public 
jobs, and rural ones in particular. To some extent. this confirms, albeit tentatively, hypotheses H2 
and H3. In addition, survey measures showed that more selfless and pro-poor values are 
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correlated with a preference for public sector jobs, while more conservative and individualistic 
views are associated with a greater preference for private jobs. Other individual characteristics 
that mattered included the type of training institution, age, gender and race. 
Finally, the choice experiment predicted that under prevailing labour market conditions, 12% of 
nurses would choose a job overseas, and the rest of the nursing population would split evenly 
between the three other career opportunities. Although lack of data prevented the comparison of 
most of these predictions with actual data, available figures on emigration flows suggest that the 
model substantially over-estimates emigration decisions made by South African nurses. 
10.1.3. Assessing the effects of policies to attract nurses to rural areas (Objective 3) 
The third objective of the thesis was to investigate the differing effects of HR interventions to 
attract more nurses to rural areas. The empirical approach taken to address this objective was to 
use another choice experiment, which was restricted to rural and urban jobs in the public sector. 
The choice experiment was purposefully designed to propose more attractive features in rural 
jobs than in urban ones. 
The analysis of the heterogeneity of job preferences amongst individuals carried out here partly 
concurred with the one performed on the whole set of job opportunities. In particular, individuals 
with rural backgrounds, those who had trained in a more rural province or who had positive 
attitudes towards rural areas were found to be more likely to prefer rural jobs than others. Yet, 
unlike what had been found in the analysis of preferences for all labour market opportunities, 
neither altruism nor any other measure of pro-social attitude was found to be associated with a 
preference for rural jobs. The final analysis only showed an association between pro-poor attitude 
(measured through a survey) and a preference for rural posts, which was significant at p<0.13. 
The analysis confirmed the presence of heterogeneous tastes within the population regarding the 
different policy levers. A further analysis showed that the origin of nursing students (whether they 
came from rural backgrounds or not) was a key factor explaining that heterogeneity. In effect, 
people from rural areas are significantly less sensitive to most of the incentives used to attract 
nurses to rural areas. 
The estimated model was then used to predict different uptake of rural vs. urban posts. Under 
baseline (current) conditions, 70% of nurses choose a position in an urban area, while 30% would 
choose one in rural areas. These figures could not be compared to actual choices, as the scarce 
data available do not provide refined information about rural and urban posts. 
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As expected from the regression results, a different management system or quicker promotion 
would not affect this distribution much. In contrast, financial incentives (salary increases and car 
allowance) have strong effects, and the guarantee to obtain study leave four years sooner than is 
usual provides the third most powerful policy lever (after the salary increases of 20% or 30%). 
The simulations also showed that a combination of different incentives could achieve a high 
uptake of rural posts. 
Finally, different policy simulations were undertaken with synthetic populations which varied in 
their proportion of rural nurses (0%, 25%, 75% or 100%). This analysis clearly demonstrated the 
potential positive effect of upstream policy measures that would seek to recruit more rural 
graduates. Indeed, the analysis showed that the more rural nurses in the population the higher 
the proportion of nurses who will choose to work in rural areas. 
10.1.4. Measuring the relative cost-effectiveness of HR interventions (Objective 4) 
The final objective of the thesis was to determine the relative cost-effectiveness of different 
policies that could be employed by the South African government to attract nurses to rural areas. 
The analysis estimated the cost-effectiveness of policies that tried to alter the working conditions 
of nurses currently working (downstream measures), as well as interventions based on the 
selection of individuals more likely to take up rural posts (upstream measures). This economic 
analysis was based on outcomes generated by stated preference techniques and embedded in a 
Markov model that was constructed to simulate the movements of staff in the long run within the 
public sector (between rural and urban posts), and also between the public and private sectors. 
The results determined that direct financial incentives are not cost-effective strategies to attract 
nurses to rural areas. Among all the downstream measures simulated, the ones found to be cost-
effective all guarantee rural nurses the possibility of study leave after two years in post. Finally, 
the analysis clearly demonstrated that increasing the number of nurses who are more likely to 
accept positions in rural areas (those with rural backgrounds) is the most cost-effective approach. 
The results also suggested that cost-effective downstream measures would bring even better 
results if they were offered to a nursing population that would include a greater proportion of rural 
nurses than the current one. 
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1 0.2. Strengths and limitations of the thesis 
In each of the five empirical chapters, the contribution of this work to the existing literature was 
discussed. The specific limitations of some of the methodological approaches and tools or 
analyses were also presented. This section brings together the main elements discussed earlier 
and reflects on the overall contribution and limitations of the thesis. 
10.2.1. Reflections on the overall empirical approach 
The strengths and limitations of the empirical approach were mainly shaped by the use of 
particular methods, as discussed below. However, some comments can be made about the 
overall empirical study design. As explained in Chapter 3, this work was embedded in a cross-
country project and constructed upon the South African component of that study. This general 
framework has determined various decisions and constraints that had to be taken into account. 
First, the CREHS project was conceived as a cohort study that would examine issues of nurse 
attraction and retention in rural areas. To avoid some of the biases that would have arisen with 
the sampling of nurses already in post (see Chapter 3), the cohort study was designed around 
nurses about to graduate and enter the labour market. This meant that the study population was 
imposed on this thesis. Similar research could have been undertaken with working nurses 
permitting the investigation of other sources of heterogeneity of job preferences (e.g. past job 
experiences). This is potentially relevant as the economic literature has recurrently underlined the 
importance of reference-dependent preferences. After they spend some time in a work 
environment, individuals' preferences are certainly influenced and framed by their own 
experience and that of their friends and colleagues. For example, it is unlikely that any study 
participant had previously worked overseas or in the private sector, although all would have had 
some experience of the public sector (through rotations during their training). However, surveying 
graduate nurses gave the opportunity to provide a baseline on work preferences at the beginning 
of a nurse's career, free from the multiple biases and influences described above. The 
continuation of the cohort study will provide a rich dataset to study these factors in the future. In 
the meantime, this study provides valuable information about the preferences of a population 
whose decisions are probably easier to change or shape than those of nurses more settled in 
their lives and perceptions. 
Second, sampling graduating nursing students made it impossible to investigate nurses' actual 
career choices. Consequently, the investigation of career preferences (Chapter 6) had to rely on 
a choice experiment. On the one hand, this approach is limited by the reliability of participants' 
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stated preferences, which may differ from their actual decisions (see previous discussions on that 
point). On the other hand, the DCE used gave the opportunity to measure the preferences of 
individuals in a market with perfect information. It is also relevant for policies to understand the 
preferences of nurses about to enter the labour market, as it may be easier to shape and alter 
their behaviours. 
Third, building upon an existing study meant that the scope to influence the content of the tools 
was somewhat limited. For example, the discrete choice experiment assessing the impact of 
different policy interventions was the product of collaborative work between researchers from 
three countries. Compromises had to be made about which attributes to include, and it is likely 
that the tools would have been different had they been developed solely for the purpose of this 
PhD. For instance, an alternative option in the policy DCE would have been to include a third job 
(in the private sector) or an opt-out option. This would probably have made the simultaneous use 
of the two choice experiments easier. However, extra questions were inserted in the data 
collection tools in South Africa. For example, several questions were added to the self-
administered questionnaire, not to mention the addition of the choice experiment presented in 
Chapter 6 to the rest of the data collection tools. 
Finally, despite these constraints, the opportunity to carry out this work within the CREHS cohort 
study has also opened several research opportunities. First, it provided unique comparisons for 
the experimental economic games that were played in the three countries, with the same 
procedures and populations. The data collection on the cohort study continues, and upcoming 
follow-up surveys will present two special opportunities: some tools will be repeated (dictator 
games and the policy choice experiment), and data on revealed job preferences will be collected 
for each cohort member. Although this goes beyond this thesis (and its timeline), these new data 
will help investigate further some questions that remained unanswered by this work and under-
researched (see below). 
10.2.2. Genera/izability of results 
The sampling of the study population was never designed to be representative of the South 
African nursing population. Somewhat unexpectedly, the population study can seem broadly 
representative of the nursing population of South Africa (based on the few socio-demographic 
elements available on the latter). However, sampling was only done in two provinces, and it is 
likely that use of alternative socio-demographic indicators would have resulted in different 
conclusions. In fact, failing to include individuals from other rural and urban parts of the country 
probably precludes a robust generalisation of the results, as one of the core concepts of this work 
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- "rural jobs" or "rural areas" - is likely to be interpreted differently across the provinces of South 
Africa. In addition, as mentioned before, study respondents were exclusively nurses about to 
enter the nursing labour market as Professional Nurses. Therefore their preferences are probably 
not representative of those of more experienced nurses, who would have worked in the public 
and private sectors. 
It would be even more ill-advised to attempt to generalise some of the findings of this empirical 
work beyond the South African context. Preliminary results from the two other countries involved 
in the CREHS cohort study underline the danger of "one size fits all" recommendations when it 
comes to designing human resources policies. For example, these analyses show that the 
influence of salary increases, better education opportunities or even types of facilities differ in size 
and sometimes in direction from one country to another (Blaauw et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, the focus of the analysis of this particular group of South African nurses and the 
limitations of the quantitative methods used are unlikely to change the core insights of the thesis 
on the importance of heterogeneity of preferences in job choices, and their relevance for policy 
design. Most health care workers are unlikely to be monolithic homo economicus, and their labour 
supply decisions will be influenced by different motives, with important implications for the policies 
public authorities might develop to address some of the failures in the health care labour market. 
In fact, there is already a broad literature outside economics showing that exposure to rural areas 
or rural origins are important for understanding health workers' locational preferences (Brooks et 
al., 2002, Lehmann et al., 2008). Preliminary results from Thailand and Kenya also underline the 
heterogeneity of individual preferences between rural and urban jobs (Blaauw and Lagarde, 
2009). 
10.2.3. Reflections on the use of discrete choice experiments 
This thesis has made extensive use of discrete choice experiments, partly so in a very novel way. 
At the same time, some of the results raise questions regarding the limits of that method. 
The work presented here made an innovative use of discrete choice experiments. First, a 
"representative" labelled choice experiment was constructed to replicate the main decisions 
nurses would face in the labour market. This is the first application of DCEs to labour market 
decisions where the objective is to simulate the actual choices made by workers, and not 
specifically to understand the trade-offs made by workers between different job characteristics. 
Here what mattered more were the trade-offs made between different types of jobs. Second, the 
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combination of the outcomes of two choice experiments in a Markov model is an original way to 
simulate movements and choices of workers in the labour markets. Albeit imperfect, it also 
constitutes an alternative to the creation of a complex unique discrete choice experiment that 
would have been the combination of the two DCEs shown here1o6. Third, the use of the predictive 
capability of choice experiments to create the outcome (the number of rural nurse-years) in a 
cost-effectiveness model also opens new possible applications for DCEs to inform policy-making. 
In this work, there were discrepancies between respondents' answers in the two DCEs. While the 
"representative" DCE with private and overseas jobs predicted that about 30% of respondents 
would choose rural jobs and 30% urban ones (an equal split between rural and urban amongst all 
those who would choose public jobs), the "policy" DCE predicted that 70% of respondents would 
choose urban jobs. Although they may simply stem from the differences in the choice sets 
proposed to respondents, these discrepancies raise a number of questions about the 
interpretation of DCE results, and their external validity in general. 
As presented in Chapter 6, the analysis of DCEs relies upon the assumptions of classical 
consumer behaviour theory, and in particular assumes that people have complete rational 
preferences, use all available information to make their choices, and engage in compensatory 
decision-making. If these assumptions hold, then there are two alternative reasons for observing 
such differences. The first comes from the absence of opt-out option in the policy DCE, which will 
have forced people who would have otherwise opted for non-public jobs to make some trade-off. 
Since these people are likely to have preferred urban to rural jobs, they probably contributed to 
increasing the uptake of urban jobs. A second explanation behind this difference is the inclusion 
of different attributes for public jobs in the two choice experiments. It is well known that the 
valuation of a DCE attribute is directly dependent on the valuation of other included attributes, as 
the analysis assumes that trade-offs are made. Therefore different estimates (and predictions) 
from two DCEs with different attributes are to be expected. 
Alternative explanations can be found in behavioural economics, a discipline that has 
incorporated insights from psychology to explore the various obstacles that can compromise what 
is seen as "rational" decision-making in the standard economic framework. A first lesson from 
behavioural economics is that context (in a broad sense) matters (Kahneman, 2003). In DCEs, 
researchers have showed that the position of the cost attribute could influence responses (Kjrer 
et al., 2006). Here, as the ordering of the two choice experiments was never changed (the 
rural/urban DCE was always administered before the "representative" one) respondents may 
1os Such hybrid DCE would have required many choice sets, and therefore a very large sample. 
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have felt encouraged to choose rural jobs, which could have increased their propensity to choose 
them in the second DCE (hence increasing the uptake of rural jobs). Similarly, individuals' 
preferences during the second DCE may have been anchored onto the choices proposed in the 
first one. Through some form of "endowment effect", the framing of rural posts in the first DCE 
(with favourable working conditions such as housing and car allowances) may have continued to 
influence the decision in the second choice experiment. 
All these various explanations are equally plausible, and to some extent probably all played a 
role. These unresolved questions call for further research into the validity of DCEs. 
10.2.4. Reflections on the use of experimental economics 
The empirical approach adopted in this thesis takes forward the empirical economic literature 
using experimental measures of social preferences to predict individual choices or behaviours. 
Two features distinguish this study from the few that have used experimental measures to 
evaluate the impact of values and norms on individual decisions or behaviour (Barr and Serneels, 
2004, Karlan, 2005, Carpenter and Seki, 2006). First, none of these studies has explored the 
relationship between experimental measures and stated preferences. Second, they have not 
used measures of altruism (obtained from dictator games), but have utilised measures of trust or 
reciprocity obtained through the trust game (Berget al., 1995). Most of the experimental literature 
has found that experimental measures of social preferences were good predictors of actual 
behaviours or other measures. For example Karlan (2005) showed that behaviour in trust games 
predicted repayment of loans to a Peruvian group lending micro-finance programme. Other 
experiments have shown a relationship between political participation and dictator game giving 
(Fowler, 2006, Fowler and Kam, 2007), suggesting that the latter may be an externally valid 
indicator of concern for the well-being of others. The erratic correlation (and statistical 
significance) here between experimental measures of altruism and job choices assumed to be 
more attractive to altruistic individuals (public choices and rural ones) raises three questions. 
The first concerns the trust one can have in stated preference techniques and their capacity to 
reflect actual preferences. This issue is discussed at length elsewhere. Until further research 
tests the correspondence between revealed and stated preferences, at least two arguments can 
provide some support to the argument that stated job preferences might be a reasonably good 
proxy for revealed ones. First, there has been some work in other fields showing a high 
correlation between stated and revealed preferences (Louviere, 1988). Second, the application of 
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DCEs to job preferences is likely to pose fewer credibility problems to respondents, who are 
typically used to consider job descriptions. 
The second question concerns the capacity of the dictator game to actually measure 
respondents' altruism. Failure to measure altruism could have stemmed from the caveats 
regarding the experimental procedures used here (see the discussion in Chapter 5). However, 
more generally, it could be a misinterpretation of behaviours in dictator games. This has been a 
recurring debate in the experimental economic literature (Frohlich et al., 2001, Bradsley, 2005, 
Koch and Normann, 2008), and to some extent there is no simple answer. While some posit that 
the anonymity and privacy of behavioural games allow the free expression of self-interest 
(Hoffman et al., 1994), others have argued that these two artificial conditions create doubts about 
the veracity of the experiments in the dictators' mind, who then choose to keep most for 
themselves (Frohlich et al., 2001). Yet, in the present study, the correlation between decisions in 
dictator games and societal values tends to corroborate the theoretical validity of dictator games 
as a way to measure underlying values, in the form of generosity and concern for others. 
Furthermore, the irregularities in the association between altruism and job preferences may also 
reflect the "instability" in behaviours observed in the labs. The latter has led researchers to 
question the link between laboratory experiments and real life decisions (Levitt and List, 2007). In 
a study where he observed the behaviours of individuals in the lab and in real situations (List, 
2005), concluded that social preferences observed in the lab were over-estimated compared to 
those observed in real situations. 
Finally, the absence of a link between experimental measures of altruism and job preferences 
questions the hypothesis formulated initially, and supported by some literature (Le Grand, 1997, 
Delfgaauw, 2007a, Buurman et al., 2009, Perry et al., 2009), that altruism is a determining factor 
for public jobs or jobs where health workers' action will have a greater impact on others (e.g. rural 
jobs). However, in dealing with nurses and their motivation, this study might tackle a more subtle 
distinction in individual motivations. It has been shown that altruism and concerns for others are 
likely to play a role in the choice of nursing as a profession. To some extent, the experimental 
results in the Chapter 5 have shown that nurses tended to be more altruistic than the traditional 
subjects of dictator games. Working as a nurse, be it in the private or public sector, means that 
they already "serve" or "help" others, their patients. Having a preference for the public or private 
sector is likely to relate to the idea that some patients are more "deserving" or "needy" than 
others. To some extent, this is better captured in the "poor" framing of the dictator game, and in 
fact a more generous attitude in that game is indeed correlated with preferences for rural jobs 
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(p<O.OB). To summarise, this empirical investigation underlines the complexity of the nature and 
role of intrinsic motivation, and the attendant measurement difficulties. 
1 0.3. Policy implications 
Because many of the policy implications that could be inferred from each results chapter have 
already been detailed in the relevant chapter sections, only the broader policy implications of the 
thesis are presented here. 
10.3.1. Money is not all that matters 
The economic analysis of behaviours is mainly concerned with the impact of financial incentives. 
One of the underlying objectives of this thesis was to try and demonstrate empirically that such 
"Econs" presented a too simplistic representation of human decisions. Several findings reinforce 
that assumption. First, altruistic individuals were found to be more attracted by public jobs, 
everything else being equal (i.e. with no particular financial incentive). Similarly, an exposure to 
rural areas (through training or childhood) or a positive attitude towards rural areas was 
associated with a greater willingness to work in rural areas, controlling for all other job 
characteristics. This means that despite recognising the difficult working and living conditions, 
nurses may have intrinsic motives to derive a greater utility from a job with no particular financial 
appeal. Finally, the strong impact of some incentives suggests that money is not the only motive 
driving individuals. For example, the effect of introducing a R500 car allowance was found to be 
more effective to attract nurses to rural areas than an equivalent monthly increase in salary would 
have been (under the assumption of linear salary effect). This is probably due to the status effect 
it may confer to nurses. 
A corollary is that although financial incentives might seem to produce the largest effects, to infer 
their superiority (and lobby for their implementation) fails to account for two facts. The first is the 
heterogeneity of individual preferences for jobs, which means that some individuals actually do 
not need (such large) financial incentives to accept jobs in under-served areas, or might be less 
sensitive to financial incentives, and more to other ones. The second shortcoming of financial 
interventions is that they constitute sub-optimal options from an economic point of view. Indeed, 
as shown in this study, decision-makers can probably always identify alternative incentives, or 
packages of incentives that are effective policy levers, but much less expensive. 
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10.3.2. Attracting an appropriate 11mix" of individuals into nursing 
To a large extent the policy debate in low and middle income countries is focused on the types of 
incentives that should be offered to health workers to entice them to work in under-serviced areas 
(Sempowski, 2004, Henderson and Tulloch, 2008, Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009). What has 
been termed here "upstream" measures, which consist in deliberate interventions aiming to 
attract particular groups of individuals into the profession, have been almost entirely absent from 
this debate. As mentioned in the literature review, these interventions have only ever been 
implemented in developed countries. In the context of South Africa, this thesis suggests that a 
more appropriate selection of students with rural backgrounds, and the nurturing of altruistic 
concerns through nursing education, might help improve the distribution of nurses between 
sectors and regions. 
The clearest policy message emerging from the thesis is that South Africa would benefit from 
increasing the selection of individuals from rural areas, or those having a positive attitude towards 
rural areas. This has been realised in some developed countries through the introduction of 
scholarships or quotas for people from specific under-served areas. An indirect way to increase 
the number of students from rural areas is to set up training programmes or build training 
institutions in under-served areas, in order to favour the enrolment of individuals from these 
areas, as well as provide exposure to rural areas to trainee health professionals. Indeed, positive 
attitude towards rural areas was also found to be strongly associated with a greater willingness to 
take up rural jobs. The development of such a favourable mindset is likely to be encouraged by a 
greater exposure to life and work in rural areas, while exclusive experience in urban areas is 
likely to fuel existing prejudices against rural areas. 
Furthermore, whilst altruism was found to be associated with a greater propensity to choose 
public jobs, South African nurses were found to be less generous towards patients than their 
Kenyan and Thai peers in the dictator game. This would suggest that the enrolment of more 
altruistic individuals into nursing could help mitigate the unequal distribution of nurses between 
the public and the private sector. In practical terms, it is not clear how the selection of altruistic 
individuals could be enhanced, as it is unlikely that dictator games would be played, or even 
could be helpful at all as a screening mechanism (candidates could easily see through the 
objective, and would "cheat" the tool). Yet there are two potential areas for indirect policy 
interventions. 
First, less generous behaviours raise some concerns about some social norms or lack of 
moral motivation that could exist in the nursing community in this country. This finding suggests 
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that greater importance be given in the curriculum to nursing ethics and attitudes towards 
patients. Other studies have highlighted the importance of training in the creation of a shared pool 
of values amongst the nursing profession, and emphasised the role of educators on the formation 
of nurses' values (Haigh and Johnson, 2007). Others have underlined the importance of better 
integrating altruism and other professional values into the nursing curriculum (Shaw and 
Degazon, 2008). 
Second, having chosen nursing reluctantly (i.e. not as one's first choice) was found to 
have a negative impact on the decision to allocate money to the students. It means that those 
students are probably less intrinsically motivated or, if one adheres to the moral interpretation, 
less sensitive to the moral norm that should prevail in the profession. Taking intrinsic motivation 
into account in the selection of nursing students, by favouring those for whom nursing was a first 
choice, could help establish a greater concern for patients in the nursing community. Several 
studies have already underlined the necessity to improve the recruitment of nurses in order to 
screen and "identify appropriate candidates" (Zysberg and Berry, 2005). 
10.3.3. Using research to inform policy 
This thesis was partly developed against the backdrop of a lack of evidence on the effects of 
different interventions to address rural shortages (Grobler et al., 2009, Wilson et al., 2009). The 
health systems literature recommends the implementation of more experimental or quasi-
experimental research to help policy-makers design the most adequate policies: "Rigorous 
studies are needed to evaluate the true effect of these strategies to increase the number of health 
care professionals working in underserved areas" (Grobler et al., 2009). Yet such study designs 
can be complex, costly, or infeasible to undertake, in particular in the case of HR interventions 
which might be difficult to randomise. The present work suggests that quicker, easier and 
cheaper alternative studies could be commissioned by governments to obtain useful information 
and inform their decisions, in particular in contexts where policies are designed more by policy-
makers' intuitions or agendas rather than by evidence. 
With a minimal amount of primary data collection (a cross-sectional survey) and some secondary 
data collected on costs, this thesis showed how it was possible to evaluate the relative cost-
effectiveness of different incentives or combinations of incentives. It also proved the value of 
evaluating the differences in job preferences across population groups to identify policies that 
appear highly cost-effective. 
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1 0.4. Areas for future research 
10.4.1. The role of altruism 
With the development of behavioural and experimental economics, altruism has been 
hypothesised to play a fundamental role in explaining individual behaviours. However, empirical 
evidence on altruism remains scarce. This work attempted to show the role of altruism in 
individual decisions by proving an association between experimental measures of altruism and 
stated preferences. This approach could be extended in several directions. 
First, it remains unclear how best to measure or capture altruism. In particular, the use of 
the dictator game to measure altruism has often been debated. In the study of health 
professionals' altruism and its role in their work decisions and attitudes, it is unclear whether 
experimental measures are the best way to quantify altruism, and if they are, whether the dictator 
game should be framed or not. These results showed a correlation between survey and 
experimental measures of altruism. Although experimental games have been promoted as useful 
measurement tools of social preferences (Glaeser et al., 2000, Ensminger, 2001, Carpenter, 
2002, Karlan, 2005), their sensitivity (that is their capacity to capture meaningful and significant 
differences in behaviours) remains unexplored. 
Second, health professionals may be relevant for the study of altruism (as explained in 
Chapter 2), however, labour market choices may not have been the ideal choice for studying a 
link between altruistic motives and health workers' behaviours. A natural extension of this work 
could look at the role of altruism in a more interactive setting between health providers and 
patients. Outcomes of interest could include health workers' attitudes and effort in the treatment 
of patients. 
Finally questions that remain under-researched are the extent to which altruism is 
shaped by external factors, and how it evolves over time. Altruism is often presented, to some 
extent, as an intrinsic characteristic of individuals. However the simple fact that age has been 
repeatedly found to be associated with greater altruism suggests that pro-social concerns vary 
over time, shaped by changing situations and circumstances (older people might be more 
generous because they have accumulated more capital). In the study of the influence of altruism 
on health workers' decisions and behaviours, another dimension concerns the study of external 
working conditions on individual altruism. More precisely, two series of factors could play an 
important role. First, collective norms and behaviours of peers could influence individual 
behaviours. Second, altruism may be crowded out by job dissatisfaction and poor working 
conditions. The cohort study upon which this thesis was built presents the opportunity to study 
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some of these factors, as cohort participants are still being followed and dictator games can be 
repeated over time. 
10.4.2. Using choice experiments to study labour market decisions 
As highlighted before, this work has drawn attention to the interest and relevance of choice 
experiments for informing HR policy design. But more generally, this work highlighted the use of 
discrete choice experiments to study labour market decisions and behaviours. This could be 
developed in two directions. 
First, although the theoretical validity of DCEs is supported by the fact that the results obtained in 
most choice experiments (including this one) confirmed some a priori expectations (Ryan and 
Gerard, 2002), further research is needed to test their external validity. The comparison of stated 
and revealed preferences that has been made in disciplines other than health economics has 
generally supported the external validity of DCEs (Louviere, 1988, Louviere et al., 2000). Yet, 
similar research has still to be done in health economics, in particular for DCEs applied to labour 
supply decisions, where it could be relatively easy to collect data on actual choices. However, 
beyond it is probably important for researchers using DCEs to go beyond simple tests of external 
validity of DCEs. More precisely, if differences are found between revealed and stated 
preferences, it is important to identify their origin in order to improve stated preference tools. 
Comparing decisions made in experimental laboratories and in the real world, Levitt and List 
(2007) identified a large number of factors that could explain differences in decisions, including 
scrutiny, stakes, selection of subjects, different time horizons and different choice sets. The last 
two issues identified by Levitt and List seem particularly worthy of further investigation. In DCEs 
respondents make decisions in a few minutes at best, while equivalent real decisions are typically 
made over days or weeks (for example the decision to take up one job rather than another). One 
way of testing (or controlling for) that effect would be to use "time-to-think" protocols where 
fieldworkers distribute the questionnaire on a day and come back the next to collect it (Cook et 
al., 2007). The other limitation of DCEs is that respondents are encouraged to focus exclusively 
on the attributes and issue at hand in the survey situation. While in some situations this is 
desirable (e.g. to have a controllable experimental environment), the contingent valuation 
literature has shown the issues arising from situations where the budget constraint was not well 
taken into account by respondents. There are other such constraints that may be overlooked by 
respondents in a job DCEs, such as regulatory (obtaining visas to emigrate), family (child care) or 
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logistical (costs incurred by a move) constraints. Survey participants could be encouraged more 
systematically to take those constraints into account. 
Second, further questions relevant to labour supply could be tested with the use of DCEs. 
Although labour economists have developed many sophisticated approaches to model and 
understand labour supply decisions better, it has mainly relied on information about jobs taken by 
individuals, but has usually failed to include information on the alternatives considered. Building 
on the possibilities offered by DCEs to include a wide range of job characteristics, the influence of 
working conditions on labour supply decisions could be tested more systematically. Health 
professionals' willingness to be compensated for bad working conditions (as the theory of 
compensating wage differential suggests) could be tested with the interaction between a salary 
attribute and working condition attribute. Furthermore, as indicated in Chapter 6, DCEs could help 
understand how well labour markets work, and the extent to which individuals make decisions 
based on complete information or restrict themselves to easily accessible job offers. 
10.4.3. Refining the economic evaluation of HR interventions 
The lack of evidence on the effectiveness of HR interventions has already been underlined many 
times in the literature (Lehmann et al., 2008, Grobler et al., 2009, Wilson et al., 2009), but 
researchers in health systems have been surprisingly silent on the absence of evidence on the 
cost-effectiveness of these interventions. Given the importance of the policy issue that shortages 
in rural areas represents, this should be a priority area for research. Similar modelling to that 
presented here could be conducted in other settings. The model would gain in robustness and 
reliability if more data could inform the choice of parameters. A more refined costing of policy 
interventions could also be undertaken - for South Africa and other potential settings. More 
sophisticated modelling could also allow for more heterogeneity in the model parameters and 
flexibility, in order to address some of the limitations of the model highlighted before. A systematic 
effort should also be made to add an economic analysis component to all projects that will, in the 
future determine the effects of HR interventions to attract staff to under-served areas. , 
1 0.5. Conclusion 
In low and middle-income countries, the vast majority of poor and disadvantaged patients live in 
rural areas where health services are least developed. A major constraint to improving the 
availability and quality of health care services in rural areas is often the lack of skilled health 
workers in rural health facilities. So far, most developing countries have employed compulsory 
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service or financial incentives to address these challenges. Despite growing attention focused on 
human resource strategies to address this maldistribution, several studies have underscored the 
lack of evidence on the effectiveness of policy interventions. At the same time, the literature has 
been silent on the absence of economic analysis of such policies. 
This thesis developed a theoretical framework that showed how the heterogeneity of preferences 
amongst health care workers can directly affect the choices made between different jobs in the 
labour market, in particular when these jobs are clearly differentiated from one another by intrinsic 
characteristics - for example public vs. private, rural vs. urban. The empirical work carried out 
with nurses in South Africa confirmed the assumption that altruistic individuals are more likely to 
choose public jobs, and people from rural backgrounds more willing to take up positions in rural 
areas. 
A subsequent economic evaluation of potential policy interventions demonstrated that adopting 
financial incentives, albeit effective to increase the number of staff in rural areas, is never an 
economically optimal option. In contrast, the most cost-effective interventions involve upstream 
measures attracting more people who naturally prefer rural jobs into the nursing professions. 
This work confirmed empirically the impact of individual characteristics on labour supply choices, 
and it demonstrated the importance for policy-making of better understanding the driving factors 
behind health professionals' job choices. 
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Appendices to Chapter 2 
Appendix 2.1: Literature review search terms and strategy 
The health literature on j~b satisfac.tion. and policy intervent~ons. was identified using the following 
search terms: staff retentton, retentton m rural areas, retentton m low-income countries turnover 
medically underserved area, rural area, motivation, intention to quit, intention to leave job 
satisfaction (see below) ' 
These terms were searched in combination with professional classifications (health workers, 
nurses, doctors, health workers). No geographical limitation was used, but the search in PubMed 
was limited to studies published after the 1st January 2007. 
The search was made on the 6th January 2010. 
Search 
#5 
#4 
#3 
#2 
#1 
Queries 
"attracting" OR "retaining" OR "attraction" OR "incentivise" OR "attract" OR 
"retain" OR "encourage" 
Search "policy" OR "policies" OR "intervention" OR "interventions" OR 
"measure" OR "strategies" OR "strategy" OR "incentive" 
Search "rural" OR "rural area" OR "rural areas" OR "underserved areas" OR 
"underserved area" OR "remote area" OR "remote areas" 
Search "job satisfaction" OR "motivation" OR "job preference" OR "job 
preferences" OR "intention to quit" OR "intentions to quit" OR "intention to 
leave" OR "intentions to leave" OR "retaining" OR "retention" OR "turnover" 
Search nurse OR nurses OR physician OR physicians OR doctor OR 
doctors OR "mid-level worker" OR "health worker' OR "health workers" OR 
"health practitioner" 
Two combinations of terms were used: 
To update the literature on job satisfaction: searches #1 was combine with #2-
this led to 3,397 references. 
To update the literature on policy interventions to attract health workers to rural areas, 
the following combination was used: #1 AND #3 AND #4 AND #5- this led to 51 
references 
Combined in a unique database, 18 redundant studies were discarded, leaving a total of 3,430 
references. 
In addition to this systematic search, relevant journals were consulted, including He.alth 
economics, the Journal of Health Economics, Health Policy and Planning, Health SeNtces 
Research, Human Resources for Health, the Journal of Rural Health, and Rural Remote Health. 
No additional reference was identified. 
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Appendices to Chapter 3 
Appendix 3.1: London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine ethical 
approval 
LONDON SCHOOL OF HYGIENE 
& TROPICAL MEDICINE 
ETHICS COMMITIEE 
APPROVAL FORM 
Application number: 5252 
Name of Principal Investigator Natasha Palmer 
Department Public Health and Policy 
Head of Department Professor Anne Mills 
Title: Health workers' preferences and policy interventions to improve 
retention in rural areas in Kenya, South Africa and Thailand 
This application has been approved by the Committee. 
Chair ·· ··-·-··· ··- ··· ···- -· ·-·- -·-
Professor Tom Meade 
Date .. . ·-·---·----· --· -··---·-· --·· ·-- · ___ .. .. 12 February 2008 .... . __ .-·. _ ..... -.- .. -.- --- --- ... . ---
Approval is dependent on local ethical approval havtng been received. 
Any subsequent changes to the consent form must be re-submitted to the 
Committee. 
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Appendix 3.2: University of Witwatersrand ethical approval 
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, .JOHANNESBIJRC 
HlJMAN RESEARCH ETH.ICS COMMI'IT~:E (MEDICAL) 
Rl4/49 Blaauw/Era.~mus 
CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE 
PROJECT 
INVESTIG /\TORS 
nF.I'ARTMENT 
DATE CONSU>ERED 
llECJSION OF' THE COMMITTEE" 
PROTOCOL NUMBEU M080221 
Health workers' preferences and policy 
interventions to improve retention in rural 
:ueas in Kenya, South Africa and Thailand 
Dr/Mr DIE Blaauw/Erasmus 
School of Public llealth 
08.02.29 
Approved unconditionally 
Unless otherwist• specified this ethical clearance is valid for 5 years and may be renewed upon 
llpplkation. 
. 
08,04.02 CHAIRPERSON .................... .. .. ~-<-:'::' .... . 
(Professor P E Cleaton Jones) 
*Guidelines for written 'infonned consent' attached where applicable 
cc: Supervisor : 
DECLARATION OF lNVESTIGATOR(S) 
To be rompleted in duplicate and ONE COl>Y returned to the Secretary at Room 10004, 10th Floor, 
Senate House, University. 
I!We tully understand th<.J conditions under which I am/Wil arc authorized to carry out the abovementioned 
research and l/we guarantee to ensure compliance with these conditions. Should any departur~ to be 
conll..'lllplatcd from the research procedure as approved lfwe undertake to resubmit the protocol to the 
Committee. I agree to a completion of a yearly progress report. 
PLEASE QUOTE THE PROTOCOL NUMBER IN ALL ENQUIRIES 
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Appendix 3.3: Information sheet 
Good day, 
The CREHS Cohort Study 
Information sheet for nursing students 
••• • • 
• 
CREHS: 
We represent the Centre for Health Policy, Wits University. We would like to give you some information 
about our research project and to invite you to participate. Let's begin by telling you a bit about the 
research . 
This research will be conducted in Thailand, Kenya and South Africa. Here in South Africa, our study will 
investigate the attitudes, values, preferences and early career choices of a cohort of nursing graduates. 
Having a cohort of nursing graduates means that we will , over a certain time period, be doing research 
with exactly the same group of people. 
From this group of nursing graduates, we hope to learn more about their attitudes to and preferences for 
certain aspects of a nursing career. We would also like to understand better the career choices they make 
at an early stage of their professional life, with a particular emphasis on the factors - individual and job-
related- affecting these choices . We are particularly interested in the things that would encourage nurses 
to choose jobs in rural areas and to continue working in those areas. 
The research will be conducted in a number of nursing colleges. The selection of the nursing colleges was 
to some extent based on geographic criteria. We wanted to make sure, for example, that we worked with 
nursing colleges in both urban and rural areas. In all cases, the plan is to work with students who are 
about to graduate. This is to enable us to follow them up once they start working. 
It is important to note that this research will be conducted in a number of phases. A big part of the 
research will be done at this point in time. However, because this is a cohort study (as explained above) 
some of the activities involving the research participants will carry on over the next year or so. 
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The following research phases are envisaged: 
Phase 1: Initial data collection (this part of the research will happen now) 
This phase will take about half a day of participants' time to complete and includes: 
A questionnaire that participants will fill in on their own. It will consist of a series of questions 
about participants themselves, their educational backgrounds and their opinions on the nursing 
profession and aspects of the work environment. 
A second set of questions, which will present a series of job descriptions/environments. 
Participants will be asked to choose their favorite job descriptions/environments. 
Two decision-making activities. In the first, you will be asked to divide certain benefits between 
yourself and other people. In the second, you will be presented with five scenarios. Again, within 
the context of these scenarios, you will be asked to divide certain benefits between different 
parties. 
Small/focus group discussions, in which participants will discuss in more depth their views on 
some of the issues and questions covered in the abovementioned questionnaires and activities. 
Phase 2: Keeping in touch 
As explained above, we would like to gather information on participants' early career choices, as they 
move from the nursing colleges to their places of work. After graduation, participants will therefore be 
contacted every three months or so to provide some information about their employment situation and to 
update their contact details. This contact will be as brief as possible and it is anticipated that it won't take 
more than a few minutes of participants' time. 
To be able to contact participants like this we will keep records of their contact details and also ask them 
to provide the contact details of family members and friends. This is so that we have alternative points of 
contact, in case participants change cell phone numbers, emigrate etc. without informing the researchers. 
Phase 3: Follow-up data collection 
Approximately 1 year from now, participants will be contacted again and asked to complete a 
questionnaire(s). The objective is to better understand how participants' choices and career concerns 
change over time. The questions asked will be about job satisfaction, participants' opinions on future 
career choices etc. It is possible that the research might continue after phase 3 if further funding can be 
sourced. If this happens, participants will be asked again at that time if they want to stay involved in the 
study. 
This, in a nutshell, is the research that we invite you to participate in. In essence, we are inviting you to 
become a member of this cohort of nursing graduates. 
Please note that your participation in the research is entirely voluntary, i.e. you do not have to take part if 
you do not want to. If you do not want to participate or if you agree to participate and you change your 
mind, you are free to tell the researchers and they will end your participation immediately, without any 
penalty to you. We don't anticipate that any harm will come to people through their participation in the 
research. 
As a participant in the research you can expect that all the information you provide will be treated in 
confidence. This means, for example, that your name will not be used when we write our reports about the 
research. It also means that no one outside the research team -lecturers, colleagues in the college etc. -
will know how you as an individual answered the questions. However, we are not able to guarantee 
confidentiality when it comes to small/focus group discussions because participants might tell others 
outside the group what was said. Having said this, the researchers will ask all participants to respect the 
confidentiality of the small/focus group discussions. No quotes or other results arising from your 
participation in this study will be included in any reports, even anonymously, without your agreement. 
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Lastly, please note that the group discussions will be tape-recorded to give the researchers an accurate 
record of the discussions. These tapes will be transcribed and kept for 2 years if no publications are made 
or 6 years after publication. 
For more information on the research please contact: 
Dr Duane Blaauw 
Tel: (011) 242 9903 
Cell: 082 295 7377 
duane.blaauw@nhls.ac.za 
Mr Ermin Erasmus 
Tel: (011) 242 9911 
Cell: 083 324 7507 
ermin .erasmus@nhls.ac.za 
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Appendix 3.4: Consent form 
1. General ethical issues 
• I have read the study information sheet [or have understood the verbal explanation] and I understand 
what will be required of me. 
• I understand that the study involves a number of phases and that I am being asked to consent to 
participate in Phases 1, 2 and 3 (as outlined in the information sheet) 
• I know that I do not have to participate in this study if I do not want to, and that I will not be affected 
negatively in any way if I do not want to participate. 
• I have the right not to answer questions if I do not want to and the right to end my participation in the 
research at any time. 
• I understand that the information I will give will be treated in the strictest confidence. 
2. Activity-specific ethical issues 
• Phase 1, small/focus group discussions: 
./ I understand that these discussions will be tape-recorded. I understand that the tapes will be 
transcribed and kept for some time before being destroyed . 
./ I understand that the researchers cannot guarantee the anonymity and confidentiality of 
these discussions, for the reasons stated in the information sheet. 
./ I agree to quotes or other results arising from my participation in the study being included 
anonymously in any reports about the study 
• Phase 2: 
./ I understand that the research team will contact me periodically 
./ 1 agree to provide the necessary contact details to enable the research team to get in touch 
with me 
Participant's name (please print): ______ _ Date: ____ _ 
Participant's signature: 
Researcher's name (please print): _______ _ Date: ____ _ 
Researcher's signature: 
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Appendices to Chapter 4 
App~ndix 4.1: Number of community service Professional Nurses in 2008, by 
provmce 
EC FS GP KZN LP MP NC NW WC South Africa 
237 72 591 226 206 86 11 184 272 1,950 
Notes: EC: Eastern Cape FS: Free State GP: Gauteng KZN: KwaZulu-Natal LP: Limpopo MP: Mpumalanga NC: Northern 
Cape NW: North West WC: Western Cape 
Source: http://www.hst.org.za/healthstats/272/data 
Appendix 4.2: Evolution of the number of registered Professional Nurses 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
PN registered 91 ,011 92,390 93,303 94,552 94,948 96,715 98,490 99,534 101,295 103,792 
with SANC 
Annual ~rowth 1.5% 1.0% 1.3% 0.4% 1.9% 1.8% 1.1% 1.8% 2.5% 
Source: http://www.hst.org.za/healthstats/101/data from PERSAL and SANC data 
Appendix 4.3: Evolution of the national density of Professional Nurses (per 
100,000 population) 
South 
EC FS GP KZN LP MP NC NW we Africa 
2000 106.1 128.9 172.5 119.8 104.6 90.5 122.3 94.3 139.9 120.3 
2001 91.2 125.2 138.7 114.4 101.7 89 119.7 95.7 137.5 111.9 
2002 74.9 124.1 136.3 109 110.5 89.6 107.1 94.1 130 106.8 
2003 98.5 130.7 115.1 107.3 119.3 93.7 127.1 88.9 113.9 107.1 
2005 109.1 149.7 106.9 108.8 110 93.2 144.6 90 111.2 109.2 
2006 102.3 139.4 113.1 111.4 110.3 96.4 126.9 88.9 114.7 109.5 
2007 106.3 131.6 107.3 120.9 115.3 92.5 147.1 81 114 110.4 
2008 114.2 94.5 111.7 136.3 127.5 102.9 155 81.1 123.4 116.6 
% change over 
21.9% 13.7% 26.7% ·14.0% ·11.8% ·3.1% the period 7.6% ·26.7% ·35.2% 13.8% 
Notes: EC: Eastern Cape FS: Free State GP: Gauteng KZN: KwaZulu-Natal LP: Limpopo MP: Mpumalanga NC: Northern Cape 
NW: North West WC: Western Cape 
Source: http://www.hst.org.za/healthstats/72/data from SANC data 
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Appendix 4.4: Geographical distribution and characteristics of the nursing 
population, 2008 
Population 
Estimates Nursing Manpower In Training as 
~20081 as at 2008/12/31 at 2008/12/31 
Province RNs ENs ENAs Total Students 
Limpopo 
Females 2 768100 7537 2836 6823 17196 1277 
Males 2 506 700 835 363 853 2051 476 
Total 5 274 800 8372 3199 7676 19247 1753 
North West 
Females 1 756 200 6342 1996 4048 12386 1094 
Males 1 668 800 705 191 538 1434 335 
Total 3 425 000 7047 2187 4586 13820 1429 
Mpumalanga 
Females 1 859100 4903 1630 3063 9596 286 
Males 1 730 900 400 144 292 836 140 
Total 3 590 000 5303 1774 3355 10432 426 
Gauteng 
Females 5 248 600 26874 10379 15042 52295 3299 
Males 5198 500 1312 682 1068 3062 701 
Total 10 447100 28186 11061 16110 55357 4000 
Free State 
-Females 1 506 800 6506 1278 2674 10458 751 
-Males 1 370 900 783 228 339 1350 245 
-Total 2 877 700 7289 1506 3013 11808 996 
KwaZulu Natal 
Females 5 321100 21188 14307 10305 45800 2187 
Males 4 784 400 1280 1517 1075 3872 614 
Total 10 105 500 22468 15824 11380 49672 2801 
Northern Cape 
Females 580 500 1915 405 1195 3515 232 
Males 545 400 156 30 119 305 58 
Total 1125 900 2071 435 1314 3820 290 
Western Cape 25658 1437 Females 2 760 400 13421 4710 7527 
Males 2 501 600 594 244 512 1350 321 
Total 5 262 000 14015 4954 8039 27008 1758 
Eastern Cape 4998 19973 2296 Females 3 441 500 12400 2575 
Males 3 137 800 827 171 671 1669 
708 
Total 6 579 300 13227 2746 5669 21642 
3004 
TOTAL 
Females 25 242 300 101086 40116 55675 
196877 12859 
Males 23 445 000 6892 3570 5467 
15929 3598 
Total 48 687 300 107978 43686 61142 
212806 16457 
Source: httQ://www.sanc.co.za/stats/stat2008/Distribution%202008xls.htm 
332 
Appendices to Chapter 5 
Appendix 5.1: Economic game introduction and instructions 
WELCOME ANNOUNCEMENT AND INTRODUCTION TO THE SESSION 
Good morning, welcome and thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. 
You will participate here in two tasks on decision making. These tasks are not designed to test you. In 
these tasks you will be presented with various options or choices. What we want to know is what choices 
you would make. There is no right or wrong answer, the only right answer is what you really want to 
choose. 
Your choices will remain anonymous. This means that nobody will be told what choices you have made. 
Not even the persons sitting around you will know which choices you make now or even later. 
We think you will find these 151 2 tasks interesting, because you will be using real money. Believe it or not 
for this type of methods this is a requirement to use real money! The use of real money ensures that you 
take this activity seriously. 
How much you take home will depend partly on the choices you make and partly on chance (like the luck 
of the draw in a lottery). Whatever money you win in the session will be yours to keep and take home. I will 
explain later how Ermin will calculate the payment for each of you while you finish the other 3 tasks. 
Before we begin I want to make some general comments about what we are doing here today and explain 
the rules that we must follow. 
There will be two small tasks on decision-making. It is important that you listen as carefully as possible. 
The instructions are simple, and it will help you if you follow them carefully. 
You cannot talk to each other while here in the group. This is very important. Please be sure that you obey 
this rule. 
If one person talks about the game while sitting in the group, we would not be able to continue today. Do 
not worry if you do not completely understand the rules: each of you will have a chance to ask questions in 
private to be sure that you understand how to play: raise your hand and someone will come near you to 
explain whatever aspect you may not have understood. 
The session will proceed in 2 parts. 
The first task should last less than 15 minutes. 
The second task should last less than 30 minutes. 
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DECISION TASK 1 
We will now begin the first activity. You can now open the first envelope that is on your desk and where~ 
says "task 1 ". 
With ~is first task, you have to decide how to divideR 100 between yourself and another person. 
You WJII never be told who exactly that person is, either during or after the session, and he or she will not 
be told who you are. 
W~ ~o not reveal the identity of that person, the recipient, on purpose, because it is part of the 
pnnc1ples of these methods to understand how you make decisions with very limited information. 
What you !llust understa~d. is that we a~e ~ing to give you at the end of the morning the money 
corresponding to your dec1s1ons and we WJII g1ve the money you will have decided to send to that other 
person. 
We are going to ask you 3 times to divide R 100. Each time you are going to be paired, or joined with a 
different person: 
• The first time (QA) you are going to decide how you want to divide the money between yourself and 
another nursing student, not necessarily here in that college. This person will be different for each of 
you. 
• The second choice is how to divide the R 100 between yourself and a patient. This patient will be 
different for each of you. 
• The third choice is how to divide the R 100 between yourself and a person who is poor. This poor 
person will be different for each of you. 
Again, as I said before, this game is played for real. The figures that you see on these sheets are real, for 
you and for the person who will receive it. We are really going to give you in the end whatever you earn, 
and will also give whatever money you allocated to the recipients. 
To divide the money, you have to choose 1 out of 11 possible divisions shown on your answer sheet 
(Show answer sheet on the projector). 
HOW DO YOU MAKE YOUR CHOICE? 
You can see the three different options referred to as A, Band C (Show sheet on the projectot): 
• the first question A refers to the division where you have to decide how to divide the money between 
yourself and another nursing student; 
• The second one B refers to the division where you have to decide how to divide the money between 
yourself and a patient; 
• The third one C refers to the division where you have to decide how to divide the money between 
yourself and a person who is poor. 
For the three divisions, you have to indicate how you want to divide R 100, by circling the corresponding 
number at the bottom. 
CONCERNING THE PAYMENT 
How much money you will earn depends direcUy on the choices you make but also parUy on chance. To 
simplify the payment and because we had some budget constraints, we will not be able to pay you the 3 
decisions altogether, but just one. 
Instead, we will randomly choose one of the three options A, B or C. Someone will come at the end and 
draw a paper from this box, and the paper chosen will decide which question we pay. 
Ermin will take all the sheets and calculate for each corresponding id number how much you take home. 
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To make sure everything is clear, I will give you some examples [show with a response sheet at 
the same time]: 
Examples: 
1. A person can decide to make the following choices: to keep nothing 0% for her and allocate 
100% to another student; to keep 50% for her and allocate 50% to the patient; to keep 100% 
for her and allocate 0% to the poor person. Overall, that person will hand in an answer sheet 
that looks like that [show at the same time on a response sheet]. 
At the end, someone will draw a token randomly; if it is PAPER B then for this person with id 
number 000 Ermin will put R50 in the envelope with ID number 000. And at the end of the 
morning we will distribute the envelopes. The corresponding R50 for the patient will also be 
paid later this month, but we cannot tell you to whom. 
2. A person can decide to make the following choices: to keep 50% for her and allocate 50% 
to the other student; to keep 90% for her and allocate 10% to the patient; to keep 10% for her 
and allocate 90% to the poor person [show at the same time on a response sheet]; 
At the end, if we draw paper B then Ermin will put R10 in the envelope with number and we 
will give R90 to someone who is poor. 
These are 2 separate examples. We will only draw a paper once and this will define what is the winning 
question for the whole group. 
Therefore it is very important that you give the same level of care to each choice, because any of the three 
could determine the money allocated to you and to someone else. Again, there is no right or wrong 
answer, the only right answer is what you really want to choose. 
If you have any question, please raise your hand. You will then be able to ask your question privately. 
If you are all ready, you can complete the problem. When you are finished please put your sheet face 
down on the right of your desk and someone will collect them. 
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Appendix 5.2: Visual support used to explain the economic games 
This appendix shows the visual support that was used to present the economic experimental 
game. The PowerPoint presentation used included some animations to highlight the different 
components and steps of the game. For obvious reasons, this cannot be reftected here. 
Welcome to the cohort study! 
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Appendix 5.3: Self-Administered Questionnaire 
TASK 5 · BASELINE SURVEY 
P~-ST_U_D_Y_N_UM_B_E_R_:----~~ 
Please answer the following questions, and for each of them 
circle the appropriate answer or fill in the space provided. 
Q 1 Your gender 
1. Male 
2. Female 
Q 2 How old are you? years 
Q 3 Are you ...... ? 
1. Single 
2. Married ------~~If Married: 
(or with long-term partner) 
3. Divorced/separated 
4. Widowed 
Q 5 How many children do you have? 
Q 4 What does your spouse/partner do? 
1. s-he studies 
2. s-he works 
3. s-he does not work 
(unemployed) 
___ child(ren) -------~If Any: 
Q 6 How old are they? 
1) years old 
2) years old 
3) years old 
4) years old 
5) years old 
Q 7 How would you describe yourself in relation to population group? (This question is for statistical 
purposes only) 
1. Black 
2. Coloured 
3. Indian 
4. Other: ________ _ 
5. Do not want to answer 
Q 8 Where were you born? 
1. Name of the Town or City or Area ----------
2. Name of the Province __________ _ 
Q 9 How would you describe the area where you were born? 
1. Very rural 
2. Relatively rural 
3. Urban (town) 
4. Urban (city) 
Q 1 0 Where did you spend most of your childhood? 
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1. Name of the Town or City or Area __________ _ 
2. Name of the Province 
--------------------
Q 11 Where do your parents live? 
1. Name of the Town or City or Area __________ _ 
2. Name of the Province. __________________ __ 
Q 12 Where is your spouse/partner from (if applicable)? 
Name of the Town or City or Area __________ _ 
Name of the Province. _______________ __ 
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Q 13 For each ~f the.following organisations, please circle the corresponding number if you are an active 
member {2), an mact1ve member (1) or not a member (0) of that type of organisation? 
Church or religious organization 
Sport or recreational organization 
Art, music or educational organization 
Labour Union 
Political party 
Environmental organization 
Professional association 
Humanitarian or charitable organization 
Any other (write in): 
Q 14 What is your father's level of education? 
Active 
member 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1. Between Grade 1 and Grade 6 (or Grade 1 and Standard 4) 
Inactive 
member 
1 
2. Between Grade 7 and Grade 9 (or Standard 5 and Standard 7) 
3. Between Grade 10 and Grade 11 (or Standard 8 and Standard 9) 
4. Matric Certificate (Grade 12 or Standard 1 0) 
5. Technicon, Other college education or University 
Q 15 Is your father currently working? 
1. Yes -----~•lfYes: 
Not a 
member 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2. No Q 16 What is his profession? 
3. N/A 
Q 17 Does he currently work in the public sector? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
Q 18 What is your mother's level of education 
1. Between Grade 1 and Grade 6 (or Grade 1 and Standard 4) 
2. Between Grade 7 and Grade 9 (or Standard 5 and Standard 7) 
3. Between Grade 10 and Grade 11 (or Standard 8 and Standard 9) 
4. Matric Certificate 
5. Technicon, Other college education or University 
Q 19 Is your mother currently working? 
1. Yes ------~ lfYes: 
Q 20 What is her profession? 2. No 
3. N/A 
Q 21 Does she currently work in the public 
sector? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
Q 22 Was nursing your first choice as a career? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
If No: 
Q 23 What was your first choice? 
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Q 24 During the course of your studies, did you complete a course on "community health" or "public 
health"? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
Q 25 Did you spend any time in a RURAL hospital or a RURAL community health centre or a RURAL 
clinic during your training? 
1. Yes -----..,.If Yes: Q 26 Provide the details below for each visit: 
2. No Type of Name of the How long in total 
Facility (hospital Area did you spend 
or clinic) there? 
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Q 27 How did you pay for your nursing training (there may be more than one answer, in which 
case, circle all relevant answers) 
My parents or other members of my family supported me 
1. I received a salary If you got a loan: 
2. I took a loan --------....;)Q 28 What is the current 
3. I was on study leave from the public sector outstanding amount on your loan? 
4. I obtained a scholarship/bursary from the 
government 
5. I received a scholarship/bursary from the private 
sector 
6. Other, specify: 
Q 29Wh h t d I 'II t t d ere ave you reques e WI you reques o 't xt r? oyour commum.!Y_ serv1ce ne yea .
Name for the Closest village! Type Is it in an urban 
facility Town or city? of facility_? or rural area? 
1st 1. Clinic 1. Rural 
choice 2. Hospital 2. Urban 
2nd 1. Clinic 1. Rural 
choice 2. Hospital 2. Urban 
3rd 1' Clinic 1' Rural 
choice 2. Hospital 2. Urban 
Q 30 How long is your contractual obligation after community service? 
1. 6 months 
2. 1 year 
3. 1.5 years 
4. 2 years 
5. Other: ________ _ 
Where would you most like to work after the end of your contract? 
Q 31 Location: 
Name of the Town or City or Area _______ _ 
Name of the Province. _________ _ 
Q 32 Type of health facility? 
1. Clinic 
2. Hospital Specify: ________ _ 
3. GP practice 
4. Other --------~ 
Q 33 Sector 
1 . Public sector 
2. Private for-profit sector 
Area of 3. Private not-for-profit sector I NGO 
specialty _______ _ 
Q 34 Type of work 
1. General nursing 
2. Community nursing 
3. Specialised nursing ) 
Q 35 Here are some of the things many people take i~to ac~ount in relatio~ to their work. Which one 
would you, personally, place first if you were looking for a JOb (c1rcle ONE only). 
1 . A good income so that you do not have any worries about money 
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2. A safe job with no risk of closing down or unemployment 
3. Working with people you like 
4. Doing an important job that gives you a feeling of accomplishment 
Q 36 And what would be your second choice? circle ONE only 
1. A good income so that you do not have any worries about money 
2. A safe job with no risk of closing down or unemployment 
3. Working with people you like 
4. Doing an important job that gives you a feeling of accomplishment 
Q 37 On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), indicate how you feel for each of the 
following statements, by circling the corresponding number 
I chose my profession to help others 
I chose my profession because I can earn money 
I chose my profession because other people value it 
I chose my profession because I can always find a job 
Strongly 
Disagree 
~ 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Strongly 
Agree 
~ 
6 
6 
6 
6 
Q 38 On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), indicate how you feel for each of the 
following statements, by circling the corresponding number 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
~ ~ 
Working in rural areas means you are without support 1 2 3 4 5 6 
from colleagues/supervisors 
You can earn more money when you work in a rural 1 2 3 4 5 6 
area 
You can obtain advancement in your career quickly if 1 2 3 4 5 6 
you choose a rural position 
Working in rural areas is not stressful at all. 1 2 3 4 
5 6 
Quality of life in rural areas is very good. 1 2 3 4 
5 6 
The lifestyle you have in rural areas appeals to me 1 2 3 
4 5 6 
The social life in rural areas is enjoyable. 1 2 3 4 5 
6 
Living in a city is stressful. 1 2 
3 4 5 6 
Bringing up children in rural areas is difficult. 1 2 3 4 
5 6 
343 
Q 39 On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) t 6 ( t 1 • • 
following statements by circling the correspo~din; ~~~~e~gree), Indicate how you feel for each of the 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
+-- ~ 
The government should spend more money for the 1 2 3 4 poor, even if it leads to higher taxes 5 6 
Around here, most unemployed people could find a job 1 2 3 4 5 if they really wanted one 6 
Many people who get social grants don't really deserve 1 2 
them 3 
4 5 6 
If social grants and other benefits weren't so generous, 
people would learn to stand on their own feet 1 
2 3 4 5 6 
~utting welfare grants would damage too many people's 1 2 3 4 5 6 
lives 
Q 40 What is the government's responsibility? 
On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), indicate if you feel for each of the following 
statements, by circling the corresponding number 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
+-- ~ 
Ensure that everyone is provided for 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Redistribute income from the better off to those who are 1 2 3 4 5 6 
less well-off 
Provide a job for everyone who wants one 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Provide health care for the sick 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Provide a decent standard of living for the old 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Give financial help to university students from low- 1 2 3 4 5 6 
income families 
Q 41 Which is it more important for governments to do? (circle one only) 
1 To get people to claim social grants and other benefits to which they are entitled 
2 To stop people from claiming social grants and other benefits to which they are not entitled 
Q 42 Why do you think there are people who live in need? 
On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), indicate how you feel about the following 
statements, by circling the corresponding number 
Because they have been unlucky 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
+--
1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Agree 
~ 
5 6 
Because of laziness or lack of will power 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Because of injustice in our society 1 2 3 4 5 6 
It's an inevitable part of modern life 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Q 43 On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), indicate how you feel for each of the 
following statements, by circling the corresRonding number 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
~ ---+ 
Criminals should receive help rather than punishment. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
The government should help the poorest. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Helping others with my time or money is very important 1 2 3 4 5 6 
to me 
Those in need have to learn to take care of themselves 1 2 3 4 5 6 
and not depend on others 
These days, people need to look after themselves and 1 2 3 4 5 6 
not overly worry about others 
Personally assisting people in trouble is very important 1 2 3 4 5 6 
to me 
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Q 44 On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), indicate how you feel for each of the 
following statements, by circling the corres12onding number 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
~ ~ 
Compulsory community service is a good thing. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I can see myself working overseas in the future 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Paying more to nurses who work in disadvantaged or 1 2 3 4 5 6 
very remote areas is fine 
Giving more responsibilities to nurses is a good way to 1 2 3 4 5 6 
motivate them. 
If I have to work in a rural area it is important to me to 1 2 3 4 5 6 
be able to choose which rural area. 
I always wanted to be a nurse 1 2 3 4 5 6 
For your career advancement, each year spent as a 
nurse in a remote or disadvantaged area should count 1 2 3 4 5 6 
twice as much as anywhere else. 
Community service is a waste of time 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I can see myself leaving nursing in the future 1 2 3 4 5 6 
If decent housing was provided at posts in rural areas I 1 2 3 4 5 6 
would be happy to go. 
I am proud to tell people that I am a nurse 1 2 3 4 
5 6 
The idea of working in the private sector appeals to me 1 2 3 4 5 
6 
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Appendix 5.4: Detailed results from the Principal Component Analysis 
This appendix reports in detail the analysis that was used to create some of the proxy variables 
used in the analysis of the data in chapters 5 to 7. In general the criterion proposed by Kaiser 
(1960)107 was followed and only factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 were retained. This 
criterion basically means that unless a factor extracts at least as much information as that 
contained in one of the original variables, it should be dropped. 
1. Nursing ethics 
This first group of variables analysed included the following questions: 
4. "I chose my profession to help others". 
5. "I always wanted to be a nurse". 
6. "I am proud to tell people that I am a nurse". 
For this group of variables, the first component is highly correlated with all 3 variables, the 
correlations are of the same sign, and it explains 54% of the variance in the data. This finding lets 
us 
interpret the first principal component as a factor that shifts the whole structure together. The first 
component was therefore extracted to create the variable "nursethics" which relates to vocational 
Component 1 Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------
Comp1 1 1.6313 .816502 0.5438 0.5438 
Comp2 1 .814799 .260899 0.2716 0.8154 
Comp3 1 • 5539 0.184 6 1. 0000 
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
Variable 1 Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 I Unexplained 
-------------+------------------------------+-------------
wethics1r 0.5048 0.8109 0.2960 I 0 
att4r 1 0.5786 -0.5723 0.5812 I 0 
att2r 1 0.6407 -0.1221 -0.7581 I 0 
-------------------------------------------
---------------
2. Extrinsic motivation 
This second group of variables included the following questions: 
6. "I chose my profession because I can earn money". 
7. "I chose my profession because other people value it". 
8. "I chose my profession because I can always find a job". 
101 Kaiser, H. F. (1960). The application of electronic computers to factor analysis. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 20, 141-151 
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9. ''You can earn more money when you work in a rural area". 
"You can obtain advancement in your career quickly if you choose a rural position". 
All variables load in the same direction on the first factor, and the latter explains about 33% of the 
variance in the data. Although the second component also has an eigenvalue greater than 1, it is 
more problematic to interpret as some variables are negative and others are positive on it. 
Component I Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------
Comp1 1.64304 .529108 0.3286 0.3286 
Comp2 1.11393 .166407 0.2228 0.5514 
Comp3 .947523 .270813 0.1895 0.7409 
Comp4 .67671 .0579134 0.1353 0.8762 
Comp5 .618797 0.1238 1.0000 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
----------------------------------------------------------
--------------------
Variable I Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 I 
Unexplained 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------+-------------
wethics2r 0.4613 0.3292 -0.5261 0.5662 0.2854 I 0 
wethics3r 0.3485 0.2195 0.8266 0.3807 -0.0479 I 0 
wethics4r 0.4480 0.5441 -0.0047 -0.7080 0.0440 I 0 
work2r 0.5391 -0.3876 -0.1662 -0.0009 -0.7290 I 0 
work3r 0.4176 -0.6302 0.1112 -0.1824 0.6188 I 0 
-------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------
3. Rurallifestyle 
This group of variables included the following questions: 
6. "Working in rural areas is not stressful at all". 
7. "Quality of life in rural areas is very good". 
8. "The lifestyle you have in rural areas appeals to me". 
9. ''The social life in rural areas is enjoyable". 
10. "Living in a city is stressful". 
-------------------------~~~~~~~~~-~---~~;~~~~~~~---~~~~~~~~~~--------~~~~~~~==~~---=~~=~==~~--
-------------+---------------------------------- 0.4780 0.4780 
Compl 2.39005 1.43965 0.1901 0.6681 
Comp2 .950397 .261009 0.1379 0.8060 
Comp3 .689388 .136265 0.1106 0.9166 
Comp4 . 553122 .13608 0. 0834 1. 0000 
Comp5 .417042 -------------------------
-----------------------------
--------------------
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
---------------------------------------------------------~~~~;-----~~~~~-----~omp5 1 Unexplained 
Variable 1 Compl Comp2 -------------+-------------
-------------+---------------------------------~~;~11 -0.0025 0 
work4r 0.4020 -0.4447 0.7241 0.0847 0 
1252 0.0549 -0.8567 lifelr 0.4901 -0. O.l 937 -0.7517 0 0 0700 -0.3422 life2r 0.5248 · 0 . 33 10 0.6461 0 0 0421 -0.4617 life3r 0.5079 - · 0.0 507 0.1012 0 
life4r 0.2545 0.8831 0.3775 -------------------------
-------------------------
----------------------------
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4. Role of the government (welfare) 
This group of variables included the following questions: 
8. "Ensure that everyone is provided for". 
9. "Provide a job for everyone who wants one". 
10."Provide health care for the sick". 
11. "Provide a decent standard of living for the old". 
12. "Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed". 
13. "Give financial help to university students from low-income families". 
14. 'The government should help the poorest" 
Component I Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
Compl I 2.46133 1.40333 
Comp2 I 1. OS8 . 0629273 
Comp3 I .99S068 .22081S 
Comp4 I .7742S2 .113738 
CampS I .660S14 .0713994 
Comp6 I .S8911S .12738S 
Comp7 I .46173 
0.3S16 
0 .1S11 
0.1422 
0.1106 
0.0944 
0.0842 
0.0660 
0.3S16 
O.S028 
0.6449 
0.7SSS 
0.8499 
0.9340 
1.0000 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable I Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 CampS Comp6 Comp7 
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
govt1r 0.3828 O.S192 0.1006 -0.2961 0.0962 -0.62SS -0.2924 
govt3r 0.4022 0.17S2 -0.3734 -0.3848 0.48S8 0.4777 0.2366 
govt4r 0.3SS7 -0.4732 0.4826 -0.2S86 0.0024 -0.229S O.S4S1 
govtSr 0.4316 -0.4SS8 -0.0493 -0.2141 -0.3148 0.2288 -0.6374 
govt6r 0.4074 0.2623 -0.3183 0.2483 -0.680S 0.019S 0.3726 
govt7r 0.3629 -0.2942 -0.2709 0.6618 0.4309 -0.2846 -0.0602 
value2r 0.28S1 0.33S7 0.6637 0.3897 0.0831 0.4406 -0.1122 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first component was extracted to create govtprov - attitude towards provision of the 
government 
5. Conservative judgement towards poverty 
Attitudes towards the four following statements were included: 
5. "Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one" 
6. "Many people who get social grants don't really deserve them" 
7. "If social grants and other benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own feet" 
8. (poverty is ) "Because of laziness or lack of will power'' 
Component 1 Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------
Comp1 1.84483 .967733 0.4612 0.4612 
Comp2 .877099 .09678S6 0.2193 0.680S 
Comp3 .780314 .282S6 0.19S1 0.87S6 
comp4 . 4977S4 0.1244 1. 0000 
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
variable 1 comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 I Unexplained 
-------------+----------------------------------------+-------------
social2r 1 0.3841 0.8087 -0.4429 0.0479 I ~ 
social3r 1 O.SS99 -0.4216 -0.2106 0.681S I 
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social4r I 
poor2r I 
0. 5811 
0.4487 
-0.3232 
0.2525 
-0.1651 
0.8557 
-0.7284 I 
0.0520 I 
0 
0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Pro-poor attitude 
This group of variables included the following questions: 
1. "The government should spend more money for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes" 
2. "Cutting welfare grants would damage too many people's lives" 
3. "Redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well-off' 
4. "Most important thing for government to do "To get people to claim social grants and other benefits to which they 
are entitled" 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Component I Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------
Comp1 1.47841 .433741 0.29S7 0.29S7 
Comp2 1.04467 .0891719 0.2089 O.S046 
Comp3 .955496 .148394 0.1911 0.69S7 
Comp4 .807103 .0927788 0.1614 0.8S71 
CampS .714324 0.1429 1.0000 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable I Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 CampS I Unexplained 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------+-------------
social1r 0.3854 -0.7133 -0.12SO -0.061S O.S686 I 0 
social5r 0.4516 0.1S33 -0.S997 0.6172 -0.1788 I 0 
poor1r 0.4112 0.606S -0.1934 -0.S287 0.3823 I 0 
poor3r O.S688 -0.2283 0.1862 -0.3730 -0.6713 I 0 
poor4r 0.3935 0.2187 0.7435 0.4434 0.2190 I 0 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Altruism 
Responses to the following two statements were included: 
3. "Helping others with my time or money is very important to me". 
4. "Personally assisting people in trouble is very important to me". 
Component 1 Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------
Comp1 1 1.36909 .73819 0.684S 0.684S 
Comp2 1 .63090S 0.31SS 1.0000 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
variable 1 Comp1 Comp2 I Unexplained 
-------------+--------------------+-------------
value3r 1 0. 7071 0. 7071 I 0 
value6r 1 0. 7071 -0.7071 I 0 
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Appendix 5.5: Independent variables used in the final analysis of the 
determinants of altruism 
Ex~ected sian 
Variable Description Student Patient Poor 
framing framing framing 
Age 18 to 20 years old 
(categorical) 
25 to 29 years old 
30 to 34 years old +I- +I- +I-
More than 35 years old + + + 
Male Respondent is a male 
White Respondent is white (as opposed to other racial ? ? ? 
categories) 
Nochild Respondent does not have children ? ? ? 
Gauteng Respondent studied in Gauteng (urban province), in a big ? ? ? 
city 
Born rural Respondent was born in a rural area ? ? ? 
Univ Respondent studied nursing at university ? ? ? 
Notnurse Nursing was not respondent's first choice ? ? ? 
Altruism Proxy of altruism measured with survey questions* + + + 
Conservative Proxy of attitudes towards the poor measured with survey 
questions* 
Pro-poor Proxy of societal values measured with survey questions* ? ? 
+ 
Extrinsic Proxy of extrinsic motivation measured with survey 
questions* 
Nursing Proxy of nursing ethics measured with survey questions* + + 
+ 
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Appendix 5.6: Additional results from the analysis of the data 
1. Testing the framing effect with nursing students 
Number of obs Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable: idn Number of groups 
R-sq: within 
between 
overall 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1287 
Random effects u i - Gaussian 
corr(u_i, X) 0 (assumed) 
Obs per group: min 
avg 
max 
Wald chi2(2) 
Prob > chi2 
1131 
377 
3 
3.0 
3 
291.16 
0.0000 
dg I Coef. Std. Err. z P> 1 z I [ 95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
student -.1917772 .0119457 -16.05 0.000 -.2151904 -.168364 
patient I -.1557029 .0119457 -13.03 0.000 -.1791161 -.1322897 
_cons I .5342175 .0111686 47.83 0.000 .5123274 .5561076 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
sigma_ u . 14 18 7 0 2 6 
sigma_e I .16400914 
rho I . 42799938 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
. test student=patient 
( 1) student - patient = 0 
chi2( 1) 
Prob > chi2 
9.12 
0.0025 
2. Testing the differences between economic and nursing students with a Mann· 
Whitney test 
• Student framing 
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test 
pop 1 obs rank sum expected 
-------------+---------------------------------
nursing I 
econ I 
377 87152.5 81620.5 
55 6375.5 11907.5 
-------------+---------------------------------
combined 1 432 93528 93528 
unadjusted variance 
adjustment for ties 
748187.92 
-50250.74 
adjusted variance 697937.18 
Ho: dgstu(pop==nursing) = dgstu(pop==econ) 
z 6.622 
Prob > lzl = 0.0000 
• Patient framing 
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test 
pop I obs rank sum expected 
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-------------+---------------------------------
nursing I 377 81178 81620.5 
econ I 55 12350 11907.5 
-------------+---------------------------------
combined I 432 93528 93528 
unadjusted variance 
adjustment for ties 
adjusted variance 
748187.92 
-18307.05 
729880.86 
Ho: dgpat(pop==nursing) = dgpat(pop==econ) 
z -0.518 
Prob > lzl = 0.6045 
• Poor framing 
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test 
pop I obs rank sum expected 
-------------+---------------------------------
nursing I 377 84124 81620.5 
econ 1 55 9404 11907.5 
-------------+---------------------------------
combined I 432 93528 93528 
unadjusted variance 
adjustment for ties 
adjusted variance 
748187.92 
-17724.73 
730463.18 
Ho: dgpoor(pop==nursing) = dgpoor(pop==econ) 
z = 2.929 
Prob > lzl = 0.0034 
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Appendix 5.7: Bivariate analysis of the influence of individual characteristics 
on the amount of money sent to the second player, for each framing 
All (n=377) 
Gender 
Male (n=54) 
Female (n=323) 
Age 
20 to 24 (n=97) 
25 to 29 (n=86) 
30 to 34 (n=94) 
more than 35 (n=100) 
Province 
Gauteng (n=216) 
North West (n=161) 
Population groups 
Black (n=335) 
Coloured (n=11) 
white (n=29) 
Marital status 
Single (n=245) 
Married or long-term partner (n=113) 
Divorced I Separated (n=7) 
Widowed (n=7) 
Not answered (n=5) 
Having children 
Has at least 1 child (n=232) 
Has no child (n=145) 
Proportion of money Proportion of money Proportion of money 
sent to student sent to patient sent to poor 
Mean SD Signif. Mean SD Signif. Mean SD Signif. 
0.342 0.198 -
0.296 0.193 
0.350 0.198 
0.294 0.206 *** 
0.330 0.189 
0.319 0.175 
0.422 0.198 
0.349 0.191 
0.334 0.207 
0.341 0.198 
0.255 0.211 
0.390 0.190 
0.320 
0.382 
0.443 
0.371 
0.360 
0.200 * 
0.188 
0.215 
0.198 
0.167 
0.359 0.197 * 
0.316 0.197 
0.377 0.202 
0.319 0.196 * 
0.387 0.202 
0.354 0.211 * 
0.358 0.188 
0.365 0.159 
0.426 0.235 
0.391 0.206 
0.358 0.197 
0.371 0.201 
0.427 0.142 
0.439 0.231 
0.364 
0.402 
0.457 
0.314 
0.400 
0.191 
0.217 
0.310 
0.219 
0.187 
0.388 0.207 
0.360 0.194 
0.533 0.244 
0.452 0.242 •• 
0.547 0.242 
0.509 0.257 
0.519 0.240 
0.531 0.228 
0.570 0.248 
0.572 0.236 *** 
0.481 0.246 
0.521 0.241 * 
0.673 0.233 
0.629 0.251 
1 o.518 
' 0.565 
I ~:~~: 
1 o.6oo 
I 
I 0.547 
1 o.511 
0.236 
0.250 
0.334 
0.297 
0.274 
0.236 
0.256 
Note: Statistical difference across categories tested with a t t~st for binary variables and a Bonferroni test for 
variables with more than 2 categories. Asterisks indicate that the differences in the mean offers made across 
categories are significantly different: *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
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Appendix 5.8: Results from dictator games with nursing students in Kenya 
and Thailand 
This appendix compares the responses given in the dictator game by nursing students from South Africa, 
Thailand and Kenya. 
The same game depicted in Chapter 5 was played with 342 nursing students in Thailand and 346 nursing 
students from Kenya. This is the reason why particular care was taken to ensure the portability of 
experiments across locations. In particular, identical game materials (payoff sheets, tokens, etc.). In 
addition, to control for currency effects (as the subjects were paid in different currencies, systematic 
variations between countries could appear due to differences in incentives provided), variations due to 
purchasing power differences were controlled by using a similar incentive in terms of daily salary. 
The first striking finding, as displayed by Figure 1, is the surprising similarity of results obtained in the 
three countries. Except for the patient recipient, to whom South African nurses give less than their Thai 
and Kenyan colleagues, there is no statistical difference in the three countries in the average amount of 
money sent to the recipients. In each of the three treatments, the proportions of students who give 
nothing, half of their endowment and all of it are equally close. For example, in the student frame, 13.5% 
of the South African nursing students kept all for themselves (8.5% in Thailand and 13% in Kenya), 42.7% 
split equally (49.1% in Thailand and 49.3% in Kenya) and 0.8% gave away everything (against 0.6% in 
Thailand and 1.5% in Kenya). 
Figure 1: Average share of the initial endowment given by nurses to recipients (with 95% Cl), by 
country, for each type of recipient 
47.8% 46.0% 
. . ........ I -··· . .. T ·-···- .. 
I ! 37.7% 
patient 
Thailand Kenya South 
Africa 
T 
1 
54.5% 52.7% 
T J; 
1 - .... ___ L ..... . 
53.3% 
poor 
Thailand Kenya South 
Africa 
Second, the descriptive results presented in the three graphs of Figure indicate that the size of gifts made 
by dictators to recipients increases with the three different frames used in all three countries. Yet, this 
increase is almost linear for Kenya and Thailand, whilst South Africa presents a different picture due to a 
less generous attitude towards patients. This is particularly clear in Figure 2 which depicts the cumulative 
distribution of choices in the three countries for that particular frame. The difference between the South 
African distribution and the other two was found significant with a two-sample Mann-Whitney test for South 
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Africa vs. Kenya (p < 0.0001) and for South Africa vs. Kenya (p < 0.0001), while there is no difference 
found between the Kenyan and the Thai ones (p < 0.39). The detailed results can be found at the end of 
this appendix. Interestingly, in all three countries, the student frame is the one that triggers the greatest 
number of purely selfish decisions (giving nothing to the recipient), and the one that prompted the most 
equal splits108. 
Figure 2: Cumulative distributions of "patient" dictator games in the three countries 
Cumulative 
percentage of 
respondents 
100 .. ~··-···--·--· .................. . 
80 
60 +------
40 ........................................... . 
·ITl Kenya 
--t:r- Thailand 
-+-SA 
Proportion of endowment allocated 
0 -~··-,··--;·---·-·,.--·~·,.-·----.,.--·-··-···r·-.. --···· r···~-·--r··-··-········· ·-· 
0% 1 0% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 1 00% 
108 An equal split is when the dictator keeps 50% for herself and allocates 50% to the recipient. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of choices in the dictator games played in Thailand with the three frames 
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Figure 4: Distribution of choices in the dictator games played in Kenya with the three frames 
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1. South Africa vs. Kenya (patient framing) 
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test 
country I obs rank sum expected 
-------------+---------------------------------
South Africa I 377 123453.5 136474 
Kenya I 346 138272.5 125252 
-------------+---------------------------------
combined I 723 261726 261726 
unadjusted variance 
adjustment for ties 
adjusted variance 
7870000.67 
-173015.71 
7 696984.96 
Ho: dgpat(country==South Africa) dgpat(country==Kenya) 
z -4.693 
Prob > lzl = 0.0000 
2. South Africa vs. Thailand (patient framing) 
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test 
country I obs rank sum expected 
-------------+---------------------------------
Thailand I 342 140546 123120 
South Africa I 377 118294 135720 
-------------+---------------------------------
combined I 719 258840 258840 
unadjusted variance 7736040.00 
adjustment for ties -218657.47 
adjusted variance 7517382.53 
Ho: dgpat(country==Thailand) = dgpat(country==South Africa) 
z 6.356 
Prob > lzl = 0.0000 
3. Thailand vs. Kenya (patient framing) 
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test 
country I obs rank sum expected 
-------------+---------------------------------
Thailand 1 342 120027.5 117819 
Kenya 1 346 116988.5 119197 
-------------+---------------------------------
combined 1 688 237016 237016 
unadjusted variance 
adjustment for ties 
adjusted variance 
6794229.00 
-187865.34 
6606363.66 
Ho: dgpat(country==Thailand) = dgpat(country==Kenya) 
z 0.859 
Prob > lzl = 0.3902 
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Appendices to Chapter 6 
Append!x 6.1: Topi~ guide for Focus Group Discussion preparing the design 
of the Discrete Cho1ce Experiment 
1. Important job characteristics 
• As a nurse, what are the important job characteristics to decide which job to apply to/ to 
take? 
Probe specific characteristics: 
i. Is the type of facility where the position is an important factor? Why? 
Probe: does it tell more what you will do? Is it an indication of the number of staff 
members? 
ii. Location: are there some rural areas more desirable than others? Why? 
iii. Is the presence of an adequate level of drugs/equipment an important factor in 
your choice? 
iv. Is career perspectives offered by a job important? How so?/what do you wish? 
v. Is the type of tasks you would perform in the position an important criterion? How 
about clinical only or partly administrative 
vi. How do working hours matter? Probe: working on weekends I night shifts 
vii. Do you expect to work a lot? 
• Are there some aspects that matter most: 
when you are offered a job in the public sector I in the private sector? (does the fact that 
you help poorer people in public facilities matter?) 
when you are offered a job in rural/urban areas ; 
2. Knowledge of job characteristics before applying 
• What do you usually know about job offer when you apply? 
i. Probe: What do they know about career prospects - in a public/private facility? 
ii. Probe: do you know something re: level of drugs/equipment? Staffing level? 
Quality of infrastructure? 
• Even when it is not written down, is there some type of information you can guess/infer? 
i. For a job in a rural/remote area- probe: working conditions I work environment? 
ii. For a job in the private sector- probe: working conditions, types of patients? 
iii. Do these unspecified elements matter for your decision? 
3. Phrasing of job characteristics/attributes 
• What exactly is important in some job characteristics? 
i. How do you judge "career prospects" offered by a job? 
Probe: on-the-job training offered? possibility to upgrade after how many years? 
Possibility to work in another facility with more responsibility later (when?)? 
ii. How would you describe good/bad working hours? Convenient? Probe: number of 
night shifts that is acceptable? days working on weekends? 
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iii. What do you consider as a poor level of equipment/supplies? 
iv. How would you describe a high workload (nurse to patient ratio makes sense?) 
4. Other job opportunities 
• Do you consider working abroad as a possibility in your career? Now? Why? 
Probe other possibilities: working for an NGO/parastatal organisation? Working for 
a lab? Pharmaceutical company? 
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Appendix 6.2: Design matrix 
In a design, the columns represent the attributes of the design, while the rows represent the 
choice sets. 
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 xll x12 x13 x14 x15 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix 6.3: Correlation matrix of main effects and interaction terms 
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x10x15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.33 -0.33 0.33 0.33 000 
xllx12 0.00 0.00 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
-0.33 0.00 0.00 000 0.00 000 
xllx13 0.00 -0.33 0.00 0.33 0.33 -0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
-0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 000 
xtlx14 0.00 -0.33 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 0.33 -0.33 -0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
xllx15 0.00 0.33 -0.33 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 0.33 -0.33 0.00 000 0.00 0.00 000 
x12x13 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.33 -0.33 -0.33 0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
xl2x14 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
xl2xl5 -0.33 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.33 -0.33 0.33 -0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 000 0.00 
x13x14 -0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 -0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 -0.33 -0.33 0.00 0.00 0 00 0 00 0 00 
x13xl5 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
x14xl5 -0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 -0.33 0.33 -0.33 -0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
The highlighted rows show that there were three interactions that could be estimated: X3 and 
X13, X2 and X12, and X5 and X15. 
364 
Appendix 6.4: Data collection problems 
Following an error in the SAS code exporting the two blocks of the design into excel, a unique 
questionnaire, built on the same block (block 1 ), was printed and administered to the first 315 
students who participated in the study. This mistake was spotted late into the data collection, so 
that most of the fieldwork had already been completed and only block 1 s had been handed in to 
participants, instead of a random administration of block 1 s and block 2s. To address the 
problem, and obtain an equal number of blocks, it was decided to administer only the 2nd block to 
the students from the remaining two training institutions to be surveyed (North West University 
and Mmabatho University). Therefore, at the end of the "normal" data collection, there was 51 
block 2s and 326 block 1s. As this was insufficient to analyse the questionnaire properly, several 
measures were taken to administer block 2s to study participants. Two strategies were used to 
get cohort members who had already completed the baseline to complete the other version of the 
DC E. 
• First, students with an email address were sent the 2nd block. Unfortunately very few of 
them had an email address, so less than a dozen such requests were sent out, and four 
questionnaires were received back from students. 
• A second more successful approach was to contact the training institutions, and arrange 
for a re-administration of the DCE. This was done in two colleges (Excelsius Nursing 
college in North-West province and Ann Latsky nursing college in Gauteng province). In 
the end, a total of 326 students completed block 1, 221 students completed block 2. 
Table Vl.1 below summarises their distribution, per college and administration wave. 
Table Vl.1: Data collection dates and administration of DCE blocks 
Name of Institution First Second Total Total 
administration administration Block 1 block 2 
Block 1 Block 2 Block 1 Block 2 
North West Province 110 51 0 59 110 110 
Mmabatho Nursing College 37 0 37 0 
Excels ius Nursing College 73 0 0 59 73 59 (Kierksdorp) 
9 North West University 0 0 9 (Potchefstroom campus) 
North West University 0 42 0 0 0 42 (Mafikeng Campus) 
Gauteng Province 216 0 0 111 216 111 
S.G. Laurens Nursing College 71 0 0 2* 71 2 (Pretoria) 
Ann Latsky College of Nursing 125 0 (Johannesburg) 0 107 125 107 
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University of Johannesburg 20 0 0 2* 20 2 
Total 326 51 0 111 326 221 
* Those questionnaires were obtained via email. 
Due to these problems, some individuals had completed two questionnaires, one during each of 
the two waves of questionnaire administration. Table Vl.2 shows that there is a sample of 375 
individuals for which at least 1 block of questionnaire is available: 153 individuals have completed 
the two blocks, 164 individuals have completed block 1s only and 58 individuals have completed 
block 2 only. Since the original sample size was 377, this means that only two individuals 
systematically filled incomplete questionnaires over the course of the two administrations. Hence, 
dropping the 19 incomplete questionnaires resulted in the loss of only two individuals. 
Table Vl.2: Distribution of completed questionnaires 
Description Block 1 Block 2 Total 
Number of questionnaires completed by individual 
Individuals who only completed one block 164 58 222 
Individuals who completed 2 blocks 153 153 153 
Total 317 211 375 
Number of questionnaires completed by nursing college 
Ann Latsky College of Nursing (Johannesburg) 120 100 220 
S.G. Laurens Nursing College (Pretoria) 70 2 72 
4 22 
41 41 
0 37 
55 127 
9 9 
University of Johannesburg 18 
North West University (Mafikeng campus) 0 
Mmabatho Nursing College 37 
Excelsius Nursing College (Kierksdorp) 72 
North West University (Potchefstroom campus) 0 
Reconstructing a sample 
It was decided to reconstruct a sample of questionnaires that would somehow recreate what 
should have been randomly collected had the data collection happened as initially planned. 
Several issues arise in considering how to draw this "recreated" sample: 
The need to avoid having an individual appearing twice in the final sample 
The need to preserve the integrity of the sample; this means that, provided they filled a 
complete questionnaires, all cohort members should appear in the final sample. 
The need to obtain a balanced number of block 1 s and block 2s. This is required to maintain 
the analysis properties of the DCE. 
The attempt to obtain a balanced distribution of block 1 s and block 2s across the two 
geographical strata (urban vs. rural colleges). 
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While the first two requirements cannot be dismissed without altering the study design, the last 
one is more flexible, and was not specifically accounted for. The selection of the final 
questionnaires to analyse was made in several steps. First, the 222 individuals for whom only one 
questionnaire can be used were put aside and kept for the final sample. Then, for each of the 153 
remaining individuals, a choice needed to be made between using either block 1 or block 2. Two 
constraints presided over this choice. First, the final sample needed to consist of an equal 
number of block 1s and 2s. With a total sample size of 375, the final sample of questionnaires 
must comprise 187 block 1s and 187 block 2s (and another one of the 2 blocks randomly 
selected). Since there are already 164 block 1s and 58 block 2s (from the individuals who have 
completed only these questionnaires), 23 additional block 1s and 129 block 2s must be selected. 
To complete the sample, it was decided to add one more block 1, because they were 
administered in the original conditions. The second constraint was to ensure that an individual 
wouldn't appear twice or that all 153 individuals who completed the two blocks would be 
represented in the final sample. To follow these constraints, 24 block 1s were randomly selected. 
This automatically identified the 24 block 2s (filled by those individuals who had completed the 24 
selected block 1 s) that needed be discarded from the final sample. The final sample used is 
described in Table Vl.3 below. 
Table Vl.3: Description of final sample 
Nursing college 
Ann Latsky College of Nursing 
(Johannesburg) 
S.G. Laurens Nursing College (Pretoria) 
University of Johannesburg 
North West University (Mafikeng campus) 
Mmabatho Nursing College 
Excelsius Nursing College (Kierksdorp) 
North West University (Potchefstroom 
campus) 
TOTAL 
Overall 
distribution of 
original sample 
125 
71 
20 
42 
37 
73 
9 
377 
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Overall Block 1 Block 2 
distribution of 
reconstructed 
sample 
125 41 84 
70 68 2 
20 17 3 
41 0 41 
37 37 0 
73 25 48 
9 0 9 
375 188 187 
Appendix 6.5: Basic presentation of the Multinomial Log it (MNL) model 
The most widely used discrete choice model is McFadden's conditional or multinomia!109 legit 
model (McFadden, 1974). This model is derived from the assumption that the random 
components for each alternative Cik follow a particular distribution. They are assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed (liD) extreme value type 1 (Gumbel) with mode zero and 
variance az = Tr 2 I A2 6 where 'A is a positive scale factor. The scale parameter). essentially 
describes the profile of the variance of the unobserved effects associated with an alternative 
(Henscher book). 
This assumption generates a combined logistic distribution for the set of disturbances Eik (for 
k=1, ... ,K) which explains the popularity of the model, as it gives simple expressions of the 
probability Pr(yi = kl Xi) for individual ito choose alternative k (where Xik is a vector of alternative 
and individual characteristics): 
(1) 
The popularity of the MNL is due to the simplicity of its specification which leads to an easy 
estimation, thanks to Maximum Likelihood estimation techniques. 
If it is lauded and used for its easy estimation, the MNL model has conversely long been criticised 
for the restrictive and sometimes unrealistic assumptions it makes. 
The most frequent criticism addressed to the MNL is its reliance on the Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption, which comes directly from the liD property of the 
distribution of error terms assumed. In practical terms, this means that if one introduces or 
suppresses an alternative, the choice probabilities of the remaining alternatives should all change 
in the same proportion, thereby assuming that one alternative is never more a substitute to an 
existing one than any other alternative11o. In the present labour market example, it means that if 
international agreements were to suppress the possibility for newly trained South African nurses 
to choose a job overseas, the model would assume that these nurses would all increase the 
remaining three main job categories in the same proportion, and not choose one alternative (e.g. 
the private sector) as a preferred substitute for a position overseas. This assumption of equal 
109 In its original article, McFadden called this model the "conditional logit model" as it is in effect the conditional 
distribution of demand given the feasible set of choice alternatives. Today, however, this model is more commonly 
called the multinomial or MNL model, and the name "conditional logit model" is usually given to choice models 
modelling how alternative characteristics affect individuals likelihood of choosing in them (as opposed to studying 
only how individual characteristics affect the likelihood of choosing an option). . . 
110 One shows easily formally that the ratio of choice probabilities of any two alternatives IS unaffected by other 
alternatives. 
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competition and proportional substitution patterns between alternatives can be judged unrealistic 
in the present case. If this is the case, it has been shown that the MNL performs poorly 
(Brownstone and Train, 1999). Henscher et al. (Hensher et al., 2005) highlight the importance of 
five issues to minimise the impact of the violations of IIA in the model estimation 111. However, the 
assumption of IIA can only be avoided by using more complex models that are presented below. 
Due to increased computer capacity, these new are being increasingly used, but the MN L 
remains a popular choice modelling framework in the DCE literature (Fiebig et al., 2005, Guttman 
et al., 2009). 
A second limitation of the MNL pertains to the presence of the scale parameter A in the choice 
probability. As shown in equation (1) it is not possible to separately identify the impact of the 
scale parameter A on the choice probability, from that of tastes. In fact, we identify only the 
product A~i (Louviere et al., 2000, Swait and Louviere, 1993). Usually, a simplification is assumed 
about the scale parameter (A = 1) to allow identification of the individual preference vector ~j. 
Heterogeneity in individual tastes can be incorporated in the model through interaction terms 
between socio-economic variables and alternative attributes (or alternative-specific constants). 
But some differences in tastes remain random, in the sense that they will be related to 
unobserved characteristics. 
The last restriction of the MNL model relates to the absence of adjustment for serial correlation 
across individual observations. Because each respondent is asked to answer a sequence of 
choices one choice, discrete choice experiment data should be analysed with panel data 
estimators to account for the fact that the within-individual variation across choices may not be 
random. To adjust for that, a random parameter that is correlated within an individual's choices 
but not across individuals has to be added. For individual i this means that the utility from a 
particular choice is given by 
Uni = Vni + Eni + ~i 
where Eni is the random error term that includes random variation across discrete choices, while ~i 
is the random error term across respondents and is constant for each individual. 
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Appendix 6.6: Kendall's tau coefficients 
Kendall's tau coefficient tests the strength of association of the cross tabulations when both 
variables are measured at the ordinal level. It is based on the number of discordant and 
concordant pairs in the datasets, and makes adjustments for ties. Values range from -1 (perfect 
inversion) to +1 (perfect agreement), and a value of zero indicates the absence of association. 
Kendall's tau is computed as follows: 
where nc is the number of corresponding pairs and ndis the number of discordant pairs in the 
dataset. 
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Appendix 6.7: Testing the robustness of alternative-specific salary variables 
Alternative Variable Coeff. St. Error e·value 
Salary Salary (in R1 ,000) 0.010 0.001 0.000 
Private job Alternative-specific constant -0.801 0.073 0.000 
Supportive staff [demanding patients] 0.254 0.044 0.000 
Support for external training [on-the-job training] 0.067 0.044 0.131 
Overseas job Alternative-specific constant -3.560 0.126 0.000 
Status recognised overseas [not fully recognised] 0.826 0.057 0.000 
Rural job Alternative-specific constant 0.253 0.090 0.005 
Clinic [hospital] 0.211 0.046 0.000 
No shortage of supply/drugs [regular shortages] 0.453 0.046 0.000 
Waiting time (per year) to get study leave -0.120 0.012 0.000 
Service for underserved [services for all] -0.035 0.046 0.455 
Urban job Clinic [hospital] 0.233 0.045 0.000 
No shortage of supply/drugs [regular shortages] 0.352 0.045 0.000 
Waiting time (per year) to get study leave -0.102 0.011 0.000 
Service for underserved [services for all] -0.004 0.045 0.921 
Note: N=18,000; Log-L: -12040; restricted Log-L: -14291; x2(15)= 4501.59 (p<O.OOO) 
Proportion of 1st choices correctly predicted:= 47.50%; proportion of first 2 choices correctly predicted=32.64%; 
proportion of full ranking correctly predicted: 22.5%. Kendall's tau: r =0.41 (p<0.0001 ). 
A likelihood-ratio test was performed to compare the model with a single salary coefficient 
presented above, to the model reported in Table 6.9, with alternative-specific salary coefficients. 
The test demonstrates that the hypothesis of a single salary coefficient should be rejected. 
Likelihood-ratio test 
(Assumption: modelO nested in modell) 
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LR chi2(3) 
Prob > chi2 
189.96 
0.0000 
Appendix 6.8: Description of base scenarios for simulations 
The expected deployment of nurses in the labour market was simulated by taking as levels for each job 
attribute those reflecting the current conditions in the South African labour market, and overseas. 
Practically, for public positions this means: 
Relatively bad working conditions in rural areas (regular shortages of drugs and medical supplies), 
but better in urban areas; 
Waiting about 4 years to obtain study leave in urban areas and 6 years in rural areas; 
The salaries reflecting the public service offers as made in 2008 (R120,000/year in urban areas and 
R132,000/year in rural areas thanks to the rural allowance); 
The provision of health services to underserved populations in rural areas who would otherwise have 
no alternative, while in urban areas this "social impact" is less strong; 
Jobs are more likely to be located in clinics in rural areas; however for urban posts, they are more 
likely to be in hospitals. 
In private positions, the working conditions are usually relatively stressful with the clients' interests placed 
at the heart of the management concerns; the salary of beginning nurses are about R10,000/month 
(R120,000/year), and there is usually no support for further training. Finally in positions overseas, the base 
scenario was chosen to reflect the literature suggesting that foreign nurses are likely to be less recognised 
as local nurses. The salary offered was chosen to reflect a generous offer for beginning nurses 
(R250,000). 
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Appendix 6.9: Testing the reliability of rank-data 
Table Vl.4 below shows the coefficient estimates and their standard errors for four models that use 
different dependent variables: the first one uses only the preferred choice provided by the respondents; 
the second one uses only information about the first two ranks; the third one uses information about the 
full ranking; and the final one using the two extreme choices. 
As expected the results show that a higher number of alternatives used decreases the standard errors 
around the parameter estimates. This reftects the increased statistical efficiency obtained by the use of 
more information to estimate the parameters. However the drop in log-likelihood of associated with the use 
of less information112 suggests that there are increasing amounts of unexplained variance corresponding 
to lower rankings. In turn, this advocates for more caution in the use of rank-order data and rank-ordered 
logit models. One way to look at the problem is to scrutinise the results obtained with the different 
specifications in a more qualitative manner, to gauge the extent to which the results are affected by the 
change in the dependent variable used. 
Table Vl.4: Goodness-of-fit of the models 
Modell Model II Model Ill Model IV 
(1st choice (1st and 2nd (Full ranking) (1st and 4th 
only) choices) chocies) 
Log-likelihood -4636 -8459 -10559 -10342 
Log-likelihood (null) -5776 -10343 -13224 -7884 
Chi2 2280 3769 5329 4914 
(p<O.OOO) (p<O.OOO) (p<O.OOO) (p<O.OOO) 
%of 1st choice predicted 51.52 51.74 51.50 51.09 
%of first 2 ranks 18.64 28.13 30.93 30.71 
predicted 
19.20 21.31 21.11 % of full ranking predicted 12.55 
Kendall's 'ta 0.3033 0.3469 0.3483 0.3456 
Kendall's 'tb 0.4044 0.4625 0.4644 0.4608 
· f th h · made· for example using the first choice 
112 In this context less information means usmg. only some ~ e ~ Olce~th the iast three considered as equal) as 
only (which only provides information on what IS t~e favounte op 1on, W1 
opposed to the complete ranking of the four alternatives. 
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Table Vl.5: Estimated earameters for different model seecifications using different number of ranks 
Alternative Variables in utility functions Modell Model II Model Ill Model IV 
l1st choice} pst and 2nd choices} {Full ranking} {Best/worst} 
Coeff. Sig. st. Err. Coeff. Sig. St. Err. Coeff. Sig. St. Err. Coeff. Sig. St. Err. 
Private job Alternative-specific constant -3.119 *** 0.664 -1.957 *** 0.409 -0.905 ** 0.351 -0.872 * 0.391 
Salary (in R 1 ,000) 0.039 *** 0.004 0.029 *** 0.002 0.023 *** 0.002 0.024 *** 0.002 
Supportive staff [demanding patients] 0.308 ** 0.098 0.409 *** 0.059 0.292 *** 0.048 0.218 *** 0.053 
Support for external training [on-the-job 0.099 0.098 0.053 0.059 0.027 0.048 0.018 0.054 
training] 
.......................... ·····--·---· .. ·----···--------------------··-·-.. -·-·-·-·----·-·-·--·--·-·-·----·-·--- -----···-··-······ Male 0.409 * 0.167 0.087 0.104 0.073 0.085 0.059 0.094 
White 0.497 * 0.243 0.329 * 0.155 0.210 0.131 0.221 0.142 
Young (<25 y.) 0.345 * 0.146 0.142 0.089 0.202 ** 0.074 0.214 ** 0.083 
Born in rural area 0.035 0.129 -0.110 0.079 -0.046 0.067 0.033 0.077 
Trained in university 0.330 0.176 0.294 ** 0.102 0.218 * 0.086 0.178 0.095 
Trained in NW province -0.020 0.134 0.096 0.078 0.134 * 0.066 0.100 0.075 
................... ·····---·----·----------·--··-··-----------·············-·-·-·-··-··------·-···--.. -·-·-·-·--·---··---·-·· ---------···· ........ ···----
Positive attitude towards rural lifestyle 0.056 0.038 0.012 0.023 0.020 0.020 0.057 * 0.023 
Conservative attitude -0.029 0.042 0.041 0.026 0.052 * 0.022 0.043 0.026 
Pro 'Welfare state' attitude -0.015 0.038 -0.020 0.023 -0.021 0.020 -0.025 0.023 
Pro-poor attitude -0.042 0.052 0.010 0.032 0.026 0.027 0.030 0.031 
................ _. ........................................ 
000 oOOoOOOO ooooOOOO"" ---OMOOMMOMMOOMMMOMMMMMM-MMMMMOMMMMM __________ ., _________________ <o•ooMOOOMO_o_O_O_O ________ ~,-·R 
---~---~~-·-- ··---·--"-·-··----..... -.. -
Overseas Alternative-specific constant -0.839 0.575 -1.131 ** 0.423 -1.214 *** 0.368 -1.242 ** 0.398 
job Salary (in R 1 ,000) 0.008 *** 0.001 0.006 *** 0.001 0.005 *** 0.001 0.005 *** 0.001 
Status recognised overseas [not fully 1.131 *** 0.097 1.059 *** 0.075 0.988 *** 0.061 1.019 *** 0.064 
recognised] 
--------------···~- ... -··-···-------··· 
... ····---·---------·------ ··--~---·-----
Male 0.664 *** 0.152 0.738 *** 0.1 0 0.786 *** 0.097 0.769 *** 0.102 
White 0.800 *** 0.224 0.823 *** 0.165 0.801 *** 0.147 0.819 *** 0.153 
Young (<25 y.) 0.842 *** 0.132 0.731 *** 0.097 0.755 *** 0.086 0.771 *** 0.090 
Born in rural area 0.172 0.123 -0.041 0.094 0.000 0.083 0.064 0.087 
Trained in university 0.184 0.153 0.293 ** 0.113 0.439 *** 0.099 0.430 *** 0.103 
Trained in NW province 1.078 *** 0.121 0.794 *** 0.090 0.868 *** 0.080 0.898 *** 0.084 
------·----------··--··---·-··-· -··-
........... - ......... ,,_.,_. _______ ............. __ . __ --
.. -------·----·---· 
Positive attitude towards rural lifestyle -0.010 0.037 -0.082 ** 0.028 -0.113 *** 0.025 -0.095 *** 0.026 
Conservative attitude 0.052 0.041 0.068 * 0.031 0.064 * 0.027 0.060 * 0.028 
Pro 'Welfare state' attitude -0.010 0.036 -0.004 0.028 -0.044 0.024 -0.057 * 0.025 
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Pro-poor attitude 0.006 0.050 0.025 0.038 0.020 0.033 0.017 0.035 
.. ~ ................ ., .. , ................................... 
'''""''''''"'""""" '""--·-~••••••••---~•••»•••••••--·•--•••.,...,..,,,,_,,.,.., .. ,,.,,.,_, .. , .. ,.,...,.., .. ,,_.,..,..,,"''"'•"-•-•••-·--·-·-•- __________ ..... ···-···········-----
Rural job Alternative-specific constant -0.039 0.576 -0.035 0.425 0.261 0.395 0.246 0.440 
Salary (in R 1 ,000) 0.025 *** 0.003 0.021 *** 0.002 0.019 *** 0.002 0.020 *** 0.002 
Clinic [hospital] 0.198 ** 0.069 0.255 *** 0.053 0.239 *** 0.050 0.216 *** 0.055 
No shortage of supply/drugs [regular 0.572 *** 0.068 0.519 *** 0.053 0.491 *** 0.050 0.495 *** 0.055 
shortages] 
Waiting time (per year) to get study leave -0.163 *** 0.017 -0.136 *** 0.013 -0.123 *** 0.012 -0.128 *** 0.014 
Service for underserved [services for all] 0.009 0.068 -0.031 0.053 -0.018 0.050 -0.024 0.055 
............................... __________________ , ___________________ , ____ , .... , ___________________________________ ,,, ... 
------·-·-.. ·-·----···--
Male 0.229 0.126 0.188 * 0.092 0.175 * 0.085 0.119 0.094 
White 0.202 0.209 0.376 * 0.148 0.218 0.132 0.024 0.142 
Young ( <25 y.) 0.387 *** 0.110 0.239 ** 0.081 0.261 *** 0.076 0.277 *** 0.083 
Born in rural area 0.605 *** 0.093 0.494 *** 0.071 0.440 *** 0.068 0.425 *** 0.075 
Trained in university -0.336 * 0.132 -0.506 *** 0.096 -0.453 *** 0.088 -0.353 *** 0.096 
Trained in NW province 0.762 *** 0.095 0.616 *** 0.071 0.578 *** 0.067 0.556 *** 0.074 
····· ················ ......... -------·--------·-·--------·-··---·-·-··-·---~-·--·····-·---·-·--··-·-·-·-·-·-·-·-··-······ ..... ---------·-·-·--·-----------Positive attitude towards rural lifestyle 0.142 *** 0.028 0.106 *** 0.021 0.114 *** 0.020 0.144 *** 0.023 
Conservative attitude -0.090 ** 0.031 -0.044 0.024 -0.022 0.022 -0.026 0.025 
Pro 'Welfare state' attitude -0.010 0.028 0.003 0.021 -0.014 0.020 -0.034 0.022 
Pro-poor attitude 0.055 0.038 0.063 * 0.029 0.057 * 0.027 0.045 0.030 
.... . .................... ------.. ----···------------------.. --.......... -·-·-·--·-·-----·-·-·-----...... --.. --·-·-·--- ----------· ........ -.... ..--~----- .. -----
Urban job Salary (in R 1 ,000) 0.031 *** 0.003 0.025 *** 0.002 0.024 *** 0.002 0.025 *** 0.002 
Clinic [hospital] 0.369 *** 0.074 0.225 *** 0.052 0.230 *** 0.048 0.284 *** 0.054 
No shortage of supply/drugs [regular 0.376 *** 0.076 0.363 *** 0.052 0.373 *** 0.048 0.359 *** 0.054 
shortages] 
Waiting time (per year) to get study leave -0.210 *** 0.019 -0.127 *** 0.013 -0.112 *** 0.012 -0.131 *** 0.013 
Service for underserved [services for all] -0.122 0.074 -0.018 0.052 -0.030 0.048 -0.061 0.054 
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Firstly, in terms of goodness-of-fit, all four models perform differently in their prediction of the alternative 
chosen first by respondents (they all predict it well in half of the cases). But when looking at more rank-
ordering of the job preferences (the correct prediction of the first two choices, and of all four choices), 
model I, which only uses information from the preferred option, performs unsurprisingly less well than the 
others. Interestingly, the model using the best and worst option (model IV) performs virtually as well as 
model Ill, which uses the full ranking. Besides, its inferior log-likelihood could signal that it is dealing with 
less variance in the choices made, confirming the intuition that individuals have stronger views about 
extreme choices. These preliminary remarks tend to suggest that using the full-ranking in the present case 
is not necessarily an unreliable option. 
Further inspection of the estimation of the coefficients in the different specifications provides more 
'qualitative' insights. To start with, overall there is no major difference in the results found on the relative 
importance of job characteristics. Only the size of some parameter estimates differs quite strongly 
between model I and model Ill and IV, most notably the alternative-specific constant terms. For example, 
when considering only the 1st choice, the overseas alternative-specific constant is not significantly different 
from the urban one. However, the descriptive presentation of the results highlighted that the overseas 
alternative triggered particularly contrasting preferences 113. A similar argument can be made for the 
alternative specific constant of the private option, whose size is significantly bigger in model 1114 . The 
different models also provide very similar results for the analysis of the role of individual variables on job 
preferences. Most parameter estimates of interaction terms with labels remain relatively stable (in sign, 
size and significance), although those coefficients that are 'borderline' significant in one model Uust below 
the 5% threshold) might be found to be no longer significant when using less ranks. 
Overall, these results are relatively comforting for the use of the full ranking given by respondents. The 
proximity between the results given by model Ill and IV could suggest that ranks 2 and 3 do not provide a 
lot more additional information, and that in fact what seems to be determinant are the extreme choices. 
113 It was shown earlier that this type of job was ranked as the preferred option in nearly 16% of the choice sets, while 
it was ranked as the least favourite one in 64% of the choice sets. . o f 11 
114 This certainly comes from the fact that the private option was the least chosen as a 1st choice- only 12.7 Yo 0 a 
job sets. Yet, it was often placed in the higher part of the lower ranks. 
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Appendices to Chapter 7 
App_endix 7 .1.: Instructions provided to study participants before the policy 
cho1ce expenment 
In this questionnaire we want to investigate the characteristics of the facilities that you would choose to 
work in. 
IMAGINE THAT YOU HAVE JUST COMPLETED COMMUNITY SERVICE AND YOU ARE OFFERED A 
JOB POSTING IN TWO DIFFERENT PUBLIC SECTOR HEALTH FACILITIES. YOU HAVE TO MAKE A 
CHOICE BETWEEN THE TWO JOBS. 
ONE OF THE FACILITIES IS IN A RURAL AREA AND THE OTHER IS IN AN URBAN AREA. 
RURAL FACILITIES ARE LOCATED IN SMALL VILLAGES OR REMOTE RURAL AREAS WHERE 
INFRASTRUCTURE IS POORLY DEVELOPED AND ACCESS TO SERVICES SUCH AS SHOPS AND 
SCHOOLS MAY BE LIMITED. 
URBAN FACILITIES ARE LOCATED IN CITIES OR LARGE TOWN WITH WELL-DEVELOPED 
FACILITIES AND GOOD ACCESS TO ALL SERVICES. 
The facilities also differ in: 
1. The type of facility (Hospital or clinic). 
2. The salary offered (Basic salary with or without an additional rural allowance). 
3. The number of years you would have to work at this facility before getting study leave to specialise (2 
or 6 years). 
4. The subsidised housing available at that facility. 
5. The time you have to be in your position before you could be promoted (1 or 2 years). 
6. Some jobs in rural areas also include a monthly car allowance which is a perk not usually available to 
professional nurses. 
7. The organisational culture and management style. 
You can assume that other characteristics of the jobs not mentioned in the above list are the same for 
both facilities. 
There are 16 questions with two job choices (Rural Facility and Urban Facility) for each q.uestion. 
Indicate which of the two jobs you would choose for each question by ticking the appropnat.~ ~ox. 
Please answer all16 questions. That means you must make a choice between the two fac11it1es offered. 
There are no right or wrong answers. 
A sample question is shown on the next page. 
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Appendix 7.2: Coding of attributes and levels 
ATTRIBUTES RURAL POST URBAN POST 
Level description Coded Level description Coded 
Type of facility • Clinic 1 • Clinic 1 
• Hospital 0 • Hospital 0 
Annual salary • R120,000 I yr Dummy variables, • R120,000 /yr 120 
• R120,000 + 10% reference category 
• R120,000 + 20% = R120,000 
• R120,000 + 30% 
Provision of subsidised • single room in 0 • None 0 
housing share flat • single room in 
• small two bed- share flat 
house 
Time to wait • 6 years 6 • 6 years 6 
before getting study • 2 years 2 
leave to specialise 
Car Allowance • None 0 • None 0 
• R500 per month 6* 
Number of years to be • 2 years 2 • 2 years 2 
spent in the facility until • 1 year • 1 year 
being eligible for 
promotion 
• Hierarchical 0 Workplace management • Hierarchical 0 
and culture • Relational 1 • Relational 
*This was recoded as a benefit per year to match with the salary units (R1 ,000 per year). 
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Appendix 7.3: Influence of rural background on the effects of policies- estimates from a mixed logit model 
Model R1 Model R2 · Rural background Model R3- Urban background 
Variable Description Coeff. St. p. Coeff. St. p. Coeff. St. P-value 
Error value Error value Error 
Rural job -job characteristics 
FIXED PARAMETERS 
Alternative-specific constant -2.823 0.309 0.000 -1.484 0.404 0.000 ·2.756 0.426 0.000 
Post in a clinic [hospital] 0.256 0.083 0.002 0.282 0.125 0.025 0.239 0.113 0.035 
Time to wait for promotion (in years) -0.106 0.084 0.206 -0.008 0.126 0.949 -0.176 0.117 0.131 
Relational management [rule-oriented management] 0.170 0.079 0.032 0.089 0.121 0.461 0.224 0.109 0.041 
RANDOM PARAMETERS 
Salary increase by Population average effect 1.477 0.172 0.000 1.280 0.592 0.015 1.698 0.034 0.000 
10% Random parameter mean 1.647 0.151 0.000 1.313 0.180 0.000 1.698 0.165 0.000 
Random parameter standard deviation 0.146 0.348 0.674 0.607 0.267 0.023 0.036 0.419 0.931 
Heterogeneity in mean - Being born in rural areas -0.786 0.227 0.001 
Salary increase by Population average effect 2.036 0.565 0.000 1.956 0.561 0.000 2.193 0.681 0.001 
20% Random parameter mean 2.134 0.172 0.000 1.975 0.214 0.000 2.185 0.192 0.000 
Random parameter standard deviation 0.566 0.241 0.019 0.559 0.330 0.091 0.667 0.288 0.021 
Heterogeneity in mean - Being born in rural areas -0.171 0.239 0.474 
Salary increase by Population average effect 2.398 0.616 0.000 1.890 0.403 0.000 2.819 0.385 0.000 
30% Random parameter mean 2.765 0.175 0.000 1.897 0.194 0.000 2.831 0.195 0.000 
Random parameter standard deviation 0.475 0.219 0.030 0.419 0.317 0.186 0.398 0.354 0.260 
Heterogeneity in mean - Being born in rural areas -0.786 0.227 0.001 
Provision of 2-bed Population average effect 0.407 0.235 0.042 0.165 0.311 0.297 0.620 0.007 0.000 
house [shared flat] Random parameter mean 0.607 0.108 0.000 0.178 0.125 0.155 0.620 0.117 0.000 
Random parameter standard deviation 0.197 0.179 0.273 0.325 0.200 0.105 0.007 0.232 0.974 
Hetero~eneif.1. in mean - Bein~ born in rural areas -0.438 0.157 0.005 - - - -
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Car allowance Population average effect 0.179 0.071 0.006 0.151 0.078 0.027 0.206 0.039 0.000 
Random parameter mean 0.204 0.020 0.000 0.149 0.023 0.000 0.208 0.021 0.000 
Random parameter standard deviation 0.077 0.026 0.003 0.087 0.034 0.011 0.042 0.052 0.428 
Heterogeneity in mean - Being born in rural areas -0.056 0.028 0.042 
Time to wait to Population average effect -0.413 0.233 0.038 -0.384 0.220 0.040 -0.448 0.251 0.037 
obtain study leave Random parameter mean -0.442 0.038 0.000 -0.384 0.041 0.000 -0.446 0.040 0.000 
(in years) Random parameter standard deviation 0.330 0.022 0.000 0.315 0.032 0.000 0.341 0.029 0.000 
Heterogeneity in mean - Being born in rural areas 0.047 0.053 0.383 
Rural job - Demographic, Education and attitudinal individual characteristics 
Rural job Male 0.054 0.196 0.781 0.362 0.272 0.184 -0.444 0.281 0.114 
White 0.427 0.293 0.145 -2.917 1.010 0.004 0.146 0.365 0.690 
Young (<25 y.) 0.320 0.169 0.059 0.208 0.256 0.416 0.478 0.224 0.033 
Born in rural area 1.168 0.255 0.000 -0.286 0.250 0.252 -0.162 0.342 0.637 
Trained in university -0.445 0.200 0.026 0.401 0.221 0.069 0.912 0.214 0.000 
Trained in NW province 0.649 0.151 0.000 0.132 0.069 0.056 0.407 0.066 0.000 
Rural lifestyle score 0.273 0.047 0.000 -0.076 0.066 0.251 0.045 0.062 0.468 
Pro 'Welfare state' attitude 0.031 0.045 0.483 -0.038 0.092 0.681 0.181 0.084 0.031 
Pro-poor attitude 0.090 0.061 0.138 -0.006 0.078 0.942 -0.127 0.065 0.050 
Conservative attitude -0.054 0.049 0.273 0.362 0.272 0.184 -0.444 0.281 0.114 
Urban job- job characteristics 
Being posted in a clinic (hospital] 0.342 0.081 0.000 0.344 0.125 0.006 0.360 0.113 0.001 
Provision of housing (no housing] 0.548 0.087 0.000 0.532 0.131 0.000 0.566 0.119 0.000 
Time to wait to obtain study leave (in years) -0.445 0.022 0.000 -0.431 0.034 0.000 -0.465 0.031 0.000 
Time to wait for promotion (in years) -0.342 0.082 0.000 -0.299 0.124 0.016 -0.358 0.112 0.002 
Relational management (rule-oriented management] -0.484 0.084 0.000 -0.539 0.128 0.000 -0.434 0.116 0.000 
Note: for dummy variable in job characteristics, the reference category is indicated in brackets. 
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Models R2 and R3 report findings from this sub-group analysis. Whilst the coefficients associated 
with job characteristics in both models are in the same direction, the utility provided by greater 
benefits in rural jobs is systematically less important for people from rural backgrounds. Figure 
below provides a graphic illustration of the differences in preference distributions for better 
housing and a 30% salary increase. As noted earlier, this is likely to stem from their higher global 
preference for rural posts (compared to their 'urban' colleagues), which is reflected here in the 
difference observed in constant terms - people from rural background have a smaller aversion for 
rural in general. 
Figure Vll.1: Distribution estimates of preferences for better housing (left) and salary 
increase by 30% (right), for people from different origins 
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Another interesting difference between the two groups relates to the effects of salary increases. 
While salary preferences are behaving as expected in the urban group (i.e. non-linear increasing 
effect in the salary increase), the results are more surprising for nurses with rural origins. Indeed, 
on average, the results suggest that their utility is increased more by a 30% rural allowance than 
it is by a 20% salary increase. A closer look at the distribution of these coefficients amongst the 
population shows that these unusual preferences might arise only from a small group of 
individuals. For these individuals, this could be interpreted as an evidence of a crowding out 
effect of their intrinsic motivation to go and work in rural areas. Such adverse effects of incentives 
have been underlined in the literature on intrinsic motivation. 
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Figure VII.~: Illustration of het~ro.g~neity in the distribution of random parameter estimates 
for salary mcreases amongst mdtvtduals of rural origins 
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Comparisons between models R2 and R3 also reveal interesting aspects in the determinants of 
job preferences of these two groups of individuals. In both groups, having trained at university 
(rather than in a nursing college) and in the North-West province (compared to Gauteng) makes 
individuals more likely to favour rural positions. However, there are unique features in the two 
groups. For example, amongst people with rural origins, white people are less inclined to choose 
rural posts, while this feature is not determining in the urban group. In that group, positive 
attitudes towards rural areas and towards a more pro-active role of the government are positively 
associated with greater preference for rural jobs. Surprisingly, in the urban group, those who have 
more pro-poor views are less likely to prefer rural jobs. 
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~p~~ndix 7:4: R~sults of the simulated scenarios under the four different 
ac1hty conf1gurat1ons (sampled population) 
Predicted uptake of rural posts 
)cenario description Urban 
hospital, Urban Urban clinic, Urban clinic, hospital, 
rural 
rural clinic rural hospital rural clinic has ita! 
Base scenario 31.85 35.11 27.7 30.78 
SINGLE INCENTIVES 
Salary increases 
1 0% rural allowance 51.92 55.56 47.03 50.68 
20% rural allowance 59.77 63.17 55.11 58.6 
30% rural allowance 64.81 68.16 60.14 63.65 
Additional allowances 
Car allowance of R500/month 46.10 49.69 41.33 44.88 
Housing opportunities 
2-bedroom house 36.77 40.27 32.26 35.61 
Better training opportunities 
Study leave in 2 years 56.42 61.23 49.85 54.78 
Better career path 
Promoted after 1 year in post 33.18 36.50 28.96 32.10 
Better management 
Relational type of management 34.00 37.34 29.73 32.90 
MULTIPLE INCENTIVE PACKAGES 
Financial packages 
10% salary increase + car allowance 66.67 69.92 62.1 65.53 
20% salary increase + car allowance 73.24 76.08 69.18 72.24 
30% salary increase + car allowance 77.61 80.23 73.8 76.68 
"Status" packages 
Better housing + car 51.80 55.45 46.89 
50.56 
Better housing + car + 1 0% increase 71.94 74.96 67.63 70.88 
Better housing + car + 20% increase 77.93 80.49 74.20 77.02 
Career-related packages 
Quick promotion + car 47.58 51.18 42.79 
46.36 
Quick promotion + 10% salary increase 53.44 57.06 48.55 
52.20 
Quick promotion + 20% salary increase 61.19 64.56 56.56 
60.04 
Quick promotion + 10% increase + car 68.04 71.23 63.54 
66.92 
'Education' packages 
Study leave soon + car 75.26 78.97 69.76 
73.93 
Study leave soon + 10% increase 81.70 84.79 76.93 
80.56 
Study leave soon + 20% increase 86.90 89.19 83.27 
86.04 
Study leave soon + 10% increase + car 91.93 93.51 89.33 
91.33 
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Appendix 7.5: Comparison between simulated package effects and add't' 
effects 1 lve 
Predicted (average) Impact measures on 
Scenario description distribution proportion of rural uptake 
%in rural %in urban Computed Additive 
posts posts effect effect 
Base scenario 31.36 68.64 
SINGLE INCENTIVES 
Salary increases 
10% rural allowance 51.30 48.70 19.94 
20% rural allowance 59.16 40.84 27.80 
30% rural allowance 64.19 35.81 32.83 
Additional allowances 
Car allowance of R500/month 45.50 54.50 14.14 
Housing opportunities 
2-bedroom house 36.23 63.77 4.87 
Better training opportunities 
Study leave in 2 years 55.57 44.43 24.21 
Better career path 
Promoted after 1 year in post 32.69 67.32 1.33 
Better management 
Relational type of management 33.49 66.51 2.13 
MULTIPLE INCENTIVE PACKAGES 
Financial packages 
1 0% salary increase + car allowance 66.06 33.95 34.70 34.08 
20% salary increase + car allowance 72.69 27.32 41.33 41.94 
30% salary increase + car allowance 77.08 22.92 45.72 46.97 
"Status" packages 
Better housing + car 51.18 48.83 19.82 
19.01 
Better housing + car + 10% increase 71.35 28.65 39.99 38.95 
Better housing + car + 20% increase 77.41 22.59 46.05 46.81 
Career-related packages 
Quick promotion + car 46.98 53.02 15.62 
15.47 
Quick promotion + 10% salary increase 52.81 47.19 21.45 
21.27 
Quick promotion+ 20% salary increase 60.59 39.41 29.23 
29.13 
Quick promotion+ 10% increase+ car 67.43 32.57 36.07 
35.41 
'Education' packages 
Study leave soon + car 74.48 25.52 
43.12 38.35 
Study leave soon + 10% increase 81.00 19.01 49.64 
44.15 
Study leave soon + 20% increase 86.35 13.65 
54.99 52.01 
Study leave soon + 1 0% increase + car 91.53 8.48 
60.17 58.29 
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Appendix 7.6: Running policy simulations on different sub-samples 
Because weighting is not a possibility in the RPL models of NLOGIT, the only way to simulate 
policy interventions on different populations is to select a sub-sample of the population on which 
the model was run (in this case, model II presented in Table 7.3). Therefore, four populations 
were "fabricated" to match the following proportions of rural/urban: 0-100, 25-75, 75-25, 100-0. 
These sub-samples were created by randomly drawing the necessary number of individuals from 
each of the two sub-groups. For example, to create population #2, all urban individuals were 
used, and 67 individuals were randomly selected from the rural sub-group to make up for the 25% 
of rural individuals. 
Original Population #1 Population #2 Population #3 Population #4 
Oo/o rural 25% rural 75% rural 100% rural 
N % N % N % N % N % 
Rural 176 46.68 0 0 67 25 176 75 176 100 
Urban 201 53.32 201 100 201 75 59 25 0 0 
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Appendix 7.7: Uptake of rural posts under various simulated scenarios, under 
the four different facility configurations (simulated population sample) 
1. Results of simulations with sample #1- 0% rural, 100% urban 
etll~i~iil~ ygli~il gf t!.ltil gg§i§ 'oi~l 
Scenario description Urban Urban Urban Urban Average hospital, hospital, clinic, rural clinic, rural 
rural hospital rural clinic hospital clinic 
Base scenario* 20.46 20.84 23.64 17.42 19.94 
Single incentive policies 
Salary increases 
10% rural allowance 41.43 42.03 45.78 37.13 40.77 
20% rural allowance 48.61 49.23 52.95 44.27 47.97 
30% rural allowance 57.76 58.40 62.02 53.45 57.16 
Additional allowances 
Car allowance of R500/month 35.63 36.18 39.74 31.60 35.00 
Housing opportunities 
31.13 23.80 26.81 2-bedroom house 27.40 27.87 
Better training opportunities 
41.02 46.44 34.09 39.23 Study leave in 2 years 40.20 
Better career path 
Promoted after 1 year in post 21.58 21.97 24.86 18.44 21.04 
Better management 
22.27 22.68 25.62 19.07 21.73 Relational type of management 
Multiple incentive policies 
Financial packages 
59.26 59.90 63.48 54.99 58.67 10% salary increase + car 69.59 61.71 65.17 20% salary increase + car 65.69 66.31 77.12 70.11 73.23 30% salary increase + car 73.67 74.24 
"Status" packages 
44.19 44.80 48.52 39.90 43.55 Better housing + car 
67.53 68.15 71.40 63.57 67.02 Better housing + car + 10% 73.78 76.66 69.65 72.77 Better housing + car + 20% 73.22 
Career-related packages 
37.08 37.64 41.25 32.99 36.45 Quick promotion + car 
42.97 43.58 47.35 38.63 42.31 Quick promotion + 10% salary 45.80 49.52 
Quick promotion + 20% salary 50.15 50.78 54.49 
60.76 61.40 64.93 56.52 
60.18 
Quick promotion + 10% increase+ 
Training packages 
65.29 66.22 70.90 59.51 
64.56 
Study leave soon + car 
73.50 74.39 78.48 68.24 
72.90 
Study leave soon + 10% increase 
80.04 80.78 84.01 75.79 
79.59 
Study leave soon + 20% increase 85.85 88.43 
Study leave soon+ 10% increase+ 88.69 89.21 91.27 
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2. Results of simulations with sample #2- 25% rural, 75% urban 
Predicted uptake of rural posts(%) 
Scenario description Urban Urban Urban Urban 
Average hospital, hospital, clinic, rural clinic, rural 
rural hospital rural clinic hospital clinic 
Base scenario* 25.73 26.17 29.20 22.38 25.18 
Single incentive policies 
Salary increases 
10% rural allowance 46.19 46.80 50.51 41.89 45.55 
20% rural allowance 53.76 54.38 57.95 49.55 53.16 
30% rural allowance 60.79 61.42 64.92 56.59 60.22 
Additional allowances 
Car allowance of R500/month 40.38 40.95 44.54 36.27 39.75 
Housing opportunities 
2-bedroom house 31.60 32.11 35.50 27.81 31.00 
Better training opportunities 
Study leave in 2 years 47.73 48.58 53.72 41.78 46.84 
Better career path 
Promoted after 1 year in post 26.96 27.41 30.51 23.52 26.39 
Better management 
Relational type of management 27.71 28.17 31.32 24.22 27.14 
Multiple incentive policies 
Financial packages 
10% salary increase+ car allowance 62.49 63.12 66.55 58.36 61.93 
20% salary increase + car allowance 69.07 69.66 72.73 65.32 68.59 
30% salary increase + car allowance 75.20 75.75 78.52 71.77 74.78 
"Status" packages 
Better housing + car 47.46 48.07 51.77 43.16 
46.83 
Better housing+ car+ 10% increase 69.24 69.84 72.99 65.38 
68.74 
Better housing + car+ 20% increase 75.16 75.71 78.44 71.76 
74.74 
Career-related packages 
Quick promotion + car 41.85 42.43 46.05 
37.70 41.22 
Quick promotion + 10% salary 47.72 48.34 52.05 
43.40 47.09 
Quick promotion + 20% salary 55.25 55.87 59.42 
51.05 54.66 
Quick promotion + 10% increase + 63.93 64.56 67.93 
59.85 63.39 
Training packages 64.49 69.13 
Study leave soon+ car 69.77 70.63 
74.84 
Study leave soon+ 10% increase 77.17 77.96 81.57 
72.48 76.65 
Study leave soon + 20% increase 83.17 83.81 86.59 
79.49 82.78 
Stud~ leave soon + 10% increase + 90.04 90.51 92.34 
87.51 89.81 
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3. Results of simulations with sample #3 - 75% rural, 25% urban 
Predicted uptake of rural posts(%) 
Scenario description Urban Urban Urban Urban 
Average hospital, hospital, clinic, rural clinic, 
rural hospital rural clinic hospital rural 
Base scenario* 38.08 38.64 42.19 34.04 37.46 
Single incentive policies 
Salary increases 
10% rural allowance 57.45 58.09 61.66 53.19 56.86 
20% rural allowance 65.74 66.34 69.55 61.84 65.22 
30% rural allowance 68.26 68.87 72.05 64.37 67.76 
Additional allowances 
Car allowance of R500/month 51.63 52.25 55.88 47.37 51.02 
Housing opportunities 
2-bedroom house 41.70 42.29 45.96 37.50 41.07 
Better training opportunities 
Study leave in 2 years 65.12 66.00 70.45 59.61 64.42 
Better career path 
Promoted after 1 year in post 39.53 40.10 43.68 35.44 38.91 
Better management 
Relational type of management 40.42 40.99 44.59 36.30 39.79 
Multiple incentive policies 
Financial packages 
10% salary increase+ car allowance 70.35 70.94 74.00 66.58 69.86 
20% salary increase + car allowance 77.09 77.61 80.18 73.88 76.70 
30% salary increase + car allowance 79.29 79.80 82.26 76.19 78.92 
"Status" packages 
Better housing + car 55.57 56.20 59.82 51.29 
54.97 
Better housing+ car+ 10% increase 73.82 74.39 77.27 70.25 
73.38 
Better housing + car+ 20% increase 80.10 80.59 82.96 77.11 
79.75 
Career-related packages 
Quick promotion + car 53.14 53.76 57.37 
48.88 52.53 
Quick promotion + 10% salary 58.95 59.58 
63.12 54.72 58.36 
Quick promotion + 20% salary 67.09 67.69 
70.84 63.26 66.59 
Quick promotion + 10% increase + car 71.65 72.23 75.22 
67.96 71.18 
Training packages 79.86 
Study leave soon + car 80.30 81.00 
84.11 76.23 
Study leave soon + 10% increase 85.77 86.37 88.83 
82.44 85.44 
Study leave soon + 20% increase 90.37 90.80 92.51 
88.02 90.15 
Study leave soon + 10% increase + car 93.38 93.72 94.98 
91.59 93.23 
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4. Results of simulations with sample 4-100% rural, 0% urban 
Predicted uptake of rural posts(%) 
Scenario description Urban Urban Urban 
Average hospital, hospital, Urban clinic, clinic, 
rural hospital rural clinic rural hospital rural 
clinic 
Base scenario* 43.81 43.15 48.21 39.45 44.42 
Single incentive policies 
Salary increases 
10% rural allowance 62.57 62.00 66.73 58.33 63.22 
20% rural allowance 71.21 70.74 74.84 67.47 71.81 
30% rural allowance 71.53 71.06 75.17 67.79 72.13 
Additional allowances 
Car allowance of R500/month 56.76 56.16 61.04 52.44 57.40 
Housing opportunities 
2-bedroom house 46.30 45.65 50.71 41.91 46.92 
Better training opportunities 
Study leave in 2 years 73.11 72.51 78.11 67.83 74.00 
Better career path 
Promoted after 1 year in post 45.36 44.71 49.78 40.98 45.99 
Better management 
Relational type of management 46.31 45.66 50.73 41.91 46.94 
Multiple incentive policies 
Financial packages 
10% salary increase+ car allowance 73.81 73.37 77.28 70.22 74.39 
20% salary increase + car allowance 80.67 80.32 83.50 77.70 81.16 
30% salary increase + car allowance 80.97 80.62 83.79 78.02 81.46 
"Status" packages 
Better housing + car 59.15 58.56 63.36 54.88 
59.79 
Better housing+ car+ 10% increase 75.71 75.28 79.02 72.26 
76.26 
Better housing + car + 20% increase 82.20 81.87 84.87 79.39 
82.67 
Career-related packages 
Quick promotion + car 58.28 57.69 62.52 
53.98 58.92 
Quick promotion + 10% salary 64.05 63.49 68.15 
59.87 64.69 
Quick promotion + 20% salary 72.51 72.05 76.05 
68.85 73.09 
Quick promotion + 10% increase + 75.05 74.62 78.43 
71.55 75.61 
Training packages 81.46 85.60 
Study leave soon + car 84.97 84.62 
88.20 
Study leave soon + 10% increase 89.55 89.31 91.99 
86.84 90.05 
Study leave soon + 20% increase 93.55 93.41 95.12 
91.80 93.88 
Study leave soon + 10% increase + 94.77 94.65 96.07 
93.30 95.05 
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Appendix 7.8: Probability of choosing rural options randomly 
The probability of choosing a rural option k times out of 16 is: 
ct6 16! 1 
pk = 216 = k! (16- k)! X 216 
There are Cf6 ways to pick k choices out of 16 
Actual and random proportion of repeated rural choices: 
Number of choice sets 
Proportion of Random ll (out of 16) where the rural N respondents choice (actual-random) option was chosen 
0 10 2.69% 0.002% 2.688 
1 2 0.54% 0.024% 0.516 
3 5 1.34% 0.854% 0.486 
4 8 2.15% 2.777% 
-0.627 
5 14 3.76% 6.665% 
-2.905 
6 25 6.72% 12.219% 
-5.499 
7 24 6.45% 17.456% -11.006 
8 20 5.38% 19.638% -14.258 
9 31 8.33% 17.456% -9.126 
10 38 10.22% 12.219% -1.999 
11 42 11.29% 6.665% 4.625 
12 50 13.44% 2.777% 10.663 
13 38 10.22% 0.854% 9.366 
14 26 6.99% 0.183% 6.807 
15 22 5.91% 0.024% 5.886 
16 17 4.57% 0.002% 4.568 
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Appendices to Chapter 8 
Appendix 8.1: Parameters of the lognormal distributions chosen for training 
uptake rates 
The graph below demonstrates why a mean of ~=0 was preferred to other values. Indeed, it was 
important to obtain a curve skewed towards the left, with high uptake rates at the beginning of the 
career. Yet it was important to spread that uptake over a few years, which is not the case here 
with ~=-1. Then the uptake rates had to fizzle out over time, and not remain at high levels, unlike 
what is the case with ~>1. 
Graph 1: Probability density function of a lognormal distribution functions (constant standard 
deviation) 
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The second graph below illustrates why the standard deviation was chosen such as cr=0.7. For values 
higher than 1, the distribution flattens and the distribution loses its skewed characteristic. For values 
smaller than 1, the distribution takes higher values at the beginning, and converges towards zero more 
quickly than it does for o=1. This latter characteristic is important, as one hypothesizes that there will be 
very few students who will specialize towards the end of their career. Therefore, a value smaller than cr=1 
is chosen, but it is important to avoid that the values of the distribution 
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Appendix 8.2: Modelling the policy effects on turnover rates and controlling 
for hysteresis effect 
It was explained that the turnover rate is affected by new employment conditions as follows: 
TU~t = TUrt X ( 1- T( 1+%)) 
Where 1 is the measure of the increased attractiveness of the rural job, assessed by the policy 
effect (the change in the proportions of nurses who initially take up rural positions). The graph 
below illustrates the problem of using values of 1 that are close to 1, and the hysteresis 
phenomenon that is triggered. 
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Appendix 8.3: Distribution of nurses in the labour market, with cumulated cohorts 
Distributions of nursing staff after the introduction of the incentives 
Policy ID Domestic market International market 
Rural incentives 
Rural Urban Private Rural Urban Private Overseas 
Base Base scenario (no incentive) 21.22% 46.45% 32.32% 18.69% 40.90% 28.46% 11.95% 
#6 10% rural allowance 27.21% 40.47% 32.32% 23.96% 35.63% 28.46% 11.95% 
#9 20% rural allowance 29.57% 38.10% 32.32% 26.04% 33.55% 28.46% 11.95% 
#11 30% rural allowance 31.08% 36.59% 32.32% 27.37% 32.22% 28.46% 11.95% 
#2 2-bedroom house 22.69% 44.99% 32.32% 19.98% 39.61% 28.46% 11.95% 
#3 Car allowance of R500/month 25.47% 42.21% 32.32% 22.43% 37.16% 28.46% 11.95% 
#1 Promoted after 1 year in post 21.62% 46.05% 32.32% 19.04% 40.55% 28.46% 11.95% 
#8 Study leave in 2 years 28.49% 39.18% 32.32% 25.09% 34.50% 28.46% 11.95% 
#4 Quick promotion + car allowance 25.91% 41.76% 32.32% 22.82% 36.77% 28.46% 11.95% 
#7 Quick promotion + 1 0% salary increase 27.67% 40.01% 32.32% 24.36% 35.23% 28.46% 11.95% 
#10 Quick promotion + 20% salary increase 30.00% 37.68% 32.32% 26.42% 33.17% 28.46% 11.95% 
#12 1 0% salary increase + car allowance 31.64% 36.03% 32.32% 27.86% 31.73% 28.46% 11.95% 
#14 20% salary increase + car allowance 33.64% 34.04% 32.32% 29.62% 29.97% 28.46% 11.95% 
#5 Better housing + car allowance 27.18% 40.50% 32.32% 23.93% 35.66% 28.46% 11.95% 
#13 Better housing + car all. + 10% increase 33.23% 34.44% 32.32% 29.26% 30.33% 28.46% 11.95% 
#16 Better housing + car all. + 20% increase 35.05% 32.62% 32.32% 30.86% 28.73% 28.46% 11.95% 
#15 Study leave soon + car allowance 34.17% 33.50% 32.32% 30.09% 29.50% 28.46% 11.95% 
#17 Study leave soon + 1 0% increase 36.13% 31.55% 32.32% 31.81% 27.78% 28.46% 11.95% 
#19 Study leave soon + 20% increase 39.29% 28.38% 32.32% 34.60% 24.99% 28.46% 11.95% 
#18 Study leave soon + 1 0% increase + car all. 37.74% 29.94% 32.32% 33.23% 26.36% 28.46% 11.95% 
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Distributions of nursing staff after 10 years 
Policy ID Domestic market International market 
Rural incentives 
Rural Urban Private Rural Urban Private Overseas 
Base Base scenario (no incentive) 16.54% 36.80% 46.66% 14.83% 32.98% 41.83% 10.36% 
#6 1 0% rural allowance 20.20% 34.16% 45.64% 18.13% 30.66% 40.96% 10.26% 
#9 20% rural allowance 22.13% 32.91% 44.95% 19.88% 29.56% 40.37% 10.20% 
#11 30% rural allowance 23.56% 32.04% 44.40% 21.17% 28.78% 39.90% 10.15% 
#2 2-bedroom house 17.28% 36.22% 46.50% 15.49% 32.47% 41.69% 10.34% 
#3 Car allowance of R500/month 18.96% 35.00% 46.04% 17.01% 31.40% 41.30% 10.29% 
#1 Promoted after 1 year in post 16.73% 36.64% 46.63% 15.00% 32.85% 41.80% 10.35% 
#8 Study leave in 2 years 19.64% 34.08% 46.28% 17.58% 30.50% 41.42% 10.50% 
#4 Quick promotion + car allowance 19.26% 34.79% 45.94% 17.28% 31.21% 41.22% 10.29% 
#7 Quick promotion + 1 0% salary increase 20.54% 33.93% 45.52% 18.44% 30.46% 40.86% 10.25% 
#10 Quick promotion + 20% salary increase 22.52% 32.67% 44.81% 20.23% 29.34% 40.24% 10.19% 
#12 1 0% salary increase + car allowance 24.13% 31.69% 44.18% 21.68% 28.48% 39.70% 10.14% 
#14 20% salary increase + car allowance 26.36% 30.38% 43.25% 23.71% 27.33% 38.90% 10.06% 
#5 Better housing + car allowance 20.17% 34.18% 45.65% 18.10% 30.67% 40.97% 10.26% 
#13 Better housing + car all. + 10% increase 25.88% 30.66% 43.46% 23.28% 27.57% 39.08% 10.08% 
#16 Better housing + car all. + 20% increase 28.18% 29.35% 42.46% 25.36% 26.42% 38.22% 10.00% 
#15 Study leave soon + car allowance 23.77% 31.22% 45.02% 21.26% 27.93% 40.27% 10.54% 
#17 Study leave soon + 1 0% increase 25.68% 30.01% 44.30% 22.98% 26.85% 39.64% 10.54% 
#19 Study leave soon + 20% increase 29.54% 27.74% 42.73% 26.43% 24.82% 38.24% 10.50% 
#18 Study leave soon + 1 0% increase + car all. 27.51% 28.92% 43.58% 24.61% 25.87% 38.99% 10.52% 
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Distributions of nursing staff after 20 years 
PolicyiD Domestic market International market 
Rural incentives 
Rural Urban Private Rural Urban Private Overseas 
Base Base scenario (no incentive) 14.94% 34.59% 50.46% 13.45% 31.14% 45.42% 10.00% 
#6 10% rural allowance 17.24% 33.05% 49.71% 15.53% 29.77% 44.78% 9.91% 
#9 20% rural allowance 18.57% 32.28% 49.16% 16.74% 29.10% 44.31% 9.86% 
#11 30% rural allowance 19.59% 31.71% 48.69% 17.67% 28.60% 43.91% 9.82% 
#2 2-bedroom house 15.39% 34.26% 50.35% 13.85% 30.84% 45.32% 9.98% 
#3 Car allowance of R500/month 16.44% 33.55% 50.01% 14.80% 30.21% 45.04% 9.94% 
#1 Promoted after 1 year in post 15.06% 34.51% 50.44% 13.55% 31.06% 45.40% 9.99% 
#8 Study leave in 2 years 16.88% 32.97% 50.15% 15.18% 29.64% 45.09% 10.09% 
#4 Quick promotion + car allowance 16.63% 33.43% 49.94% 14.98% 30.11% 44.98% 9.94% 
#7 Quick promotion + 1 0% salary increase 17.47% 32.91% 49.62% 15.74% 29.65% 44.70% 9.90% 
#10 Quick promotion + 20% salary increase 18.84% 32.13% 49.03% 16.99% 28.96% 44.20% 9.85% 
#12 10% salary increase + car allowance 20.02% 31.49% 48.49% 18.06% 28.40% 43.74% 9.80% 
#14 20% salary increase + car allowance 21.77% 30.59% 47.65% 19.65% 27.61% 43.02% 9.72% 
#5 Better housing + car allowance 17.22% 33.06% 49.72% 15.52% 29.78% 44.79% 9.91% 
#13 Better housing + car all. + 10% increase 21.38% 30.78% 47.84% 19.30% 27.78% 43.18% 9.74% 
#16 Better housing + car all. + 20% increase 23.29% 29.83% 46.88% 21.04% 26.95% 42.35% 9.66% 
#15 Study leave soon + car allowance 20.04% 31.04% 48.91% 18.02% 27.91% 43.98% 10.09% 
#17 Study leave soon + 1 0% increase 21.77% 30.11% 48.12% 19.58% 27.09% 43.28% 10.06% 
#19 Study leave soon + 20% increase 25.84% 28.07% 46.09% 23.27% 25.27% 41.50% 9.95% 
#18 Study leave soon + 1 0% increase + car all. 23.59% 29.18% 47.23% 21.22% 26.26% 42.50% 10.02% 
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Distributions of nursing staff after 30 years 
Policy 10 Domestic market International market 
Rural incentives 
Rural Urban Private Rural Urban Private Overseas 
Base Base scenario (no incentive) 14.53% 34.60% 50.87% 13.12% 31.26% 45.95% 9.67% 
#6 1 0% rural allowance 16.42% 33.34% 50.23% 14.85% 30.14% 45.41% 9.60% 
#9 20% rural allowance 17.54% 32.71% 49.76% 15.86% 29.58% 45.01% 9.55% 
#11 30% rural allowance 18.41% 32.23% 49.35% 16.66% 29.17% 44.66% 9.51% 
#2 2-bedroom house 14.89% 34.33% 50.78% 13.45% 31.01% 45.87% 9.66% 
#3 Car allowance of R500/month 15.76% 33.75% 50.49% 14.24% 30.50% 45.63% 9.63% 
#1 Promoted after 1 year in post 14.62% 34.53% 50.85% 13.21% 31.19% 45.93% 9.67% 
#8 Study leave in 2 years 16.13% 33.27% 50.60% 14.55% 30.03% 45.66% 9.75% 
#4 Quick promotion + car allowance 15.92% 33.65% 50.43% 14.38% 30.41% 45.58% 9.62% 
#7 Quick promotion + 1 0% salary increase 16.62% 33.23% 50.16% 15.02% 30.04% 45.34% 9.59% 
#10 Quick promotion + 20% salary increase 17.77% 32.58% 49.65% 16.07% 29.47% 44.91% 9.54% 
#12 1 0% salary increase + car allowance 18.78% 32.04% 49.18% 17.00% 29.00% 44.51% 9.50% 
#14 20% salary increase + car allowance 20.32% 31.27% 48.41% 18.40% 28.32% 43.85% 9.42% 
#5 Better housing + car allowance 16.41% 33.35% 50.24% 14.83% 30.15% 45.42% 9.60% 
#13 Better housing +car all.+ 10% increase 19.97% 31.44% 48.59% 18.09% 28.47% 44.00% 9.44% 
#16 Better housing + car all. + 20% increase 21.70% 30.60% 47.70% 19.67% 27.74% 43.24% 9.36% 
#15 Study leave soon + car allowance 18.91% 31.63% 49.46% 17.07% 28.55% 44.65% 9.73% 
#17 Study leave soon + 1 0% increase 20.53% 30.79% 48.68% 18.54% 27.80% 43.96% 9.70% 
#19 Study leave soon + 20% increase 24.73% 28.75% 46.52% 22.37% 26.01% 42.07% 9.56% 
#18 Study leave soon + 10% increase + car all. 22.34% 29.89% 47.76% 20.19% 27.01% 43.16% 9.64% 
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Distributions of nursing staff after 40 years 
PolicyiD Domestic market International market 
Rural incentives 
Rural Urban Private Rural Urban Private Overseas 
Base Base scenario (no incentive) 14.42% 34.71% 50.87% 13.04% 31.40% 46.02% 9.54% 
#6 1 0% rural allowance 16.19% 33.53% 50.28% 14.66% 30.36% 45.52% 9.47% 
#9 20% rural allowance 17.24% 32.93% 49.83% 15.62% 29.83% 45.13% 9.42% 
#11 30% rural allowance 18.07% 32.49% 49.44% 16.37% 29.44% 44.80% 9.38% 
#2 2-bedroom house 14.76% 34.46% 50.78% 13.35% 31.18% 45.95% 9.52% 
#3 Car allowance of R500/month 15.57% 33.91% 50.52% 14.09% 30.70% 45.72% 9.49% 
#1 Promoted after 1 year in post 14.50% 34.64% 50.85% 13.12% 31.34% 46.01% 9.53% 
#8 Study leave in 2 years 15.92% 33.47% 50.62% 14.39% 30.25% 45.75% 9.61% 
#4 Quick promotion+ car allowance 15.72% 33.82% 50.46% 14.23% 30.61% 45.67% 9.49% 
#7 Quick promotion + 1 0% salary increase 16.38% 33.42% 50.20% 14.83% 30.26% 45.45% 9.46% 
#10 Quick promotion + 20% salary increase 17.46% 32.81% 49.73% 15.82% 29.73% 45.05% 9.41% 
#12 1 0% salary increase + car allowance 18.42% 32.31% 49.27% 16.69% 29.28% 44.66% 9.36% 
#14 20% salary increase + car allowance 19.88% 31.58% 48.54% 18.03% 28.64% 44.03% 9.29% 
#5 Better housing + car allowance 16.18% 33.54% 50.28% 14.65% 30.36% 45.52% 9.47% 
#13 Better housing+ car all.+ 10% increase 19.55% 31.74% 48.71% 17.73% 28.78% 44.18% 9.31% 
#16 Better housing + car all. + 20% increase 21.20% 30.94% 47.86% 19.24% 28.09% 43.44% 9.23% 
#15 Study leave soon + car allowance 18.56% 31.91% 49.53% 16.78% 28.85% 44.78% 9.59% 
#17 Study leave soon + 1 0% increase 20.14% 31.10% 48.76% 18.22% 28.13% 44.10% 9.55% 
#19 Study leave soon + 20% increase 24.35% 29.08% 46.57% 22.06% 26.35% 42.19% 9.40% 
#18 Study leave soon+ 10% increase+ car all. 21.93% 30.23% 47.85% 19.84% 27.36% 43.31% 9.49% 
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Appendix 8.4: Simulated distribution of nurses under the current conditions 
This corresponds to the results of the combination of simulations from the two DCEs, under the current 
conditions offered on the market. Results for the "policy" DCE are presented in Chapter 6, with different 
types of simulated nursing populations. 
Sample description 
Original sample 
Sample #1 (0% rural) 
Sample #2 (25% rural) 
Sample #3 (75% rural) 
Sample #4 (100% rural) 
I % uptake of each type of post 
\ Overseas I Rural \ Private Urban 
i 11.95 ! 30.7 4 ! 28.46 28.83 
11.79 130.17 \28.76 29.28 
11.72 I 30.40 I 28.73 29.15 
12.16 \ 30.57 \ 28.20 29.06 
12.15 ! 31.39 l 28.13 28.33 
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Appendices to Chapter 9 
Appendix 9.1: Details of the five stylised career paths used for salary costing 
The figures in the table reflect the salaries earned by nurses. Costs to the government are 25% higher 
(accounting for fringe benefits) 
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T1: PN with linear career, T2 : PN with linear career, some T3: PN with successive management T4: PN (4 years) then specialises T5: PN (8 years) then specialises 
no management posts late management posts posts 
Sala 
Salary Grade Salary Salary Grade Salary Salary Grade Sala~ Salary Grade Salary Grade Salary 
notch notch note not notch 
PN-A2 1 PN-A2 1 PN-A2 1 PN-A2 1 PN-A2 1 117,225 117,225 117,225 117,225 117,225 
117,225 
1 
117,225 
1 
117,225 
1 1 1 
117,225 117,225 
120,741 
2 
120,741 
2 
120,741 
2 
120,741 
2 
120,741 
2 
2 2 2 2 2 
120,741 120,741 120,741 120,741 120,741 
3 3 3 3 
124,365 124,365 124,365 120,741 2 124,365 
3 3 3 PN-81 1 124,365 
3 
I 124,365 124,365 124,365 177,318 
128,094 
4 
128,094 
4 
128,094 
4 
177,318 Specialist Nurse 1 128,094 
4 
128,094 
4 
128,094 
4 
128,094 
4 
182,640 2 128,094 
4 
5 5 5 
131,937 131,937 131,937 182,640 2 177,318 PN-81 1 
PN-A3 1 PN-A3 1 PN- A5 (clinical 1 
programme 
144,174 144,174 205,563 coordinator grade1) 188,121 3 177,318 Specialist Nurse 1 
1 1 1 
144,174 144,174 205,563 188,121 3 182,640 2 
144,174 
1 144,174 
1 
211,728 2 193,761 4 182,640 2 
2 2 211,728 2 193,761 188,121 148,500 148,500 4 3 
2 2 3 199,575 148,500 148,500 218,082 5 188,121 3 
3 3 3 
152,955 152,955 218,082 218,082 PN-82 1 193,761 4 
3 3 4 
152,955 152,955 224,625 218,082 Specialist Nurse 1 193,761 4 
4 4 4 
157,542 157,542 224,625 218,082 1 199,575 5 
4 4 5 
157,542 157,542 231,363 224,625 2 218,082 PN-82 1 
5 5 5 
162,270 162,270 231,363 224,625 2 218,082 Specialist Nurse 1 
PN-A4 1 PN-A4 1 PN -A6 1 
177,318 177,318 238,305 231,363 3 218,082 1 
1 1 clinical programme 1 
177.318 177,318 238,305 coordinator g rade2 231,363 3 224,625 2 
1 1 2 
177,318 177,318 245,457 238,305 4 224,625 2 
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182,640 2 2 2 182,640 245,457 238,305 4 231,363 3 
182,640 2 182,640 2 PN- A7 1 260,403 245,457 5 231,363 3 
188,121 3 3 Assistant Manager Nursing 4 188,121 260,403 245,457 5 238,305 
188,121 3 3 2 188,121 268,218 245,457 5 238,305 4 
193,761 4 4 2 193,761 268,218 252,819 6 260,403 PN-B3 1 4 4 3 Operational 193,761 193,761 276,261 252,819 6 260,403 manager nursing 1 
199,575 5 5 4 199,575 284,550 260,403 PN-B3 1 268,218 2 5 5 4 Operational 
199,575 199,575 284,550 260,403 manager nursing 1 268,218 2 
199,575 5 205,563 PN-A5 1 395,932 PN -A8 1 268,218 2 276,261 3 6 
Operational manager nursing Deputy Manager Nursing 
205,563 205,563 1 395,832 1 268,218 2 276,261 3 
205,563 6 2 407,706 2 276,261 3 284,550 4 211,728 
6 2 2 276,261 3 284,550 PN-B4 1 205,563 211,728 407,706 
7 3 3 Assitant manager 
211,728 218,082 419,937 284,550 4 293,086 nursing 2 
7 3 3 
284,550 PN-B4 1 293,086 211,728 218,082 419,937 2 
7 4 5 Assistant manager 
211,728 224,625 432,534 293,086 nursing 2 301,878 3 
8 4 5 
293,086 2 218,082 224,625 432,534 301,878 3 
8 5 5 
301,878 3 310,935 218,082 231,363 445,509 4 
8 5 5 
301,878 3 218,082 231,363 445,509 310,935 4 
9 PN -A6 1 PN -A9 1 
310,935 224,625 238,305 445,509 4 310,935 4 
224,625 9 238,305 
1 458,877 Manager Nursing 310,935 4 320,262 5 
224,625 9 245,457 
2 458,877 2 320,262 5 320,262 5 
9 2 3 
224,625 245,457 472,644 320,262 5 320,262 5 
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Appendix 9.2: Price of standard accommodations in South Africa 
Bachelor 1-bed 2-bed 
Johannesburg 2,757 3,164 3,819 
Germinston 1,216 1,859 2,067 
Pretoria 1,945 2,292 2,801 
Nelspruit 2,045 2,561 3,193 
Durban 1,901 2,578 3,297 
Cape Town 2,189 2,661 3,319 
Port Elisabeth 1,849 2,108 2,535 
East London 1,727 2,165 2,710 
Bloemfontein 1,215 1,738 2,100 
AVERAGE 1,872 2,347 2,871 
Standard Deviation 474.8 442.7 588.3 
Source: Rode Report, 2008, 3rd quarter 
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Appendix 9.3: Costing education policies 
Sp~~ialties are offered as 1-year post diploma courses. Nurses can follow different types of post-graduate 
training courses. Based on a sample of four nursing training colleges, the four most demanded specialties 
were: 
- Primary Health care (135 students) 
- Critical Care (81) 
- Advanced Midwifery (71) 
- Theatre techniques (52) 
The other courses had numbers in the 30s and lower. 
Most courses require a maximum tutor student ratio of about 1:18-20, while the PHC course requires a 
ratio of around 1:8-10. In consultation with one nursing college, it was estimated that the average salary 
for a lecturer would be R200k-R220k per annum. 
For the cost estimation, a unique tutor-student ratio of 18 was retained, to reflect that the majority of 
courses will allow a higher number of students per tutor, but that the PHC specialty course might diminish 
the average ratio. 
Budget of a nursing college: 
Type of cost 
staff's salaries 
Goods and services 
Household items 
Maintenance 
Capital assets 
TOTAL 
Amount 
(R 1,000) 
22,600 
4,000 
100 
110 
1,100 
27,910 
Proportion of 
salary costs 
100% 
17.7% 
0.4% 
0.5% 
4.9% 
100% 
From the budget detailed above, there are 23.5% of overhead costs on top of salary costs. Because this 
information was obtained from a relatively big training institution, it was assumed that the overheads could 
be slightly higher for smaller institutions where fixed costs couldn't be spread out so much. Therefore a 
25% overhead rate was assumed. 
The following are the student number across all Gauteng colleges for 2009, also across all years of study: 
3241 college students of all years working to emerge as professional nurses (like the students in 
the cohort) 
502 bridging students (enrolled nurses studying to become registered nurses) 
732 training to be staff nurses (a mid-level category) 
566 post-basic students attending specialist courses. 
Therefore post-basic students who are specialising only represent a minority of all students in the training 
institutions (11.2%) in a province where one can assume that there is a high demand for specialist courses 
(due to the concentration of hospitals where specialist nurses will be mostly hired). 
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Appendix 9.4: Details of policy intervention costs 
' 
" 
G) 
' 
In 
' 
::I ~ ~ 
0 
0 0 In In 
c 0 ... 
.c ..r:::: 
... 
.... N ...r:::: 
"CI ~ ~ ~ + + 
tn tn 
-
Cl) 0 .. .. 
"iii "iii 
-
.,Q c c c 
Cl) Cl) Cl) ~ 
Ill • 
.... N C") ii ii ii ~ 
Cost components E. ~ + + + 
In In u u u ... rn 
Cl) Cl) Cl) Cl) Cl) Cl) 
rn In rn In .c ...r:::: ... 
u u ii ii ii ii ~ ~ ~ 0 Ill 
... 
u Ia 
c:: c:: u u u u Ill 
c. c. 
Ill ; In In In In Ill Ia c:: ... Cl) ~ ~ ii ii ii 0 Cl) 
... 
~ ~ ~ 
Cll 
u 
.2 .2 
In rn rn ; Cl) Cll 
c:: Ill 
Ill ... 
Ill Ill Ill "CI "CI "'C Ia 
... 
Scenario description ; ii ii ii ii ii ii 
Cl) Cl) Cll u u 
Ia 
en In In In rn 
... ... ... ::I u 
en Ill Ill Ill "'C 
"'C 
~ 
0 c:: 
·= 
ii ii ii ii ... 
... .... Cl) ... "'C 
·u; 
Cl) Cll Cl) Ia Cll 
Ill In E e E e Ci> Ci> Ci> 
... 
"'C ~ 
::I ::I 
u 
"" 
.... .... 
.... u u u Cll c:: "'C 
~ Ill 0 0 
0 0 0 0 u u u .!:::: Ia 0 
(.) :I: :I: z z z 
... 
z <( <( <( c (J) :E 
Base scenario X X X X 
SINGLE INCENTIVES 
Salary increases 
1 0% rural allowance X X X X 
20% rural allowance X X X X 
30% rural allowance X X X X 
Additional allowances 
Car allowance of R500/month X X X X X 
Housing opportunities 
2-bedroom house X X X X 
Better training opportunities 
Study leave in 2 years X X X 
Better career path 
Promoted after 1 year in post X X X X 
MUL TIPLE·INCENTIVE PACKAGES 
Financial packages 
10% salary increase + car allowance X X X X X 
20% salary increase + car allowance X X X 
X 
30% salary increase + car allowance X X X 
X 
"Status" packages 
Better housing + car X X X 
X X 
Better housing + car + 10% increase X X X 
X X 
Better housing + car + 20% increase X X X 
X 
Career-related packages 
Quick promotion + car X X X 
X X 
Quick promotion + 10% increase X 
X X X 
Quick promotion + 20% increase X 
X X X 
Quick promotion + 10% increase + car X X 
X X X 
'Education' packages 
Study leave soon + car X X 
X X 
Study leave soon + 1 0% increase X X 
X X 
Study leave soon + 20% increase X X 
X X 
Study leave soon + 1 0% increase + car X X X 
X X 
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Appendix 9.5: Structure of costs by strategies (calculated over 40 cohorts) 
Salary Car Education Housing 
direct cost cost 
Base scenario 94.92% 0.00% 1.76% 3.32% 
1 0% rural allowance 95.25% 0.00% 1.71% 3.04% 
20% rural allowance 95.50% 0.00% 1.70% 2.80% 
30% rural allowance 95.73% 0.00% 1.67% 2.60% 
2-bedroom house 92.66% 0.00% 1.71% 5.63% 
Car allowance 92.61% 2.40% 1.70% 3.29% 
Promoted faster 95.02% 0.00% 1.74% 3.24% 
Study leave soon 94.20% 0.00% 2.46% 3.34% 
Quick promotion + car 92.77% 2.34% 1.68% 3.21% 
Quick promotion + 10% salary increase 95.33% 0.00% 1.71% 2.96% 
Quick promotion + 20% salary increase 95.59% 0.00% 1.69% 2.73% 
10% salary increase + car allowance 93.13% 2.19% 1.68% 3.00% 
20% salary increase + car allowance 93.53% 2.01% 1.69% 2.76% 
Better housing + car 90.39% 2.35% 1.68% 5.58% 
Better housing + car + 1 0% increase 91.10% 2.14% 1.68% 5.08% 
Better housing + car + 20% increase 91.71% 1.97% 1.65% 4.67% 
Study leave soon + car 91.63% 2.37% 2.74% 3.25% 
Study leave soon + 10% increase 94.22% 0.00% 2.81% 2.97% 
Study leave soon + 20% increase 94.58% 0.00% 2.74% 2.68% 
Study leave soon + 1 0% increase + car 92.22% 2.11% 2.79% 2.89% 
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Appendix 9.6: Expected costs and effects for various downstream policies 
simulated for different populations 
Results for sample #4 (100% rural nurses, 0% urban nurses) 
Policy/scenario Average expected Average 
costs expected 
effects 
Base scenario R 1 ,451 ,889,888 5,332.94 
1 0% rural allowance R 1,813,275,634 6,126.94 
20% rural allowance R 2,113,183,655 6,612.94 
30% rural allowance R 2,300,351,413 6,649.62 
2-bedroom house R 1,511,170,964 5,455.87 
Car allowance R 1,596,859,971 5,842.24 
Promoted faster R 1,510,171,091 5,438.84 
Study leave soon R 1,681 ,299,635 6,239.72 
Quick promotion +car R 1 ,650,622,059 5,909.38 
Quick promotion + 10% salary increase R 1,874,142,176 6,188.95 
Quick promotion + 20% salary increase R 2,191 ,404,942 6,699.24 
10% salary increase + car allowance R 2,028,808,291 6,806.63 
20% salary increase + car allowance R 2,368,916, 795 7,340.39 
Better housing +car R 1,657,306,529 5,949.70 
Better housing + car + 1 0% increase R 2,107,257,637 6,940.99 
Better housing + car + 20% increase R 2,445,856,043 7,448.65 
Study leave soon + car R 1,900,818,536 6,909.05 
Study leave soon + 1 0% increase R 2,188,065,776 7,274.49 
Study leave soon + 20% increase R 2,569,827,033 7,796.28 
Study leave soon + 10% increase + car R 2,358,516,755 7,662.05 
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Results for sample #3 (75% rural nurses, 25% urban nurses) 
Policy/scenario Average expected Average 
costs expected 
effects 
Base scenario R 1,397,143,981 5,070.82 
10% rural allowance R 1,734,189,174 5,788.63 
20% rural allowance R 2,012,853,277 6,220.52 
30% rural allowance R 2,227,833,779 6,372.81 
2-bedroom house R 1,457,169,692 5,204.43 
Car allowance R 1,532,303,415 5,541.73 
Promoted faster R 1 ,449,917,525 5,157.82 
Study leave soon R 1,578,298,037 5,787.96 
Quick promotion +car R 1,582,961,811 5,602.46 
Quick promotion + 10% salary increase R 1,795,256,755 5,858.91 
Quick promotion + 20% salary increase R 2,085,042,444 6,294.81 
1 0% salary increase + car allowance R 1,959,393,226 6,504.66 
20% salary increase + car allowance R 2,291,033,876 7,019.73 
Better housing + car R 1,604,410,180 5,706.42 
Better housing + car + 10% increase R 2,074,815,820 6,772.13 
Better housing + car + 20% increase R 2,412,852,694 7,272.41 
Study leave soon + car R 1,824,101,004 6,559.66 
Study leave soon + 10% increase R 2,128,032,590 6,991.78 
Study leave soon + 20% increase R 2,627,213,458 7,833.86 
Study leave soon + 1 0% increase + car R 2,326,004,899 7,457.55 
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Appendix 9.7: Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICER) for cost-effective 
strategies with less rural nursing populations 
Strategy ID 
Results from the Probabilistic sensitivity analysis 
ICER for 1 cohort ICER for 40 cohorts 
Results for sample #1 (0% rural nurses, 100% urban nurses) 
No intervention with sample #1 
Study leave soon 
Study leave soon + car 
Study leave soon + 10% increase + car 
Study leave soon + 20% increase 
81 
E1 
E2 
E4 
E5 
Results for sample #2 (25% rural nurses, 75% urban nurses) 
No intervention with sample #2 
Study leave soon 
Study leave soon + car 
Study leave soon + 10% increase + car 
Study leave soon + 20% increase 
82 
E1 
E2 
E4 
E5 
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Less effective than current baseline 
Less effective than current baseline 
R 365,175 
R 478,867 
R 499,258 
R 352,472 
R 419,090 
R 471 ,401 
Less effective than current baseline 
dominated 
R 315,402 
R 495,003 
R 529,447 
dominated 
R 299,669 
R 465,762 
R 502,963 
Appendix 9.8: Calculating the present value of an average nurse year 
The cost of a nurse to the government is given by the sum of salaries paid to the nurse. As 
indicated in Chapter 9, the flow of salaries over the course of a career depends on the career 
path taken by a nurse. The same "stylized" career paths presented in figure 9.2 are used and a 
weighted average of the five paths is taken to make the calculation. 
The average present cost of a nurse working in a rural area in public sector over n years of career 
is therefore: 
[15 Ln (1 + p)sZt c - w o- k (1 + rl 
k=O t=O 
Where sZt is the baseline (b) salary for career path k 
Simplified example of five streams of salaries over four years 
Year Career Career path Career path Career path Career path 
path #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 
0 120 120 120 120 120 
1 120 120 125 130 130 
2 120 125 125 130 140 
3 125 125 130 140 140 
For example, if the first four years of salaries in five career paths were as in the table above, then 
the present cost of those four years would be: 
- (120•1.3 120•1.3 120•1.3 + 125•1.3) + w (120•1.3 + 120•1.3 + 125•1.3 + 125•1·:) 
Co-Wl (l+r)o + (1+r) 1 + (1+r) 2 (1+r)3 2 (l+r)o (l+r)l (l+r)2 (l+r) 
(
120 * 1.3 125 * 1.3 + 125 * 1.3 + 130 * 1.3) 
+ w3 (1 + r)o + (1 + r)l (1 + r)2 (1 + r)3 
With w1 = 0.10; w2 = 0.30; w3 = 0.05; w4 = 0.25; Ws = 0.30 · 
To obtain the average cost of a nurse year, it is necessary to divide that cost estimate by the 
present value of then years (NY0 ), which is: 
n 1 
NY0 = I (1 + r)t 
t=O 
The average present value of a nurse annuity is therefore obtained by the ratio Co I NYo · 
With the actual data presented in appendix 9.1 we find that the present value of a nurse annuity is 
R238,324. 
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